THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO THE ETHICAL SPHERE IN THE THOUGHT OF SØREN KIERKEGAARD

Seung-Goo Lee

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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A Dissertation

submitted to

The University of St. Andrews

For

The Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

Seung-Goo Lee

1990

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DECLARATION

I was admitted under Ordinance 350 (General No.12) and Resolution of the University Court, 1967, No. 1 (as amended) as a full-time candidate for the degree of Ph. D. with effect from 1st October, 1987.

I hereby declare that the following thesis which is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Divinity, is based upon the result of research carried out by myself, that it is my composition, that it has not previously been presented for a higher degree. This research was carried out in the University of St. Andrews under the supervision of Dr. M. Daphne Hampson.

Seung-Goo Lee

CERTIFICATION

I certify that Seung-Goo Lee has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution of the University Court, 1967, No. 1 (as amended), and therefore, is qualified to submit this thesis in application for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

M. Daphne Hampson

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supervisor

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. M. Daphne Hampson for being such a fine supervisor. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to her for her kind guidance, helpful encouragement and especially, enormous patience during the course of this work.

I also would like to thank Prof. D.W.D.Shaw, Dr. George Hall and Mr. Michael Keeling for their help and encouraging comments in the course of this research.

A special thanks is due to Professor Stephen N. Dunning of the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. C. Stephen Evans of St. Olaf College, and Professor Robert L. Perkins of the Stetson University, who were kind enough to read substantial parts of the first draft of this thesis and give valuable suggestions and support. Especially, Professor Dunning gave me the pleasure of having a personal conversation with him when he visited London in 1988, and offered helpful and encouraging comments in subsequent correspondence. And Dr. Evans was kind enough to read the third chapter and give valuable comments and encouragement in several letters. I gratefully appreciate the time, energy and encouragement that they have given me.

A warm thank you to Miss Allison Griffith for her help with my English and reading the first draft of the thesis; and to Rev. Dr. Ian Bradley for his reading the pen-ultimate version of this thesis. I also thank Rev. David Currie, my fellow student here in St.Mary's College, and his wife Susan for the fellowship that

they shared with my family.

I gratefully acknowledge the Overseas Research Studentship awarded by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom, and the University Research Grant awarded by the University of St. Andrews throughout the period of this research which together greatly helped to carry out this research. Further financial support has been provided by Korea Christian Mission Center, Hallelujah Christian Church and Nampo Presbyterian Church in Korea. I thank them for their prayer and support.

I want to share the joy of finishing my second English work with my mother Mrs. Sook-Ja Cho, my wife Sook and my two children, Young-Woo and Ji-Hye, who could not enjoy the constant company of their son, husband, and father during the last three years.

ABSTRACT

This is a study about the relationship between the ethical sphere and Christianity in Kierkegaard's thought. Against the tendency among Kierkegaard scholars to emphasize the continuity between the ethical sphere and Christianity, I tried to show through this study that in Kierkegaard's writings there was a very strong emphasis on the discontinuity between these two spheres.

I started by asking whether there is a difference and discontinuity between "rationalistic ethics" (the ethics of the person who is in the ethical sphere) and Christian ethics. {Chapter One} Firstly, in the examination of Abraham's act of faith in **Fear and Trembling**, I showed that even in this book there was a hint of a new ethics which follows from faith. To answer the question as to whether there is a clear description of this new ethics, I turned to **Works of Love**. In the examination of this book, I identified the ethics of Christian love, and asserted that the ethics of Christian love was different and discontinuous from merely human love. In the next section, I examined Christian ethics as the ethics of Christian discipleship. Through an examination of some parts of **Philosophical Fragments** and **Training in Christianity** I argued that Christian ethics, as understood by Kierkegaard, is different from merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagianism. Throughout this chapter's discussion I argued that Christian ethics was not only different from the ethics of the ethical person, but also antithetical to it. For ethics based on merely human love was criticized severely in **Works of Love**, and

the merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagian discipleship were regarded as misunderstandings of Christian ethics.

I turned, in the second chapter, to the consideration of the problem of becoming oneself. In this chapter, I firstly examined the second volume of **Either/Or**, and argued that the ethical self was an autonomous self which tried to be itself by itself. In contrast, the Christian self is totally dependent on God in its becoming itself. I drew this conclusion from an examination of **The Sickness unto Death**. In this examination, I argued that even though there were some ambiguities in this book, despair as sin was clearly understood only by the Christian who believed in the forgiveness of sin by God and had faith. Only the existing individual who is in faith is regarded as overcoming the despair and having become a "self" (or "spirit"). I pointed out that in their understandings of the eternal, of the power of self, these two understandings of the self were different from one another.

In the last section of this second chapter, I raised the question of the understanding of the self of the person in religiousness A. By an examination of the Socratic understanding of the phrase "one can be oneself in relation to God" and an analysis of Socratic inwardness, I argued that those in religiousness A had a different God, or different conception of God from the Christian God. I also argued that this difference between their respective conceptions of God was the fundamental reason for the difference between the Christian understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in religiousness A.

In the third chapter, I examined the problem of epistemology. Firstly, I drew out, from Kierkegaard's various pseudonymous writings, the presuppositions and epistemological standpoint of the natural man. Then, I compared this with the Christian epistemological standpoint which was drawn from Kierkegaard's later writings. I argued that in his later writings there were very clear indications that the Christian has an epistemological standpoint which is substantially different from that of the natural man.

I turned then to an examination of Kierkegaard's journal entries, and showed that even though he himself could not always think in the way which he asserted that the Christian should think, Kierkegaard did not compromise and say that it was proper and inevitable for us to mix the Christian standpoint and the natural man's standpoint. Rather, he strongly resisted the idea that such a mixture was Christian.

Next I returned to one of Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous writings, **Philosophical Fragments**, to show that Kierkegaard's ultimate intention in writing this book can be interpreted in a manner consistent with his later writings. I argued that even though, because of the ambiguity in this book, there are other ways of interpreting it, it is also possible that the Socratic standpoint and the Christian standpoint are two exclusive views of reality as a whole, and that even in this book Kierkegaard tried to show the difference and discontinuity of the Socratic (humanist) standpoint and the Christian standpoint. According to this interpretation of Kierkegaard's intention, he who has the

Christian point of view should see and consider everything from the Christian standpoint; for him, there is no autonomous realm to be thought of from the Socratic (humanistic) standpoint.

Based upon this examination, I concluded that for Kierkegaard Christian ethics follows on from Christian theology (his Christian theistic faith), and the understanding of becoming oneself also follows on from the Christian's stance of faith (so that the Christian self is regarded as the "theological self"), and his epistemological standpoint is also Christian. In this sense, there is a wide gap between the Christian sphere and the ethical sphere, or to put this another way, their direction is different: one is theistic and one humanistic. For Kierkegaard, to be a Christian thus involves a change in one's ethics, in one's understanding of becoming oneself, and in one's epistemological standpoint.

Then, I drew out some implications for Kierkegaard's theory of the existence-spheres as a whole and suggested some implications for Christian theology today.

ABBREVIATIONS

CI — The Concept of Irony. Trans. Lee M. Capel. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.

E/O, I/II — Either/Or, Vol. I and Vol II. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

E/OS, I — Either/Or, Vol. I. Trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, revised by Howard A. Johnson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

E/OL, II — Either/Or, Vol. II. Trans. Walter Lowrie, revised by Howard A. Johnson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

JCC — Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. Trans. T.H. Croxall. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958.

ED — Edifying Discourses, 4 vols. Trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1943-46.

FT, R — Fear and Trembling and Repetition. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

SUD — *The Sickness unto Death*. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

FTL, SUDL — *Fear and Trembling* with *The Sickness and Death*. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941.

RL — *Repetition*. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941.

PF, JC — *Philosophical Fragments* with *Johannes Climacus*. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

PFS — *Philosophical Fragments*. Trans. David Swenson, revised by Howard V. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

CA — *The Concept of Anxiety*. Trans. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

CD — *The Concept of Dread*. Trans. Walter Lowrie. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

TOCS — *Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life*. Trans. David F. Swenson. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1941.

SOLW — *Stages on Life's Way*. Trans. Howard V. Hong Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

SOLWL — *Stages on Life's Way*. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940.

CUP — *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Trans. David S.Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961; 9th printing, 1968.

PA — *Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age*. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

PAL — *The Present Age*. Trans, Alexander Dru and Walter Lowrie. London and New York: Oxford University press, 1940.

AR — *On Authority and Revelation*. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955.

PH — *Purity of Heart*. Trans. Douglas V.Steere. New York: Harper and Bros., 1948.

GS, LF — *The Gospel of Suffering* and *The Lilies of the Field*. Trans. David F. Swenson and L.M.Swenson. Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1948.

WL — *Works of Love*. Trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946.

WLH — *Works of Love*. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

Chr. D — *The Christian Discourses*. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

Crisis — *The Crisis* and *The Crisis in the Life of an Actress*. Trans. Stephen Crites. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.

TC — *Training in Christianity*. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.

AN, OL — *Armed Neutrality* and *Open Letter*. Trans. Howard V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1968.

PV — *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*. Trans. Walter Lowrie. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1939.

FSE, JFY — *For Self-Examination*, and *Judge for Yourselves!* Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.

AUC — Kierkegaard's Attack upon "Christendom", 1854-1855. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.

Journals — Journals of Søren Kierkegaard. Trans. Alexander Dru. London and New York: Oxford University press, 1938.

LY — The Last Years. Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

JP — Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers. 7 Vols. Trans. H.V.Hong and Edna H.Hong. London and Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967-1978.

**** Footnote numbers will be given in [ ]

**** Titles of books, emphases, and foreign words will be in bold print.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This is a study about the relation of Christianity to the ethical sphere in the thought of Søren Kierkegaard. In this study, I am trying to explore the question of whether Kierkegaard thinks that being a Christian involves a transition from the way in which the natural man lives, such that all aspects of human life - our ethics, our understanding of what it means to be a self, and our perspective on truth - are transformed. If this is the case, then there is a fundamental difference between the way in which the natural man thinks and lives and that of the Christian.

I will examine this question by looking at Kierkegaard's understanding of the nature of the interface between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere.[1] My purpose in this is to demonstrate that there is a qualitative difference between the ethical sphere (as "the ethical mode of existence") and the Christian sphere (as "the Christian mode of existence"), such that one may say that these two different spheres are actually rival views of life. Hence, to be a Christian is to overcome the ethical view of life. If there were still to be some remnants of the ethical view of life in one's mode of existence, then one would not yet be in the Christian sphere in the decisive sense. In other words, the overcoming of the ethical sphere is a genuine overcoming and passing beyond. Therefore, I shall also show that one's transition from the ethical sphere to the Christian sphere not only affects one's way of life, but also affects one's epistemological standpoint, although this aspect of the

transformation is expressed very obscurely in Kierkegaard's writings. In other words, the Christian has a total life-view based on his Christian faith. With regard to this, another closely related point can also be made: Kierkegaard's work shows that if there were a religiousness, or a religious view of life which did not break with the ethical view of life, then that religiousness or religious view of life would not be a Christian one, but one of immanence, which Kierkegaard sometimes calls religiousness A.

Some explanation of the terms which I use, especially the terms "aspect" and "sphere", is required here. By "sphere" I mean one's mode of existence, one's outlook and way of life. As is well-known, there are, according to Kierkegaard, basically three spheres in which a person can be: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious spheres.[2] These three different ways of life are sometimes called "existence-spheres"[3] or "the stages of life"[4]. As we shall see, what is interesting about Kierkegaard's spheres of life, is that from within each sphere of life there is a complete life-picture. In this sense, Kierkegaard sometimes calls these spheres "interpretations of existence"[5], or, as I usually say, "views of life"[6].

However, if we consider Kierkegaard's use of the terms "the aesthetic", "the ethical", and "the religious", it is also the case that the person in each sphere will have aesthetic, ethical and religious aspects to his life. For example, the person in the ethical sphere has aesthetic, ethical and religious aspects to his life, but he sees these aspects from the ethical view of life.

Likewise, the person in the Christian sphere also has aesthetic, ethical and religious aspects to his life, but he sees these aspects from his Christian view of life. Thus I am distinguishing between the word "sphere" and the word "aspect". For, it appears that Kierkegaard uses the terms "the aesthetic", "the ethical", and "the religious" in two different ways. Sometimes he uses them to mean "views of life" ("spheres"), and sometimes to mean "aspects (or components) of life". In relation to "the ethical", Stephen Evans makes a similar point when he says: "It is helpful here to distinguish two uses of the term 'the ethical': as stage or existence-sphere and as a component in human existence."[7] I think the same can be said about "the aesthetic" and "the religious" as well. If this is so, it is very important to bear in mind these two ways in which Kierkegaard uses these terms ("the aesthetic", "the ethical", and "the religious"), otherwise it is very easy to misunderstand their meaning in relation to the spheres of life.

What is interesting is that each "sphere", as an outlook and way of life, affects these different aspects of life. So, as I shall show in this study, if one is in the Christian sphere, one has one's own total view of life which is based on Christianity; one has a Christian view of the aesthetic aspect of life, of the ethical aspect of life, and of the religious aspect of life. Therefore, the Christian sphere as the Christian outlook and way of life is different from both the aesthetic sphere and the ethical sphere. It seems obvious that a Christian who has a Christian view of the aesthetic aspect of life and of the

religious aspect of life ("religion" in the restricted sense of the word), is different from the aesthete who has an aesthetic view of life. What is difficult to discern is whether the Christian has a different understanding of the ethical aspect of life from the person who is in the ethical sphere. This is the reason why I am mainly concerned with the relation of the Christian sphere to the ethical sphere. Hence I shall attempt to show Kierkegaard's strong emphasis on the discontinuity between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. I think that Kierkegaard, in his various writings, emphasizes the radical discontinuity between them; the emphasis on the discontinuity is greater than the indications of the continuity.

One of the basic motivations of this study is my concern about the tendency among scholars of Kierkegaard to emphasize the continuity between Christianity and the ethical sphere. Some scholars believe that Kierkegaard stands firmly in the position of asserting that the ethical is somehow continued in the Christian sphere, and that there is continuity among the spheres. We can find two group of scholars who hold this view.

Those who belong to the first group try to find the remnants of the Hegelian dialectic in Kierkegaard's thought and interpret the spheres of life in relation to it. From the Hegelian dialectic which they believe they have detected in Kierkegaard's spheres of life, they draw the conclusion that the relation between the spheres is basically that of continuity. For example, Stephen Dunning says that his own interpretation of the stages as a progression, or a systematic development "from the aesthetic

through the ethical and culminating in the religious", "implies continuity rather than radical discontinuity among the stages."[8] Hence, for Dunning, the relation between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere is also that of a progression, or development. He thinks that there is a Hegelian dialectical relationship between spheres, and therefore, the religious sphere is the synthesis of the aesthetic and the ethical. (He even tries to see such a Hegelian dialectical movement within each sphere except for the ethical stage). However, his book as a whole is an attempt to show this Hegelian dialectical relationship between the stages.[9]) He says:

> In dialectical terms, the ethical consciousness opposes a logic of reciprocity [which is the logic of the ethical stage] to the aesthetic logic of contradiction. It is the tension in this opposition that propels the self forward and lays the foundation for the dialectic of inwardness in the religious stage.[10]

As he himself is aware, and indeed asserts, here he tries to see the Hegelian dialectic, and says that "Kierkegaard continued to think in the Hegelian, mediating terms."[11] For Dunning, therefore, the aesthetic stage and the ethical stage are necessary elements (or stages) for a self to advance to the religious stage, for the religious stage is understood as the culmination of this process, or "the dialectical fulfillment of the aesthetic and the ethical stages."[12] It is true that Dunning distinguishes "systematic, progressive development" from the Hegelian claim "that a particular line of development is 'necessary'."[13] In this sense, he admits the existence of a "leap" in that development. However, in so far as, in his understanding of the dialectical relationship between stages, being in or passing

through the aesthetic sphere and the ethical sphere is the necessary condition for one's development to the religious sphere, I cannot help thinking that Dunning denies only one aspect of the necessity of this development. He denies that one must necessarily develop from the ethical to the religious; but the ethical stage itself is one of the necessary elements of one's being in the religious stage, in the sense that one must be in the ethical stage before going to the religious stage, and that the ethical view of life is an important element in the religious stage. In this sense, he says:

> It [the dialectical structure of the theory of stages] is a dialectic in which the initial stage [the aesthetic stage] is one of contradiction, contradiction is in turn negated by reciprocity [of the ethical stage], and then contradiction and the reciprocity are united in paradox [in the religious stage].[14]

In this Hegelian sense, he sees the relationship between the ethical and the religious as that of a development or progression which implies continuation of the ethical into the religious stage.

In this respect, his interpretation of the stages of life is very similar to that of S.U. Zuidema, who also observes these stages of life in relation to Kierkegaard's use of dialectic, which he thinks has not been clearly removed from the influence of Hegel's dialectic. He says:

> It [the subsequent stage] transcends the preceding and at the same time takes the preceding into itself in its own unique way. Hegel's dialectic is unmistakenly present here. Each following stadium or stage includes within itself a higher synthesis with the preceding; it is constituted by a higher synthesis with the preceding...The idea of a revolutionary evolutionary leap binds together and synthesizes these different attitudes toward life as steps of an ascending

> life....The truth of the ethical stadium also recurs in the religious field in an intensified and sublimated way.[15]

Hence, there is a basic continuity between the ethical sphere and the religious sphere. What is defined as the ethical, by the person who is in the ethical sphere, is also included in the Christian's understanding of the ethical aspect of life; the ethical is positively elevated into the religious sphere.

Louis Dupré also indicates that Kierkegaard's spheres of life should be considered as "an application of Hegel's dialectic to Christian philosophy of life." He continues:

> As dialectical moments, they are so intrinsically linked with one another that they only receive their ultimate meaning from the whole, which is determined by the final, the religious moment.[16]

Hence, for Dupré, "ethics...is a necessary step in the realization of man's true nature."[17]

As we have seen, such an interpretation of the spheres of life as a progression, or development, is closely related to the Hegelian dialectic which can be well harmonized with these terms ("progression" and "development"). At this point, we have to ask whether Kierkegaard really has such a Hegelian dialectical element in his dialectic of existence. It is true that he uses the term "dialectic" and this term has a close relationship to the Hegelian dialectic. However, Kierkegaard is very careful when he uses this term in his writings; he tries to eliminate the Hegelian connotation from it. When he designates his dialectic "qualitative dialectic"(CUP, p. 347 and passim) in contrast to the dialectics of Hegel, which he looks upon as a "quantitative

dialectics", he has a very clear sense of a distinction between them. Kierkegaard's qualitative dialectic is a dialectic which is related to the qualitative change of existence; it is "a pathos-filled transition."(JP, III, 2339(Pap. IV C 12))

Here is the place of a leap, which describes that particular qualitative change of existence. The quality of existence is changed in the act of a leap. He contrasts it with the quantitative dialectic by which he means the Hegelian dialectic. In an entry in his journals he says:

> [Everything] depends upon making the difference between quantitative and qualitative dialectic absolute. The whole of logic is quantitative or modal dialectic, since everything is one and the same. Qualitative dialectic is concerned with existence.(Journals, No. 584(Pap. VII 1 A 84)=JP, I, 759)

In the quantitative dialectic, there can be an Aufhebung, and therefore quantitative accumulation and advancement can bear the synthesis. Hence, Kierkegaard cannot find any sign of qualitative change in this quantitative dialectical movement.[18] For, in Kierkegaard's opinion, there is continuity, synthesis, and identity in this quantitative dialectical movement. That is why he coins this new phrase "the qualitative dialectic", for what he is interested in, "this concrete existential individual" (what the Germans would call Existenz) cannot be properly understood or posited without a change in the quality of existence. This change in the quality of existence involves a real change in one's view of life. That is, in Kierkegaard's dialectic of existence, there is a real change in one's view of life. In Kierkegaard's opinion, two different views of life are mutually exclusive.[19] As Paul Ricoeur says: "A dialectic without mediation - this is the

Kierkegaardian dialectic."[20] Hence, we may say that there is a difference between the dialectic of Kierkegaard and the dialectic of Hegel and the Hegelians.[21]

So I am not persuaded by the assertion that one can find a kind of Aufhebung in Kierkegaard's dialectic. And I question why some eminent scholars try to relate Kierkegaard's dialectic to that of Hegel. Even though they have found the so-called existential character of the Hegelian dialectic (which had not been understood properly until they had explained it)[22], it is one thing to have an exact understanding of Hegel's dialectic, and it is another to put that understanding into the reading of Kierkegaard's work. Even if Kierkegaard had misunderstood the dialectic of Hegel, only his own understanding of it can be the background against which he thought. In this sense, I cannot agree with those scholars who see the Hegelian dialectical movement in Kierkegaard's spheres of life, and assert that the ethical sphere (as the ethical view of life) is somehow continued even in the Christian sphere. The reason why I cannot agree with them should become clearer in the course of this study.

There are other scholars who also hold that the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere are closely related, but do not base their interpretation of this relationship on the existence of the remnants of the Hegelian dialectic in Kierkegaard. They try to base their interpretation of this relationship on the passages which they quote from Kierkegaard's writings. Reidar Thomte can be a representative of this second group of scholars.[23]

Thomte points out several facts which are related to this relationship. Firstly, he says that "he [Kierkegaard] never spoke of the ethical as being dethroned by the religious."[24] After asserting this, he quotes several passages from Kierkegaard's writings (mostly from the Postscript):

1. "The ethical is the absolute and in all eternity the highest."(CUP, p. 133).

2. "The ethical is the highest task for every human being."(CUP, p. 135)

3. "The ethical requirement is for every individual."(CUP, p. 284)

4. "The ethical is an expression for the God-relationship."(CUP, pp. 122-23, 138)

5. The religious sphere lies so close to the ethical that "there is a constant communication between the two".(CUP, p.144)

6. "The religious sphere possesses the ethical"(Papirer, VII B 235, p. 20).

7. A person "must have passed through the ethical in order to arrive at the religious stage."(CUP, p. 347).

From these quotations, he concludes that: "There is, therefore, no conflict between the ethical and the religious."[25]

Secondly, he asserts that "Kierkegaard presents only one great choice: Either the aesthetic mode of life,...or the ethical mode of life comprehended within the religiosity of immanence and culminating in Christianity."[26] In relation to this assertion he quotes the following: "There are three stages: an aesthetic, an ethical and a religious....But in spite of this triple division the book is nevertheless an either-or. The ethical and the religious stages have in fact an essential relationship to one another."(CUP, p. 261) "Three stages and yet one

either/or."(Papirer, VI B 41, 10).

In relation to both the first and the second points, Thomte merely quotes several passages from Kierkegaard. He just assumes that the meaning of these passages is obvious. However, these passages are among the most ambiguous passages found in Kierkegaard. So, according to the interpretation of these passages, the meaning may vary. For example, quotation 7 comes immediately after the sentence: "[The] different spheres must be kept clearly distinct, and the qualitative dialectic with its decisive mutation that changes everything so that what was highest in one sphere is rendered in another sphere absolutely inadmissible, must be respected."(CUP, p. 347, emphasis given). Applying this to the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere, this sentence seems to imply that what was highest in the ethical sphere is rendered absolutely inadmissible in the Christian sphere, thus, it suggests the exact opposite of what Thomte has said. (But at this stage in my thesis I wish to reserve judgement as to which interpretation is correct.)

Secondly, in relation to these quotations, we have to bear in mind the fact that there is some discussion of the ambiguity surrounding the term "the ethical" in Kierkegaard's own writings. It is very difficult to be immediately sure what meaning of "the ethical" Kierkegaard has in mind in each particular context. There are some scholars who are careful enough to notice the different meanings with which Kierkegaard uses the term "the ethical". For example, Evans says:

Actually Kierkegaard uses the term "ethical" in several

> different senses. The first is the ethical viewed as a stage...Kierkegaard also speaks of the ethical in a new sense, the sense in which it is an essential aspect of religious existence....The difference between the two ethics is that the first is a science "which can strictly be called ideal" while the second "begins with the real"(CD, p. 18).[27]

Mackey also says:

> In Climacus's usage "the ethical" is identical with inwardness or subjectivity. This is not the ethical "stage on life's way" occupied by Judge Wilhelm. "To be ethical" is, for Climacus, simply another way of saying "to be human".[28]

Therefore, it is difficult to identify the exact relationship between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere by merely quoting several passages from Kierkegaard's writings (especially, his pseudonymous writings) without thinking of their contexts.

From this observation I propose that in order to discuss the exact relationship of the ethical sphere to the Christian sphere, one should compare the general orientation, presuppositions and consequences of one sphere to those of the other. Without such a discussion, it is easy to distort the exact relationship between them. Hence, I shall try to provide such a discussion in this study.

As these critical comments on the claim that there is a continuity between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere suggest, this relationship can be observed differently. Indeed, certain commentators hold that there is a new ethics in the Christian sphere, and that here there is radical difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. For example, Regis Jolivet says:

> [The] religious gives birth to a new ethic [which contrasts

> with] the ethical of the pre-religious stage, which made religion subordinate to itself as one of its own element...."[29]

And in this new ethics (Christian ethics), as Malantschuk says, "the redeeming grace of God is the presupposition for man's ethical decision and action."[30] Paul Holmer and Klemke (following Holmer) also assert that the ethical and the Christian spheres are genuine ethical alternatives.[31]

As far as the observation that there is a new ethics in the Christian sphere is concerned, my interpretation is closer to Jolivet and others than the scholars whose interpretation is outlined above. However, I think that the difference and discontinuity between the ethical and the Christian spheres is not only confined to the difference in ethics. Rather, there is a total and fundamental difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere, which involves not only ethics, but also the understanding of the self and the epistemological standpoint, as I shall seek to show in this study. In this sense, this study may be of value if it leads to a more exact understanding of the relationship between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere, and it may offer a partial contribution to the problem of the spheres of life in general.

The importance of this study, however, is not confined to the quest for an exact understanding of Kierkegaard's existence-spheres. As the difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere is great, so also is the difference between, on the one hand, the theology of those who think of this

relationship as one of continuity and, on the other, the theology of those who think that there is discontinuity. Therefore, the question as to whether the ethical sphere is to be overcome, or to be continued in the Christian sphere, is important not only because it is inherently interesting but also because of its implications for theology. Determining whether a person believes the ethical sphere is continued or overcome in the Christian sphere will reveal a great deal about his theology and his understanding of human life as a whole.

As a matter of fact, this is part of the wider question, often considered in western thought, under the discussion of the relationship between reason and faith, or between faith and works. Even today this problem has not been resolved or become outdated. Part of the importance of Kierkegaard lies in the fact that he sees this problem in its modern form and tries to solve it at the beginning of the modern age. As a modern man[32] living after the Enlightenment he knows that the spirit of the world (Zeitgeist) of his time and of the future is of such a kind that it makes man turn away from Christian truth, and advances modern paganism which does not know transcendence in sensu strictu, but only immanence. As Miller says: "[The] nineteenth century was busily bending all its intellectual and poetic and moral efforts to the task of doing away with the transcendence of God."[33] Post-Enlightenment men want to be their own master. And now people attempt to attain the whole truth through their own endeavour. Men will not acknowledge other truths than those attained through their own observation and logical reasoning. There cannot be any other ethics apart from

the one which men themselves have found or regulated - autonomous ethics. Now we have come of age; we are adults and can be ourselves by ourselves. As Michalson says: "The autonomous self gradually becomes the criterion for what can be considered truly revelatory."[34]

Kierkegaard stands squarely in the middle of this critical situation.[35] He faces the problem of the relationship between Christianity and the Enlightenment view of the world, truth, the self, and ethics, relentlessly and with open eyes. He never attempts to evade it. So the main question for Kierkegaard is: how can one become a Christian in this modern situation, in this post-Enlightenment age? What does it mean to be a Christian in the modern age? Is it now impossible to be a Christian? Must one change the characteristics of Christianity in order to be a Christian, as a modern man? These are the questions which Kierkegaard, as a post-Enlightenment man, has to face and to which he tries to provide an answer. Such a quest for a solution to this problem is of itself worthy of careful consideration. Moreover, when we consider the position of Kierkegaard in relation to the development of modern theology[36], we cannot deny the importance of this consideration of the relation between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere.

In particular, in the light of recent trends in theology, this study can, I hope, play a corrective role by reflecting Kierkegaard's position in relation to the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher. For theology since the 1960s has become much more human-centered and has been moving away from a transcendent

God. As Alan Race puts it: "[Attention] has shifted to developing notions of divine immanence: God must work in and through the created order, and mostly of course through the human capacity for creative goodness."[37] In particular, there is a very strong Hegelian tendency in modern theology. We can mention several theologians who either base their theology on Hegel's thought or modify Hegelian thought: Juergen Moltmann[38], Eberhard Juengel[39], Wolfhart Pannenberg[40], Hans Kueng[41], process theologians[42] and strangely even Karl Barth.[43] At the same time, since the 1960s there is a revival of interest in Schleiermacher. James Torrance reports this revival as follows:

> One of the fascinating features of theology in our day is the revival of interest in Schleiermacher in the same century which has witnessed the most radical questioning of both his method and point of view.[44]

Even before the 1960s many theologians tried to develop their theologies on the basis of Schleiermacher's insights. Hence, Schleiermacher is regarded as "a theological teacher not only of the past, but above all, of the future."[45] Perhaps, we may name Paul Tillich as one of the representatives of this tendency[46], even though we should remember that his theology is highly distinctive, and a personal creation. He says:

> My decision [about the question as to whether the attempt to construct a synthesis out of the elements in theology...or whether a return to the orthodox tradition with some modernization is the right way]...is thoroughly on the side of Schleiermacher.[47]

Some critics think Rudolf Bultmann is also under the influence of Schleiermacher. For example, Richard R. Niebuhr has written that "the intellectual tradition Bultmann embodies draws many of its

insights ultimately from Schleiermacher, although that fact has not been much acknowledged."[48] Many other theologians are under the direct or indirect influence of the Schleiermacherian approach to theology. George A. Lindbeck says that what he calls the experiential expressive approach to theology and religion, which "is particularly congenial to the liberal theologies influenced by the Continental developments that began with Schleiermacher"[49], is "so pervasive in contemporary theology and at the same time so variegated that it is hard to decide on any one author to serve as an instance."[50]

However, it would be more accurate to speak of the presence of a combination of the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher in the thought of modern theologians: as Paul Ricoeur describes his position as a "post-Hegelian-Kantian"[51], and John E. Smith speaks of the "Kant-Hegel Syndrome" in philosophical theology.[52]

Hence, a clarification of Kierkegaard's position in relation to Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel is important for modern theology. In particular, an inquiry as to whether the ethical sphere is continued or not in the Christian sphere is vital for a clarification of Kierkegaard's position. As we shall see, Kierkegaard supports the view of a transcendent God who can also enter into the realm of time and space. I think that this is something that has been missing in modern theology, and therefore I think that Kierkegaard is worth considering in relation to a tradition in which this appears to have been lacking.

How then should we tackle this basic problem of the relationship between the Christian and ethical spheres? In order to show the fundamental difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere, I shall approach this problem by examining three questions that arise in relation to Kierkegaard: (1) does the Christian have a different understanding of ethics from the person in the ethical sphere?, (2) does the Christian have a different understanding of the problem of becoming a self?, and (3) does the Christian's faith have an effect on the cognitive aspect of human life, in the sense of whether there is any change in the way in which he thinks? That is to say, is there any difference between the ethical person's understanding of what truth is and that of the Christian?

These three issues are representative of different types of categories which are, in fact, approximately related to the traditional three divisions of philosophical inquiry: axiology (the question of value), ontology (the question of being, which includes the question of the self), and epistemology (the question of knowledge). But in the division of the argument of this study, I did not a priori use the traditional three branches of philosophy and try to relate them to Kierkegaard's material. I think that in Kierkegaard's writings these three different questions (i.e., (1), (2), and (3) above) are latent, and this allows us to consider a very wide spectrum of thought and life. As we probe the issue deeply, it becomes evident that the understanding of the relation of the Christian sphere to the ethical sphere is inseparably bound to questions of axiology,

ontology, and epistemology. Therefore, I shall discuss these questions in turn, and that discussion will form the substantial part of this study.

I shall start, in the first chapter of this study, with a consideration of the question of whether the Christian has a different understanding of the ethical aspect of life ("ethics") from the person in the ethical sphere. That is, I shall begin by an examination of the axiological aspect of this interface between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. In this first chapter, Fear and Trembling, Works of Love, and some parts of Philosophical Fragments and of Training in Christianity will be the main texts under discussion. The main point with which I conclude this chapter is that the Christian is understood by Kierkegaard to be consciously under God's command at every moment in his life. Hence, the Christian's ethics is different from the ethics of the person who is in the ethical sphere.

From the comparison of ethics we turn, in the second chapter, to the problem of self. That is, we shall approach the problem of the difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere from the perspective of the problem of becoming a self. In demonstrating this difference, the ethical person's understanding of becoming a self as expressed in the second part of Either/ Or and that of the Christian as expressed in The Sickness unto Death will be extensively compared. This comparison will conclude with the observation that while the ethical person thinks that he can be himself by himself, the Christian believes that he can only be himself in relation to God who is conclusively revealed in the

Christ event. Another problem which will also be discussed in this second chapter is the relation between one's understanding of becoming a self in religiousness A and that of religiousness B. Concerning this problem, we shall point out both some similarities between religiousness A and B, and the substantial difference between them. In connection with this, one may make a very good point that one's sense of what it means to become oneself depends on the God to whom one relates.

In the third chapter, we shall turn to the most subtle problem in this quest for the interface between the ethical and the Christian sphere: can the thesis that in the Christian sphere everything changes also be applied to the cognitive aspect of human life? If so, in what sense? Can we say that the "epistemological standpoint" of a person is, in a sense, affected, or changed in relation to faith? As these questions suggest, in the third chapter, we shall explore the epistemological aspect of the difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. A survey of Kierkegaard's reflections on the relation between philosophical reason and faith will show that a tension must inevitably exist between the empirical approach which says that our reason does not change, does not have a positive relation with faith, and the soteriological approach which says that our epistemological standpoint also must be changed when we become Christians. Kierkegaard has not given us a contradiction-free solution to this difficult problem. However, Kierkegaard's great contribution is that he is not satisfied with one easy answer, but points out the difficulties of the problem and tries to illuminate

them deeply and from all sides through rigorous thinking. After studying Kierkegaard, therefore, we are in a much better position to grasp the complexities of the relation between the natural man's "epistemological standpoint" and that of the Christian.

On the basis of this discussion, we may conclude that for Kierkegaard, the Christian is a man who, in principle, has transformed all aspects of his life because of his faith; his understanding of ethics, of the problem of becoming himself, and even the "epistemological standpoint" are different from that which he had when he was in the ethical sphere. Whenever Kierkegaard mentions the Christian, he is thinking of such an ideal Christian.(cf. AN, p. 35) Such an ideal is both the basis of concrete Christian existence here and now and, at the same time, the task to be accomplished. In principle, he is already such a Christian, but, in reality, he has to endeavour moment by moment to be such a Christian. This is one of the main reasons why Kierkegaard hardly ever dares to call himself a Christian. He is aware that he and many other so-called Christians do not, in reality, always stand in this ideal position. In reality, the so-called Christian may also be swayed by the attitude and rationality of the ethical man whenever he is not faithful to the object of his faith. But Kierkegaard also asserts that such cannot be the true portrait of the Christian. At the very least, the Christian, for Kierkegaard, is a person who is always transforming his ethics, his conception of the self, and his epistemological standpoint into the ethics, conception of the self, and the epistemological standpoint which are based on faith.

Therefore, the "leap" between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere implies the abandoning of the presuppositions and view of life of the ethical sphere and the reconstructing of an outlook and way of life which is true to the characteristics of Christianity.

NOTES

1. As I shall suggest in the following, I use the word "sphere", as Kierkegaard did, with the meaning of one's mode of existence. (cf. Peter Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard: An Introduction to his Life and Philosophy, tr. Alan Moray Williams (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 158). So by the ethical sphere I mean the ethical mode of existence, the ethical outlook and way of life, and by the Christian sphere I mean the Christian mode of existence, the Christian outlook and way of life.

2. I am aware of the discussion of whether there are three or more spheres among Kierkegaard scholars. (See, e.g., Stephen Crites, "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and as Act," in Josiah Thompson, ed. Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1972), p. 202: "[There] seems in principle no end to the exfoliation of Kierkegaardian stages.") That is the reason why I put the word 'basically' in the sentence above.

3. SLOWL, p. 430; CUP, pp. 136, 144, 377, 385, 387, 400, 448, 474, 475, 498, 513.

4. SLOWL, p. 394; CUP, pp. 261, 262, 264, 265, 307, 325, 439, 463.

5. CUP, p. 506.

6. SLOWL, pp. 170, 280, 282, 394; CUP, pp. 150, 315, 386, 388, 393; CS, p. 110.

7. C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 173. See also his Subjectivity and Religious Belief (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), pp. 100f.

8. Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 4, 256 (emphasis given). However, in a personal conversation with me he said that this assertion was only concerned with the structure of Kierkegaard's authorship, not with the contents of these stages. Hence, the following description of his view must be read in the light of this reservation.

9. Especially see the following ironical sentences: "It is all the more startling that the very 'systematic ein, zwei, drei ridiculed in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (CUP, 319) can be discerned in many of the pseudonymous texts, Postscript among them!...I have come to the conclusion that Kierkegaard was quite unconscious of the extent to which he continued,...a Hegelian structural analysis."(Ibid., pp. 4-5) Of course, he makes a qualification that the dialectical structures he finds "in most of

Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works are 'Hegelian' only in a formal or structural sense, not in terms of content, and certainly not as the objective unfolding of spirit in world history."(Ibid., p. 259, n. 19).

10. Ibid., p. 104.

11. Ibid., p. 250.

12. Ibid., p. 246.

13. Ibid., p. 256, n. 11.

14. Ibid., p. 250.

15. S.U. Zuidema, Kierkegaard, trans. David H. Freeman (Nutley, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1977), pp. 25, 32. For a similar view on this subject, see Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 77, esp. n. 96; idem, "Love and Forms of Spirit," Kierkegaardiana, 10 (1977), p. 110; and Dunning, pp. 255f, n. 11. See also Jerry H. Gill, "The Ethico-Religious, Introduction," in Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. J.H. Gill (Minneapolis: Burgess Pub. Co., 1969), p. 152; and Arland Ussher, Journey Through Dread (London: Darwen Finlayson, 1955), p. 44.

16. Louis Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian (New York and London: Sheed and Ward, 1963), p. 74, n. 4.

17. Ibid., p. 76.

18. Cf. JP, III, 2345(Pap. V C 1). See also J. Heywood Thomas, "Logic and Existence in Kierkegaard," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 2 (1971), pp. 5f.; Gregor Malantschuk, "Qualitative Difference," in JP, III, p. 900; and Martin Heinecken, The Moment before God (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1956), p. 182.

19. Cf. Jorgen K. Bukdahl, "Introduction," to Kierkegaard and Dialectics (Aarhus: University of Aarhus, 1978), p. i: "One main difference [between the dialectics of Hegel and that of Kierkegaard] was that, in Kierkegaard's opinion, certain oppositions simply excluded each other."

20. Paul Ricoeur, "Two Encounters with Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard and Evil, Doing Philosophy After Kierkegaard," in Kierkegaard's Truth: The Disclosure of the Self, ed. Joseph H. Smith (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 320.

21. See also Paul Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Logic" (originally published in Kierkegaardiana II (1957): 25-42), in Kierkegaard's Presence in Contemporary American Life, ed. Lewis

A. Lawson (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1971), pp. 68-70; Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel (London: SCM, 1963), pp. 40f.; and Sylvia Walsh Utterback, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Christian Existence" (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1975), pp. 11ff.

22. See Dunning's following assertion: "I am not personally convinced that Hegel ever meant to claim the sort of necessity that is being criticized..."(ibid, p. 256, n. 11). See also Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (London: Nisbet, 1952), p. 128.

23. Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 103. For a similar interpretation, see also Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 46: "He [Kierkegaard] is not reluctant, indeed, to admit...that the entire content of the ethical sphere can be taken over by the naturally religious man. His real difficulty centers about the relation between esthetic and religious, especially Christian existence."(emphasis given). David F. Swenson also asserts: "[Kierkegaard] holds that each higher stage is constituted, not by abolishing the lower, but by subordinating it."(Something About Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1953, the second edition), p. 163 (emphasis given).) See also L.L. Miller, In Search of the Self: The Individual in the Thought of Kierkegaard (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1962), pp. 12f., 299.

24. Thomte, p. 103.

25. Ibid., p. 103

26. Ibid., p.104. He lists several other authors who he thinks are of the same opinion: Emmanuel Hirsch (in Kierkegaard-Studien (Guetersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1933), II, P. 805), Walter Lowrie (in his introduction to Postscript, pp. xix), and Eduard Geismar (in Lectures on the Religious Thought of Soren Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1937), pp. 58-59). Besides them, James Collins also makes the same point. See his The Mind of Kierkegaard, pp. 46f. See also Paul Sponheim, Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence (New York: Haper and Row, 1968; New York: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 35f., 291, 319.

27. C. Stephen Evans, Subjectivity and Religious Belief, pp. 100-01. See also JP, I, 848-1007.

28. Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1971), p. 174. Cf. CUP, pp. 119-121. See also E.D. Klemke, "Some Insights for Ethical Theory From Kierkegaard" (originally published in The Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1960): 322-330), in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 83.

29. Regis Jolivet, Introduction to Kierkegaard, trans. W.H. Barber (London: Frederick Muller, 1950), p. 143. Evans also makes a similar point that Kierkegaard develops the new ethics in the Christian sphere. See his Subjectivity and Religious Belief, p. 101. See also Dupré, pp. 156-63, 165, 170; Gene Outka, "Religious and Moral Duty: Notes on Fear and Trembling," in Religion and Morality: A Collection of Essays (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press, 1973), p. 211, n. 10; Gregor Malantschuk, "The Ethical, the Ethical Consciousness," in JP, I, pp. 530f.; and Brita K. Stendahl, Søren Kierkegaard (Boston; Twayne Publishers, 1976), p. 183.

30. Malantschuk, "The Ethical, the Ethical Consciousness," in JP, I, p. 531.

31. Paul Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Ethical Theory," Ethics, LXIII (1953), pp. 157-70; and Klemke, "Some Insights for Ethical Theory from Kierkegaard," pp. 79-91, esp. p. 80. See also Arthur C. Cochrane, The Existentialists and God (Dubuque, Iowa: The University of Dubuque Press, 1956), p. 138, n. 12.

32. Cf. "Our future grandchildren will find it difficult to believe that Kierkegaard lived in the nineteenth and not in the twentieth century."(Vladimir Weidle, The Dilemma of the Arts, trans. M. Jarrett-Kerr (London: SCM, 1948), p. 123, cited in Mallary Fitzpatrick, Jr., "Current Kierkegaard Study: Whence-Whither," Journal of Religion 50 (1970), p. 83. See also John Douglas Mullen, Kierkegaard's Philosophy: Self-Deception and Cowardice in the Present Age (New York, New American Library, 1981), p. 1.

33. Miller, p. 119.

34. Gordon E. Michalson, "Faith and History: The Shape of the Problem," Modern Theology 1 (1984/85), p. 286. For a good discussion of this process see Heinz Zahrnt, The Historical Jesus, tr. J.S. Bowen (London: Collins, 1963), pp. 23-26; and Conrad Bonifazi, Christendom Attacked: A Comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (London: Rockliff, 1950), pp. 1-17.

35. For a good discussion of the intellectual situation in which Kierkegaard started his authorship, see Miller, pp. 24-30; and Patrick Gardiner, Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 16-31.

36. Even though Kierkegaard lived in the nineteenth century, he affects many theologians of the twentieth century explicitly and implicitly. Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, "Editor's Preface," to Paul Sponheim, Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence, p. ix: "[It] is clear that this critic [Kierkegaard] of academic theology, whose mordant wit and intellectual modesty would have thought the title utterly presumptuous, has turned out to be more of a 'maker of modern theology' than almost any of modern contemporaries."

37. Alan Race, "Creation from the Nuclear End," Theology XCII, no 750 (Nov., 1989), p. 506.

38. On Moltmann's Hegelian tendency, see his Trinitaet und Reich Gottes: Zur Gotteslehre (Muenchen: Chr. Kaiser, 1980), esp., 120-123, E.T. (London: SCM, 1981), pp. 106-108. See also Christopher Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann's Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), pp. 57, 59, 117-9; and Richard Bauckham, "Juergen Moltmann", in The Modern Theologians, pp. 294f.

39. On Juengel's Hegelian Tendency, see his God as the Mystery of the World, trans. Darrell L. Guder (Edinburgh: Clark, 1983), pp. 96f. See also J.B. Webster, Eberhard Juengel: An Introduction to his Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 36, 63-4.

40. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (London: SCM, 1968), pp. 127ff. See also Christoph Schwoebel, "Wolfhart Pannenberg," in The Modern Theologians, pp. 258, 259, 267, 274, 280, 286.

41. See, especially, Hans Kueng, Menschwerdung Gottes (Freiburg: Herder, 1970), tr. J.R. Stephenson, The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel's Theological Thought as Prolegomena to a Future Christology (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1987).

42. For a good discussion of the close relationship between Whitehead's thought and Hegel's, see Robert Ellis, "From Hegel to Whitehead," Journal of Religion 61 (1981), pp. 403-421.

43. On Barth's Hegelian tendency, see his Evangelical Theology (London: SCM, 1965), pp. 88f. See also G. S. Hendry, "The Freedom of God in the Theology of Karl Barth," Scottish Journal of Theology 31 (1978), 229-244; Paul Avis, The Methods of Modern Theology: The Dream of Reason (Marshall Pickering, 1986), p. 53.

44. James B. Torrance, "Interpretation and Understanding in Schleiermacher's Theology: Some Critical Questions," in Scottish Journal of Theology 21 (1968), p. 268. See also Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion (London: SCM, 1965), pp. 9-10.

45. Paul Seifert, Die Theologie des Jungen Schleiermacher (Guetersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1960), 201, cited in James K. Graby, "Reflections on the History of the Interpretation of Schleiermacher," Scottish Journal of Theology 21 (1968), p. 289. See also B. A. Gerrish, A Prince of the Church: Schleiermacher and the Beginning of Modern Theology (London: SCM, 1984).

46. For a similar view see Robert C. Johnson, Authority in Protestant Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), p. 134; George H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian message

(New York: Scribner's, 1962), pp. 4, 51; and Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, pp. 230f. However, one should also see his strongly Hegelian tendency. As William B. Green says: "The Hegelian cast present throughout in both the method and content of Tillich's theology."("Paul Tillich," in A.W. Hastings and E. Hastings, eds. Theologians of Our Time (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1966), pp. 212f. See also J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal (London: SCM, 1963), pp. 171, 180; and Cochrane, pp. 78f. Hence, it is fairer to say with Paul Avis that "Tillich's approach is eclectic."(The Method of Modern Theology (Marshall Pikerling, 1986), p. 173).

47. Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology (London: SCM, 1967), p. 91. In another place, he says again: "I believe that his [Schleiermacher's] 'unconditional dependence' is only a slightly narrower way of saying 'unconditional concern'."(Ibid., p. 105).

48. Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, p. 8. See also p. 88, n. 25.

49. George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984), p. 16.

50. Ibid., p. 31.

51. Paul Ricoeur, "The Specificity of Religious Language," Semeia 4 (Fall, 1975).

52. John E. Smith, Reason and God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), and Experience and God(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

CHAPTER ONE

ETHICS

Let us begin this quest for the relationship between the ethical view of life (the ethical sphere) and the Christian view of life (the Christian sphere) as understood by Kierkegaard, with a consideration of the relationship between the ethical person's understanding of ethics, and that of the Christian, expressed in several books by Kierkegaard. In this chapter, I shall show that the Christian as understood by Kierkegaard has ethics which is based on Christian faith.

There is an interesting question here. For Kierkegaard, as a descendant of the Reformation, thinks that for the Christian ethics comes out of theology. In other words, the Christian has ethics which is based on his Christian view of life, so that his ethics may be designated "Christian ethics", or "the ethics of faith"[1], or "the ethics of grace"[2] (to use Dupré's words). Naturally there is an interesting conflict here, for the term "ethics" is generally understood in the world as the ethics of the ethical sphere. Hence the basic question of this chapter is: what is the relationship between Christian ethics (which comes out of Christian belief in God) and a general ethics of human practical reason? In what follows I will call these two ethics "Christian ethics" and "rationalistic ethics", respectively. We may see a similar question in relation to the Reformers in the 16th century.[3] However, the situation is heightened in

Kierkegaard as compared with the Reformers; (i) because for Kierkegaard living in the 19th century, there is a certain secularity to the realm of ethics which is there before the question of the relation of this realm to the relation to God arrives on the scene. And (ii) since Kant has sharpened the issue as to what ethics is and has given that realm its own integrity - indeed to the point that every duty to God becomes a duty towards ethics and relating God's command to ethics would be something "immoral", and which contravened this scene.

In this situation, Kierkegaard I think shows us how Christian ethics should be. In the final analysis, I want to show that Christian ethics is quite different from the ethical person's understanding of the ethical aspect of human life. Rather, Christian ethics is antithetical to rationalistic ethics. In the ethics of the ethical person the justification for ethics comes from one's application of the categorical imperative, whereas in Christian ethics justification for ethics comes from one's relation to the Christian God. This fundamental difference between the place of ethics results in all kinds of difference between Christian ethics and the ethics of the ethical person.

In order to show this difference, I shall, in the first section of this chapter, examine Fear and Trembling. For Fear and Trembling is the book which is mainly concerned with the relation between the ethical and the religious. In the examination of this book, first its complexity and ambiguity will come to the foreground, rather than a clear difference between two ethics. However, in the final analysis, it will be suggested that even

this book hints at the difference between these two ethics.

I shall then, in the second section, examine a clear description of Christian ethics in Works of Love. Here the difference between "rationalistic ethics" and "Christian ethics" will be considered through a discussion of two different understandings of love. In this section Christian ethics is considered as the ethics of Christian love.

I shall then, in the third section, consider Christian ethics as the ethics of Christian discipleship. In this discussion Training in Christianity and some part of Philosophical Fragments will be the main texts to be examined, but I shall refer to other texts to elucidate my discussion. Here one of the most clear points will be made that, for the Christian, only the acts of "following" Jesus based on the belief that Jesus is the God-Man, who is the Saviour and at the same time the Teacher (the example), are regarded as the Christian ethical acts in the real sense.

Based upon this three step examination we shall then conclude that the Christian is understood by Kierkegaard to be a disciple, whose "following" Jesus may be identified with works of love, which are the expression of his faith in the God-Man; and that therefore his ethics is different from, indeed antithetical to, the ethical person's understanding of the ethical aspect of life.

I

Let us then start with Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric

published under the pseudonym "Johannes de Silentio". What I want to do in this section is to show that in Fear and Trembling there is a certain sense in which this may also be said to pertain: every act of the believer has to come out of his faith in God. Thus one's religious ethics follows from one's belief in God. As we have mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, there is an interesting conflict here, for the term "ethics" in the world, and especially in 19th century Denmark, and therefore in this book, Fear and Trembling, is understood as the universal ethics of the ethical person.[4] Hence the basic quest of this section is to seek what is the relation between religious ethics which comes out of theology and a general ethics.

Yet Fear and Trembling is one of the most complex books of Kierkegaard.[5] One of the most difficult matters for interpretation is how to understand Abraham's act of paradoxical faith in this book. In this section, therefore, after briefly summarizing the main theme of this book, I shall examine Abraham's act of faith by (1) analyzing his double movement of faith, and (2) considering the meaning of the teleological suspension of the ethical. Through this discussion I hope to show that the believer, who is exemplified by a knight of faith in this book, has a quite different understanding of the ethical aspect of human life from that of the ethical person, whose understanding of ethics is distinguished by the characteristics of universality, of autonomy, and of a post-Enlightenment sense of rationality.

By way of introduction, let us briefly survey this book. As suggested above, its main theme is how to understand the Abraham-Isaac case in Genesis chapter 22, especially in relation to the understanding of ethics.

In the "Prelude" Johannes provides four quite different poetical versions of understanding this case, each of which is an attempt to depict the exact situation and meaning of this event. These descriptions come from a certain man's wish "to be present in that hour when Abraham raised his eyes and saw Mount Moriah in the distance, the hour when he left the asses behind and went up the mountain alone with Isaac."(FT, p. 9=FTL, p. 26) This man's wish is even described by Mackey in the following way: "In his disenchantment he desires to achieve an imaginative contemporaneity with Abraham in the moment of his ordeal."[6] But Johannes, as we shall see, gives the impression that none of these four versions can be a proper understanding of this case.

In the first description, two sayings of Abraham are contrasted with one another, one spoken to Isaac (outward expression) and the other spoken to God as prayer (inward intention). "Stupid boy," Abraham is portrayed as saying to Isaac, "do you think I am your father? I am an idolater. Do you think it is God's command? No, it is my desire."(FT, p. 10=FTL, p. 27) But Abraham is further described as saying to himself in a low voice, "Lord God in heaven, I thank you; [after all] it is better that he believes me a monster than he should lose faith in you."(FT, p. 11=FTL, p. 27) That is, Abraham pretends to Isaac that he is a selfish idolater who desires to sacrifice Isaac, lest

Isaac should lose his faith at the thought of God demanding the sacrifice. To this description, Johannes relates the story of the mother blackening her breast in order to wean the child. In this situation "the child believes that the breast has changed, but the mother - she is still the same, her gaze is tender and loving as ever."(FT, p. 11=FTL, p. 28) Similarly, even though Abraham looks different, he is the same as ever in his love. There is no breach of his paternal love.

In the second description, Abraham offered Isaac but got Isaac back, so he could return home with him, just as in the Genesis story. But "[from] that day henceforth, Abraham was old; he could not forget that God had ordered him to do this. Isaac flourished as before, but Abraham's eyes were darkened, and he saw joy no more."(FT, p. 12=FTL, p. 28, emphasis given) In a word, he lost his faith. From then on, he continued living in resentment of God's dreadful demand.

In the third description, after the event Abraham is supposed to ride out alone to Mount Moriah. He is further described in the following way: "[He] threw himself down on his face, he prayed God to forgive him his sin, that he had been willing to sacrifice Isaac, that the father had forgotten his duty to his son."(FT, p. 13=FTL, pp. 28f., emphasis given) However, it is also said that "he could not comprehend that it was a sin that he had been willing to sacrifice to God the best that he had."(FT, p. 13=FTL, p. 29) So there is a tension within his mind.

In the fourth description, Isaac who "saw that Abraham's left hand was clenched in despair, that a shudder went through his whole body" lost his faith, even though he never talked to anybody about this.(FT, p. 14=FTL, p. 29)

As we have mentioned above, these four attempts to understand the Abraham and Isaac case are not satisfactory for Johannes. So Johannes asks "who is able to understand him [Abraham]?"(FT, p. 14=FTL, p. 29) and just gives a "Eulogy on Abraham" who is the father of faith.(FT, pp. 15-23=FTL, pp. 30-37) After that, however, he tries to suggest another understanding of the case, and this is the main body of the book. In this attempt he shows "the prodigious paradox of faith, ...a paradox that gives Isaac back to Abraham again...."(FT, p. 53=FTL, p. 64) Johannes' final understanding of this story is expressed in the form of three problemata: (1) "Is there a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?"(FT, pp. 52-67=FTL, pp. 64-77) (2) "Is there an Absolute Duty to God?"(FT, pp. 68-81=FTL, pp. 78-91) (3) "Was It Ethically Defensible for Abraham to Conceal His Undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?" (FT, pp. 82-120=FTL, pp. 91-129)

Actually, these three questions come from Johannes' understanding of the ethical aspect of life. His understanding of ethics is partly Kantian and partly Hegelian.[7] However, this partly Kantian and partly Hegelian ethics is quite compatible with modern theories of ethics, except that of emotivism. The "ethical" in this book is particularly similar to the universalizability requirements that R.M. Hare expounds.[8]

Let us then consider the characteristics of the ethical in FT. According to Johannes de Silentio, "the ethical as such is the universal."(FT, pp. 54, 68, 82=FTL, pp. 64, 78, 91)[9] And, as the universal, the ethical has also the following three characteristics.

Firstly, "as the universal it [the ethical] applies to everyone, which from another angle means that it applies at all times."(FT, p. 54=FTL, p. 64) In other words, as Dunning says, "the ethical is a matter of categorical imperatives, duties that are obligatory without regard to particular circumstances."[10] The moral obligation is an unqualified imperative, the rule that is binding on all persons everywhere.

Secondly, the ethical is self-contained (immanent): "it rests immanent in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its telos [end, purpose] but is itself telos for everything outside itself, and when the ethical has absorbed this into itself, it goes not further."(FT, p. 54=FTL, p. 64) Therefore, the ethical is as such the divine(cf. FT, pp. 60, 69=FTL, pp. 70, 78), "since," as Perkins says, "it is supposedly an all-inclusive and complete modus explicandi of all human duties."[11] Even though the ethical person uses the term God, as Kierkegaard says, "God comes to be an invisible vanishing point, an impotent thought; his power is only in the ethical, which [is the content of existence]."(FT, p. 68=FTL, p. 78) That is, from the perspective of the ethical view of life, even God must be subjected to the ethical (i.e., the universal).[12] This is clearly expressed in Kant's contention that Abraham ought to have responded to the

so-called divine command as follows:

> That I ought not to kill my good son is certain beyond a shadow of a doubt; that you, as you appear to be, are God, I am not convinced and will never be even if your voice would resound from the (visible) heavens.[13]

See also Hegel's following assertions:

> [The] secular is capable of being an embodiment of the true...it is now perceived that morality and justice in the state are also divine and commanded by God, and that in point of substance there is nothing higher or more sacred.[14]
>
> The true reconciliation whereby the divine realizes itself in the region of actuality is found in the ethical and legal life of the state.[15]
>
> The ethical life [Die Sittlichkeit] is the divine spirit indwelling in the self-consciousness of this actual present age as a people and its individual members....[16]

Therefore, in the final analysis, according to the ethical view, only the ethical itself is the absolute. Hence there is no special duty towards God. In one place, Kant makes exactly the same point: "There are no special duties to God in a universal religion, for God can receive nothing from us; we cannot act for Him, nor yet upon Him."[17] One's duty is not to God but only towards one's neighbour and society, for in carrying out one's duty one does not enter into relationship with God but only with other men.

This point is quite similar to the ethical understanding of Judge William, another pseudonymous author who represents the ethical sphere. For Judge William also, God is the universal background to his life, and he accepts his duty as from God. His relationship to God is never separated from what is universal, and always understandable to all men. God does not in any special

sense break into or intervene in his life. Hence it is difficult to equate Judge William's God with the God of Christianity, even though Judge William thinks that his God is the God of Christianity.[18] One of the logical implications of this immanent understanding of the ethical is that ethics is understood as rationalistic ethics, in the sense that only what the human being is able to think of can be the basis and contents of ethics.

Thirdly, the ethical is the disclosed, the manifest.(FT, p. 82=FTL, p. 91) Self-disclosure is the third characteristic of the ethical understanding of the ethical aspect of human life.[19] From this perspective, as Perkins puts it, "if one cannot explain what one is doing and why to his fellow man," then this inevitably means that "something is indeed suspicious about one's motives."[20] This characteristic of self-disclosure presupposes that everybody can understand such self-disclosure, insofar as it is an expression of the universal. Judge William says in Either/Or that "the beauty of the universal consists precisely in the fact that all understand it."(E/OL, II, p. 342=E/O, II, p. 338) In this sense, ethical language is a public language, a point closely related to the rationalistic character of this ethical thinking.

From the first characteristic of the ethical and the ethical task comes the first problem: "Is there such a thing as a teleological suspension of the ethical?" According to Johannes, the first ethical task is that one should express oneself constantly in the ethical and therefore abolish one's particularity in order to become the universal.[21] Yet the

Abraham and Isaac case stands against this understanding of the ethical task of human being. Abraham's case cannot be understood as those of tragic heroes (e.g., Agamemnon's, Jephthah's, and Brutus's cases).(FT, p. 59=FTL, p. 69) Abraham's case is totally different; "he overstepped the ethical entirely and possessed a higher telos outside of it, in relation to which he suspended [the ethical sphere]."[22] In short, "the story of Abraham contains, then, a teleological suspension of the ethical."(FT, p. 66=FTL, p. 77) By this assertion, Johannes answers affirmatively the question, which he has asked at the beginning, as to whether there is such a thing as a teleological suspension of the ethical, even though Johannes himself cannot understand such a thing. For him as a person who has a view of life which is quite compatible with the ethical view, such a teleological suspension of the ethical is "unthinkable"(FTL, p. 71) or "inconceivable".(FT, p. 61)

The recognition that Abraham has teleologically suspended the ethical thus makes Johannes think of what is that telos in relation to which this teleological suspension of the ethical takes place. He assumes that such a telos, as we shall see, can only be God or the absolute duty to God. So he again asks: "Is there such a thing as an absolute duty toward God?"(FT, p. 70=FTL, p. 80) Johannes thinks that such an absolute duty towards God is possible only in the paradox of faith. Yet "[the] story of Abraham contains such a paradox."(FT, p. 70=FTL, p. 81) If Abraham is the true knight of faith and the father of faith, there must be an absolute duty towards God, or Abraham as the knight of faith "is lost".(FT, p. 81=FTL, p. 91)

The third problem ("was Abraham ethically defensible in keeping silent about his purpose before Sarah, before Eliezer, before Isaac?") comes from the third presupposition of the rationalistic understanding of ethics which Johannes has; that is, one's ethical task is "to work [oneself] out of [one's] hiddenness and to become disclosed in the universal."[23] Whereas "[the] authentic tragic hero sacrifices himself and everything that is his for the universal...in this...he is the beloved son of ethics"(FT, p. 113=FTL, p. 122); Abraham cannot speak because "no one can understand" him.(FT, p. 113=FTL, pp. 122-23) So it is said of Abraham that "he speaks in a divine language, he speaks in tongues".(FT, p. 114=FTL, p. 123) But such a possibility of silence which is beyond the demands and charge of the ethical view of life can be only if "there is a paradox, that the single individual as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute."(FT, p. 120=FTL, p. 129) This is a brief survey of the book.

Having briefly surveyed the basic structure of the book let us turn to the main question of this section: how should we then interpret Abraham's act of faith? In my opinion, when Johannes discusses the story of Abraham, he is thinking of Abraham as a paradigm of paradoxical faith. By "paradoxical faith" I mean the faith which believes something paradoxical "by virtue of the absurd". In the case of Abraham, as we shall see, he believes that God will give Isaac back to him even when he draws the knife. As far as the <u>form</u> of faith is concerned, this paradoxical faith is the same as Christian faith; for, as we shall see, Christian

faith which believes the absolute paradox of the God-Man is also paradoxical faith. It is true that the concrete object of faith is different: Abraham does not believe in the paradox of the God-Man (since he was before the God-Man existed on earth), whereas the Christian, to be a Christian, should believe in the God-Man. However, the structure and form of their faith are quite compatible.[24]

Indeed, there are some parallel examples which Johannes uses in order to make the characteristics of faith clear, and these examples are drawn from the Christian stories. The first example is the story of the Virgin Mary who conceives Jesus "miraculously".(FTL, p. 75=FT, p. 65) The second example is the story of an Apostle who was not offended by the absolute paradox.(FT, p. 66=FTL, p. 76, emphasis given) The third example comes from Luke 14:26: "If any one comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple."(FT, p. 72=FTL, p. 82) Johannes thinks that this demand of Jesus is "a remarkable teaching on the absolute duty to God."(FT, p. 72=FTL, p. 82) He also thinks that this demand has more or less the same character as the demand which had been given to Abraham. So he says: "Anyone who does not dare to mention such passages does not dare to mention Abraham, either."(FT, p. 75=FTL, p. 85)[25]

Moreover, there is a direct assertion that "Abraham represents faith."(FT, p. 56) So we can speak of Abraham as "an example of faith"[26], or "a type" of the believer[27], or "the paradigm of faith according to which all instances are to be declined in all cases" in the sense that "Abraham's faith is the pattern after which the Christian must model his own belief."[28] Indeed, Johannes says that "he [Abraham] acts by virtue of the absurd....He gets Isaac back again by virtue of the absurd."(FT, pp. 56f.=FTL, p. 67) Johannes also calls Abraham "the father of faith".(FT, pp. 18, 82=FTL, pp. 33, 92) This term presupposes the affirmation of the homogeneousness of the faith of Abraham and Christian faith. It is true that the Jews also use this term to refer to Abraham. However, when Johannes uses this term in this book, he is thinking about Christian faith (clearly that is the case in Kierkegaard's case, in Denmark in the 19th century) and thinks that Abraham is the father of this faith, as did St. Paul.[29] I think this is more appropriate than Kierkegaard's later understanding of this case as a typical Jewish thought which is against the Christian thought.[30] The following quotation shows the close relationship between Abraham's faith understood by Johannes and the Christian believer understood by St. Paul and Jesus.

> [Abraham] was...great by that power whose strength is powerlessness[31], great by that wisdom whose secret is foolishness[32], great by that hope whose form is madness[33], great by the love that is hatred of oneself[34].(FT, pp. 16f.=FTL, p. 31)

From these several points I conclude that in this book Abraham is regarded as a paradigm of paradoxical faith. When I am saying this I do not disregard the difference of situation between the Christian and Abraham. But I think that there is a typological relationship between them. I am also supposing that Kierkegaard believes that God the Son was before Abraham (even though He was not yet the God-Man). Therefore, I am saying that Abraham is a paradigm of the believer who has paradoxical faith.

Having said that Abraham is described as the paradigm of the believer, we now need to develop an exact understanding of Abraham's act of faith. In order to understand the act of faith of the knight of faith, firstly, I shall analyze the double movement of faith which the knight of faith makes; and secondly, I shall consider the meaning of the teleological suspension of the ethical. Through this consideration, I hope to show that despite some ambiguities, for the knight of faith who has paradoxical faith, his "acts of love" result from his belief in God.

Firstly, let us think about the problem as to in what exactly consists Abraham's act of faith in this story. In order to understand this movement of faith, one has first to understand what Johannes calls the movement of infinite resignation. For Johannes contrasts the movement of infinite resignation with the movement of faith, and also contrasts the knight of infinite resignation who is making the movement of infinite resignation with the knight of faith who is making the double movement of faith.

What is then the movement of infinite resignation? This is the movement in which one resigns everything infinitely. Such resignation enables one to "become clear" to oneself with respect to "one's eternal validity", giving a sense of the infinite by freeing oneself from the demands of the finite. Hence if Abraham had been a knight of infinite resignation, then he would have done as follows:

> He would have [marched up] to Mount Moriah, he would have split the firewood, lit the fire, drawn the knife. He would have cried out to God, "Reject not this sacrifice; it is not the best thing I have, that I know very well, for what is an old man compared with the child of promise, but it is the best I can give you. Let Isaac never find this out so that he may take comfort in his youth." He would have thrust the knife into his own breast.(FT, pp. 20f.=FTL, p. 35)

According to Johannes, this movement of infinity, that is, the movement of infinite resignation, is the movement which man himself can make by himself.(cf. FT, pp. 51f.=FTL, p. 62) Johannes says: "It takes a purely human courage to renounce the whole temporal realm in order to gain eternity."(FT, p. 49=FTL, p. 59) As Stendahl says, "this [the knight of infinite resignation] is not 'Abraham', but 'Socrates'."[35] In another place, Johannes calls Socrates' ignorance "the infinite resignation", and says, "[this] task alone is a suitable one for human capabilities...."(FT, p. 69=FTL, p. 79) Shestov even says that "Socrates was a knight of resignation and all the wisdom he bequeathed to mankind was the wisdom of resignation."[36] So Johannes himself can assert that "I can resign everything by my own strength".[37]

This movement of infinite resignation can be identified with the movement of repentance.[38] And yet this repentance is in the power of human; "[he] can make the movement of repentance under his own power."(FT, p. 99=FTL, p. 109. emphasis given) So Johannes says that this movement of infinite resignation is "a purely philosophical movement" which he dares say he is "able to make if it is required."(FTL, p. 59=FT, p. 48) For it is a movement which can be carried out in immanence, and which everybody can make.

In this sense, we may assimilate the movement of repentance in Fear and Trembling to repentance in the second volume of Either/Or.[39] Both of them are still in the realm of immanence and quite different from the repentance of Christianity which involves the consciousness of sin. In relation to Judge William's concept of repentance Perkins makes a good point: "For the Judge, repentance is the bright expression of the ethical and the ethical man is capable of achieving it without external aid, i.e., divine grace."[40] Hence it is understandable that Dunning, amongst others, asserts that "it is clear that it [the movement of infinite resignation] must be classified as ethical."[41] Indeed, this movement of infinite resignation is quite compatible with the ethical sphere as the view of life. By this movement of resignation one gains one's "eternal consciousness".[42] And "in the infinite resignation there is peace and rest."(FT, pp. 45, 49=FTL, p. 56, 60)

However, I am not sure whether the movement of infinite resignation is only in the realm of the ethical sphere. One might think that it is not only in the ethical sphere, since it is also the characteristic of what Climacus later calls religiousness A.[43] But religiousness A is quite compatible with the ethical sphere. Therefore, one can detect an ethical understanding of the ethical aspect of life in the movement of infinite resignation which the person in religiousness A makes. In relation to the God to whom the knight of resignation relates, he can only make the movement of infinite resignation, and that is the end. There is no return back to the finite, and there is no new creation by God.

In contrast with the movement of infinite resignation, the movement of faith consists of a double movement. First, there is the movement of infinite resignation. But it is <u>immediately</u> followed by the movement to the finite.(cf. FT, p. 38=FTL, p. 48) That is, by faith one gets back the finiteness which one has given up. Johannes says: "He resigned everything infinitely, and then he grasped everything again by virtue of the absurd."(FT, p. 40=FTL, p. 51) Actually, the situation is more like the following saying of Abraham: "But it will not happen, or if it does, the Lord will give me a new Isaac, that is, by virtue of the absurd."(FT, p. 115=FTL, p. 124) Hence, as G. Clive observes, "had he [Abraham] despaired of getting Isaac back, he would have lacked faith, the capacity to believe in the possibility of the impossible."[44] Here is his faith. "By faith," as Mackey says, "he receives the world, symbolized by Isaac, after he has let it go."[45] There is thus "a new creation by virtue of the

absurd."(FT, p. 40=FTL, p. 51)

This is "repetition" in Kierkegaard's sense of the word (that is, not just monotonous repetition of the same thing which goes back to the same first without any change, but fulfilling repetition which goes to a higher place), though this concept was enlarged later by another pseudonymous author Constantine Constantius.[46] For repetition is the same as the double movement of faith.[47] In this sense, the repetition remains transcendent and the word "transcendent" must be understood in the Christian sense: only God is able to grant this repetition. Indeed Kierkegaard says that repetition "is a transcendent, religious movement by virtue of the absurd which sets in, when you have arrived at the limits of the wonderful."[48] We can thus agree with Mackey when he says that in "the Christian believer the paradox of Abraham will repeat itself when he attempts to live the new life that is given to him beyond the extremity of guilt and condemnation."[49] Actually, it is here in this double movement of faith that the paradoxical character of faith (which Abraham has) appears. This very point is one which Johannes intends to show in Fear and Trembling.[50] Because of this unfailing faith in God Abraham can receive Isaac with joy and thanksgiving.(FT, p. 36=FTL, p. 46)

Here one important question can be raised: can the movement of faith be a movement which is added to the movement of infinite resignation? So that if one makes the movement of infinite resignation, then what is needed is to make the second movement to the finite? Or is the double movement of faith as a whole a new

movement which one should make? In the next few paragraphs I want to show that the double movement of faith as a whole is completely different from the movement of infinite resignation.

At first glance, however, the way in which Johannes puts his discussion may suggest that the former is the case. That is, if one has made the movement of infinite resignation, only the second movement of finite is needed. For one thing, there is a passage which runs as follows:

> Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that anyone who has not made this movement does not have faith; for only in infinite resignation do I become conscious of my eternal validity, and only then can one speak of grasping existence by virtue of faith.(FT, p. 46=FTL, p. 57)

So it is understandable that there are some scholars who think that the movement of infinite resignation is a pre-condition of faith[51], or that one must be a knight of infinite resignation before becoming a knight of faith.[52]

However, when we look at this problem closely, we can find that this is not the case. For in the movement of faith, the first movement of infinite resignation must also be related to that of faith. Arbaugh and Arbaugh say: "Faith does include infinite resignation before God but it also include <u>trust</u> in face of the absurd...<u>it is resignation with divinely inspired trust added to it</u>. Abraham still believed in God's promise in the very moment when God required him to destroy the instrument of promise."[53] Mackey's following description of the situation also makes it clear that there is a close relation between resignation and faith in Abraham's case. He says that "<u>even while</u> he gave him

up, Abraham believed that God would not require Isaac or that, requiring him, He would yet give him back."[54]

Hence the infinite resignation of Agamemnon is quite different from that of Abraham who makes this movement of resignation in relation to his faith. Only if Abraham had done something for a great ethical cause (cf. FT, p. 21=FTL, p. 35) would he have been a tragic hero just like Agamemnon who offered his daughter for the welfare of the nation. If this were the case, Abraham would also be only in the movement of infinite resignation, and his movement of infinite resignation would be "the surrogate of faith"(FTL, p. 46), or "a substitute for faith."(FT, p. 35) But Abraham in the real story offered Isaac still having the faith that God is faithful to His own promise. This point is clear in the following quotation:

> But what did Abraham do?...During all this time he had faith - he had faith that God would not demand Isaac of him, and yet he was willing to sacrifice him if it was demanded. He had faith by virtue of the absurd.... He climbed the mountain, and even in the moment when the knife gleamed he had faith - that God would not require Isaac.(FT, pp. 35f.=FTL, 46)

According to this passage, the double movement of faith is carried out thoroughly only by faith. If there were no faith from the first, Abraham's act could not be regarded as the act of faith, the movement of faith. According to Johannes, "he [the knight of faith] is continually making the movements of infinity, but he does it with such precision and assurance that he continually gets finitude out of it."(FT, p. 40f.=FTL, p. 51) Hence there is a difference between the infinite resignation of the movement of infinite resignation and the infinite resignation of the movement

of faith.

Accordingly, the movement of faith is different from the movement of infinite resignation from the first. Hence the double movement of faith is a totally new movement. As far as the first movement of infinite resignation of the movement of faith is concerned, it looks similar to the movement of infinite resignation. However, even at this stage the movement of faith is different from the movement of infinite resignation in so far as the infinite resignation of the movement of faith is related to faith.[55]

From this consideration, we can think that while the movement of infinite resignation is quite compatible with the ethical view of the ethical aspect of human life, the movement of faith is quite incompatible with the ethical understanding of the ethical aspect of human life.[56] And at the same time, we can also think that there is a new way of looking at the act of the knight of faith. This new way of looking at the act of faith can become clearer in the consideration of the meaning of the teleological suspension of the ethical.

Let us then think about the exact meaning of the teleological suspension of the ethical. The true character of the teleological suspension of the ethical appears in comparing it with the cases in which there is no question of a teleological suspension of the ethical itself. Johannes lists three cases which are similar to the Abraham-Isaac case, but yet do not have a teleological suspension of the ethical: the cases of Agamemnon, of Jephthah,

and of Brutus.(FT, p. 58=FTL, p. 69) These tragic heroes are still in the ethical. Actually, these cases are alluded to in an attempt to see if the sacrifice of Isaac can possibly find a place within the confines of ethics.(cf. FT, p. 57=FTL, p. 67) What Johannes finds is that whereas the acts of these heroes can be ethically justifiable, the case of Abraham cannot be understood in this way. These tragic heroes are confronted with a situation in which public (social) and private morality conflict. Their sacrifices, as the result of ethical consideration in this conflict, are higher expressions of the ethical. Hence they "can claim", as Swenson suggests, "a higher ethical justification for [their] deed."[57] In the comparison between the ethical duties, one ethical duty (e.g., keeping a whole nation) appears as higher than another duty (e.g., keeping one's child's life). So they put that higher ethical duty above the other duty. Hence when the tragic hero has to sacrifice his own child for the greater good of the whole nation, people somewhat easily understand this behaviour and even respect him for the courage in carrying it out. His act of sacrifice is understandable by all and in the realm of the universal. Therefore, since everything is moving only in the realm of the ethical sphere[58], there is no question of a teleological suspension of the ethical. Moreover, the idea of a teleological suspension of the ethical itself, for him who has the ethical understanding of ethics, is contradictory.

Only when a higher telos outside of the ethical enters, there is a teleological suspension of the ethical. In this case, the telos is not a higher ethical telos, for it is outside the ethical

sphere. Hence even the thought that this telos is outside the ethical is itself outside the ethical sphere as a view of life. But this does not mean that Johannes who thinks of this teleological suspension of the ethical in relation to Abraham's case is outside the ethical sphere. He only sees that for Abraham there is a teleological suspension of the ethical, and asserts that he cannot understand such a suspension as Abraham makes. Johannes is only in the realm of religiousness in general, which is later designated religiousness A by another pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus.[59] And yet, as we have seen, according to the rationalistic view of ethics, which the person in religiousness A has, the ethical is the absolute telos.(FT, p. 54=FTL, p. 64) That is, within the rationalistic view of ethics, there is no question of a teleological suspension of the ethical. If there is any question of a teleological suspension of the ethical, then it means that the case is outside the ethical view of life. What Johannes means by a teleological suspension of the ethical is that the ethical sphere as a whole is suspended for the interests of a higher telos outside the ethical sphere. Then, the person who is involved in this teleological suspension of the ethical by accepting a telos outside the ethical, is also outside the ethical sphere by the act of faith. As Hannay says: "He places himself outside the self-sufficient universalistic ethics."[60] Indeed, Johannes describes Abraham in this way; "By his act he overstepped the ethical entirely."(FTL, p. 69=FT, 59)

What then is the telos which makes this teleological suspension of the ethical? Johannes does not give us a direct answer to this question. But he intimates that God, or the absolute relationship with God is the telos.(cf. FT, p. 59=FTL, p. 70) Abraham carried out God's command not from the rationalistic judgement of what is universal, but for the sole reason that God commanded it. His primary concern is sincerely to devote himself, and what is dearest to him, to God. So we can agree with Valone when he says that "what Kierkegaard wants to argue is that a moral philosophy must be subordinate to God."[61]

In relation to this, let us ask, how does one live after experiencing the teleological suspension of the ethical? Does one live in the ethical sphere, or does one live by faith at every moment of one's life? That is, does "the ethical" as a view of life ("sphere") reappear after the momentary teleological suspension of the ethical, or is the ethical view of life continuously suspended in the existence of the knight of faith?

Some commentators think that this suspension is only momentary. For example, Arbaugh and Arbaugh say that "the man of faith...feels obliged to temporarily set aside or suspend it [the universal imperative of the ethical]."[62] So after the momentary exceptional experience, the knight of faith lives according to the ethical imperative. According to this interpretation of the book, one may draw out from Johannes' discussion of this story an understanding that what is ethical is absolute; the ethical in the ethical sphere is the ethical in the Christian sphere; the ethical is always the same. And, as we can see in this book, there can be

"a teleological suspension of the ethical" for a moment for a religious person. As far as his ordinary life is concerned, he is an ethical person who is under the duty of the ethical imperative. Yet if there were a direct command of God at a special moment, then there ought to be such a suspension of the ethical for a moment. And after that moment, he would return to the ethical sphere; the ethical is absolute for him as for the person in the ethical sphere. Therefore, the difference between the ethical person and the religious person can only be found where there is such a direct intervention of God.

Is this really the case? We have to look at the text more carefully. According to Johannes, Abraham is always in relation to God at every moment in his life. As Mackey says, "[Abraham's] whole life after faith is a new creation in which he does not the least thing but 'by virtue of the absurd'."[63] If he is not doing this continuously, he cannot be the knight of faith.(cf. FT, p. 122f.=FTL, p. 131) Hence the movement of faith is continued throughout his life; "at every moment, he makes the movement of faith."(FT, p. 115=FTL, p. 124) As Johannes says, "every moment of his life he buys the opportune time at the highest price, for he does not do even the slightest thing except by virtue of the absurd."(FT, p. 40=FTL, p. 51, emphasis given). In one place, Johannes describes the life of one who is making the movement of faith as follows: "[To] live happily every moment this way by virtue of the absurd...not to find rest in the pain of resignation but to find joy by virtue of the absurd - this is wonderful."[64] The movement of faith is the task of his existence; faith is "a

task for a whole lifetime."(FT, p. 7=FTL, p. 23) "Fear and trembling" of faith continue to the last hour of a believer's life, who has fought "the good fight [of faith] and kept the faith". He has fear and trembling of faith at every moment in his life, for he exists coram Deo at every moment.[65]

Actually, in Fear and Trembling, what is emphasized is the continuation of Abraham's faith. Abraham -- who by faith "emigrated from the land of his fathers and became an alien in the promised land"(FT, p. 17=FTL, p. 31), who by faith "received the promise that in his seed all the generations of the earth would be blessed"(FT, p. 17=FTL, p. 32), who believed this promise even when "it became unreasonable"(FT, p. 17=FTL, p. 32), who by faith "accepted the fulfillment of the promise"(FT, p. 18=FTL, p. 33), who "had fought with time and kept his faith"(FT, p. 19=FTL, p. 33) -- believed God and his faithfulness even in the situation in which everything seems to be lost and "even in the moment when the knife gleamed".[66] Here we can see the continual nature of his faith. His faith is not something which exists at one moment, but soon disappears at the next. He believes in God at every moment. If Abraham has faith, he always lives in the paradoxical relationship of faith. If we understand the double movement of faith in this way, we can understand that "faith is a way of life". We can also understand the true meaning of the spiritual trial. If Abraham did not have faith, if he lived only in the ethical sphere before this event, this event cannot be a spiritual trial, for there is nothing that can be shown through this trial. Only if Abraham lived by faith continuously can this event be an

occasion in which Abraham shows the faith which he had and keeps even in this situation. This book shows clearly that Abraham continued to believe in God and His promise; he did not doubt even for a moment. At every moment he made the movement of faith.

The life of the knight of faith can also observed in his relation to the absolute duty to God. When he made the movement of faith, for him as the knight of faith, the ethical which had been the absolute, the divine, "reduced to the relative in contradistinction to the absolute relation to God."(FT, p. 71=FTL, p. 81) His ethics is not autonomous but comes from his relation to God. As Dupré says, "the relationship with the Absolute in faith has changed the whole perspective of ethics."[67] He only lives by faith. He carries out God's command willingly simply because God has commanded it. He always lives in lively relation with God.(cf. JP, IV, 4462(Pap. X 3 A 394)) Or else "faith has never existed".[68]

Here there is one of the differences between the ethical person's understanding of ethics and the Christian's understanding. From the perspective of the ethical person, what is rationalistic and autonomous is the ethical. If we understand ethics only in terms of the rationalistic understanding of ethics, then we have to say that the act of the knight of faith cannot be justified (in terms of the ethical understanding of the ethical aspect of life). He cannot be ethical from the perspective of the person who is in the ethical sphere. He is outside the universal which is the fundamental character of the ethical understanding of the ethical aspect of life. From the perspective of the ethical

sphere, he is irrational, behaving heteronomously and fanatically.

But from the perspective of the knight of faith, what is important is not what is autonomous and rationalistic, and therefore what is regarded as the universal by the ethical person. What is really important for the knight of faith, is that which is in relation to God. For the ethical person like Kant, however, such a relation to God, as Perkins says, "is heteronomous, unnatural, irrational, and ununiversalizable."[69] However, he who has known the living God "determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute by his relation to the universal."(FT, p. 70=FTL, p. 80) Yet this can happen only when we see the possibility of understanding the ethical aspect of human life differently from the perspective of the ethical person.[70] Only when we accept the existence of the telos which is outside the ethical sphere, can we see the act of the knight of faith differently from the person who is in the ethical sphere. Only in the teleological suspension of the ethical is there a possibility for one to see the act of Abraham as the act of faith.

To repeat, from the perspective of the ethical person Abraham is "crazy"(FTL, p. 86) or "mad"(FT, p. 76); his act in this story is irrational or morally perverse.[71] But if one has a perspective in which one can think of a teleological suspension of the ethical, then one sees the situation differently. As Evans says:

> The person who lacks [faith] will find these commands unintelligible....But the trusting believer will see things otherwise. Because he believes...he regards these commands as

duties.[72]

Or, as Carnell says:

> When Abraham learnt what it meant to live before God (coram Deo), absolute devotion to the details of the ethics was replaced by the absolute devotion to the will of God.[73]

From this perspective of faith, the believer can say that "love to God may bring the knight of faith to give his love to the neighbor."(FT, p. 70=FTL, p. 80) His love to his neighbour - which can be understood as the basic expression of Christian ethics - is based on his love to God.[74] For the believer, therefore, ethics is not autonomous, it is dependent on God.(cf. JP, IV 4768(Pap. X 4 A 141)) As Blanshard puts it: "The ultimate source of right and wrong is the will of God, and the knight of faith...will at every moment of life be in the service of his royal master [God]."[75] Here appears a new ethics which is different from the autonomous, rationalistic, and immanent ethics of the ethical sphere.[76] Perkins also sees this point and says: "[Kierkegaard's] principle task here is to set forth the problem of a religious ethics when faced by the demand of a rationalistic ethic."[77] The absolute relation to God makes the believer understand the ethical aspect of human life from the perspective of the absolute relationship with God.(cf. JP, I, 894=Pap. IV C 72) From this standpoint, Kierkegaard, in one of his journal entries, says: "Kant held that man was his own law (autonomy) i.e., bound himself under the law which he gave himself. In a deeper sense that means: lawlessness or experimentation."(Journals, No. 1041=JP, I, 188=Pap. X2 A 396) For, as Malantschuk says, "from the religious standpoint, it

appears that even man's best endeavors in the human-ethical domain are basically an expression of self-assertion."[78] Hence we can agree with Kerrigan when he says: "Kierkegaard came to discern in the faith of Abraham...willed renunciation of autonomous will...."[79] Johannes describes the situation of the knight of faith in the following way: "Anyone placed in such a position is an emigrant from the sphere of the universal."(FT, p. 115=FTL, p. 124, emphasis given) He no longer lives in the sphere of the universal, that is, the ethical sphere and religiousness A which is commensurable with the ethical view of life.

Up to now we have closely examined several points which lead us to the conclusion that in Fear and Trembling a tension between the rationalistic understanding of the ethical aspect of life and that of the knight of faith is discussed in depth. In the course of our discussion we have seen that the principle by which the knight of faith acts is quite different, and incompatible with that of the ethical person. We have also seen that religiousness A, which is shown in the person and thought of Johannes de Silentio, is quite commensurable with the ethical sphere. These points show that what is ethical in the ethical sphere would be the absolute and the best which man could think and do, if there were no God who had such a particular relationship with man. However, we have also seen complexities and therefore, the possibility of a different understanding and interpretation of the problem of ethics as it is treated in Fear and Trembling. This makes me ask it there is some other book in which Kierkegaard more clearly shows this difference between the ethics of the person in

the ethical sphere and Christian ethics. With an affirmative answer to this question, let us turn to Works of Love.

NOTES

1. Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, pp. 171, 175.

2. Ibid., p. 170.

3. In relation to Luther, Daphne Hampson indicates this. See her "The Self's Relation to God: A Study in Faith and Love"(unpublished Th. D. diss., Harvard University, 1983), chapter 1. See also William Kerrigan, "Superego in Kierkegaard, Existence in Freud," in Joseph H. Smith, ed. Kierkegaard's Truth: The Disclosure of the Self, p. 123; and Lev Shestov, Kierkegaard and the Existentialist Philosophy (1949), tr. Elinor Hewit (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1969), p. 295.

4. For a good discussion of the background against which Kierkegaard argues in FT, see Geoffrey Clive, "The Teleological Suspension of the Ethical in 19th Century Literature," Journal of Religion 34 (1954), pp. 75-8.

5. So Louis Mackey even says that it is "a little book which is as deeply misunderstood as it is widely read."(Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 206. See also Edward F. Mooney, "Abraham and Dilemma: Kierkegaard's Teleological Suspension Revisited," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 19 (1986), p. 24: "There are evident difficulties in reconstructuring the Kierkegaardian perspective as a sustained and coherent argument. It is not an accident that critics have torn their hair over the text."

6. Mackey, A Kind of Poet, p. 207, emphasis given.

7. For a similar view on this subject, see Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 93; George Price, The Narrow Pass: A Study of Kierkegaard's Concept of Man (London: Hutchinson, 1963), pp. 192, 204, n.4; Mooney, "Abraham and Dilemma," p. 39, notes 7, 9; Dunning, p. 276, n.19; Robert L. Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel: The Dialectical Structure of Kierkegaard's Ethical Thought" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1965), pp. 81-102, 138-140, 280; also his "For Sanity's Sake: Kant, Kierkegaard, Father Abraham," in Perkins, ed. Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals (University, Alabama: The Univ. of Alabama Press, 1981), p. 53; Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, pp. 186, n. 2 and p. 196, n. 22; and also his Journey to Selfhood: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 243, n. 114.

There are some scholars who either detect only a Hegelian understanding of ethics in Johannes' view (see, for example, E.L. Allen, Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought (London: Stanley Nott, 1935), p. 55; T.H. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary (London: James Nisbet, 1956), pp. 150, 153; Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p. 74; Outka, "Religious and Moral duty," p. 211; Merold Westphal, "Abraham and Hegel," in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, esp. p. 73; and Mullen, pp.

32f., 81, 121f., 132), or assert that the Hegelian elements are more dominant. (C. Stephen Evans, e.g., says that "despite the Kantian sound of 'the universal', Johannes' conception of the ethical is essentially Hegelian. The highest ethical duties are concretely embodied in societal institutions."("Is the Conception of the Absolute Duty toward God Morally Unintelligible?", in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, p. 144. However, he, except in this passage, observes strong Kantian trends in the ethical sphere.) For a similar view, see Jeremy D.B. Walker, To Will One Thing: Reflections on Kierkegaard's "Purity of Heart" (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), p. 9.)

On the other hand, there are some other scholars who think that the ethical person's understanding of ethics is only Kantian. See, e.g., George E. Arbaugh and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship: A Guide to the Writings of Kierkegaard (Rock Island, Illinois: Augustana College Library, 1967), p. 109. See also Denzil G.M. Patrick, Pascal and Kierkegaard, vol. II (London and Redhill: Lutterworth Press, 1947), p. 197; and George Schrader, "Kant and Kierkegaard on Duty and Inclination," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, pp. 324f. Even among those who see both the Kantian and Hegelian elements in the ethical sphere, some interpreters observe that the Kantian elements are more dominant. For example, Perkins, observing some criticism of Hegelian ethics by the ethical pseudonymous authors, says that "it is more sympathetically related to Kant rather than Hegel."("Kierkegaard and Hegel", p. 158.) See also Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 18. So their view is a good antithesis to that of Evans and Walker, which I have mentioned above, but to consider this problem, though interesting, will go far beyond the scope of this present study, for this involves a very complicated problem of Kant and Hegel interpretation as well.

Since what is important in relation to this present study is the fact that Kierkegaard uses the Kantian and Hegelian understanding of the ethical aspect of human life as being representative of the ethical view, here I just suppose that both the Kantian and Hegelian elements are in the ethical sphere. This can be drawn out from the text, if we attempt to derive from Johannes' complicated and polemical passages only the conception which Johannes has of the ethical, leaving aside for a moment the polemical aspects.

8. Cf. R.M. Hare, The language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). For a similar view that there are similarities between Johannes' understanding of ethics and Hare's understanding, see Gene Outka, "Religious and Moral Duty," pp. 213, 222; Edmund N. Santurri, "Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling in Logical Perspective," Journal of Religious Ethics 5 (1977), pp. 225-47.

9. Compare G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, tr. T.H. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 108-10. See also H.J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral

Philosophy (London: Hutchinson, 1947; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1971), esp., pp. 129-142.

10. Dunning, p. 115.

11. Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel," p. 104. See also Evans, "Is the Concept of an Absolute Duty toward God Morally Unintelligible?," p. 141; and Outka, "Religious and Moral Duty," p. 237.

12. For a similar view, see Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 226; Miller, p. 189.

13. I. Kant, Der Streit der Fakultaeten (Hamburg: Verlag von Felis Meiner, 1959), s. 62, cited in Outka, "Religious and Moral Duty," p. 235. Cf. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), pp. 25, 51, 58. See also Clement C.J. Webb, Kant's Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), pp. 67f., 196ff.; and Charles Lewis, "Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and the Faith of Our Fathers," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (1986), p. 5.

14. Hegel, Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree (New York, 1956), pp. 422, 442.

15. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, tr. E.S. Haldane (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), Vol. III, p. 138.

16. Hegel, Enzyklopaedie, Anmerkung to section 552, Nicolin and Poeggeler edition, p. 432, cited in Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom (Pennsylvania: American Academy of religion, 1972), p. 53. Crites also says that Hegel asserts that "genuine religion and genuine religiosity proceed only from sittlichkeit, that only from the ethical sphere can the true idea of God arise...."(p. 53) See also J. Heywood Thomas' summary of the young Hegel's position: "Religion, he thought, should be the most important force for attaining morality which was the chief end of man."(Subjectivity and Paradox, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957, p. 22, emphasis given).

17. Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 142.

18. For a similar observation, see Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, pp. 13-32; Thomte, p. 66; and Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel," pp. 137f., 141, 148. Perkins speaks of Judge William's religion as "the watered down prudential version recognizable by a rather contradictory expression 'Christian hedonism'."(p. 138) He also says that "his [Judge William's] reading of Christianity is confined by ethics understood as the universal."(p. 141)

19. See FT, pp. 88=FTL, pp. 96f.; FT, pp. 109-10=FTL, p. 119; E/O, II, p. 322=E/OL, II, p. 327.

20. Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel," p. 127.

21. FT, p. 54=FTL, pp. 64-5. Cf. E/O, II, p. 255f., 328=E/OL, II, pp. 259f., 333. Compare with Herbert Marcuse's comment on the Hegelian philosophy: "The Philosophy of Mind and in fact the whole of the Hegelian system is a portrayal of the process whereby the 'individual becomes universal' and whereby 'the construction of the universality takes place'."(Reason and Revolution (New York, 1955), p. 90.

22. FTL, p. 69=FT, p. 59. See also FT, pp. 60f.=FTL, pp. 71f.

23. FT, p. 82=FTL, p. 91. Cf. CUP, p. 227.

24. See also JP, II, 1123(Pap. VIII 1 A 649). Therefore, it is quite understandable that many scholars treat Abraham as a paradigm of Christian faith. See Allen, p. 158; Shestov, pp. 147f.; Price, pp. 189-195; Arbaugh and Arbaugh, pp. 108, 112, 114, 116; Swenson, pp. 182-184; Lowrie, "Translator's Notes," FTS, p. 265, n. 24 and n. 27; Edward John Carnell, The Burden of Soren Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), pp. 126-131; Miller, pp. 200f; Mooney, "Abraham and Dilemma," p. 29; Frederick Sontag, A Kierkegaard Handbook (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979), pp. 63, 169f.; Westphal, "Abraham and Hegel," in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, pp. 63, 76-77; John Donnelly, "Kierkegaard's Problem I and Problem II: An Analytical Perspective," in ibid., p. 117; Evans, "Is the Concept of Absolute Duty...," pp. 141-151; and Gregor Malantschuk, "Hope," in JP, II, p. 584. But most of them just assume that this is the case, without seriously discussing this problem.

The only interpreter, as far as I know, who is very careful to point out this fact that Abraham is the paradigm of Christian faith is Louis Mackey. See his A Kind of Poet, pp. 206-226, esp., p. 221-223.

25. Mackey also finds a similarity between these three cases and that of Abraham. He says: "These, plus the text from which the title of this book [Phil. 2:12-13] is lifted show clearly enough that whatever Johannes says about Abraham is to be understood obliquely of the Christian believer."(A Kind of Poet, p. 222)

26. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 114. See also Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 152.

27. Cf. JP, IV, 4650(Pap. X 3 A 114). See also Collins, pp. 91, 95f. Mackey also notices the fact that Abraham is "a type or figure of faith, foreshadowing the faith of the New Covenant."(A Kind of Poet, p. 222)

28. Mackey, A Kind of Poet, p. 223. See also Westphal, "Abraham and Hegel," pp. 76-77.

29. Mackey, in relation to this, refers to Romans 4:20-25 indicating that Abraham is "foreshadowing the faith of the New Covenant". (A Kind of Poet, p. 222) He also refers to Hebrews 11:17-19. Westphal also notices the relation between Romans 4 and Hebrews 11 (and also Galatians 3) and the case of Abraham. See his "Abraham and Hegel," p. 63.

30. Cf. JP, II, 2221(Pap. X 5 A 572), 2223(Pap. X 5 A 132). For the view that Abraham in FT is a distortion of the Biblical Abraham, see Paul Dietrichson, "Introduction to a reappraisal of Fear and Trembling," Inquiry 12 (1969), pp. 236-45.

31. Cf. 2 Cor. 11:30, 12:9-10, 13:4.

32. Cf. 2 Cor. 1:18, 21, 23, 25, 2:14.

33. Cf. 2 Cor. 5:13, 11:1.

34. Cf. Lk. 14:25-27, 16:13.

35. Stendahl, p. 124. See also Shestov, pp. 83f.

36. Shestov, p. 84.

37. FT, p. 49=FTL, p. 60. See also FT, 50f.=FTL, pp. 60ff.

38. See FT, p. 99=FTL, p. 109. For a similar view, see Thomte, p. 65; Adi Shmueli, Kierkegaard and Consciousness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 44; and Shestov, p. 86.

39. Cf. E/O, II, p. 224=E/OL, II, p. 229. For a discussion of repentance mentioned in the second volume of Either/Or, see the first section of chapter II of this study.

40. Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel," p. 155. For a good discussion of the ethical person's concept of sin in contrast with the Christian concept, see Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, pp. 234-235.

41. Dunning, p. 124.

42. FT, p. 48=FTL, p. 59. See also E/O, II, pp. 206, 214=E/OL, II, pp. 210, 218. See also the first section of the second chapter of this study.

43. For a similar view on this subject, see Lowrie, "Translator's Notes," FTL, p. 265, n. 24; Allen, p. 158; Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 112; Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel," p. 280; Josiah Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth: Kierkegaard's

Pseudonymous Works (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), pp. 111, 201f.; Mackey, A Kind of Poet, pp. 214, 221; and Jerry H. Gill, "Faith Is as Faith Does," in Kierkegaard's "Fear and Trembling", p. 206.

44. Clive, p. 79.

45. Mackey, A Kind of Poet, p. 215. See also Heinecken, p. 303; and Swenson, Kierkegaardian Philosophy in the Faith of a Scholar (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1949), pp. 148f.

46. There are some commentators who notice this relation between "to be given the finite back" after having given it up and "repetition". For example, in relation to a passage (FTL, p. 33: "[It] is greater to hold fast to the temporal after having given it up."), Lowrie says: "Here we have a glimpse of 'repetition'."("Translator's Notes," FTL, p. 264, n. 15). See also Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 150; Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, pp. 120-5, esp., p. 124; and Stephen D. Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History (Chambersbrug: American Academy of Religion, 1972), p. 82. For the meaning of "repetition", see his "Introduction" to his translation of Crisis, p. 34. Note also that Crites mentions that the Danish word for repetition [Gjentagelsen] is "literally a taking or receiving again."(In the Twilight of Christendom, p. 82.)

47. See also Peter P. Rohde, "Søren Kierkegaard: The Father of Existentialism," in Jerry H. Gill, ed. Essays on Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: Burgess Pub. Co., 1969), p. 16. See again his SK, An Introduction to His Life and Philosophy, pp. 96f., 98, 99.

48. Pap. IV B 117, cited in Søe, "The Period up to the Postscript," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, eds. Niels Thulstrup and M.M. Thulstrup (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels, 1978), p. 114. See also JP, III, 3794(Pap. IV A 169). See again Lowrie, "Translator's Introduction," to RL, p. xxi.

49. Mackey, "The View from Pisgah," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 426.

50. For a similar view, see C. Edward Deyton, Speaking of Love: Kierkegaard's Plan for Faith (Lanham and London: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 107f., 111.

51. See, e.g., Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel," p. 109. See also Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, pp. 127f.

52. Mooney says that "The Knight of Faith must first have been a Knight of Infinite Resignation," even though he qualifies this by saying that "renunciation of the world must proceed or accompany a faithful commitment to God."("Abraham and Dilemma," p. 37). See also Hong and Hong, in JP, III, p. 916.

53. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 111.

54. Mackey, A Kind of Poet, p. 215, which is based on FTL, p. 46. See also Evans, "Is the Concept of Absolute Duty...," p. 145; Shmueli, pp. 43, 45; and Outka, "Religious and Moral Duty," pp. 207, 209f.

55. Cf. JP, III, 3753(Pap. X 3 A 352); JP, IV, 4242(Pap. XI 3 B 126), 4523(Pap. X 4 A 191), 4939(Pap. X 4 A 538), 4953(Pap. XI 2 A 86); JP, VI, 6824(Pap. X 4 A 673). See also Utterback, p. 169; and Harvey Albert Smit, Kierkegaard's Pilgrimage of Man: The Road of Self-Positing and Self-Abdication (Delft: W.D. Menema, N V, 1965), p. 163.

56. Cf. Evans, "Is the Concept of Absolute Duty...," p. 143

57. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, p. 87. See also Perkins, "For Sanity's Sake," p. 54: "In each case some rational explanation is possible." See again John Donnelly, "Re-examining Kierkegaard's 'Teleological Suspension of the Ethical'," in John Donnelly, ed. Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972), pp. 303-5; and his "Kierkegaard's Problem I and Problem II," pp. 123f.

58. Cf. Mooney, "Abraham and Dilemma," p. 27: "[A] tragic dilemma is in a conflict entirely within the realm of ethics, a conflict between universal 'objective' principles."

59. See FT, p. 48=FTL, 59. For a similar view on this subject, see Gill, "Faith Is as Faith Does," in Kierkegaard's "Fear and Trembling", p. 206. See also Bretall, A Kierkegaard Anthology, p. 117; Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, pp. 112, 129f.; Thompson, "The Master of Irony," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 110; Crites, "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and as Act," in ibid., p. 219.; and Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, p. 74.

60. Hannay, p. 78.

61. James J. Valone, The Ethics and Existentialism of Kierkegaard: Outlines for a Philosophy of Life (New York: University Press of America, 1983), p. 195. See also Shestov, pp. 269-76.

62. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 109. See also Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p. 77; Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology (London: Nisbet, 1936), p. 233; Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, p. 24, n.2; also his "Introduction" to Crisis, p. 40, n. 28; Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel," pp. 294, 295, 296; and Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 75. Daphne Hampson also mentioned this.

63. Mackey, "The View from Pisgah," p. 407. See also Denzil Patrick, p. 195.

64. FT, p. 50=FTL, p. 61, emphasis given. See also JP, IV, 4021(Pap. X 1 A 433). See again Perkins, "For Sanity's Sake," p. 58.

65. See TC, p. 89; LY, pp. 81f.(Pap. XI 1 A 193); JP, I, 974(Pap. X 1 A 412); JP, III, 3369(Pap. II A 313); JP, V, 6146(Pap. IX A 25).

66. FT, p. 36=FTL, p. 46. For a good discussion of this point, see Dunning, "What is Fear and Trembling Really About?," pp. 4f., 12f. I used Dunning's type-written version of this article. I thank him for sending me this article to read.

67. Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p. 156.

68. FT, p. 81=FTL, p. 91. See also Shestov, p. 150.

69. Perkins, "For Sanity's Sake," p. 54.

70. This discussion implies that there is a fundamental barrier that it erects between the believer and the unbeliever. For a good discussion of this barrier, see David J. Wren, "Abraham's Silence and the Logic of Faith," pp. 159-164. See also Evans, "Is the Concept of an Absolute Duty...", pp. 141-151, esp. pp. 146, 150.

71. There are some critics who also think of Abraham and Kierkegaard in this way. For example, Brand Blanshard, "Kierkegaard on Faith," The Personalist 49 (1968): 5-23, reprinted in Essays on Kierkegaard, pp. 113-125.

72. Evans, "Is the Concept of Absolute Duty...," pp. 150, cf. p. 146. See also JP, V, 6001(Pap. VIII 1 A 116); JP, IV, 6768(Pap. X 4 A 141). See again Mackey, "The View from Pisgah," p. 396.

73. Carnell, p. 127. See also Stendahl, p. 127.

74. As we shall see in the next section of this chapter, this theme is deeply developed in Works of Love.

75. Blanshard, "Kierkegaard on Faith," p. 114.

76. This is very different from what Roman Catholic moral theologians think of the relation between the ethical and what is revealed supernaturally. The difference between Kierkegaard's understanding of Christian ethics and Roman Catholic moral theology will be extensively discussed in section 3 of this chapter.

77. Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel," p. 109. See also his "For Sanity's Sake," p. 56.

78. Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Way to the Truth: An Introduction to the Authorship of Søren Kierkegaard, trans. Mary Michelsen (Minnesota: Augsburg Pub. House, 1963), p. 53.

79. Kerrigan, p. 160.

II

In this section, I want to show that Christian ethics understood by Kierkegaard as the ethics of Christian love in Works of Love is based on his Christian faith.[1] This implies the following three things. Firstly, Christian ethics of love is a response to the Christian God's love. Secondly, Christian love always has this God as its middle term; Christian love is one's relationship with others as one relates to God. Thirdly, Christian ethics as understood in terms of love also has social implications. That is, Christian love can also be applied to social relationships.

In the course of this discussion, a clear contrast will be made between the Christian understanding of love and the understanding of the person in the ethical sphere. As we shall see, it is difficult to say that the Christian and the natural man have the same understanding of ethics, and that Christian love is merely the identification of the ethical relationship between one man and another. For, as we shall show, their conceptions of love are substantially different from one another.

Before proceeding to show this, a brief understanding of the text which we shall examine in this section is in order. It is very obvious that Works of Love is a book in which Kierkegaard develops his understanding of Christian ethics in terms of "works of love".[2] This book is quite obviously a Christian writing. It has a subtitle which makes this fact clear: Some Christian

Reflections in the Form of Discourses. True to this subtitle, the book is in a sense a kind of exposition of some verses in the New Testament (e.g., Luke 6:44, Matt 22:39, Romans 13:8, 10, I Tim 1:5, I John 4:20, I Cor. 8:1, 13:5, 7, 13). And in this book, as Croxall says, "New Testament ethics are taken seriously and literally."[3] This ethics is considered to be the ethics of Christian love. Kierkegaard makes it quite clear that in this book he is talking about "the love about which Christianity speaks."(WL, p. 7) He sometimes speaks very directly of "Christian love".(WL, pp. 7, 20, 25, 41, et passim) This book is not a neutral reflection on the theme of love, but rather it is a Christian reflection on Christian love. But this does not mean that what is considered in this book is only a part of love as a whole. On the contrary, Kierkegaard believes and asserts that Christianity "has made manifest what love [really] is."(WL, p. 44) So for him "Christian love is the essential love, as, from the Christian viewpoint, there is only one kind of love."[4] For Christianity "has transformed everything, has transformed all love."(WL, p. 119) So only Christian love is regarded as the true love, love divinely understood, love eternal, and love the supreme good.

Let us then begin the main discussion of this section: the proposition that Christian ethics as works of love are based on Christian faith. As I have indicated, this proposition will be discussed from the following three perspectives: (1) Christian ethics as expressed in Works of Love is a response to the Christian God's love, (2) Christian love has this God as its

middle term, and (3) Christian ethics as works of love has social implications.

(a)

Let us start with a consideration that Christian love is a response to the Christian God's love. This point is rather less obvious in the main discussion of love in this book. However, this is what is presupposed in it, and there are some indications of this fact in this book. One of the most important indications of this can be found in the "Prayer" at the beginning of the book.(WL, p. 4) The inexhaustibly fertile contents of this prayer cannot be analyzed in full here. However, we can make several important observations about it. First of all, it must be borne in mind that the one who is the object (or, more accurately, the other subject) of this prayer, the one who hears this prayer is the Christian God. He is understood in this prayer as the triune God. Kierkegaard repeats three times this clause "How could anything rightly be said about love if Thou wert forgotten", and after each of them he calls God "Thou God of Love, from whom all love comes in heaven and on earth"{God the Father}, "Thou, our Saviour and Redeemer, who gave Himself to save us"{God the Son}, and "Thou Spirit of Love"{God the Spirit}. He makes this prayer to this triune God. Secondly, therefore, when he speaks of God as "God of Love" or "Thou who art love", these cannot be understood as reducing God to the concept of love, or the principle of love, or love itself understood as an Abstract. To repeat the old-fashioned expression, Kierkegaard calls God love, but does not call love (as an abstract concept or the principle of love) God.

Kierkegaard's God is personal.[5] God, for Kierkegaard, cannot be reduced to an abstract principle of love. And thirdly, only in relation to this personal triune God can one properly speak about love, and works of love. One may say that only when one comes to know God can one know what love is, not the other way around. God who loves us, who gave Himself to save us, and who reminds the believer to love as he is loved by this God, is the fundamental presupposition of Christian love. If this is the case, what is described in relation to God the Father is also best understood as being related to this special love, "the Agape of the Cross", to use Nygren's words.[6] Then the expression, "so the lover is only what he is through being in Thee", for example, also means that one can love only in relation to this trinitarian God who expressed His love in His salvific works, rather than generally that everybody who loves in any sense is in fact in God.

To put these three points in a sentence, we may say that Kierkegaard understands God's love as the salvific love of the trinitarian God. God the Father is described as the origin of love "from whom all love comes"; God the Son as the one who conclusively expressed this love through giving "Himself to save us all"; and God the Spirit as the one who makes us know and remember the sacrifice of love which God the Son offered.

From this trinitarian-soteriological understanding of love, Kierkegaard draws out the characteristics of Christian love which we as Christians have to express. That is, first of all, to love as we are loved by God; to love our neighbour as ourselves. Moreover, since it is based on God's love which accomplished the

redemption and is under the works of the Holy Spirit, it is "without claim or merit". In this sense, this prayer succinctly reflects what Kierkegaard tries to say in this volume as a whole. But some people may raise an objection that such a trinitarian understanding of love is expressed here because it is a prayer and so follows the traditional way of expressing one's prayer. So let us think about whether such a trinitarian-soteriological understanding of love is confined to this prayer, or can also be found in other places in this volume.

It is true that expressions about the Trinity are rare in this book. We have already suggested the reason for this: in this book Kierkegaard presupposes the traditional understanding of the Trinity.[7] There is, however, one place in which Kierkegaard clearly speaks of the Trinity centering on God the Son. He says:

> He was One with the Father, and in community of love was One with the Father and the Holy Spirit, He who loved the whole race, our Lord Jesus Christ....He was indeed the God-Man, and so eternally different from every other man, but He was, nevertheless, also true man, tried everything human.(WL, p. 125)

This description centres on God the Son who was incarnate as Jesus. But it is quite clear that the incarnate One is One with God the Father and the Holy Spirit and that He is the God-Man, true God(vere deus) and true man(vere homo) at the same time. Such an understanding is presupposed throughout the book. For Kierkegaard, who thinks of the event of Incarnation as that of love in order to save us (i.e., salvific love), frequently mentions this love of God. For example, he says: "God loved us first....[When] the question was about reconciliation, God was the

one who came first".[8]

Hence God's love is prior. However, as Kierkegaard says in one of his journal entries, "all by himself no man can ever come to think that God loves him. This must be proclaimed to men. This is the gospel, this is revelation."(JP, II, 1216(Pap. VIII 1 A 675)) And according to Kierkegaard, Christ and the Christ event is the expression of God's love for us. Christ is our Saviour who saves us.[9] Hence we may say with Mackintosh that "we find no cause to doubt the truth of [Kierkegaard's] impassioned affirmation that for him also the certainty of God's fatherly love in Christ was the Archimedean point."[10] But at the same time Christ is our Teacher(WL, p. 99), or Pattern.(WL, pp. 214, 233)[11] That is to say, Christ saves us to make us follow Him. What is emphasized in this book is that what must be learnt and imitated is love expressed by Christ.[12] Through Christ we learn of the nature of God's love. Actually, this book asserts that Christ is the only source of true love. Kierkegaard says that "what love is, divinely understood, this the best of men could learn only from Him [Christ]."[13]

Let us then consider at length how Kierkegaard understands the love of Christ. Basically, Christ "loved by virtue of the divine understanding of what love is."(WL, p. 90) By this assertion Kierkegaard emphasizes the difference between the human understanding of love and the divine understanding of love. Throughout this book, Kierkegaard observes the conflict between the human (understanding of) love, or the earthly love, or worldly (understanding of) love, on the one hand, and the divine

understanding of love, or spiritual love, or Christian (understanding of) love, on the other.[14] And he says: "[Christianity] really knows only one kind of love, spiritual love."(WL, p. 116. cf. pp. 118f.) And this love is concretely revealed by the God-Man. This is one of the strongest assertions which Kierkegaard makes in this book.(cf. WL, pp. 21, 44, 89f, 97f., 116, et passim) In this sense, Kierkegaard himself thinks that this book is "the powerful polemic."(JP, V, 6111(Pap. VIII 1 A 559)) What is the fundamental difference between "true love as God understands it" (or "spiritual love") and "earthly love"? This we shall consider in detail in relation to the second point of this section that Christian love is love which has God as the middle term. Here I shall just point out three characteristics which are expressed in Kierkegaard's description of Christ's love.

First of all, Christ's love was "the fulfilment of law", and therefore "the fullness of the law".[15] (When Kierkegaard speaks of the law he is speaking of the law of God.[16]) When Kierkegaard speaks of Christ's love as "the fulfilment of law", he is thinking of two closely related points. One of them is the fact that Christ's love was one which accomplished completely the demand of God; what was demanded in the law was thoroughly carried out by Christ. In this sense, he is the fulfilment of the law. But there is another point which we also have to consider in relation to this phrase "the fulfilment of the law". That is that the ultimate demand of the law of God is love in the divine sense. In relation to this point Kierkegaard says:

> [There] is no more conflict between the law and love than there is between the sum and those numbers whose sum it is; as

> little as there is conflict between the vain attempt to find the sum and the successful finding of it, the happy decision that it has been found.(WL, p. 86)

Here we can see the profile of Kierkegaard who is overcoming and transcending the traditional Lutheran dualism of law and gospel.[17] And according to Kierkegaard, Christ's love satisfied the demand of love as the sum of what is demanded in the law.

The second characteristic of Christ's love drawn from Works of Love is that Christ's love was perpetually active.(WL, pp. 81f.) His love is always new, for he always actively loves with the love of eternity.(WL, p. 82) Such an activity can only come from the fact that He loves with love as it is divinely understood. Hence this activity of love also implies the limitlessness of His love in loving others.(WL, p. 139) Christ's love as perpetually active love is boundless in its activity of loving.

The third characteristic is closely related to the last one, for the fact that "His love recognized no difference" (our third point) can also be observed as an expression of the fact that He always loved actively (our second point). His love did not know any difference. In this sense His love was limitless in its width. As Kierkegaard says, "His sole wish was that everyone should become His disciple."(WL, p. 82) Christ loved with love which had these characteristics. Kierkegaard says:

> He [Christ] loved by virtue of the divine understanding of what love is....Therefore His whole life was a terrible collision with the purely human understanding of what love is....Thus Christianity came into the world, and with Christianity came the divine explanation of what love is.(WL, p. 90, emphasis given)

So far we have discussed the love which Christ showed us. Having discussed the characteristics of God's love revealed in Christ's act of love, we have to ask: how does this love relate to our acts of love? In the next few paragraphs, I shall discuss this.

The existence of the God-Man as the only true expression of love divinely understood urges us to respond to this divine love.[18] In this sense, Christian love is basically a response to God's love expressed in the existence of Jesus Christ as the God-Man.[19] The fact that one is loved by Christ in this way makes one aware of one's responsibility to love others in the same way. In this sense, Kierkegaard speaks of Christ as the pattern.(WL, pp. 23, 214, 233) What Kierkegaard wants to say here is that the Christian must be aware that he is the one who is supposed to resemble Christ. In this act of resembling Him, one can resemble God and be God's fellow-labourer.(WL, p. 52)

We have already observed that God definitely expressed His love in the redemptive love of Christ. Hence the Christian is commanded to love as a person who was enabled to love, not by his own power, but with the love which was given to him. To put this differently, the spontaneity of Christian love, as Arbaugh and Arbaugh say, "springs directly from the life of faith."[20] Hence, in relation to the Christian's experience, there is no conflict between God's command and one's spontaneous love. For, as Watson well observes, Christian love "means a whole-hearted surrender to God, whereby man becomes God's willing slave, content to be at His disposal, having entire trust and confidence in Him and desiring

only that His will should be done."[21] Here we can see one of the basic differences between the Christian perspective, on the one hand, and the ethical perspective and the perspective of religiousness A, on the other. Let us consider this matter more closely.

In one place, Kierkegaard asserts that love is a matter of heart and of conscience by using biblical reference(I Tim. 1:5). He says that "[love] must be from a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of an unfeigned faith."(WL, p. 111, 119) When he says this, he is thinking of heart and conscience as understood by Christianity. The heart of which he is thinking is not neutral, but is related to God. "[This] heart," says Kierkegaard, "must be bound to God....the heart must be bound illimitably to God, if it will be pure."(WL, p. 120) Likewise for him conscience is also basically related to God. As he says: "[What] is conscience? In the conscience it is God who looks at a man, so the man must in everything see God. Thus does God educate."(WL, p. 304) In another place, he speaks of conscience as the God-relationship.[22] In this sense, Croxall is quite right when he says that "there is no conscience, according to Kierkegaard, without God."[23] Hence love comes from the heart bound to God, and of a good conscience which is regarded as the God-relationship. This means that if our heart is not bound to God, and if our so-called conscience does not know the God-relationship in the real sense we cannot love with the love divinely understood. In other words, only in relation to God can we understand and do what is commanded by God.(WL, p. 21) So only

when one is in relation to God is there no conflict between the divine command to love and spontaneous love. When such a person loves, he loves voluntarily and spontaneously, but he is basically commanded by God to love.

In this sense, Christian love, as a response to God's love, is regarded as duty. Here is a new understanding of duty. From this Christian perspective, duty is not something which can be found out autonomously by rationalistic, and universalistic moral judgement as understood in the ethical sphere and religiousness A. Rather duty is what is commanded by Christ.[24] When Christ says that "Thou shalt love", then that is precisely one's duty.(WL, p. 20) The Christian is commanded to love others as he was loved, and "such a commandment has not originated in any human heart."(WL, pp. 20-21) We have already observed that this love of God is definitely expressed in the redemptive love of Christ.

In another place, Kierkegaard shows this (i.e., that Christian love is one's response to God's love expressed by Christ) by using the concept of debt. He says that love may be regarded as an infinite debt. At first glance, the meaning may be ambiguous. But when we see the intention with which Kierkegaard uses this concept, we can understand that by debt Kierkegaard means a debt of love which the Christian owes God. Let us first quote one passage.

> However, love is perhaps most correctly described as an infinite debt...Generally we say about the one who is loved, that through being loved he becomes a debtor...[but] he who loves is [also] in an infinite debt...when the lover gives what is infinitely the highest gift one man can give another, his love, then he places himself in an infinite debt.(WL, p. 143)

In this passage, Kierkegaard says that both the one who is loved by another and the one who loves another are in an infinite debt. He intimates that one can easily understand this expression in relation to the one who is loved by somebody else. But by saying that the one who loves is also in an infinite debt, he indicates that he is not talking about an ordinary case of the debt of love. Here we have to ask what makes Kierkegaard assert that "to love is to assume an infinite debt."(WL, p. 152) It is not easy to answer this question, but one may find a clue in Kierkegaard's emphasis on remaining in debt. That is to say, the true lover always wishes to remain in debt; he does not think at any moment that he has done all the things which he has to do in relation to the person he is loving.(cf. WL, p. 152) For, as Shmueli says, "the love of others is a debt that constantly increases even while one attempts to pay it off. It is an infinite involvement; the more one loves the more one needs to love."[25] So in a love-relationship one must do everything but "fear only one thing, that he might thus do everything so that he would get out of debt."(WL, p. 145) The duty to love thus includes the duty to remain in the debt of love to each other. So there is no resting-place in the works of love.[26] The true lover is always awake and working, for such a lover always feels himself as a debtor.

Kierkegaard describes such a debt-relationship in the following way, (and here we can finally find the answer to the question raised above):

> This debt-relation is carried over into the relation between man and God. It is God who, so to speak, kindly takes charge

> of the demand of love; by loving a man the lover comes into an infinite debt - but also a debt to God as guardian of the beloved. Now comparison becomes impossible, and now love has found its master.(WL, p. 153)

Here God is expressed as the master of love, and it is asserted that everybody must be related to this God in their love. So in the end, one is in an infinite debt only in relation to God. "God is love", says Kierkegaard, "hence the individual must remain in debt - as God judges him, or as he abides in God, for only in the infinitude of debt can God abide in him."(WL, p. 154) Hence the one who places himself in an infinite debt in loving others thinks and acts in relation to God at every moment of his life. He is always in an infinite debt in his loving. For "before God [we have] by no means been able to pay the debt of loving one another!"(WL, p. 155)

But here one of the most difficult questions may be raised: can one love in this way by oneself? Kierkegaard gives a very definite answer to this question: it is not possible for one to love others with this love by oneself. As Malantschuk correctly observes: "The distance between a person's ability and the ideal is at its greatest here [the divine command of love], which makes man's need of grace especially obvious."[27] That is to say, one can carry out this divine command of love only in relation to the works of God the Spirit. So the true lover can only be described as follows: "[The true lover] breathes in God, he draws the nourishment for his love from God, he is strengthened through God."(WL, p. 197) In this sense, God is the origin of love. And in relation to this, Kierkegaard says that "a man's love is

grounded...in the love of God....[Human] love mysteriously grounded in God's love."(WL, p. 8) So it is now clear that love divinely understood, or Christian love is a response to God's love, and at the same time, this response also comes from God's love itself. So Christian love is, as Arbaugh and Arbaugh say, "the spontaneous expression of one's very being after [one] has been transformed by faith....[And it] is made possible through divine grace, a power without which one could not fulfil the good...."[28]

However, here one must be aware that Kierkegaard does not suggest any infusion of God's love which works automatically.[29] For Kierkegaard, one is before God, or related to God at every moment of one's life. And in relation to God, one always finds oneself as a person who has not yet accomplished what is demanded. Kierkegaard himself confesses:

> [I] shall admit, that many times it has offended me, and that I am still very far from imagining that I have fulfilled this commandment [of love], which to flesh and blood is an offense, and to wisdom foolishness.(WL, p. 49)

This limitation is not only his, for every Christian has to make the same confession. Nobody has reached perfection and Christianity does not teach that we can accomplish the perfection of love. Hence the Christian loves spontaneously, but he always feels that he has not completely accomplished what is demanded by God.

Why is this the case? One of the reasons can be found in the nature of Christian love. As we have seen, Christian love is not something which can be accomplished at a moment once-for-all, rather it is a continuous activity, pure activity.[30] This also implies that one cannot depend upon oneself even in one's loving.(WL, p. 6) Kierkegaard says: "And how often has not a victory been won in vain, if the victor then became proud, conceited, arrogant, self-satisfied, and thus lost just through having conquered!"(WL, p. 269) For man is always in need of God. Without God he is too strong (in an ironical sense) by himself, so he does not love in the true sense and does not feel the necessity of being loved. However, such a man falls precisely at the moment in which he thinks that he is standing. Hence Kierkegaard says: "A man only stands then after having overcome everything, when he immediately, at the very moment of victory, ascribes the victory to God."(WL, pp. 269f.) This is the way love always behaves. In this sense, Kierkegaard says that "this is the highest and truest wealth of the devout that he needs God"(WL, p. 9), and that "it is a saving grace if you do it [to love others in the Christian sense]."(WL, p. 50) Such a true lover does not claim any merit, for he always thinks that only God does all things, and he also "understands that before God he is simply without merit."[31]

Now we can understand the seriousness of the question of whether one can love others in the Christian way by oneself. The reason for the negative answer to this question lies in the fact that Christian love is not something which one can do by oneself. It is possible only in relation to God. Hence we can assert, as

we have intimated at the beginning of this discussion, that Kierkegaard thinks that love divinely understood is originally God's love and the spiritual response of the human to this divine love.[32] This is the first characteristic of Christian love. In the discussion of this characteristic we have also observed the absolute difference between merely human love and Christian love. This difference will be clearer in the discussion of the second characteristic of Christian love.

(b)

The second characteristic of Christian love - that "God is the middle term in one's love" - is basically a logical consequence of the first characteristic, that Christian love is of divine origin and therefore the spiritual response of human beings to God's love. Kierkegaard uses this expression "the middle term" to characterize Christian love. For example, he says:

> Worldly wisdom believes that love is a relationship between man and man; Christianity teaches that love is a relationship between man - God - man, that is, that God is the middle term.(WL, p. 87, Kierkegaard's emphasis)

The fertile meaning of this sentence cannot be properly described within the limits of this section. Here I just want to adumbrate the meaning of the clause that "God is the middle term", by considering it in relation to three related elements of Christian love: "love to God", "love to neighbour", and "love to oneself". I think that the meaning of "God is the middle term" can well be produced in our consideration of these related elements of love; "love to God" as the whole of love, "love to neighbour" as the outward expression of love, and "love to oneself (in the proper

way)" as the inward expression of love. These three elements cannot be separated in the activity of love; they may be called three aspects of one love. And here is the meaning of "God is the middle term of love." Let us consider these three elements in turn.

Firstly, "love to God" as the origin of Christian love as a whole. According to Christianity, God is the only One who is able to be the object of love.[33] In this spirit, Kierkegaard can say that God is not only the third person in every love-relationship, but that He Himself is in fact the only beloved object. Kierkegaard uses the expression "love to God" and the strangely coined phrase "God-relationship" interchangeably. For the true God-relationship is the relationship of love; to have a relationship with God is to love God. In one of his journal entries, Kierkegaard says: "If a man really honestly says: God is love, then this man eo ipso has only one desire, to love God (who is love) with all his heart and all his strength."(JP, I, 538(Pap. X4 A 624)) Yet, as the expression "God is the middle term of love" suggests, Kierkegaard tries to see God in the love relationship between people as the one who is the most central in their love relationship. So it is important for Kierkegaard to put the God-relationship and "love to God" in the foreground. He says that "ultimately love to God is the decisive thing; from it stems love to the neighbor, but paganism never suspected this. They left God out."(WL, p. 48) For Kierkegaard "love to God" is the origin of human's spiritual love as a whole. Without "love to God", there is no love at all.

The criterion of being in Christian love, therefore, is only "love to God", or a God-relationship. Kierkegaard says:

> However beautiful a love-relationship has been between two or among many, however absolutely this love has been to them the source of all their happiness and all their blessedness in mutual sacrifice and renunciation, whether all men have praised this relationship - if God and the God-relationship have been neglected, then from the Christian viewpoint it has not been love, but a mutually enchanting illusion of love.(WL, p. 87, cf. WL, pp. 98f.)

As this quotation shows, for Kierkegaard the God-relationship is the most important thing; it is the matter of life and death in relation to love. In this sense, in some places Kierkegaard speaks of the God-relationship as the supreme good.(WL, pp. 42f., 190)

The mention of the supreme good (summum bonum) makes us think about something more than the God-relationship as being the criterion of love. For in this book, the God-relationship also appears as the standard of love, and therefore of Christian ethics and living. Here is another place in which we can detect the absolute difference between Christian ethics and other ethics in the world with regard to love. Kierkegaard says:

> The world simply does not notice that such a man [the Christian as a lover] has a totally different standard for his life, and that this explains the whole procedure quite simply, while, explained according to the world's standard, it becomes quite meaningless. But since the world does not realize and does not wish to realize that this standard, the God-relationship, exists, hence it cannot explain such a man's conduct as anything except a peculiarity - for the fact that it is Christian conduct naturally cannot occur to the world, which as Christian certainly best knows what Christianity is.(WL, p. 164, emphasis given)

Hence, for the Christian, the standard of ethics is the God-relationship which is not the case in any other ethics.[34]

Whereas "[the] pagan and the natural man have the merely human self" as their standard (SUD, p. 81=SUDL, pp. 211f.), Kierkegaard's Christian has the divine standard.[35] To say that the God-relationship is the standard for Christian living has two kinds of implication.

First of all, it means that the Christian is always in the presence of God, that is, he must be aware of being before God at every moment in his life.[36] The true lover "does not forget that he is before God, wherever he is."(WL, p. 294, cf. JP, III, 2407(Pap. VIII 1 A 89)) Hence the consideration of what is morally right and wrong must be done in the presence of God, that is, in relation to God. Kierkegaard says that "it is God who must decide what in every case is love."[37] God-relationship means one's awareness of being before God, and such a person who is aware of being in the presence of God cannot help but obey God.(WL, p. 98)

Secondly, to say that the God-relationship is the standard of Christian ethics also implies the absoluteness of God's standards. As we have discussed in the last part of this section, there is nobody who dares to assert that he has accomplished and reached the standards of God. God's standards always make us nothing[38], or "less than nothing".(JP, VI, 6823(Pap. X 4 A 663)) For God's standard is so far above ours that it destroys our relative differences.[39] "Therefore," says Kierkegaard, "the merely human understanding finds it so difficult."(JP, I, 515)

Here we may raise the question of how this "love to God", this God-relationship, is expressed in relation to other people. By raising this question we have already turned to the second element of Christian love - "love to one's neighbour". Love for God is inevitably expressed even in one's relation to others. This is one of the main characteristics of love for God. For Kierkegaard Christian love is always actively expressed even to others as in loving one's neighbour.[40]

However, here one important point must be emphasized. That is, the love for one's neighbour does not completely express or exhaust love for God, as some people suggest.[41] One should love God with all one's heart and with all one's soul and with all one's mind: one should love one's neighbour as oneself.(WL, p. 17) There must be a clear difference between one's "love to God" and one's "love to others".[42] If there is no difference between them, if one's love for one's neighbour completely expresses or exhausts one's love for God, then the neighbour becomes one's idol, and then this love is not love, but idolatry. So Kierkegaard emphasizes that God and love for God must be put first; "Christianity teaches that God has the first priority."(WL, p. 121, cf. JP, III, 2428(Pap. X2 A 63)) The command that we should love God is prior to the command that we should love our neighbour and gives content and meaning to it. This is "[because] man primarily belongs to God before he belongs to any other relationship, he must first be asked whether he has taken council with God and with his conscience."[43] So even in love for one's neighbour the love for God or God-relationship is the most

important factor.

Therefore, Kierkegaard understands love for neighbour in relation to love for God. The concept of loving one's neighbour is used by Kierkegaard in a very special way; it does not mean just loving others in the ordinary sense.[44] It cannot be equated with the Kantian categorical imperative of "[acting] in such a way that you always treat humanity...in the person of every other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end".[45] In order to see these points, we have to look closely at Kierkegaard's concept of neighbour. According to Kierkegaard, only when God is the middle term is there any chance at all of discovering one's neighbour. Love for God is the source of one's love for others.(WL, p. 130) Hence without God, without neighbour; "it is only in company with God that one discovers [one's] 'neighbor,' for God is the middle term".(WL, p. 64)[46]

Therefore, there are two things which must be borne in mind when we think about the concept of loving one's neighbour. The first thing is, as we have observed, that Christian love for one's neighbour springs from the same root as Christian love for God - the divine love. In short, the divine origin of Christian love is the first thing which makes Christian love different from Kantian ethics. Another thing which also must be borne in mind is the fact that the reason why Kierkegaard is talking about loving the neighbour is only because Jesus Christ commanded this love just in this form; "Thou shalt love thy neighbor."(WL, p. 15, et passim. cf. Matt. 22:39) What is important to him is to "act according to the command and orders of Christ, [and to] do the will of the

Father."(JP, III, 3023(Pap. XI 1 A 339)) We cannot avoid the naivety of Kierkegaard. He just accepts this command. But, as Michael Paul Plekon says, this is the most important aspect of Christian love: "Most importantly, this love is the mandatum novum, the new commandment of which Christ spoke...It is ordered: you shall love."[47] This command is the starting point of Kierkegaard's discussion of this subject.[48] This is something already given. He just assumes that the concept that one should love one's neighbour is given as the command of love, and that Christianity comes with this command. Here is one of the fundamental differences between the Christian ethics of love and any other forms of ethics. In relation to this, the Christian and Kierkegaard himself are not ashamed of being observed by Kantian ethicist as heteronomous and authoritarian.

Based upon this understanding we can agree with Arbaugh and Arbaugh when they say: "Is this Christian duty a Kantian imperative? Indeed it is categorical, but on non-Kantian grounds....A Christian loves his neighbour because it is the will of God that he does so, not because the neighbour needs or merits it."[49] Bowen also thinks that for Kant the form of the categorical imperative is itself more important than God, the commander, and says that "Kierkegaard obviously thought that Kant had the cart before the horse" and regards it as "inversion of priority."[50] Hence, pace Friemond who thinks that Kierkegaard should be regarded as a direct follower of Kant[51], there is a fundamental difference between the ethics which comes from the Kantian categorical imperative and Christian ethics which follows

Christ's command to love one's neighbour.

The Christian is thus commanded by God to love his neighbour without any discrimination. This also implies that to love one's neighbour is to love him as he is. One should not love the imagined form which he himself has projected from his own imagination on the actual person, but the actual person himself.[52] Hence the true lover can only be described as follows: "[He] loves every man according to his own characteristics...he seeks the other's own."(WL, p. 218, Kierkegaard's emphasis) So in true love, it does not matter whether the one to be loved has faults, or weaknesses, or imperfections. For "in earnestness and truth he loves them as they are."(WL, p. 135) Hence the genuine Christian lover forgives others and believes that God is able to create love in their heart.

There is one more step for the Christian lover to take: helping the other man to seek God. For true love, the "sacrifice would precisely consist in helping the other man to seek God."(WL, p. 214) In another place, Kierkegaard says again:

> A love-relationship is threefold: the lover, the beloved, the love; but the love is God. And, therefore, to love another man is to help him to love God, and to be loved is to be helped to love God.(WL, p. 99, emphasis given)

Hence helping the other man to seek God is the most important aspect, and the ultimate expression of one's love. Thus Kierkegaard says again: "The love which does not lead to God, the love which does not have this as its sole goal, to lead the lovers to love God, stops at the purely human judgment as to what love

and what love's sacrifice and submission are...."(WL, 92f.) Yet when we consider the point that to seek God is, for Kierkegaard, the only way in which one becomes oneself, we also have to say that to help the other man to seek God is also to help him to be himself in the real sense.(WL, p. 225) In order to help someone to be himself, the Christian lover helps him to seek God. Here is the best expression of one's love for another.

Now it is clear that for Kierkegaard only the Christian expression of love, which is based on Christ's command of love for one's neighbour, which does not have any limitation in its width and depth, which depends only on God and His love, and which helps others to be themselves by seeking God, is true love. For Kierkegaard, "[all] other love...is nevertheless perishable, it merely blooms."(WL, p. 7) In this spirit, Kierkegaard says:

> [Wherever] Christianity does not exist, the intoxication of self-esteem reaches its maximum, and this intoxicated exaltation is what is admired. But earthly love and friendship are the highest expression of self-esteem; they are the I intoxicated in the other I.(WL, pp. 46f.)

From this observation Kierkegaard draws out the conclusion that what is regarded as true love in the world in reality is <u>idolatry</u>.(WL, p. 48) What is regarded as love in the world, as idolatry from the perspective of Christianity, does also have the following three characteristics: changeability (WL, pp. 25-31), not being free (WL, p. 32-33), and being liable to come to despair.(WL, pp. 33-36) In short, it is not eternal.(WL, p. 16) "But Christian love is eternal...it has the truth of the eternal in it."(WL, p. 7) In this spirit Kierkegaard also says: "But the Christian love abides, and just for that reason it <u>is</u>...it must be

believed and it must be lived."(WL, p. 7)

How is this true love then expressed in relation to oneself? In this question we are entering the discussion of the third element of Christian love - the "true love to oneself". Yes, we said "love to oneself". How can it be? Did not we say that true expressions of love are demonstrated only in self-denial, or self-sacrifice? Yes, we said precisely this in our discussion of "neighbour-love", and Kierkegaard emphasizes that "[true] love is the self-denying love."[53] Therefore, it is understandable how one could assert, as Nygren does, that Christian love "has no place for self-love. Christianity does not recognise self-love Christian....Agape cannot recognise any such thing as a justifiable self-love."[54] However, Kierkegaard says that one can love oneself in the true sense.(Cf. JP, III, 3771(Pap. X 5 A 53)) So there are two kinds of love to oneself: love to oneself which must be negated in the activity of love and love to oneself which is expressed in the activity of love, which is "self-love in a good sense"[55], or, as Gene Outka calls it, "a proper or justified or true self-love"[56]. Hence the activity of love is also observed as a transformation of one's "love to oneself" from the negative one to the positive one, from the egocentric one to a purely theocentric one. From this transformed, theocentric, viewpoint, as Lindstroem says, "the new signification of the word self-love is capable of expressing something essential concerning man in his capacity of being a creature whom God has created and given a special mission to."[57]

It is true that according to Kierkegaard, the positive and true love for oneself which is expressed in the works of love is closely related to self-abnegation, self-denial, or self-sacrifice. But this self-denial is not a way in which one can assert one's spiritual welfare. Rather, this self-denial must be regarded as the normal attitude of a human being towards God and others and himself. This paradoxical truth can properly be understood only in relation to the problem of becoming a self which we shall consider in the next chapter. As we shall see, for Kierkegaard, to be oneself in the real sense of the word is possible only in relation to God, and this relation to God is expressed to others as the love for one's neighbour. In order to be oneself, one first should be sober. In relation to this sobriety, Kierkegaard says:

> Everywhere where Christianity exists there is also self-abnegation, which is Christianity's essential form. In order to live as a Christian, one must first and foremost become sober; but self-abnegation is exactly the transition through which a man, in the meaning of the eternal, becomes sober.(WL, p. 46)

Hence "loving oneself in the true sense", which is one of the important elements of becoming oneself, Kierkegaard regards positively. And along with love for God and love for one's neighbour, love for oneself constitutes true love. And true self-love can only be found in love for one's neighbour; true self-love is self-abnegation which is an inward expression of love for one's neighbour.[58]

Now we have examined all of the elements of Christian love - one's love for God, one's love for one's neighbour, and one's love for oneself. We have shown that these three elements of Christian love are closely related to one another. In fact, the meaning of Christian love can be summarized, as I have intimated at the beginning of this discussion, with the expression that "God is the middle term of one's love". This expression firstly shows the priority of the "love to God"; secondly, the relatedness of the "love to God" and the "love to one's neighbour"; and thirdly, the possibility of true love for oneself in relation to God. In this sense, the second characteristic of Christian love can be found in this expression "God is the middle term of the Christian's love".

(c)

Now let us turn to the problem of social ethics. Does Kierkegaard have social ethics? The answer to this question depends on one's conception of social ethics. If one thinks that social ethics should be dealt with from a different perspective to that with which one deals with personal ethics, then one should say that Kierkegaard does not have any social ethics. For example, D.D. Williams says:

> Kierkegaard lacked a social ethical doctrine of agape which is no less concerned to break through to neighbour, but is less naive about how social orders corrupt human relationships....Kierkegaard's doctrine remains inadequate.[59]

For, according to Kierkegaard, the Christian sees the problems of social ethics with the same eyes with which he sees the problems of personal ethics. We have seen above that the Christian regards

Christian love as spiritual love and applies this spiritual love to his ethics. So his ethics can be designated as "Spiritual ethics", because he thinks that the accomplishment of the summum bonum in his ethics is possible only under the influence of the Holy Spirit. The Christian, as understood by Kierkegaard, thinks that one should apply the principle of love even to problems of social ethics. Kierkegaard thinks that the basis of social ethics is also commanded by Jesus Christ and the accomplishment of this ideal is also possible only in relation to the influence of the Holy Spirit. In this sense, as Arbaugh and Arbaugh say, Christian "love is the invisible life of the spirit and the source of Christian social concern."[60] In this spirit, Kierkegaard says: "Christianity is not indifferent to anything secular, on the contrary, it is solely spiritually concerned for everything."(WL, p. 117) For those who think in this way, as Heinecken well expressed, "[the] oft repeated criticism that Kierkegaard has no social ethics is really without foundation, as is quite apparent from a study of the Works of Love."[61]

Someone will ask whether it is possible to think in this way after Karl Marx. This is a vast question and it needs separate study. In this section, I just assume that it is possible, and by doing so I am following Jeremy Walker and Werner Stark who assert as follows:

> There can be, I believe, no valid 'synthesis' of the Marxian and the Kierkegaardian answers to the fundamental question of commitment. Their radical humanisms are in immediate opposition. Nor can there be, I believe, a third answer, given the exhaustiveness of their opposing humanisms. It is not possible to evade the question. Therefore the basic question for our time, as for all times, can be put: Marx or Kierkegaard?[62]

> Yes, Kierkegaard was in the last analysis much more of a realist than Karl Marx. Marx believed that human selfishness was not an eternal trait of human nature, but just a passing feature, born of the institution of private property and bound to fade away with it...Kierkegaard, on the other hand, faced the fundamental fact of our fallen state, namely, that we can only advance towards the good, alike as individuals and in society, if we overcome ourselves and follow the cross.[63]

The Christian social ethics which is found in the works of Kierkegaard is Spiritual social ethics which is also based on the principle of love.[64] I want to show this by considering several salient passages in Works of Love. The first passage runs as follows:

> [It] is infinitely important that it is Christ who has said it [Christ's command of love], and when it is said to an individual, it is precisely to him that it is said, the whole eternal emphasis is on that him, even if in a way it is said to all individuals.(WL, p. 80)

This passage makes two points clear. Firstly and mainly, what is commanded by Jesus Christ, which provides the basis of Christian ethics, must be regarded as speaking to the individual person. That is, everyone must regard the command as a personal command.[65] However, this is not the whole of the story. With this, this passage also intimates that this command is actually addressed to all individuals. This point hints at the universal applicability of the command. Even though each individual should accept the command as addressed to himself, the command itself is objective, and the validity of this command does not depend on each individual's applying it to himself.[66] This universal applicability is very important in relation to the theme under discussion. For, according to the logic of this discussion, one should think that the command of love is intended to be the

universal principle. And if this love-command is the way in which God changes or transforms the world, then there is no other way in which one can change the world except by applying this principle of love.

In relation to this, let us quote the second passage:

> [Everyone] who forms parties and factions, or joins such, he steers on his own responsibility, and all his achievement, even if it were the transformation of the world, is a delusion...for it is certainly possible that Providence might use of it, but, alas, it would not have used him as an instrument; he was a self-willed, a conceited man, and Providence also uses the efforts of such a man by accepting his difficult labor and letting him lose the reward.
>
> However laughable, however slow, however inexpedient, loving one's neighbor may seem to the world, it is still the highest act a man is able to accomplish.(WL, p. 71)

In this passage, Kierkegaard criticizes all other attempts to transform the world by human powers, and at the same time suggests that the way in which Christianity tries to transform the world is the highest act a man is able to accomplish. According to Kierkegaard, the principle of love is the only way in which this world can fundamentally solve the problems of human life. Malantschuk describes well Kierkegaard's position:

> On the basis of a rigorous Christian position Kierkegaard maintains that injustice cannot be removed by force, since one who uses coercion eventually functions on the same level as one who perpetrates wrong. Only suffering love can defeat injustice.[67]

When Kierkegaard is asserting this as social ethics, he is keenly aware that in the eyes of the world this is laughable, too slow, almost impossible, and inexpedient, for in this world, man is regarded as the measure of all things.[68] However, its impossibility in the eyes of the world was not a hindrance for

Kierkegaard who continues to believe and assert that this (i.e., to love others in this way and transform the world in this way) is the highest act a man is able to accomplish. Thus one can make the point that when Kierkegaard seems to be indifferent to social change, the real fact is that he is not indifferent to social change in the real sense of the word, but he is attacking all attempts to change the world with merely human resources which ignore the divinely commanded method of love. This point is very important, when we think about a common misunderstanding of Kierkegaard as an extreme individualist.[69]

It is true that Kierkegaard thinks that the only way to solve human problems personally and collectively is to stand before God alone. But this is not because Kierkegaard himself is an individualist, but only because this is the only way in which a human being can stand before God, for "[to] God, the infinite Spirit, all these millions who have lived and are still living do not form a mass - he [God] sees only the single individuals."[70] In his study of Kierkegaardian encounter with modernity, Plekon also makes a similar point:

> One does not become a single individual for aesthetic or socio-psychological reasons. Rather, the project of the individualization of consciousness is grounded in transcendence, is required by the Eternal. We can only come to the Absolute, we can only stand before God <u>as individuals</u>. For Kierkegaard, the basis for singular individuality is not an abstract anti-sociality but the conviction that the fundamental human relationship is the God-relationship....[71]

Based upon this understanding, he, as a sociologist who examines <u>Works of Love</u>, asserts as follows: "There is a distinctive social orientation in the Kierkegaardian corrective: the reconstruction

of the social world can only be accomplished by transformed, corrected single individuals."[72] This is because "[in] becoming a 'doer' of the Word, a 'worker of love', the inwardly transformed individual becomes the most effective agent for the transformation of others and his society."[73]

Indeed, once one stands before God alone, then, as we have seen in the discussion of this section, one is inevitably related to others who also stand before God individually.[74] This is the reason why God is described as the middle term of Christian love. This is because the standing before God is the way in which we can see the fundamental equality between all people.(cf. JP, I, 236(Pap. XI A 135)) According to Kierkegaard, equality is an expression of humanness.(JP, I, 63(Pap. VIII 1 A 268)) However, according to Kierkegaard, we should try to seek equality only based upon this fundamental equality, and the other ways in which one tries to seek the equality of human beings cannot be adequate ones, for they cannot fundamentally solve the problem of difference. In this sense, one may say, with Arbaugh and Arbaugh, that "[to] assert that S.K. leaves the individual 'hermetically' sealed off from others is true only in the sense that the individual is compelled to face God alone over the issue of whether he is or is not loving towards his fellow-man."[75] A similar suggestion of a social view of the Christian is found in one of Kierkegaard's journal entries:

> I should have been ashamed before God, and my soul would have been troubled, if I had become so self-important that I behaved as though 'other men' did not exist.[76]

So we may say, with Crites, that "the Kierkegaardian individual is

not simply a-social."[77] For, as Shmueli says, "Christian love aims...to form a society in which people can help each other to become true subjects. The individualism expressed by Kierkegaard's philosophy is an attitude which can be formed only in the bosom of a Christian society".[78] I think that Shmueli has correctly understood Kierkegaard's meaning. For basically Kierkegaard thinks that structural transformation of society must be based on each individual's God-relationship.[79] This is the reason why Kierkegaard is critical of socio-political movement which is not based on God-relationship.[80] As Stendahl says: "What Kierkegaard refutes so sharply...is false belief in human solutions, in progress and evolution, development and expansion."[81] Such a movement is judged by Kierkegaard as not solving human problems fundamentally.(WL, pp. 59f.) The reason why Kierkegaard criticizes these social movements does not lie in Kierkegaard's indifference to social problems, but in his real concern for solving these problems. The seeming individualism, therefore, is the way in which Kierkegaard seeks the fundamental answer to all the social problems. For, in Christian love, as Plekon says, "there is not only self-transformation, but transformation of the web of society, the nature of social relationship."[82] And as Stark says, "the stronger the individuals, the firmer also the social bond."[83]

In this sense, the demand of the Christian love is the demand of the fundamental revolution. Kierkegaard says:

> [Christian] love is a revolution, the most profound of all, but the most blessed! So then in love there is confusion; in this blessed confusion there is for the lovers no difference between 'mine' and 'thine'....There is a 'you' and an 'I' and

> there is no 'mine' and 'thine'!...The more profound the revolution is, the more completely the difference of 'mine' and 'thine' disappears, the more perfect is the love.[84]

In one of his journal entries, he says again: "[What] the God of Christianity wanted was a world-transformation."(JP, I, 561(Pap. XI 2 A 102)) This fundamental way of transforming the world through love is also observed by Kierkegaard as an anticipation of that which is the case in eternity. So the true lover is one who lives eternity even in his temporal existence.(WL, pp. 72f.) Some sentences later Kierkegaard calls such an understanding of the human relationship "this agreement with God"(WL, p. 73) and asserts that there must be an actualization of this agreement with God in one's real life. He says again:

> [Might] this not seem so glorious to you that for your part you would decide to make this agreement with God; that you wish to unite with Him in order to maintain this understanding, that is, <u>to express in your life</u> that with Him you will maintain this understanding as the only true understanding, whatever may befall you because of it, even if it should cost you your life; that with God you will hold it fast as your victory over all indignities and injuries.(WL, p. 73, emphasis given)

The hope of the final victory of love, which is quite different from the normal concept of victory, surely presupposes that there will be some cosmic eschatological consummation which will be carried out by God himself.[85] Until that time, the Christian is summoned to endeavour to transform the world by loving one's neighbour individually and collectively. This endeavour includes the attempt to change the structure of society to the ideal form in which the true spirit of the command of love is reflected.[86] Hence, as Collins says, Kierkegaard asserts that "all social forms [must be] determined by a radical 'love' or orientation, based

upon one's relation to God."[87]

Based on this observation, I agree with Croxall's interpretation of Kierkegaard's social ethics:

> Nevertheless, the Works of Love is not against such things [the efforts of social reformers]. On the contrary, it leaves the door wide open for them and prepares for them in the best possible way....So Kierkegaard sets out his programme. He does not seek to overturn or even to alter the established order, but rather to introduce health-giving reflexions which, if acted upon, would work their cure (he believed) more surely, if more silently, than political revolution. He makes his appeal to the individual rather than to the State or nation.[88]

In short, for Kierkegaard love in the Christian sense is the best possible policy even for social problems.(cf. PV, p. 120) The power to solve these problems, as we have observed before, is regarded as coming from God Himself. God the Spirit is the One who carries out this task through calling to mind the sacrifice of love which Jesus Christ made, and reminding the believers to love as they are loved, and their neighbour as themselves. So Christian social action should be "a spiritual movement"(JP, VI, 6671(Pap. X 3 A 415)); and as far as this love can only come from the Holy Spirit, Kierkegaard's social ethics is also Spiritual ethics.

Now it must be quite clear that Kierkegaard's ethics of love is profoundly based on his Christian faith. In this section, we have observed that Kierkegaard sees love in its true sense as the love of God which is conclusively expressed in the Christ event, and as a human response to this divine love, which is possible only in relation to God the Spirit. We have also observed that the expression of this love always has God as its middle term, so

"love to God" is the fundamental source of love, and "love to one's neighbour" is the outer expression of love, and the "love to oneself" is the inward expression of love. We have also seen that there are very clear social implications of this love. Throughout this discussion, we could see a clear difference between Christian ethics and other forms of ethics. Kierkegaard shows us in this book that the Christian sees the ethical aspect of human life from a different perspective from those of the ethical person and the person in religiousness A. There is, therefore, a fundamental difference between the Christian view of the ethical aspect of life and that of the ethical perspective. In this section we have shown this difference through a consideration of the Christian understanding of love. In the next section, we shall look at it from the perspective of Christian discipleship.

NOTES

1. Another theologian who also thinks of Christian ethics basically in terms of Christian love, Anders Nygren also asserts that "Christian ethics are rooted in Christian faith"(Agape and Eros: A Study of the Christian Idea of Love, Part 1, trans. A.G. Herbert (London: SPCK, 1932), p. 65) and that this is the basic cause of the fundamental difference between Christian ethics and other ethics.(ibid., p. 45). See also Walker, pp. 12, 142.

2. In one place, Kierkegaard uses the term Christian morality and says it is "the true morality."(WL, p. 42) See also Douglas V. Steere, in WL, p. vii; Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, pp. 325f, 361f.; Hong and Hong, "Translator's Introduction," to WLH, p. 15; Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 258; Stendahl, p. 183; John W. Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 284; Utterback, p. 240; and Mullen, pp. 149, 155.

3. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 220. Croxall continues: "Kierkegaard points us, in the first part of his work, mainly to the Christian command to love one's neighbour. In the second part he bases his thought upon St. Paul's epoch-making chapter, I Corinthians 13." See also Bonifazi, p. 116.

4. WL, p. 119. See also WL, pp. 116, 118; TC, p. 113. Sylvia I. Walsh emphasizes this point in Works of Love. See her "Forming the Heart: The Role of Love In Kierkegaard's Thought," in Richard H. Bell, ed., The Grammar of the Heart (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), pp. 235f. See also Utterback, pp. 91, 213, 251.

5. See also LY, p. 277(Pap. XI 2 A 175); JP, II, 1437(Pap. XI 1 A 35); JP, II, 1452(Pap. XI 2 A 175).

6. Nygren, Agape and Eros, part 1, p. 76, et passim.

7. This applies to most of his writings. For a similar understanding of this subject, see N.H. Søe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox," in A Kierkegaard Critique, eds. Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 223-4; Smit, pp. 96f.; Heinecken, p. 19; Per Lonning, "Kierkegaard as a Christian Thinker", in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, pp. 166f.("The dogma of the Trinity does not play a dominating role, but it can be accentuated clearly enough."); Sponheim, pp. 207f.; and Bonifazi, pp. 80f., 93.

For a more explicit expression of the Trinity, see JP, II, 1919(Pap. X 5 A 44); JP, II, 1285(Pap. X 3 A 200); JP, II, 1432, 1548(Pap. X 5 A 23, X 3 A 394); JP, III, 3380(Pap. II A 538), 3445(Pap. X 2 A 344); JP, IV 4462(Pap. X 3 A 394); JP, IV, 6792(X 4 A 472), 6832(Pap. X 5 A 43).

8. WL, p. 272. See also WL, p. 83; JP, III, 2402(Pap. IV A 183). See also JP, II, 1412, 2407(Pap. X3 A 421, VIII 1 A 89); JP, III, 3394(Pap. IV B 171).

9. See WL, pp. 4, 99, 137. See also Nygren, I, p. 86; Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary p. 220; Thomte, p. 159; Gates, Christendom Revisited: A Kierkegaardian View of the Church Today (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), p. 13; and Deyton, pp. 65, 109.

10. Mackintosh, p. 262.

11. See also Nygren, I, p. 65.

12. See also Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 223.

13. WL, p. 90, emphasis given. See also WL, p. 139. Jacques Colette is one critic who clearly observes this point. See his Kierkegaard: The Difficulty of Being Christian, trans. Ralph M. McInerny and Leo Turcotte (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), p. 41.

14. See, esp., WL, pp. 37, 47, 116(earthly love vs. spiritual love), and pp. 41, 43, 44(earthly love vs. Christian love). For another discussion of this point, see Utterback, pp. 25, 242f., 256f., 260f.

15. WL, p. 81. See also JP, I, 295, 297, 944(Pap. II A 388, 473, VIII 2 B 34:7); JP, II, 1484, 1884, 1905(Pap. X 4 A 230, X 3 A 615, X 4 A 366). For a good discussion of this point, see Utterback, pp. 342, 351f.

16. WL, p. 87. For the most explicit explanation of Kierkegaard's meaning of "the law of God", see Hans Friemond, Existenz in Liebe nach Søren Kierkegaard (Muenchen and Salzburg: Verlag Anto Pustet, 1965), p. 106.

17. See also WL, p. 87; JP, I, 435(Pap. II A 277).

18. Cf. JP, I, 508(Pap. X4 A 624); JP III, 2407, 2442(Pap. VIII 1 A 89, X 5 A 50).

19. See also Philip S. Watson, "Translator's Preface," in one volume version of Agape and Eros (London: SPCK, 1953), pp. ix, xii; and Gates, Christendom Revisited, p. 132.

20. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 261. For a good discussion of the compatibility of the spontaneity of Christian love and of being commanded to love by Christ, see Sylvia I. Walsh, "Forming the Heart," pp. 243-46.

21. Watson, "Translator's Preface," to the one volume version of Agape and Eros, pp. viii-ix. See also Gates, Christendom Revisited, pp. 13f.

22. WL, p. 116. See also JP, III, 3214(=Pap. VII 1 A 10); JP, IV, 4431(Pap. VII 1 A 45).

23. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, pp. 225f., emphasis given. See also JP, I, 682(Pap. III A 196).

24. Here we can see a point of contact between Works of Love and the Abraham case in Fear and Trembling. Even though there is no Christological consideration in Fear and Trembling, what is demanded by God is the most important thing for the knight of faith. Likewise, in Works of Love the Christian is understood as being demanded by God to love his neighbour. For a good discussion of the relationship between Fear and Trembling and Works of Love in relation to this subject, see Gary Starr Bowen, "Kierkegaard on the Theological Ethics of Love," The Duke Divinity School Review 43 (1980), pp. 25-32.

25. Shmueli, p. 78.

26. See WL, pp. 145, 151.

27. Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 362.

28. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, pp. 258f., 260. See also Steere, "Introduction," to Works of Love, p. x.

29. I am indebted to Dr. Daphne Hampson for this idea. In her classes on Kierkegaard, she usually emphasizes this point.

30. See WL, p. 293. See also WL, pp. 81-3, 152f.; JP, I, 542(Pap. X 5 A 98).

31. WL, p. 107. See also WL, pp. 176, 310. I shall discuss this subject more extensively in the next section. For a good discussion on Kierkegaard's anti-Roman Catholicism in relation to Works of Love, see Arbaugh and Arbaugh, pp. 266ff.

32. For a similar view, see Nygren, Agape and Eros, Part 1, p. 69; Valter Lindstroem, "A Contribution to the Interpretation of the Works of Love," Studia Theologia VI (1953), p. 28; and Steere, "Introduction" to Works of Love, p. x: "[The] Christian ethic, according to Kierkegaard, involves the Grace of God and involves a life in active response to that Grace."

33. See WL, pp. 17, 214. See also JP, VI, 6615(Pap. X 3 A 68). One critic, S.W. Utterback, makes this point clear.(p. 252).

34. See also Kresten Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psychology, trans. B. Kirmmse (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 331; and Hannay, p. 271.

35. SUD, p. 114=SUDL, p. 186. See also Journals, No. 1089(Pap. X 2 A 643).

36. WL, p. 308. See also JP, II, 1785(Pap. X 3 A 268); JP, III, 3377(Pap. II A 377).

37. WL, p. 103. See also Heinecken, pp. 123, 238.

38. See WL, p. 84; JP, V, 6125((Pap, VIII 1 A 602), 6135(Pap. VIII 1 A 650).

39. Cf. Journals, No. 854=JP, II, 1381(Pap. IX A 476). See also JP, I, 514, 515(Pap. X 2 A 420, 421); JP, II, 1216, 1353(Pap. VIII 1 A 675, VIII 1 A 63); JP, VI 6731(Pap. X 4 A 53); JFY, p. 164. See again Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p. 163.

40. See WL, pp. 48, 154; JP, III, 2434, 2479(Pap. X 3 A 739, X 1 A 47). See also Gates, Christendom Revisited, p. 132.

41. Among others, Kant does so, and he says: "There are no special duties to God in a universal religion."(Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 142, note. Louis Jacobs' interpretation of the Jewish thought is along the same lines. See his "The Relationship between Religion and Ethics in Jewish Thought," in Religion and Morality, pp. 171f.

42. See also Gene Outka, Agape. An Ethical Analysis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 52, 193; Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, p. 183; and Gates, The Life and Thought of Kierkegaard for Everyman, p. 75.

43. WL, p. 114. See also WL, p. 88, 92; JP, III, 2428(Pap. X 2 A 63).

44. Cf. Nygren, I, p. 68; and Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, pp. 125f.

45. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, trans. H.J. Paton, The Moral Law (London: Hutchinson, 1947), p. 96.

46. For a similar view, see Hannay, p. 270; and Leslie Zeigler, "Personal Existence: A Study of Buber and Kierkegaard," Journal of Religion 40 (1960), p. 92.

47. Michael Paul Plekon, "Kierkegaard: Diagnosis and Disease: An Excavation in Modern Consciousness"(unpublished Ph. D. dissertation in Sociology, Rutgers University, 1977), p. 259.

48. For a similar view, see Deyton, p. 104.

49. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 260.

50. Bowen, "Kierkegaard on the Theological Ethics of Love," p. 28.

51. Friemond, pp. 33-5, esp. p. 35.

52. Cf. WL, pp. 133, 192.

53. WL, p. 297. See also JP, III, 2410(Pap. VIII 1 A 196); JP, III, 3779(Pap. XI 1 A 376).

54. Nygren, Agape and Eros, Part 1, p. 170. See also pp. 71f.

55. JP, III, 2414(Pap. VIII 1 A 521). See also WL, pp. 19, 188, et passim; JP, III, 2399(Pap. IV B 147); JP, V, 6091(Letters, no. 167); JP, VI, 6280(Pap. IX A 500).

56. Outka, Agape, p. 23. Besides Outka, Valter Lindstroem (in his "A Contribution to the Interpretation of The Works of Love," Studia Theologia 6 (1952):3-6), and Elrod (in his Kierkegaard and Christendom, pp. 128-32) observe the two kinds of self-love in Works of Love. Valter Lindstroem also quotes from Emanuel Hirsch (Kierkegaard-Studien (1933), p. 869f, n.4) that "Kierkegaard denies the legitimate self-love and acknowledges the severely enjoined true self-love." See also Sponheim, p. 144; Nordentoft, p. 368; Friemond, p. 110; and Utterback, pp. 214, 247ff.

57. Lindstroem, "A Contribution...", p. 4. See also p. 8.

58. See WL, pp. 19, 44-46, 88, 220.

59. Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1968; Lanham, New York, and London: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 200-1. For a similar view, see Brian V. Hill, "Søren Kierkegaard and Educational Theory" (originally published in Educational Theory 16 (1966), pp. 344-353), in Kierkegaard's Presence, pp. 200f.

60. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 259.

61. Heinecken, p. 151.

62. Walker, p. 17. See also JP, IV, 4124(Pap. VIII 1 A 209).

63. Werner Stark, "Kierkegaard on Capitalism" (originally published in Sociological Review 42 (1950), pp. 87-114) in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 145.

64. For another discussion of this, see Stark, pp. 120-148. See also David Bruce Fletcher, Social and Political Perspectives in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard (Washington: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 5, 16, 65-74; and Hong and Hong, "Notes", in JP, IV, p. 643, n. 134.

65. WL, p. 12. See also Steere, "Introduction" to Works of Love, p. ix.

66. Pap. IX A 4, cited in Howard A. Johnson, "Kierkegaard and Politics," in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 81f. n. 10. See also Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 264; and Steere, "Introduction" to WL, pp. viii-ix.

67. Malantschuk, in JP, II, p. 559. See also JP, II, 1195(Pap. X 4 A 127).

68. See Journals, 2548-2550; JP, II, 1195(Pap. X 4 A 127).

69. Among others, D.D. Williams is the one who relates Kierkegaard's lack of social ethics and his so-called individualism.(op. cit., pp. 200f.) For criticisms of Kierkegaard's individualism, see also Zuidema, p. 18; Mackintosh, pp. 257f.; H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), pp. 180, 181, 243f.; Marjorie Greene, Introduction to Existentialism (Chicago: Phoenix Press, 1959), pp. 38-40; and Vincent A. McCarthy, "'Psychological Fragments': Kierkegaard's Religious Psychology," in Kierkegaard's Truth, p. 263.

70. JP, II, 2030(Pap. X 3 A 476). See also JP, I, 238(Pap. X 4 A 11); JP, I, 603(Pap. XI 2 A 229); JP, I, 1034(Pap. VI A 65); JP, II, 1385(Pap. X 1 A 64); II, 1997(VIII 1 A 9); II, 2004(VIII 1 A 482); II, 2009(IX A 318); II, 2015(X 1 A 218); II, 2066(XI 1 A 384); II, 2081(XI 2 A 135); JP, III, 2567(XI 1 A 589); III, 2568(XI 1 A 590); and OL, pp. 51, 53. See again Gates, Christendom Revisited, pp. 46f., 81f., 137-140; and Bradley R. Dewey, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ (Washington/Cleveland: Corpus Books, 1968), pp. 21, 23.

71. Plekon, pp. 255-56. See also Lindstroem, "The Problem of Objectivity and Subjectivity in Kierkegaard," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p. 237; Miller, p. 16; Heinecken, pp. 283f, 381; and Bonifazi, pp. 149f.

72. Plekon, p. 258. See also: "The social orientation is best expressed in Works of Love....Over and over again Kierkegaard stresses the social orientation of Christian love...."(pp. 259, 260)

73. Ibid., p. 259. See also Stark, pp. 120, 121.

74. Cf. OL, p. 53; JP, IV, 4070, 4110(Pap. I A 307, VII 1 A 20, X 2 A 478, XI 1 A 438); JP, V, 5489(Pap. III C 24). See also Heinecken, pp. 151f., 381; Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, trans. Harold Knight (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), p. 128: Dewey, pp. 179f., n. 21: Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 321; Fletcher, pp. 14, 66, 67; and Bonifazi, pp. 149, 173f.

75. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 259, their emphasis.

76. Journals, No. 719. See also PV, pp. 149f.

77. Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, p. 65. See also Plekon, pp. 262f.; Heinecken, pp. 257f.; Bonifazi, pp. 173f.; Calvin O. Schrag, Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Human Finitude (Northwestern University Press, 1961; 2nd edition, 1972), p. 201; and Sponheim, pp. 144, 209ff.

78. Shmueli, p. 174.

79. See also Stark, pp. 141f.=Social Theory and Christian Thought, pp. 100-2: Arbaugh and Arbaugh, pp. 239, 259, 262; Fletcher, pp. 19, 22, 56f., 68f.; and Malantschuk, "Social-Political Thought", JP, IV, p. 664.

80. See OL, pp. 49ff. For a good discussion of Kierkegaard's view of revolution, see Johnson, pp. 74-83.

81. Stendahl, p. 184. See also Mullen, p. 93.

82. Plekon, p. 261. See also Steere, "Introduction" to Works of Love, p. xiv.

83. Stark, p. 142.

84. WL, p. 215. See also JP, IV, 4158(Pap. X 1 A 269).

85. Cf. TC, pp. 26ff., 167, 180, 193, 198. See also JP, I, 510(Pap. X 2 A 37); JP, III, 3620(Pap. XI 1 A 199).

86. Cf. JP, II, 2829; JP, IV, 4131, 4166; PV, p. 113. See also Diem, p. 128; Stark, pp. 141f., 144f.; Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 262; Hong and Hong, "Notes," in JP, IV, p. 664; Fletcher, pp. 22, 26, 56, 57, 66-69. For a good example drawn from the field of education, see John R. Scudder, Jr., "Kierkegaard and the Responsible Enjoyment of Children" (originally published in the Educational Forum 30 (1966), 497-503), in Kierkegaard's Presence, pp. 240-49.

87. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 185. See also Stark, p. 141.

88. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, pp. 226f., emphasis given. See also Robert Bretall, "Works of Love," in his A Kierkegaard Anthology, p. 283.

III

In this section, I want to consider Christian ethics as the ethics of Christian discipleship. But, as we shall see, this is only another way of looking at the same Christian ethics which we have considered as the ethics of Christian love.

I shall examine the meaning of Christian discipleship by considering the following two questions: (1) does one have to be a Christian in Kierkegaard's sense of the word in order to be regarded as a disciple or follower of Christ? (In other words, is it possible to be a disciple without being a Christian?); (2) can this emphasis on discipleship be understood as a tendency to emphasize the human factor in relation to the question of salvation, a tendency of synergism, rather than monergism? (The scope of synergism is very broad. But in this section, I am mainly concerned with the Roman Catholic view of salvation. So the main question is whether Kierkegaardian discipleship can be regarded as something similar to Roman Catholic discipleship.) These two questions are raised because following Christ means different things to different people.[1]

The first consideration [(1) above] comes from a negative response to those who think that to be a follower of Jesus means only to act in the way in which Jesus did and therefore does not necessarily mean that one should believe in Jesus's being the God-Man as Saviour. I shall call this view "merely ethical discipleship", and I think such merely ethical discipleship is not able to have its place in the thought of Kierkegaard. Hence I

shall show that for Kierkegaard, Jesus's being the Pattern cannot be separated from His being the Saviour; He is the Pattern as the Saviour. In other words, as Thomte says, "Kierkegaard's conception of Christ the Pattern is essentially grounded in his conception of Christ as the atoner for sin."[2] To put this differently, one's following Christ which is the vital part of discipleship can only come from one's faith-relationship with the God-Man. As I hope to show, here one is able to see the clear difference between the merely ethical understanding of discipleship and that of the Christian understanding.

And the second question [(2) above] arises from the fact that Kierkegaard's understanding of being a Christian, a disciple, cannot be seen as a kind of semi-Pelagian understanding of being a Christian which emphasizes that one has one's own power to follow Christ and one can be justified and saved through one's own efforts which are formed by God's grace. As this cursory description shows, I use the term "semi-Pelagianism" or "semi-Pelagian understanding" in a very broad sense. (That is, by semi-Pelagianism I do not mean semi-Pelagianism in the restricted sense, e.g., that of John Cassian, Abbot of Massilia (Marseilles), of Faustus of Rhegium, Gennadius of Massilia of the fifth century, which was condemned at the Second Council of Orange (529 A.D.), or that of Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims(c. 806-82)).[3]) By this term I cover all understanding of salvation which asserts synergism (the theory of cooperation of God and man in the act of salvation). Three characteristics of this view can be pointed out here. Firstly, the human's natural capacity to do good is

approved. Secondly, though the need of God's grace is emphasized, God's grace does not break with natural human efforts.[4] Thirdly, therefore, even though the ultimate meritorious cause of man's salvation is asserted to be Christ's atonement, Christ's atonement is understood to have purchased grace by which one is now able to merit one's salvation for oneself.[5] I shall call this view of discipleship "semi-Pelagian discipleship", and I shall show that Kierkegaard's understanding of discipleship is also far from this "semi-Pelagian discipleship".

I shall show these two points through an attempt to understand Kierkegaard's meaning of discipleship expressed in Philosophical Fragments and Training in Christianity. My discussion of these two books therefore is restricted to the things which are directly related to discipleship. My point here is that one can relate the discipleship of Philosophical Fragments to that of Training in Christianity, even though in these two books different aspects of discipleship are dealt with.

Let us start with the consideration of discipleship expressed in Philosophical Fragments. In this book Christianity is suggested as a thought-experiment (scheme B) contrasted to scheme A which is the Socratic view, and the fact that the Teacher whom a disciple has to follow is the God-Man is clearly expressed from the outset. He is called the "divine teacher"(PF, p. 19=PFS, p. 24) in the sense that He is teacher as God.[6] That is to say, He became the God-Man in order to be the teacher. But, as Arbaugh and Arbaugh say, "[in] incarnation God does not empty Himself or lay aside his glory."[7] At the same time, His servant form is not

just a deception, but it is real. In this sense, He is the God-Man, very God and very man.

Climacus emphasizes both Christ's divinity and His humanity. That he is a historical individual man is regarded as an obvious fact; at the same time, it is also emphasized that he gives "some sort of sign" which puts us in the difficult position of having to choose to believe that he is God. The signs serve to attract attention and will then lead to either faith or offence. That he is God is never immediately apparent; there are only signs. However, these signs are important. For, according to Kierkegaard, it is important that the God-man "became noticed", so that "he still was recognizable by his divine authority, even though it demanded faith to solve its paradox."(JP, III, 3077(Pap. IV A 103)) Climacus says:

> The god did not, however, take the form of a servant in order to mock human beings; his aim, therefore, cannot be to walk through the world in such a way that not one single person would come to know it [his presence and his identity].(PF, p. 56=PFS, p. 69)

That is to say, he was not here on earth as in the way in which some docetists think; "the servant-form is not something put on but is actual, not a parastatic but an actual body."(PF, p. 55=PFS, p. 68) Hence we can say with Dupré as follows:

> Kierkegaard never questioned Christ's divinity. For him even the idea of a kenosis, in which Christ through an act of total annihilation empties Himself of His divinity, is unthinkable.[8]

Indeed, Kierkegaard says in one of his journal entries, for the Christian, "[at] every moment Christ is God just as much as he is man - just as the sky seems to be as deep in the sea as it is high

above the sea."[9] That the teacher is the God-Man implies that the right relationship with the teacher is only through faith; one cannot be his disciple without believing that this individual human being (Jesus) who was in this world at a certain time and space is the God-Man. That the God-Man has been on earth - "it is a historical fact."(PF, p. 87=PFS, p. 108) Christian truth comes as a shocking proclamation from an historical man, outwardly quite human, but who claims to be God. But precisely this is the possibility of offence; that this historical person is the God-Man is the possibility of offence to everybody. However, one cannot be a disciple without first having the possibility of offence and then overcoming this possibility through faith.

This is true both of the disciple (temporally) contemporary to Jesus and of the disciple at second hand. In this sense, "[immediate] contemporaneity is by no means a decisive advantage."(PF, p. 106=PFS, p. 133) So there is also basically no difference between the first generation of secondary disciples and the most recent generation of secondary disciples.(cf. PF, p. 93=PFS, p. 117) In this sense, Climacus says that: "There is no follower at second hand. The first and the latest generation are essentially alike...."(PF, pp. 104f.=PFS, p. 131) For the only way of being a follower for both of them is to believe in the God-Man.

But can one believe the God-Man by oneself? There are some people who think that Philosophical Fragments is ambiguous in this matter, because it says, on the one hand, that we cannot believe the God-Man by ourselves, and on the other hand, that believing in

the God-Man is letting go by our will.[10] However, as I shall show in this paragraph, Climacus' answer is very clear: letting go by our will is possible only when God gives the condition to do so. In this sense, Climacus says that "faith is not an act of will."(PF, p. 62=PFS, p. 77) He says again:

> For example, if I have the courage to will it [the understanding]...[then I am in the Socratic sphere] because from the Socratic point of view I possess the condition and now can will it [this understanding]. But if I do not possess the condition (and we assume this in order not to go back to the Socratic), then all my willing is of no avail....(PF, p. 63=PFS, p. 77)

> According to the hypothesis [the scheme B]...he will not be able to set himself free. (And this is truly just the way it is....)(PF, p. 17=FPS, p. 21)

> Only the person who personally receives the condition from the god (which completely corresponds to the requirement that one relinquish the understanding and on the other hand is the only authority that corresponds to faith), only that person believes.(PF, p. 103=PFS, p. 129)

Based on these passages, we can say that in Philosophical Fragments one can believe in the God-Man only when God gives the condition. Thulstrup makes this point clear, when he summarizes the argument of this book as follows:

> Faith...[is not] an act of will, since such is possible only if the condition is already present, if the will is capable of realizing what it aims at, consequently only if the condition is already present."[11]

Therefore, only after having been given the condition by God is faith "an expression of will."[12] As Dupré says: "The activity of the human will in faith becomes possible only through a choice by God Himself; only within the limits of the datum of grace, which transcends all freedom, can faith be called free."[13] That is, we as human beings who are not in the truth cannot believe in

the God-Man by ourselves. As David E. Roberts says, we "cannot reach liberation by 'willing' because it is precisely the will that needs to be liberated."[14] Since we are in untruth (sin), our mind "certainly cannot think it [the truth], cannot hit upon it on its own, and if it is proclaimed, the understanding cannot understand it and merely detects that it will likely be its downfall."(PF, p. 47=PFS, p. 59) So we cannot have faith and be disciples of the God-Man by ourselves.

Hence, as Arbaugh and Arbaugh say, "God must prepare the human heart to receive truth...in order to be Teacher God must enter man's world as Saviour."[15] So He became the God-Man in order to be the Saviour and He did the work of redemption as the Saviour. And at the same time, this work must be applied by God Himself to the individual human being individually. This act of application of the redemption is called in this book "giving the condition." Climacus says: "Only one who receives the condition from the God is a believer."(PFS, p. 129=PF, p. 103) This was true of the contemporary disciples.(PF, p. 65=PFS, p. 80) And this is also true of all disciples of all generations.(PF, p. 100=PFS, p. 126) Without the God-given condition, without God's opening their eyes of faith, they cannot be disciples of the God-Man. The disciple is one "who knows that without the condition he would have seen nothing, inasmuch as the first thing he understood was that he himself was untruth."(PF, p. 65=PFS, p. 81)

These two points {i.e., (1) Jesus is the God-Man, and (2) one can be a disciple only when God gives the condition for understanding the truth} show that discipleship in this book is not only a question of adopting a good example, nor a matter of accepting some knowledge from the teacher. What is important is the relationship between the teacher and the disciple, which is based on the right recognition of who the teacher really is, that is, the God-Man. For, according to Climacus, "only the believer...can [know the teacher] as he was known."(PF, p. 68=PFS, p. 84) Curious multitudes who want to hear him, "craving to be able to tell others that they have seen and heard him [the teacher]"(PF, p. 57=PFS, p. 71) cannot be the disciple; those who are only concerned about abstract knowledge which the teacher teaches are also not the disciple in the real sense; and those who are only concerned about the moral teaching of the teacher are not the disciple either. Only those who have a real faith-relationship with the God-Man are disciples.

Hence, one cannot speak of merely ethical discipleship in relation to the view of discipleship expressed in this book. The God-Man is not regarded as merely a good example to imitate, or resemble; He is not a moral teacher who has left a good influence to future generations.[16] This book shows that if Christianity is true, the teacher is the teacher as the Saviour and the Redeemer and the one who "is a <u>reconciler</u>".(PF, p. 17=PFS, p. 21, <u>atonement</u>) So one cannot speak of "merely ethical discipleship" in relation to the understanding of discipleship in this book.

But can the same be said for semi-Pelagianism? Can one not regard the God-given condition as something similar to the infusion of grace?[17] In a sense, this is a somewhat interesting idea, for the teacher is described as the "one who restores the lost condition and gives the learner the truth"(PFS, p. 21=PF, p. 17), and one may list similar things which show the relation between semi-Pelagianian discipleship and Climacus' view of discipleship. Indeed, Dupré says that "Kierkegaard firmly maintains that each step preparatory to the reception of God's grace must itself already be grace."[18] However, when we consider the character of the disciple which is expressed in the book, we cannot give a positive answer to this question. In particular, two things have to be emphasized in relation to this subject.

The first concerns with the relationship between, on the one hand, what we were doing independently of God before we became disciples and what we are doing in relation to God after we became disciples, on the other. According to semi-Pelagianism, it is possible that there is a close relationship between them; that is, provided one tried to be good by oneself before one became a disciple, what one will do after becoming a disciple is the same work, but now aided and strengthened by the infused grace. For example, D'Arcy says:

> But a being who has a mind and a spiritual will and power to love can submit to this Divine pressure on it without destruction...[A] human being can remain himself while acting above his natural capacity.... Now it is this mysterious elevation of man above himself which is described in the technical language of the supernatural and of grace.[19]

So for Catholicism grace fulfils nature. The same is true of the

cognitive aspect, that is, what one knew before becoming a disciple is now confirmed and complemented by the supernatural revelation. In every aspect, grace does not violate nature, but completes.

However, Climacus sees the situation totally differently. According to him, before one's becoming a disciple, he is untruth; moreover, he cannot even "be described as a seeker".(PFS, p. 16=PF, p.13) But in the moment in which one becomes a disciple, one "becomes a different person, not in the jesting sense - as if he became someone else of the same quality as before - but he becomes a person of a different quality."(PF, p. 18=PFS, pp. 22f.) There is a fundamental change of the quality of one's existence. Hence "as a result of receiving the condition in the moment, his course [of life] took the opposite direction, or he was turned around."(PF, p. 18=PFS, p. 23)

It is true that sometimes the semi-Pelagian system also has the language of new birth or regeneration. For example, D'Arcy whom we mentioned above says:

> The Epistles of St. Paul abound in attempts to describe it [the supernatural or grace]. He calls it grace, adoption, regeneration, membership in Christ. St. John's favourite name for it is 'sonship'.[20]

However, as we can see even in this quotation, these concepts are usually changed into so-called semi-Pelagian concepts. Hence, even though they [Climacus and semi-Pelagian thinkers] use the same terms, the meanings which they give to these terms are different from one another. In the semi-Pelagian system, regeneration or the new birth is only a different designation for

grace. As grace does not destroy nature but completes, so regeneration or the new birth does not have any break with the natural human capacity but enhances it above human capacity. However, for Climacus, such positive enhancement cannot be in the scheme B. In scheme B, there is a clear discontinuity between one's being in error and one's being a new creature. One must be turned about; the direction of one's striving has to be changed. There is no positive enhancement of what one was doing. Therefore, there is a break between what one was doing before becoming a disciple and what one is doing after becoming a disciple.

Secondly, we have to consider the different understanding of faith between semi-Pelagianism and the disciple understood by Climacus. In contrast to semi-Pelagian understanding of faith as basically assensus (assent), Climacus regards faith basically as trust in the God-Man. So the God-given condition does not function as "grace infused" does in the semi-Pelagian system. It is far from human efforts, even those which are guided by God's grace. Faith is absolutely passive. Even when it works actively, it keeps the character of passivity in relation to God. And what is emphasized throughout the book is that one cannot be saved through or by one's own merits.

As far as Philosophical Fragments is concerned, many people may agree that the disciple is the one who has a right relationship with the God-Man, and that such discipleship is far from "merely ethical discipleship" and semi-Pelagian concept of discipleship. Can we apply the same view to Training in

Christianity? Firstly, can one find "merely ethical discipleship" in this book?

It is true that in this book the act of following Jesus Christ in His humiliation is emphasized. One should imitate Him in His humiliation; one should resemble Him. For "Christ's life here upon earth is the paradigm...Every generation has to begin all over again with Christ and thus to present His life as the paradigm...."(TC, p. 109) If we do not give a full attention to the exact meaning with which Anti-Climacus uses these expressions, then it is easy to think that Anti-Climacus provides us with a view of merely ethical discipleship. If we start to think in this way, then it is also easy for us to think that by the "admirer" to whom Anti-Climacus contrasts the "follower" he means the one who takes Jesus as a special religious character (the God-Man); and the follower is the one who does not pay any attention to this so-called Christological business, but tries to follow what Jesus did.

However, if we carefully examine the meaning of Anti-Climacus' passages, as those who are familiar with the pages of this book will know, this question ("whether one can find "merely ethical discipleship" in this book?") has, in fact, no relevance here. For from beginning to end this book is quite clear that it is concerned with one's relationship to the God-Man (TC, p. 83, et passim) who "eighteen hundred years and more" ago "walked here on earth...in order to seek the lost, in order to suffer and to die"(TC, p. 9), "who sits in glory at the right hand of the Father"(TC, p. 26) and will "come again in

glory".(TC, p. 27, cf. TC, pp. 167, 180, 193) That is the reason why this book talks so much about the offence, and Christ's drawing us unto Himself (Part III).[21] In this book, we shall get a view of discipleship which first of all emphasizes Jesus Christ's being the God-Man and which is far from "merely ethical discipleship".[22] For the "God in time" is not simply the ideal man in whom we find out our own humanity through imitation. The "God in time", to be sure, is the example [Pattern] to be followed, but he is also the one who forgives our sin. Therefore, one's following Christ can only come from one's faith-relationship with the God-Man. Such an understanding of discipleship is what I would call "high-christological discipleship". In what follows, I want to point out three salient aspects of Anti-Climacus' view of discipleship, which clearly show that "merely ethical discipleship" has no place in his view of discipleship: (1) the fact that Anti-Climacus' emphasis on Christ's humiliation also shows his belief in Christ's exaltation, (2) Anti-Climacus' emphasis upon the difference between Jesus Christ as the God-Man and the ordinary individual human being, and (3) Anti-Climacus' differentiation between ordinary suffering and Christian suffering.

Let us begin with Anti-Climacus' emphasis on Christ's humiliation. We are invited to look at Jesus Christ in his humiliation. The historical person and his historical life are the most important things for Anti-Climacus. If we try to look at him through the eyes of later interpretation and of the later development of history, then we are only distorting what he was

and is in the real sense.

Why does Anti-Climacus emphasize the humiliation of Christ so much? The answer to this question must be sought in relation to his view of discipleship. For he says that "what corresponds to humiliation is a follower."(TC, p. 231) The follower can only be found in relation to the concrete historical person who lived on earth in time and space. One cannot be a follower of the one who is only in heaven, or in imagination, or in myth, or in Urgeschichte. If and only if there was a historical person in a concrete time and space is there the question of following. In this sense, the emphasis on the humiliation of Christ cannot be an element which supports merely ethical discipleship. On the contrary, it is, for Anti-Climacus, an element which shows the importance of a faith-relationship with this Jesus Christ.[23] His Jesus is from the outset "the God-Man." That is precisely the reason why he has such strong emphasis on the offence, that one cannot remove this offence from this book. Anti-Climacus says:

> Offence has essentially to do with the composite term God and man, or with the God-Man...[The] situation is inseparable from the God-Man, the situation that an individual man who stands beside you is God-Man. The God-Man is not the unity of God and mankind. Such terminology exhibits the profundity of optical illusion. The God-Man is the unity of God and an individual man.(TC, p. 83)

The fact that the historical person (Jesus) is the God-Man is the occasion for offence. It was an offence to the immediate contemporaries to Jesus. So they said: "Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not his mother called Mary? and his brethren...and sisters, are they not all with us? Whence hath this man all these things?"(TC, p. 105, cf. Matt. 13:55=Mk.

6:3) They were offended by the historical Jesus, for he intimated that he and God the Father are one, and demanded that they believe in him.(TC, p. 135) But the fact that he who quite directly said this was here on earth as an individual human being is the occasion for offence. From here there are only two alternatives: "either to be offended or to believe."(TC, p. 83) That is to say, for Anti-Climacus, either one can believe that the historical Jesus is the God-Man, or one is offended by him.

Moreover, according to Anti-Climacus, if Jesus were not the God-Man, there would be no exaltation which is attributed to him.(TC, p. 167) And in this case, even the word "humiliation" does not make any sense, for if Jesus were just a man, it could be rightly said about him that he was a man; that is not a humiliation. Only if Jesus were the God-Man could his existence on earth as an individual human being be called a humiliation.

This is the reason why the period of His humiliation, Christ's life on earth, is regarded as the absolute which can be contemporary with every generation. Anti-Climacus says: "His [Christ's] earthly life possesses the eternal contemporaneousness."(TC, p. 68) "For in relation to the absolute there is only one tense: the present."(TC, p. 67) Therefore, according to Anti-Climacus, everybody can be contemporary with two ages: "the age in which he lives" and "Christ's life on earth".(TC, p. 68) As far as Christ's life on earth is regarded as the absolute by Anti-Climacus, there is no room for "merely ethical discipleship" for him. For a good moral teacher and ethical example cannot be the absolute in this sense, even at his

best.

In relation to this, Anti-Climacus also emphasizes that the real follower of Jesus should believe both his humiliation and his exaltation. It has been asserted by some scholars that Kierkegaard did not take seriously the fact that Christ is risen and glorified.[24] It is, however, clear that Kierkegaard thinks that Christ is resurrected[25] and highly glorified.[26] Christ's humiliation and exaltation are not something which we may choose between as we wish.(TC, p. 166) Both those who only think of the exaltation and those who do not believe the exaltation are not true to the truth which Jesus Christ is.(TC, pp. 154f., 166)

Now it becomes clear that Anti-Climacus' emphasis on the humiliation of Christ cannot be an element which supports merely ethical discipleship; on the contrary, it serves as an element which makes it clear that Christ is the God-Man, and that therefore if one wants to be a real follower of Jesus, one should believe in him as the God-Man. Hence we may say that Anti-Climacus' emphasis on Christ's humiliation supports what may be called "high-christological discipleship", rather than "merely ethical discipleship".

What we are going to suggest as the second aspect of Anti-Climacus' view of discipleship (that is, his emphasis on the difference between the God-Man and the ordinary human being) also serves as an element which supports what we have called "high-christological discipleship". Anti-Climacus strongly emphasizes the difference between the God-Man and the ordinary

individual: "[The] God-Man is essentially heterogeneous from every other individual man and from race as a whole."[27] When Anti-Climacus emphasizes this point he does not mean that there is only quantitative difference between them. Rather, Anti-Climacus, as we have seen, emphasizes the fact that even though Jesus Christ is true man, He is also at the same time God. "[As] God-Man, although truly man, He is yet so heterogeneous, so unlike the individual man, that it is not just simply a matter of course that with a kind of impudent forwardness one should want in a way to take sides with Him."[28]

First of all, Anti-Climacus makes it clear that if one begins with the assumption that Jesus was a man, then one cannot reach the conclusion that he is God or the God-Man at all.(TC, p. 30) So only one who begins with the presupposition that He was God (Anti-Climacus calls this presupposition "the assumption of faith") is able to perceive the God-Man rightly. So if any one just regards Jesus as only a good moral teacher, then he has nothing to do with Christianity. For Christianity's emphasis "falls upon the fact that God lived" on earth as an individual human being.(TC, p. 35)

That is why the fact that God lived in time and space as an individual human being (Jesus) is more important than the consequences of his life or his teaching. If this individual human being under discussion is nothing but a man, then the consequences of his life and his teaching are more important than the mere historical fact that he lived, for "in relation to a man it remains nevertheless true that the consequences of his life are

more important than his life."(TC, p. 35) But, according to Anti-Climacus, "to apply this to Christ is a blasphemy, it is to make Him a mere man."(TC, p. 123)

Here is one of the differences between Jesus Christ and Socrates. For in the case of Socrates, there is no problem of leaping to another quality, from that of man to that of God, when one thinks of the consequences of his life. The consequences of his life also remain in the realm of man. And even though unfortunately people ignore the fact that he lived, this does not detract from the impact of his teaching. For the consequence of his life is more important that the fact that he lived.(TC, p. 35) Anti-Climacus who speaks of the Socratic person in this way, emphasizes that the same cannot be applied to Jesus Christ. "Very different is the case with Jesus Christ!"(TC, p. 37) For he is the God-Man. So for him the fact that he lived is more important than any thing else. Hence the one who thinks of Jesus as merely a good moral teacher, according to Anti-Climacus, cannot have the right relationship to Christianity. Such a person may find in Jesus a very good moral example, from whom one may receive very good ethical teaching. But he "demolishes Jesus Christ."(TC, p. 36) He thinks of Jesus as a good person, and he may try to do throughout his life what he thinks Jesus exemplified. But he is, according to Anti-Climacus, far from what Jesus really was and is. "Then," he spells out the reason why he thinks in this way, "Christ is no more the God-Man, but only a distinguished man whose life is homogeneous with the development of the race."(TC, p. 218) If He were a mere man, then he could be a good moral example,

but He cannot be the Saviour of the world. As Anti-Climacus says: "if He is not very God, He does not save men." (TC, p. 137) But for Anti-Climacus, Jesus Christ is the only Saviour: "He is the Saviour, there is no salvation for any but in Him."(TC, p. 81) Jesus Christ is also the Pattern, but that only as the Saviour.[29]

From this perspective, Anti-Climacus also emphasizes the fact that following Jesus Christ therefore begins with the right recognition of Him as the God-Man. In another place, Kierkegaard says:

> If I want to proceed directly to be ethical about this [imitation], I take this prototype in vain. Here it is a matter of worship and adoration first and foremost - and only through worship and adoration can there be any question of wanting to imitate....[30]

Hence to follow Him does not mean being perfectly like Him; that would be regarded as "mockery of God". Anti-Climacus emphasizes the difference between the God-Man and the individual human being from every perspective. The God-Man knows "everything beforehand, his sufferings and the certainty and necessity of his destruction, and yet [is] able to live day after day tranquilly, with devotion to God, as if He understood it all as good."[31] But for individual human beings, the situation is different. They have to "be handled carefully, and hence it is only little by little [that their tasks are] made clear to [them]."(TC, p. 184) That is the reason why Jesus Christ "did not at once foretell all that they would suffer""[even] to the Apostles, though they were contemporary with Him."(TC, p. 184) Therefore, what is recommended in this book by the term "following" or "imitating" is

that "thy life has as great a likeness to His as it is possible for a man's life to have."(TC, p. 108) Only to try to be like him as far as possible as a human being is what is emphasized in this book.[32] For "[no] man, with the exception of Christ, is the truth; in the case of every other man the truth is something endlessly higher than he is...[But] Christ is the Truth."(TC, p. 200) The difference between Christ the Pattern and human beings as the followers is also clearly emphasized in Kierkegaard's journal entries:

> Even the chosen apostle, and thus every one without exception, is qualitatively different from the God-man in this way - the apostle must be constrained; the God-man is the only one who has pure ideality and therefore voluntarily the maximum.[33]

> By becoming contemporaneous with Christ (the exemplar) you discover precisely that you do not resemble Him...[Then] you flee to the exemplar that he may take pity upon you. Thus the exemplar is at the same time He, who infinitely judges you most strictly - and, in addition, He Who has mercy upon you.[34]

In Kierkegaard's other work, "Has a Man the Right to let himself be Put to Death for the Truth?", Kierkegaard once again makes this point clear. In this work the major stress is placed upon the dissimilarity between Christ the Master and every man. Per Lønning makes a good case about this work, when he says: "The real task of the essay can thereby be said to be...the affirmation of the boundaries of the likeness to the Master for which a believing Christian can strive."[35] Hence Anti-Climacus' and Kierkegaard's emphasis upon the difference between the God-Man and the ordinary human being which we have considered in the last few paragraphs also underlines their insistence on what we have called high-christological discipleship, rather than merely ethical

discipleship.

Now let us turn to the third aspect of Anti-Climacus' view of discipleship: the problem of suffering. For Anti-Climacus, a disciple is one who suffers for being a disciple. In relation to this, we have to mention the fact that this book, just like his other books, makes it clear that what a disciple has to suffer for being a disciple is not ordinary suffering, but Christian suffering. By "Christian suffering" Anti-Climacus refers to what is specifically Christian - "suffering in likeness with Jesus Christ"(TC, p. 173), "the sufferings which a Christian must endure...sufferings he can well avoid merely by refraining from being a Christian."(TC, p. 67) In short, Christian suffering is "suffering for Christianity"[36], or "suffering for the doctrine".[37]

Therefore, for example, "illness, financial difficulties, anxiety for the year to come, [etc.]"(TC, p. 115) does not belong to Christian suffering. At the same time, what the ethical man has to suffer for the sake of his ethical efforts is not Christian suffering either. According to Anti-Climacus, "[such] sufferings are the universal human experience, in which the heathen are (or were) just as severely tried as the Christians."(TC, 173) Therefore, "to suffer in likeness with Christ does not mean to encounter the unavoidable with patience...."(TC, p. 173) Christian suffering is something one should suffer because one is a Christian. In Christian suffering, according to Anti-Climacus there are two kinds of suffering.

The first kind is something external which comes from the heterogeneity between the world and the Christian.[38] In this sense, this is "the suffering which Christ and Christianity themselves brought into the world", that is, suffering "because of the word [of God, or of the Gospel]" and "for righteousness' sake [in the biblical sense of the word]"(TC, p. 110), the suffering which there "is always when there is truth in the profession of being a Christian"(TC, p. 112), which comes when one truly asserts that "I will belong to Christ, I will be a Christian!"(TC, p. 117) For example, "tribulation and persecution [which] arise because of the word"(TC, p. 116, cf. Matt. 13:21=Mk 4:17), and to "suffer ill at the hands of men because as a Christian or by being a Christian"(TC, p. 173) belong to Christian suffering.

The second kind of suffering is more internal, but it is also suffering which the Christian suffers because he is a Christian. It is suffering within the Christian inwardness which results from his sensitivity to God and His will and therefore to his own sinfulness.(TC, pp. 194f.) Kierkegaard says that "for the Christian sorrow for sin is the deepest sorrow."[39] But though this is suffering "with which no other human sufferings can compare in painfulness and anguish"(TC, p. 194), the Christian is willing to remain a Christian and to endure this suffering. This does not mean that he enjoys suffering; he is not a spiritual masochist. He merely knows that such is the case for a man who lives the Christian life according to what is suggested by his Pattern, the God-Man, even though he cannot dare to equate his own case with the case of his Pattern. Here we can see again the

difference between the God-Man (the Pattern) and the individual Christian (the follower).[40] The Christian has to follow and imitate and resemble his Pattern, but always in his following he clearly knows the ultimate difference between the God-Man and the individual human being.

Up to this point we have observed firstly Anti-Climacus' emphasis on Christ's humiliation, and secondly, the difference between Jesus as the God-Man and other human beings; and thirdly, what is the nature of the Christian suffering which is supposed to inevitably follow the life of a disciple. Now we may see that these are closely related to one another. What becomes obvious through these observations is the fact that the disciple in this book is also a disciple of Jesus Christ who demands first of all belief in His being the God-Man. This disciple cannot be understood as a person who is only morally influenced or moved by the good moral example of Jesus. If one follows Jesus merely in this way, one is not yet a disciple in the sense with which this book uses the word.[41] In short, Christ is understood as both the Saviour and the Pattern.(TC, p. 232) And as we have seen, in order to follow the Pattern, one should be renewed by Christ. In one of his journal entries, Kierkegaard says:

> I believe that his [Christ's] activity [of redemption] was the principal thing, because that life which he enjoins (Matt 5) cannot blossom forth before regeneration; consequently this is the conditio sine qua non; and, on the other hand, this life must necessarily unfold in him who is truly regenerated. I Cor. 5:7, Eph. 5:2, Rom 3:25.[42]

Thus, according to Kierkegaard, "grace [must be] in the first place."(JP, II, 1493(Pap. X 5 A 101)) I think what we read in

Training in Christianity is not different from what we read in this journal entry. Hence the faith-relationship between the God-Man and the individual human being has to precede one's being a disciple. Without faith in the God-Man, according to the logic of this book, there is no following in the real sense of the word. This is because "works apart from faith are dead."(JP, I, 976(Pap. X 1 A 457)) Therefore, we can conclude that discipleship in this book cannot be understood as "merely ethical discipleship".

Indeed, many commentators observe that Kierkegaard's strong emphasis on imitation in Training in Christianity must be related to his emphasis on the need for grace.[43] That is to say, one of his most important intentions when he emphasizes the imitation is the fact that man by himself and of himself cannot do this; there is, therefore, a desperate need of grace of God. However, this interpretation functions in two ways. On the one hand, it makes it clear that there is no place of "merely ethical discipleship" in this book; on the other hand, it makes us ask about the relevance of the concept of semi-Pelagianism to this book.

So now let us turn to the problem of semi-Pelagianism. There have been several attempts by some scholars to detect a semi-Pelagian tendency in Kierkegaard's emphasis on the imitation of Christ. For example, even though not directly mentioning Training in Christianity, H. Roos says:

> [There] are certain positive tendencies which...point in the direction of the Catholic position; that is especially true of his emphasis upon the principle of action [esp., Kierkegaardian concept "imitation"] in contrast to that of faith.[44]

Malantschuk also says:

> In his [Kierkegaard's] later years, when he particularly emphasizes the significance of imitation for the Christian life the tendency toward Catholicism becomes more marked in his writings.[45]

Therefore, it is worth considering this problem of semi-Pelagianism extensively.

I shall consider this problem through a thorough examination of Part III of this book, for this part of the book is the most likely one from which one may draw out such a tendency. (But I shall refer to other parts of the book and other materials in order to illuminate the points which I shall draw from this part.) Indeed, a superficial reading of this part may give support to this view, since in it Christ's drawing us to Himself is expressed as being harmonious with our trying to be disciples. But careful examination which hopefully I shall provide in what follows, will show that, in the final analysis, one's being a disciple cannot be achieved by one's efforts, even though it is true that one should try to be a disciple. For in spite of one's efforts, human efforts, even those under the spiritual influence of God, are always found to be insufficient, and moreover one's salvation only depends on what the God-Man has done, and this is the conclusive motivation of one's being a disciple in the real sense.

What is important in relation to this is the fact that throughout this part, one's being and remaining a disciple, which is termed here as being drawn to Christ, is regarded as the work of Christ. Anti-Climacus says:

> [On] high He is not resting, but He works hitherto, employed

> and concerned with drawing all unto Himself...[Thou] seest not God's almightiness - and yet it is fully certain that He also works, that a single instant without Him, and the world is nothing. So likewise He is invisible on high, yet everywhere present, employed in drawing all unto Himself - while in this world, alas, there is worldly talk about everything else but Him, as though He did not exist.(TC, p. 155)

Hence the God-Man is now working on high. Yet this work is based on His work which He has done when He was here on earth (that is, His redemption or atonement), and being carried out by Him from on high; He draws us unto Himself from on high. Hence, as we shall see, there is a coherence or unity between what He has done on earth and what He is doing now. This coherence or unity can be observed from two aspects; one is concerned with our knowing the fact that He draws us unto Himself, and the other one is concerned with the relation between what He has done on earth and what He is doing on high.

The first aspect (which concerns our knowing this fact) is less important in comparison with the second aspect, but it also shows the unity between His work on earth and His work on high. Anti-Climacus says:

> It is the exalted One who shall do this [drawing to Himself], but it is the humbled One who has said that he will do it. In case the humbled One had not lived, we should have known nothing about the exalted One; and in case the humbled One had not uttered this word, we should have known nothing about the promise that He from on high will draw all unto Himself.(TC, p. 161)

As this passage shows, if Christ in His humiliation had not said what He would do when He would be on high, we could not know this fact. In this sense, what He has done on earth is related to what He is doing on high. But, as we have said above, this aspect of

the unity of His work is less important.

The main thing we have to bear in mind in relation to the unity of Christ's work is the fact that what He has done on earth (redemption) is the ground or basis of what He is doing now on high. To draw us unto Himself is Christ's work, and His work has a kind of coherence; what he has done when he was here on earth does not break with what He is doing from on high.(TC, p. 151) Without having redeemed us, he cannot draw us to Himself; that is, without redemption we cannot be disciples.

Anti-Climacus sees this even in relation to the way in which Jesus puts the clause, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all unto Myself."(TC, p. 151, et passim, John 12:32), and also the way in which the evangelist interprets this clause. That is, Anti-Climacus sees and emphasizes that Jesus says this clause in this form when He was in His humiliation. So the situation of humiliation is very important, and at the same time His drawing us will be carried out if or when He is lifted up from the earth. Moreover, Anti-Climacus reminds us of the fourth evangelist's interpretation of these words of Jesus in the following verse (John 12:33): "'This He [that is, Christ] said signifying what death He should die.' Thus the Apostle explains the being lifted up from the earth as humiliation, as the deepest humiliation, as crucifixion."(TC, p. 251, emphasis given) Hence what Jesus Christ means is that, after he is crucified, that is, after he has accomplished the redemption, He will draw us unto Himself. But this does not mean that it is only on the cross that Jesus Christ does the work of redemption, even though what he has

done on the cross is the essence of the work of redemption. Anti-Climacus has a very strong sense of the importance of Christ's life on earth for the work of redemption. Following the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, Anti-Climacus says that "He [Christ] Himself learned by what He suffered - He learned obedience."(TC, p. 180) That is, the way in which He lived on earth - His absolute obedience to God the Father, His suffering for being the Truth, etc. - is a part of His work of redemption, and this work is the basis or foundation of what He is doing now.(TC, p. 181) What is important here is the coherence or unity of His work. His work now is the continuation of the work he carried out on earth. His work has two kinds of completion; one is the completion of the work of redemption and the other is the application of this completed redemption. So we can say, as Anti-Climacus does, that He continues to complete {the second completion} the work even now which He has completed when he was here on earth {the first completion}. His drawing us unto Himself is His own work as the work of the second completion. Anti-Climacus says again:

> [He] is invisible on high, yet everywhere present, employed in drawing all unto Himself - while in this world, alas, there is worldly talk about everything else but Him, as though He did not exist. He employs the most various things as the way and the means of drawing unto Himself...But though the means He employs are so many, all ways come together at one point, the consciousness of sin - through that passes 'the way' by which He draws a man, the repentant sinner, to Himself.(TC, p. 155)

This quotation highlights clearly the way in which Christ in His exaltation from on high draws us unto Himself. Even though He uses many means of drawing us unto Himself, "all ways come together at one point, the consciousness of sin". Here, the unity

of His works clearly appears. By pointing out this fact, Anti-Climacus closely relates what Christ has done when he was on earth to what He is doing now. The death on the cross which is done as the means of solving the human problem of sin, is closely related to His making us conscious of our sin. Both of them are His own works; rather, they are two parts of His own work. As we have asserted above, He draws us unto Himself on the basis of what He has done on earth.

What is emphasized in the unity of His works is the fact that even though He may use several different means, the One who conclusively does this work is Jesus Christ Himself. In this sense, on the last page of this book, Anti-Climacus says again that "for Thou alone art able to draw unto Thyself, though Thou canst employ all means and all men to draw all unto Thyself."(TC, p. 254, emphasis given) Jesus Christ draws us, he makes us conscious of our sin, and on the basis of the redemption which He has done on earth He forgives our sin. He "will not forget [us] even when, alas, [we do] sometimes forget Him, who from on high continues to draw [us] unto Himself, until the last blessed end when [we] shalt be by Him, and with Him on high."(TC, p. 156) In this way, the fact that all that is related to our salvation is Christ's own work is emphasized throughout this book.

In relation to this, we have to understand the meaning of drawing to Himself which Jesus said that he would do. Anti-Climacus says that "here the meaning of truly drawing to oneself is duplex: first to make that which is to be drawn its own self, and then to draw it to oneself."(TC, p. 159) In order

to understand this properly, we have to first understand the Christian sense of becoming oneself (which I shall discuss and compare to the ethical understanding of becoming oneself in the next chapter).

Here I just want to point out one fact which is closely related to the problem of semi-Pelagianism, and which Anti-Climacus also emphasizes. The activity of drawing to Himself is described here as a two-step activity: firstly making the one who is to be drawn become himself, and then drawing the one to Himself. What must be remembered is the fact that even the first step is closely related to Christ; it is not an autonomous, or independent happening. "Christ would first and foremost help every man to become himself, would require of him first and foremost that by entering into himself he should become himself...."(TC, p. 160) In this way, Anti-Climacus emphasizes that even the first step of the drawing is possible only in relation to Christ. As we shall see in the next chapter, in the Christian consciousness one cannot be oneself by oneself; it is only in relation to God, who has conclusively revealed Himself in the Christ event, that one can be oneself in the full sense. Hence even the first step of being drawn by Christ is closely related to Christ Himself who first makes one to be oneself, "so as then to draw [one] unto Himself."(TC, p. 160) Hence even in the first step of the drawing, one is in relation to Christ.

In this sense, I wonder whether it is more accurate not to regard this two-step activity as something which is happening through two different stages. Anti-Climacus himself describes this as a possible alternative, when he says:

> [When] that which is to be drawn is in itself a self, the real meaning of truly drawing to oneself is, first to help it to become truly its own self, so as then to draw it to oneself, or it means to help it to become its own self with and by the drawing of it to oneself.(TC, p. 159, emphasis given)

In this sense, this two-step activity looks like an analytic expression of what is happening at the very same time. Whatever that may be, what is emphasized in this context is the fact that it is possible to choose Christ or to choose to follow (or be drawn by) Jesus Christ only when one becomes oneself. This intimates that we cannot choose Christ by ourselves before we are really related to Christ. Our relation to Christ comes before our choice to follow Christ. If there is the slightest possibility for us to choose by ourselves to follow Christ in the context of this discussion of Anti-Climacus, then we have to say that Anti-Climacus has a semi-Pelagian tendency. If one can be oneself by oneself and if only after that can one be related to God and Christ, then we cannot help speaking of his semi-Pelagian tendency. But what we find is the emphasis upon Christ's initiative in our becoming ourselves.(TC, pp. 156f.)

This point can be confirmed by the observation that in this book, one's consciousness of arriving at a certain standard or one's sense of conquering in relation to one's efforts to follow Christ, is scathingly criticized.[46] In fact, one's imagination that one had conquered is regarded as being caught by Satan's

tactics.(Cf. TC, pp. 224ff.) It is true that Anti-Climacus speaks of these things in relation to the Church as a whole, rather than to individual human beings. But if this is the case for the Church as a whole, then this can also apply to individual human beings who belong to that Church. Hence if the Church, which imagines that it has arrived at a certain standard by itself or even by God's grace, is not the true Church, but one which "has taken the Church of Christ in vain"(TC, p. 205), then the individual human being who thinks that he can be saved or justified by what he has done with the help of God's grace is also not the true Christian, but one who has taken Christ in vain.

That one cannot reach perfection is one of the reasons why Anti-Climacus, who is Christian to an extraordinary degree, says:

> [I] am convinced in my inmost heart that what I say is Christian; but I dare not say of myself that I am so perfect a Christian that I might venture to give the impression that at every instant I feel equally vividly what I have here said, not that I would assume responsibility for every deduction from it.(TC, p. 249)

Even though he himself cannot be such a person in its full sense, he cannot help pointing out what is the ideal form of being a Christian. This attitude is in keeping with his view of discipleship. According to him, a disciple tries to do all things he can do in order to be a disciple and suffers for being such a disciple, but he will never attribute any merit to his own efforts of being a disciple and to his own suffering for being a follower in the true sense. He even thinks that such thought of meritoriousness is one which defiles one's being a true disciple.[47] For a true disciple does not start from himself (if

this is the case, he cannot find any way in which he can be a disciple in the sense with which this book uses this term); rather he begins to strive to be a true disciple, a true Christian with the redemptive understanding of the death of the God-Man.(Cf. JP, III, 2483(Pap. X 1 A 197)) For such a person, if there were no redemptive event of the cross, then there would be no point in being a disciple, and then the term "Christian" would not make any sense at all. That is to say, without redemption there is no starting point for him. For such a person, "His [Christ's] death becomes the infinite guarantee with which [he as] the striver starts out, the assurance that infinite satisfaction has been made...."(TC, p. 270) In this spirit, Kierkegaard says:

> The fellow-worker with Christ in relation to the atonement thou canst not be, not in the remotest way. Thou art wholly in debt, He wholly makes satisfaction. [viz., The guilt is entirely yours: the making satisfaction is entirely his.](Chr. D, p. 308)

This is the conclusive reason why such a disciple does not put any merits on his efforts or works.(Cf. Journals, No. 1069(Pap. X 2 A 511)) What is given to him by God is the starting point and the ending point for him.

A quotation from Kierkegaard's journal entry will clearly elucidate this point.

> No, the Atonement and grace are and remain definite. All striving toward imitation, when the moment of death brings it to an end and one stands before God, will be sheer paltriness - therefore Atonement and grace are needed, Furthermore, as long as there is striving, the Atonement will constantly be needed to prevent this striving from being transformed into agonizing anxiety in which a man is burned up, so to speak, and less than ever begins to strive. Finally, while there is striving, every other second a mistake is made, something is neglected, there is sin - therefore Atonement is unconditionally needed. Although it is the utmost

> strenuousness, imitation should be like a jest, a childlike act - if it is to mean something in earnest, that is, be of any value before God - the Atonement is the earnestness.[48]

This passage clearly shows us Kierkegaard's understanding of the relation between atonement and our striving to imitate Christ in His humiliation (discipleship).

Firstly, the only basis or foundation of one's salvation is the atonement which Christ has accomplished when He was here on earth. Human striving is only paltriness and "like a jest, a childlike act" before God; that is, it, whatever that may be, has no value at all before God. What is more, "good works in the sense of meritoriousness are naturally an abomination to God."(JP, II, 1121(Pap. VIII 1 A 19))

Secondly, Christ's atonement is also the basis of one's striving to imitate Christ in His humiliation(cf. JP, II, 1875(Pap. X 3 A 378), 1910(Pap. X 4 A 492)); only such striving which is based on atonement is able not to be transformed into "agonizing anxiety in which a man is burned up".[49] That is, as Marie Thulstrup says, "God's grace awakens thankfulness in a person, and it is precisely thankfulness which eo ipso leads to the imitation of Christ. It comes about because of joy [of redemption]. Therefore, this kind of imitation has nothing in common with a legalistic demand for imitation binding upon everyone."[50]

In short, imitation for the Christian is "the fruit of faith."[51] So Kierkegaard says that "infinite humiliation and grace and then a striving born of gratitude - this is Christianity."[52] He says again: "Your striving is to be as rigorous as possible, and then it is nevertheless by 'grace' that you are saved."[53] These points illuminate the view of discipleship of Training in Christianity.

Now it must become clear that even in relation to Training in Christianity which emphasizes the act of following Christ, it is difficult to find a semi-Pelagian tendency. On the contrary, in this book, it is emphasized that one's following Christ, which is the vital part of discipleship, can only come from one's faith-relationship with the God-Man.

So far we have observed that the view of discipleship in Philosophical Fragments and in Training in Christianity cannot be understood as "merely ethical discipleship" which sees the Pattern (Christ) as only a good moral teacher and example; and it cannot be understood as providing synergism which sees the problem of salvation as a cooperative work of God and man. These two observations make it clear that Christian understanding of the ethical aspect of life, which is basically treated as a problem of discipleship in these two books, is fundamentally different from the rationalistic understanding of ethics. For Christian understanding is suggested to be something which is different to the view of the ethical person; moreover, it is seen as something which cannot be compromised even with a religious view which does not make a clear distinction between the Christian view and the

merely ethical view. In short, the Christian does not think that the ethical aspect of life is autonomous, or independent of God. Rather, the ethical aspect of human life is also understood to be closely related to God and faith in God, for "the Christian ethical norm" is being a "disciple"(cf. JP, II, 1901(Pap. X 4 A 340)), as described in this section.

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On the basis of the discussion so far advanced, we can conclude this chapter by saying that the Christian understanding of the ethical aspect of life is not the same as that of the ethical person; rather there is a clear distinction and break between them. For the ethical person, what is important is human practical reason which makes ethical universality possible. But for the Christian, what is important is not self-sufficient reason, but God and the God-relationship. Here our long quest for an understanding of Christian ethics reaches its end. What is suggested as the antithesis between ethics and faith in Fear and Trembling can be conclusively understood as the antithesis between the rationalistic understanding of the ethical aspect of human life and the Christian understanding. This Christian understanding of ethics which comes from Christian faith, shows us that there can be something which could be called Christian ethics. Christian ethics is suggested as the ethics of love in Works of Love and is also seen as the ethics of discipleship in Philosophical Fragments and especially in Training in Christianity. Our comparison between rationalistic ethics and

Christian ethics shows one aspect of the clear discontinuity between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. Our next task is to try to see whether such discontinuity can also be observed in their understanding of becoming a self. This is what we shall consider in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Cf. Dewey, The New Obedience, p. xxii.

2. Thomte, pp. 174f.

3. For a discussion of semi-Pelagianism in the restricted sense, see James Orr, The Progress of Dogma (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1901), pp. 160-62.

4. Cf. God bestows "prevenient" grace, in order that "those who by sins are alienated from God may be disposed through His quickening and assisting grace to convert themselves to their own justification but freely assenting to, and co-operating with, the said grace."(Decree on Justification of the Council of Trent. 5)

5. Cf. Ibid., 3, 7, 10, 16.

6. PF,p. 15=PFS, p. 19. See also PF, 14f. 62=PFS, pp. 18, 77.

7. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 134. Hence it is difficult to say, as Roos claims, that in the thought of Kierkegaard Christ's divinity would be in some way "absorbed" by his humanity.(H. Roos, "Søren Kierkegaard und die Kenosislehre," Kierkegaardiana, II (1957), pp. 54-60, cited in Colette, p. 45.

8. Dupré, p. 148. See also Bonifazi, p. 92; Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 134; and Colette, p. 45f. According to Colette, M. Grimault, in his Kierkegaard par lui-meme, tried to interpret Kierkegaard's christology as a theology of a Docetic tendency(p. 45).

9. JP, I, 284(Pap. II A 595); JP, VI, 6364(Pap. X 1 A 156).

10. See, e.g., Hampson, "The Self's Relation to God: A Study in Faith and Love," p. 194; Dewey, pp. 31, 184, n. 32; and Lewis, "Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and the Faith of Our Fathers," pp. 13, 16, n. 55.

11. Niels Thulstrup, "Introduction" to PFS, p. lxxvii. See also Jerry H. Gill, "Kant, Kierkegaard and Religious Knowledge," Essays on Kierkegaard, p. 68; and David Wisdo, Kierkegaard on Belief, Faith and Explanation," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987), pp. 109f.

12. JP, II, 1094(Pap. I A 36). See also JP, II, 1130(Pap. X 1 A 368); FSE, pp. 100f.; TC, PP. 128, 82, 102.

13. Dupré, p. 103. See also Mackey, " A Ram in the Afternoon: Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Other," in Kierkegaard's Truth, p. 221; Stendahl, pp. 165f.; Nordentoft, pp. 124, 346.

14. David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp, 76f., see also pp. 84f.; and Wisdo, p. 112. See again PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 19.

15. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 134.

16. The logical implication of the view that Jesus was merely a good moral example is well presented by Robert C. Roberts, in his Faith, Reason, and History: Rethinking Kierkegaard's "Philosophical Fragments" (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1986), pp. 29f.

17. I owe this question to Daphne Hampson.

18. Dupré, p. 104.

19. M.C. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love (2nd edition, London; Faber and Faber, 1954), pp. 85f.

20. Ibid.

21. In this sense, I cannot understand how John W. Elrod, in relation to this book, can say that for Kierkegaard "to perceive Christ essentially...as an atoner and redeemer is theologically incorrect, for such a view imputes to Christ qualities and powers that are essentially incongruous with our humanness...Christ's life constitutes an ethical paradigm for all individuals who choose to will the existence of a community of ends...Theological doctrines about the nature of Christ's divinity are themselves dependent upon the ethical essence of Christianity."(Kierkegaard and Christendom, pp. 245, 247. Even though afterwards he unwillingly accepts the obvious fact that "[innumerable] passages in his journals and published works lay an unmistakable stress upon the redemptive value of Christ"(p. 245), Elrod, as we can see from the quotation above, tries to understand Christ's divinity from his ethical excellence, and in this sense he seems to look at Kierkegaard through Kantian philosophical eyes.

22. Arbaugh and Arbaugh also make a similar point: "Such following is possible only through worship - not in the place of worship - for imitation of Christ is not ethical but is a religious discipleship.... Christian life is...a responsiveness to a Christ who comes with transcendent claims and absolute requirements."(Kierkegaard's Authorship, p. 327)

23. For a similar view, see Colette, pp. 63f.

24. See, e.g., Oscar Cullman, Christ and Time, trans. Floyd Filson (London: SCM, 1958), p. 168. See also Zuidema, p. 39. Sponheim (p. 193, n. 82) mentions two German scholars who also think in the way - Siegfried Hanso ("Die Bedeutung des Leidens fuer das Christusbild Søren Kierkegaards," Kerygma und Dogma (1956): 1-28) and Hennig Schroeer, Die Denkform der Paradoxalitaet als Theologisches Problem (Goetingen: Van denhoeck

and Ruprecht, 1960), pp. 87, 131f.)

25. JP, II, 1359(Pap. VIII 1 A 356); JP, IV, 3923(Pap. VIII a 324), 4634(Pap. X 1 A 416), 4658(Pap. X 3 A 382); GS, pp. 18f.

26. See TC, p. 167; JP, I, 311(Pap. VIII 1 A 371); JP, I, 312(Pap. VIII 1 A 374); JP, I, 313(Pap. VIII 1 A 377); and JP III 3418(Pap. VIII 1 A 372). For a good discussion of this subject, see N.H. Soe, "The Last Period (after 1849)," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, pp. 152f. See also Bonifazi, p. 92.

27. TC, p. 216. See also JP, I, 194(Pap. X2 A 253); JP, I, 236(Pap. X 1 A 135); JP, I, 692(Pap. IX A 153); JP, I, 693(Pap. X1 A 132); JP, II, 1385(Pap. X 1 A 64); JP, II, 1922(Pap. X 5 A 88); JP, III, 2898(Pap. X 5 A 96); JP, III, 3645(Pap. X 2 A 296); Journals, No. 887=JP. IV, 4454(Pap. X 1 A 134); WLH, p. 154; PH, p. 139.

28. TC, pp. 197f. For another discussion of the difference between Jesus as the God-Man and other individual human beings, see Dewey, pp. 106f.

29. See TC, p. 232. See also JP, II, 1863(Pap. X 6 B 241); JP, II, 1892(Pap. X 3 A 767); JP, II, 1837(Pap. VIII 1 A 303); JP, II, 1848(Pap. IX A 101); JP, II, 1833-1956 ["Imitation"]; and AN, p. 35. For a good discussion of Christ's being the Pattern as the Saviour in Training in Christianity, see Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, pp. 349-353. See also Miller, p. 313; and Shestov, p. 201.

30. JP, IV, 4454(Pap. X 1 A 134). See also Journals, No. 925(Pap. X 1 A 455); JP, I, 334(Pap. X 1, A 279).

31. TC, p. 184. See also JP, II, 1924(Pap. XI 1 A 4); JP, III, 3442(Pap. X 6 B 239); JP, III, 3683(Pap. X 3 A 377); JP, IV, 4645(Pap. X 2 A 257). The God-Man even knew with certainty that He would be exalted: "He, the humbled One, knew that He would be exalted, He knew it with eternal certitude."(TC, p. 163) See also Chr. D., p. 78.

32. Gates makes this point clear. See his Christendom Revisited, p. 148.

33. JP, I, 352(Pap. X2 A 422). See also TC, p. 194; JP, I, 615(LY, p. 306=Pap. XI2 A 263); Journals, Nos. 887(Pap. X 1 A 134), 1020(X 2 A 296), 1049(X 2 A 411), 1311(XI 1 A 115); JP, II, 1857(X 2 A 47), 1911(X 4 A 499); JP, IV, 4315(Pap. X 5 A 35), 4486(Pap. XI 1 A 564); Pap. X 1 A 132, cited in Dupré, p. 176.

34. Pap. IX A 153, cited in Per Lønning, "The Period up to the Ethical Religious Essays," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, p. 136.

35. Per Lønning, p. 140.

36. Cf. TC, pp. 117ff, John 16:23 and Matt. 16:23). See also JP, II, 1843(VIII 1 A 536), 1859(X 2 A 317), 1893(X 3 A 776), 1902(X 4 A 349); JP, III, 2453(XI 2 A 390), 3580(X 6 B 227), 3663(XI 1 A 33), 3677(X 3 A 125); JP, IV, 4621(Pap. IX A 330); JP, VI, 6653(X 3 A 249), 4660(Pap. X 3 A 492), 6794(Pap. X 4 A 488). See also Dewey, pp. 145f.

37. JP, IV, 4662(Pap. X 3 A 471), 4680(Pap. X 4 A 456), 4688(Pap. X 4 A 593), 4693(Pap. X 4 A 643), 4717(Pap. XI 1 A 493), 4967(Pap. X 3 A 5). See also Dupré, p. 173; and Utterback, pp. 308, 311, 312, 313, 318, 319.

38. Cf. JP, IV, 4709(Pap. XI 1 A 340), 4710(Pap. XI 1 A 350), 4730(Pap. XI 2 A 396); JP, VI, 6938(Pap. XI 2 A 252).

39. JP, IV, 4639(Pap. X 2 A 53). See also JP. IV, 4657(Pap. X 3 A 305).

40. See TC, p. 194; GS, pp. 87, 95. For a similar observation of this point, see Gates, Christendom Revisited, pp. 132f.; and Utterback, p. 291.

41. Cf. Vater Lindstroem, "The problem of Objectivity and Subjectivity in Kierkegaard," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p. 240. See also Colette, p. 46.

42. JP, I, p. 273(Pap. I A 28). See also JP, I, 242(Pap. 1 A 38); JP, II, 1492(Pap. X 5 A 64).

43. Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 362. See also Thomte, p. 181. He is citing TC, pp. 23, 25 and Papirer X 2 A 76.

44. H. Roos, Søren Kierkegaard and Catholicism, trans. from the Danish by Richard M. Brackett (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1954), p. 12f.

45. Malantschuk, "Catholicism," in JP, I, p. 508. See also Colette, pp. 75f., 80. Dupré also remarks that in Kierkegaard thought there is "a true synergistic theory of grace." "This synergism," continues Dupré, "is by no means restricted to the initial stage of grace...it plays a role throughout the development of the act of faith."(Dupré, p. 91) For a general background to this discussion, see pp. 216f. However, Dupré admits that for Kierkegaard the Christian's endeavour does not have any merit. See pp. 166, 169, 180.

46. Cf. TC, pp. 174, 205, 224f., 249. See also JP, II, 1857(Pap. X 2 A 47); LY, pp. 33f.(Pap. XI A 22), 282(XI 2 A 187), 298(XI 2 A 233), 328(XI 2 A 325). See again Dupré, p. 180 and Dewey, pp. 152f.

47. TC, p. 174. See also JP, II, 1121(Pap. VIII 1 A 19), 1431(Pap. X 4 A 640), 1867(Pap. X 3 A 276), 2138(Pap. X 2 A 76), 2139(Pap. X 2 A 203), 2140(Pap. X 3 A 672; JP, III, 2477(Pap. X 1 A 25), 3096(Pap. X 4 A 641), 3740(Pap. VII 1 B 181:2); JP, VI, 6623(Pap. X 3 A 98); Journals, 1272(Pap. X 4 A 639); JFY, p. 213; FSE, pp. 7ff., 11f.; WLH, pp. 356f. See again Dewey, pp. 126f.; and Bonifazi, p. 164.

48. JP, II, 1909(Pap. X 4 A 491). See also JP, I, 938(Pap. X2 A 208; JP, II, 1121(Pap. VIII 1 A 19), 1135(Pap. X 2 A 207), 1139(Pap. X 3 A 322), 1140(Pap. X 3 A 323); JP, V, 6001(Pap. VIII 1 A 116), JP, VI, 6521(Pap. X 2 A 157), 6969(Pap. XI 2 A 439). See also Utterback, pp. 342-352.

49. Cf. JP, III, 3443(Pap. X 2 A 342); JP, IV, 5012(Pap. IX A 399).

50. Marie M. Thulstrup, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Imitation," p. 270. Cf. Journals, No. 1150(Pap. X 3 A 602); JP, I, 993(Pap. X 3 A 734); JP, II, 1518(Pap. XI 1 A 176). See also Dewey, pp. 128f., 160f.; and Utterback, p. 352.

51. JP, II, 1908(Pap. X4 A 459). See also JP, II, 1884(X 3 A 615), 1886(Pap. X 3 A 667), 1892(Pap. X 3 A 767), 1919(Pap. X 5 A 44); JP, III, 2915(Pap. XI2 A 181), 3681(Pap. X 3 A 278).

52. JP, I, 993(Pap. X3 A 734). See also JP, IV, 4867(Pap. X 2 A 635).

53. JP, II, 1489(Pap. X 4 A 619). See also Gates, Christendom Revisited, pp. 148-151.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SELF

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the ethical person's understanding of the self and the Christian's understanding. That is, in this chapter, the ontological aspect of the difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere is dealt with. I hope to show that there is also a distinction and definite break between the ethical person's understanding of the self and the Christian understanding, as there is a clear-cut distinction between the ethical understanding of ethics and the Christian understanding (as we have seen in the last chapter).

By the terms "ontology" and "ontological" I do not mean that there is ontology in the traditional sense of the word ("the inquiry into beings as beings", "the inquiry into the being of beings", or "the inquiry into being as such"[1]) in the thought of Kierkegaard. For it would be futile to try to find such a traditional ontology in the thought of Kierkegaard. In fact, he is very critical of traditional ontology, especially Hegelian metaphysics. One may even say that "Kierkegaard has no ontology".[2] Hence when I speak of "ontology", I use this term in a very special way. On the one hand, the meaning which I give to this term is very broad in the sense that it includes all kinds of matters which are related to the problem of human beings and existence, even though these are not systematically arranged as

ontology in sensu strictu. So ontology here is a "pre-ontological" ontology (to use Heidegger's terminology[3]), or an "implicit ontology" (to use Calvin Schrag's terminology[4]). That is, it is an existential-ontic (or pre-theoretical) understanding of one's existence. Kierkegaardian ontology is what is implied in his understanding of the human being which he defines as an existing individual. What I want to do is to draw out from his various writings this implied understanding of the human being as an existing individual. But on the other hand, the term is also very restricted in the sense that it deals only with what is related to human existence and one's being oneself. Kierkegaardian ontology does not include theology proper, or cosmology. It is only concerned with the concrete human being and his existence. But this does not mean that Kierkegaard does not mention God or the world when he is speaking of human problems. But these references are made mainly in relation to the problem of one's becoming oneself. In this sense, one may speak of Kierkegaardian ontology as a restricted ontology, or, as John Elrod does, a "regional ontology"[5].

In relation to the term "ontology", another point must also be made here. In spite of the general trend among scholars, who use this term to cover all "Kierkegaard's spheres of existence", I cannot help pointing out the clear difference between the ethical person's understanding of becoming oneself and the Christian's understanding. Hence I do not believe that the ontology of the ethical person is the same as that of the Christian. I do not think that there is one ontology which is the basis for the

doctrine of spheres of existence. In this sense, my position is the opposite of that of Elrod, who thinks that Kierkegaard "developed an ontology in the pseudonyms in his writings on the self"[6] and that "this ontology makes possible and unifies the aesthetic, moral, and religious modes of existence."[7] As I have mentioned above, Elrod is not the only one who thinks in this way. It is a general trend among scholars to find an ontology behind Kierkegaard's spheres of existence. In particular, those who try to compare Kierkegaard's thought to that of other existential thinkers assert an ontological basis to Kierkegaard's works.[8] However, in my opinion, there are two possibilities of speaking of an ontology which covers and unites several spheres of life. One of them is excluding the Christian sphere from the discussion, because after excluding the Christian sphere, it is possible to construct an ontology which covers and unites the aesthetic sphere and the ethical sphere and religiousness A. For the fundamental thought of these spheres are basically the same, that is, immanentism. But it is very difficult to include Christianity and the Christian mode of existence within this same structure. For, as Malantschuk says, Christian ontology is the ontology which "cannot be contained within human 'immanental thought'".[9]

The second possibility of speaking of an ontology of Kierkegaard is of identifying the Christian ontology which is the self-understanding of the Christian existence, and then looking at other spheres from this perspective. In fact, I think, the discussion in The Sickness unto Death follows this line of thought, and in section 2 of the chapter, I shall examine this

book and develop such an ontology. We have to differentiate the ethical understanding of the self and the Christian understanding. This is the thesis which I hope to maintain in this chapter.

In this chapter, I shall first consider the ethical person's understanding of the problem of the self and of one's being oneself. I shall do this through a thematic reading of the second volume of Either/Or, and I shall refer to the second part of Stages on the Life's Way and other material in order to shed light on the points which I shall make in relation to Either/Or. In the course of this discussion, the close relationship between the ethical person's understanding of the self and Heidegger's idea of authentic self will be identified. (But as space is limited, I will merely point out several similarities. For extensive discussion of the comparison of the ethical person's view of becoming a self and Heidegger's view of becoming an authentic existence, a separate study would be needed.)

I shall then, in section 2, consider the Christian understanding of becoming oneself through a thorough examination of The Sickness unto Death. In the course of this examination, one can clearly see that even though there is what one may call a structural similarity between the ethical understanding of the problem of becoming oneself and the Christian understanding, they are basically different. By "structural similarity" I mean that the structure of the self of the ethical person and that of the Christian are similar in that both of them have two opposite, or contradictory elements (i.e., body and soul, temporality and eternity, or finitude and infinitude) which must be integrated by

the third element. The structure of the self of the ethical person is similar to the Christian's. However, the differences lie in their understanding of the way in which the integration of these elements is accomplished, and the characteristics of the resulting integrated self in each person (the ethical and the Christian person).

After finishing this discussion, in section 3, we shall consider another closely related problem: how can we understand the person who is in religiousness A? He appears to have exactly the same structure of the self as that of the Christian, for he also affirms that one can be oneself only in relation to God. For him too the relation to God is the necessary and sufficient element of the integration of oneself. However, we hope to show the fundamental difference between the ways in which one believes to accomplish this integration of each sphere. So this section on the problem of religiousness A is also helpful for our conclusion that even in the problem of becoming a self there is a clear distinction and definite break between the ethical person and the Christian.

I

Let us start with a consideration of the ethical person's understanding of the problem of becoming oneself. Our consideration of this problem will proceed in the following way. First, we shall see one of the most characteristic emphases of the ethical person: choice. In considering this, we shall find that

this choice, emphasized so much by the ethical person, is nothing other than the choice of oneself. Then we shall examine the way of choosing oneself suggested by the ethical person. And then lastly, we shall consider the characteristics of the resultant ethically integrated self. Through this examination we shall be able to see that the ethical person understands that one can be oneself by one's own efforts, if only one wishes and tries to do so. For the ethical person, to be oneself is a possibility which is latent in his structure of the self itself.

First, what is the most characteristic emphasis of the ethical person? When we examine the letters of Judge William, the pseudonymous representative of the ethical viewpoint, in Either/Or, it is easy to see that one of the most dominant themes is that of choice.[10] In many places Judge William emphasizes the importance of choice. To put it in the context of the book, he recommends the young man (who is designated "A" by the editor of the book, Victor Eremita) to choose. This implies that according to Judge William, "A" as an aesthetic person has not yet made the choice of life. From this we can see that by the term "choice" or "to choose" Judge William means a very special choice.

When we closely examine the passages in which Judge William mentions this choice, we can find that the choice to which he refers is that in which one chooses oneself.[11] So his recommendation to the aesthete "A" can be summarized in the following command: "[Win] yourself, acquire your own self"(E/OL, II, p. 167=E/O, II, p. 163), or "choose [yourself]".(SOLWL, p. 124) Indeed, "choose yourself" is the repeated refrain throughout

the whole of Judge William's writings to "A". This presupposes that the ethical person does not think that every human being, given his biological and psychological reality, is a "self". Here appears the special meaning of the term "self". Every living being is not yet a "self". To be a "self" is understood as a task. And that task is accomplished through one's choice.[12]

What then does Judge William mean by the terms "to be oneself", or "to choose oneself"? There are three expressions which are used in relation to the term "to choose oneself". Sometimes Judge William says that "one should choose the ethical". From time to time he says that "one must choose oneself in one's eternal validity." And in some places he says that "one should choose the absolute" or "one should choose absolutely". These expressions are clues to the exact understanding of choice of oneself. In the next few paragraphs, I shall discuss the meaning of these three expressions one by one in relation to the problem of becoming oneself. But such a separate discussion is only for convenience's sake; in fact, they cannot be separated. They contribute in their own ways to clarifying the meaning of "one's becoming oneself".

The choice of oneself is, first of all, regarded as the choice of the ethical. For the ethicist, choice itself is the ethical concept. So Judge William says that "the ethical constitutes the choice"(E/O, II, p. 169=E/OL, II, p. 173); and in another place he says again: "The act of choosing is a proper and stringent expression of the ethical."[13]

According to the ethicist, therefore, the aesthetic choice is either entirely immediate, or does not know a decisive either/or, so it is no choice at all.[14] Thus in the eyes of the ethicist the aesthetic person is only in the world of possibilities; "everything is possible for you [the aesthete, "A"]..., but it is unhealthy"(E/O, II, p. 16); "you are the epitome of any and every possibility."(E/O, II, p. 17) The aesthete thus seeks to exist as pure possibility, and refuses to take on concrete determinants. The aesthete, as Stack says, "loses his sense of his own actuality, his own temporal reality."[15] The aesthetic existence is a "poet-existence" which does not know the concrete world, but only lives in the world which he himself composes according to his own imagination.(E/O, II, p. 210=E/OL, II, pp. 214f.) In this sense, the aesthete is only an observer in the game of life. As Judge William speaks of "A": "[You] stick your hands in your pocket and contemplate life."(E/O, II, p. 195=E/OL, p. 200) In the same spirit, he also describes "A" as follows:

> You are a hater of activity in life - quite appropriately, because if there is to be meaning in it life must have continuity, and this your life does not have.(E/O, II, p. 195=E/OL, II, p. 200)

Hence, according to the ethicist, the aesthete is not yet himself.[16] For, according to the ethicist, only with the choice of the ethical does one become oneself. Conversely, we may say, as Ronald J. Manheimer says, that "one becomes ethical by deciding to actualize one's possibilities in such a way that the individual defines himself."[17] For, according to the ethical person, the choice of the ethical is not the choice between good and evil, but the choice between choosing good and evil and not

choosing at all.(E/O, II, p. 169=E/OL, II, p. 173) Hence at first, the self's choice of itself must be the choice to choose. At this stage, "the point is still not that of choosing something; the point is not the reality of that which is chosen but the reality of choosing."(E/O, II, p. 176=E/OL, II, p. 180)

Accordingly, in the opinion of the ethicist, the aesthete does not have a proper conception of good and evil. As Mackey says, "[the] distinction between good and evil does not exist for the aesthete."[18] The aesthete is not yet good or evil. And yet without choice personality deteriorates.(cf. E/O, II, p. 163=E/OL, II, p. 167) For the ethicist thinks that the choice of evil is not the choice, for choice itself, as we have seen, implies the ethical choice. Judge William says:

> [It] actually is a matter of only one choice. Through this choice, I actually do not choose between good and evil, but I choose the good, but when I choose the good, I choose eo ipso the choice between good and evil. The original choice is forever present in every succeeding choice.(E/O, II, p. 219=E/OL, II, 223)

Hence the ethicist thinks that anyone who is capable of choosing between good and evil will choose the good.(E/O, II, p. 168=E/OL, II, p. 172) Therefore, according to the ethicist, only with one's becoming oneself is there a differentiation between good and evil, so only then is one either good or evil.(E/O, II, p. 223=E/OL, II, 227) Hence to fail to choose is to fail to be either good or evil. But this is to lose oneself. Thus, according to the ethicist, to choose oneself means to choose the ethical, or to choose oneself as the ethical self.

Yet the ethical implies freedom. As Judge William expresses it: "[In] the ethical I am raised above the moment, I am in freedom."(E/O, II, p. 179=E/OL, II, p. 184) The ethical choice, or choice understood by the ethicist, is an act of freedom. "The act of resolution," says Judge William, "is the ethical act, it is freedom."(SOLWL, p. 115) Thus, for the ethicist, there is an irrevocable relationship between freedom and choice; if there is no choice there is no freedom, and vice versa. This is the very reason why Judge William can assert: "It is for freedom, therefore, that I am fighting (partly in this letter, partly and chiefly in myself), for the time to come, for Either/Or [i.e., choice]."(E/O, II, p. 176=E/OL, II, p. 180) So one may say with Elrod that "it [to choose oneself] is the acceptance of oneself as radically free and responsible for oneself".[19] In this sense, to choose oneself is to accept responsibility for oneself.[20] To choose oneself in freedom does not mean to abandon all circumstances in which one is placed. One aspect of choosing oneself in freedom is to accept what was given with one's birth, the "particular given that the self has not determined but that cannot be escaped."[21]

Such activity of accepting what was given is described by Judge William as to accept one's facticity as a possibility.(cf. E/O, II, p. 251=E/OL, II, p. 256) Another aspect of choosing oneself in freedom is to take that possibility as one's task.(E/O, II, p. 251=E/OL, II, p. 256) This is the only way in which one can actualize oneself. The actualization of the possibility is the becoming of the self. Hence one can say that in the activity

of choosing, one's personality is determined as ethical. As Thomte expresses it: "The ethical breaks forth from the very depth of his personality."[22]

Here in relation to freedom and to the ethical a novel idea of essence and accidence appears. Judge William says:

> Everything that is posited in his freedom belongs to him essentially, however accidental it may seem to be; everything that is not posited in his freedom is accidental, however essential it may seem to be.(E/O, II, p. 260)

For "[the experience of choosing] gives a person's being a solemnity, a quiet dignity, that is never entirely lost."(E/O, II, p. 176=E/OL, II, p. 181) Hence only what is posited by one's freedom constitutes one's essence. But, as we have seen, one's freedom is expressed in one's acceptance of what was given and in one's choice of being an ethical self. That is to say, through one's use of freedom (understood by the ethicist) only the ethical becomes to belong to the ethical self essentially, and everything else is for him accidental.

Moreover, by being ethical "in freedom he himself chooses his place [in the world] - that is, he chooses his place".[23] In this sense, the ethical person is very concrete.(E/O, II, p. 215=E/OL, II, p. 219) Thus to be oneself in the ethical sense is to be concrete, even to the extent that it must be a "social and civic self".(E/O, II, p. 263=E/OL, II, p. 267) For, according to Judge William, only through the civic life can one be oneself.(E/O, II, p. 216=E/OL, II, pp. 219f.) So he who chooses to be himself can be described as follows: "He is a specific individual; in the choice he makes himself into a specific individual: namely, into

the same one, because he chooses himself".(E/O, II, p. 251=E/OL, II, p. 256) This is why Judge William criticizes all kinds of attempts not to be concrete. One of the representative examples is that of the mystic who escapes from this concrete world to the world of spirit. Of such a mystic Judge William says:

> The mystic's error, then, is not that he chooses himself..., but his error is that he does not choose himself properly; ...he does not choose ethically.... The mystic's error is that in the choice he does not become concrete either to himself or to God; he chooses himself abstractly and therefore lacks transparency.(E/O, II, pp. 247f.=E/OL, II, pp. 252f., emphasis given)

The matter under concern here is the fact that it is unethical not to be concrete in the world. This applies to everybody who tries not to be concrete, however free he looks. So the mystic who, in some sense, may be considered as choosing with freedom, does not choose with freedom in the real sense of the word. For, according to the ethicist, "a person can choose himself according to his freedom only when he chooses himself ethically."(E/O, II, p. 247=E/OL, II, p. 252) Only one who chooses to be concrete chooses according to one's freedom, and "only as a concrete individual is [one] a free individual."(E/O, II, p. 247=E/OL, II, p. 252)

Yet, for the ethicist, this being concrete is, ironically, the only way in which he becomes the universal man.(E/O, II, pp. 255f.=E/OL, II, pp. 260f.) The ethical is the universal, as we have seen in the first chapter of this study. Judge William also says that the one who lives ethically expresses the universal in his life(E/O, II, p. 256=E/OL, II, p. 260), and that "[not] until the individual himself is the universal, not until then can the ethical be actualized."(E/O, II, p. 255=E/OL, II, p. 260) To

be universal, therefore, is to be ethical, and to be ethical is to choose to be ethical. So the ethical person thinks that in the act of choosing the ethical, one becomes oneself.

Let us turn to our second expression, "one must choose oneself in one's eternal validity".(cf. E/O, II, pp. 211, 213, 214=E/OL, II, pp. 215, 217, 218) Here the self which the ethicist chooses appears as his task; the self which he has to realize in time and history. But one's self in one's eternal validity, which one should try to realize in one's concrete life, is not something which transcends oneself. Judge William says:

> [I] know where a treasure is buried that can make you richer than the whole world, and this treasure belongs to you, and you must not even thank me for it, lest you damage your soul by owing everything to a human being. This treasure is stored in your own inner being. There is an Either/Or there that makes a human being greater than the angels.(E/O, II, p. 176=E/OL, II, p. 180)

The human being, as he is, has the possibility of being himself in his inner self. As Judge William expresses it, there is an either/or of becoming oneself or of not doing so <u>in one's own inner self</u>. In this sense, one can say that "the ethical individual...does not have duty outside himself but within himself."(E/O, II, p. 256=E/OL, II, p. 261) And one can also make the following paradoxical statement: the self, which comes into existence with the act of choosing, has already existed, "for it was [in fact] 'himself'."(E/O, II, p. 215=E/OL, II, p. 219) One cannot choose the self which one is in one's eternal validity, if such a self does not already exist as a possibility within oneself. The ethical person seeks and finds his ultimate goal within himself, for his goal is really his own self in its

absolute concreteness.[24] But this self, which was there only as a possibility, now comes into existence as one chooses oneself. Judge William expresses this idea in the following way:

> What I choose, I do not posit, for if it were not [already] posited I could not choose it, and yet if I did not posit it by choosing it then I would not choose it. It is, for if it were not I could not choose it; it is not, for it first comes into existence through my choosing it, and otherwise my choice would be an illusion.[25]

Hence it is not true to say, in the absolute sense, that one creates oneself. For there is already something within oneself from which one can produce oneself. Therefore, Judge William uses not the term "creator", but "editor".(E/O, II, p. 260=E/OL, II, p. 264) The ethical self is his own editor.

From this it follows that after the choice of oneself one is the same self one was before, but at the same time, one can be said to become another in the sense that one has changed (that is, one has become oneself) through the choice. "It [the ethical] does not want to make the individual into someone else but into the individual himself...."(E/O, II, p. 253=E/OL, II, p. 257) So Judge William speaks of such a person as follows:

> He remains himself, exactly the same that he was before, down to the most insignificant feature, and yet he becomes another, for the choice penetrates everything and changes it. Thus his finite personality is now made infinite in the choice, in which he infinitely chooses himself.(E/O, II, p. 223=E/OL, II, p. 227)

Now the self is infinitized through one's choice of oneself, infinitized in the absolute sense. Hence the ethical self <u>is regarded by the ethical person as "the absolute"</u>. Judge William maintains:

> Not until I absolutely choose myself do I absolutely infinitize myself, because I myself <u>am</u> the absolute, because only I myself can choose absolutely....(E/O, II, pp. 223f.=E/OL, II, p. 228)

> I choose the absolute, and what is the absolute? It is myself in my eternal validity. <u>Something other than myself I can never choose as the absolute</u>....(E/O, II, p. 214=E/OL, II, p. 218, emphasis given)

As these quotations show, the ethicist regards "oneself in one's eternal validity" (i.e., "the ethical self") as <u>the absolute</u>.[26] Accordingly, becoming conscious of oneself as such a being is the most important thing in the world.(E/O, II, p. 206=E/OL, II, p. 210) This is one of the reasons why "this choice to be oneself" is also described as "the absolute choice".

Hence, this term "the absolute choice" has a double meaning; it modifies the object of the choice and at the same time relates to the way in which one chooses that object. As far as I know, Collins is the only person who discusses this double meaning of the absolute choice. But he thinks that this is a matter of either/or, saying that "'an absolute choice' may refer either to the object chosen or to the way of making one's choice"; and he chooses the latter, as we can see in the following passage: "It refers to the manner in which I will or refuse to will, rather than to a thing which I seek to obtain."[27] I wonder how he does not see the obvious fact that the object of choice (the ethical self, in this case) is designated <u>the absolute</u>. For the ethicist, the only object which can be chosen absolutely is oneself. To repeat, oneself is the absolute for the ethicist. It must be chosen as the absolute, not a relative thing. Accordingly, one should also choose oneself absolutely; one should not choose

oneself only in part or relative to other things. This is why mediation, which tries to mediate two different things (oneself and the other, in this case) and enhance both of them into the third other, has no place here. For, as Judge William says, "if one admits mediation, then there is no absolute choice, and if there is no such thing, then there is no absolute Either/Or."(E/O, II, p. 173=E/OL, II, p. 177) This is because basically mediation works with the logic of both-and, whereas what is important for the ethical person is either/or. As far as we are existing individuals, we cannot resort to mediation, for "absolute mediation is not possible until history is finished."(E/O, II, p. 173=E/OL, II, p. 177) Hence insofar as we are existing individuals we choose to be ourselves as ethical selves or we choose not to be ourselves as ethical selves. In this spirit, Judge William also says that "only by choosing absolutely can one choose the ethical. Consequently, the ethical is posited by the absolute choice."(E/O, II, p. 177=E/OL, II, p. 181) Only through an absolute choice can a person be the ethical self, or oneself in the ethical sense.

Now we have the full picture of the ethical conception of becoming oneself. To be oneself in the ethical sense is to be ethical, the universal, by accepting what is given and at the same time accepting oneself as "the absolute". As we have mentioned, "to be ethical", "to be oneself in one's eternal validity" and "to choose the absolute" - these three expressions cannot be separated from one another. The exact meaning of one's becoming oneself can be understood only when we combine the meanings of these

expressions.

Here we shall pause for a moment in order to draw out the implications of our discussion so far. The main question which we have asked in this section is what "one's becoming oneself" means in the ethical sphere. From the discussion which we have engaged in until now we can draw out the following ideas. There is potentiality for ethical existence within one's inner self. That is, one can be the "ideal self"(E/O, II, p. 259=E/OL, II, pp. 263, 264), the "eternal self" (or "oneself in one's eternal validity")(E/O,II, pp. 206, 213, 214=E/OL, II, pp. 210, 217, 218), or the "absolute self"(E/O, II, p. 219=E/OL, II, p. 223); this is one's ethical possibility. This "ideal (or eternal, or absolute) self" can also be designated the ethical self or ethically possible self. This ideal self has a dialectical relationship with the finite self which is conditioned by one's facticity or necessity that "is the limiting factor of the self".[28] What is demanded of oneself in order to be oneself is to actualize the ideal (eternal, absolute, or possible) self in the concrete life-situation. This actualization involves, as we have seen, the acceptance of one's concrete circumstances in which one is placed, the acceptance of one's facticity or necessity. Only after one accepts one's concrete facticity and sees one's ethical possibility as one's task, and then synthesizes these two factors within one's existence, does one become an actual ethical self. Now, for such an ethical self, temporality becomes the medium of his self-revelation and self-actualization; now "time seems to him to be a true blessing."(E/O, II, p. 305=E/OL, II, p.

310) In this sense, the ethical person asserts that "man in fact is at once temporal and eternal."(SOLWL, p. 116) Here is the actualization of one's potentiality for becoming a self.

Here we may ask a question: how then can one accomplish the synthesis of one's facticity and one's possibility? In other words, how can one become oneself? What does the ethicist suggest? With these questions we have turned to the next stage of our discussion of the ethical understanding of becoming oneself. That is, how is it possible to actualize this ethical self?

Judge William as the ethicist suggests what seems to be a very negative way of becoming oneself; he recommends that we should despair. He says:

> Choose despair, then, because despair itself is a choice, because one can doubt without choosing it, but one cannot despair without choosing it. And in despairing a person chooses again, and what then does he choose? He chooses himself ... in his eternal validity.(E/O, II, p. 211=E/OL, II, p. 215)

The main thought in this quotation so rich in meaning is: despair is the only way in which one can choose oneself.[29] Judge William does not say that despair is a prelude to choosing oneself, but despair is the way to be oneself. For, according to William, as we shall see, true despair itself involves the choice of oneself. Here we can see Judge William uses the term "despair" in a special way. Hence it is worth considering the meaning which Judge William gives to this term.

When we discuss despair as used by the ethicist, we have to bear in mind the fact that there are two kinds of despair understood by Judge William; one is what may be called phenomenal despair, and another is what is recommended by Judge William. McCarthy also gives his attention to these two kinds of despair which Judge William speaks of. McCarthy calls them "despair as a state" and "despair as an act", respectively.[30] Mackey also makes a similar distinction between these two meanings of despair. He says: "[The] despair which Judge Wilhelm recommends is not the despair which the aesthete nurtures as the last end of a life of enjoyment. It is a despair of the life of enjoyment as such, and thus the gateway into a new way of life....By despairing of himself qua aesthetic he will at once have chosen himself qua ethical in his eternal validity."[31]

Indeed, in some places, Judge William says of the aesthete that he is in despair. This is phenomenal despair, or despair as a state. We may quote two passages in relation to this:

> Consequently, it is manifest that every esthetic view of life is despair, and that everyone who lives esthetically is in despair, whether he knows it or not."(E/O, II, p. 192=E/OL, II, p. 197)[32]

> [Every] life view that has a condition outside itself is despair. Thus, wanting to sorrow is despair in exactly the same sense as wanting to seek happiness, since it is always despair to have one's life in something whose nature is that it can pass away.(E/O, II, pp. 235f.=E/OL, II, p. 240)

The main thought in these passages is that according to the ethical view of life, the life and existence of the aesthete is one of despair. This is despair which the ethical person finds in the aesthete's mode of existence. This kind of despair is

sometimes called "finite despair".(E/O, II, p. 221=E/OL, II, pp. 225f.) The result of "finite despair" is to damage one's soul.(E/O, II, p. 221=E/OL, II, p. 225)

To such a person who is in finite despair, Judge William, ironically, recommends that he should despair.(E/O, II, p. 211=E/OL, II, p. 215) How can we understand this? Does it mean that the despair in which the aesthete is at the moment is not enough, and therefore the aesthete must go deeper into despair? Does it mean that the aesthete himself must be aware of the fact that he is in despair? Or can this be understood in some other way? I think it is the best possible way of looking at this recommendation to differentiate the two different meanings of despair: "despair as phenomenon" and "despair as the precondition or negative element of the ethical repentance". It is true that when Judge William speaks of repentance, he does not add the adjective "ethical" before the term "repentance". But, as we shall see, the characteristics of repentance of which Judge William speaks are different from those of Christian repentance, which we shall closely examine in the next section.[33] So in this section, I shall put the adjective "ethical" before "repentance". The following quotation shows what I mean by despair as the precondition or negative element of ethical repentance.

> Generally speaking, a person cannot despair at all without willing it, but in order truly to despair, a person must truly will it; but when he truly wills it, he is truly beyond despair. When a person has truly chosen despair, he has truly chosen what despair chooses: himself in his eternal validity.(E/O, II, p. 213=E/OL, II, p. 217)

Here Judge William distinguishes two kinds of despair: to despair

in the ordinary sense and to truly despair. Only through truly despairing is one truly in and beyond despair, and does one choose oneself in one's eternal validity. What is such true despair? Judge William does not give us a direct answer to this question. But when we closely examine several passages, we can get an indirect intimation of the equation of this true despair with ethical repentance. Let us look at the following quotation:

> [It] certainly is true that when I despair, I despair over myself just as over everything else. But this self over which I despair is something finite like everything else finite, whereas the self I choose is the absolute self or myself according to its absolute validity.(E/O, II, pp. 218f.=E/OL, II, p. 223)

This passage makes it clear that in true despair two things are involved: despair of the finite self and the choice of the absolute self. If these two things happen in the process of one's true despair, the meaning of true despair is no different from the meaning of the ethical repentance, for only by repentance does one choose oneself in the real sense. True despair <u>through</u> which one can be oneself in one's eternal validity is nothing other than the ethical repentance. So Judge William says that "such a willing [willing one's despair] is identical with the absolute resignation."[34] Only repentance can fulfil the role of such a true despair. In this sense, Judge William says that he emphasizes "that choosing oneself is identical with repenting oneself, because repentance places the individual in the closest connection and the most intimate relation with an outside world."[35] Without repentance, one cannot be the ethical self. The ethical repentance is also very concrete repentance, repentance which is closely related to existence. Hence, as the

ethical person, Judge William can say that "I repent myself out of the whole of existence."(E/O, II, p. 224=E/OL, II, p. 229, emphasis given) The ethical person thus shows that true despair as ethical repentance must be concrete, and it is, actually, a way in which one can be oneself.

Now let us turn to the result of such a true repentance (or true despair). What are the characteristics of the resulting self? One can point out three characteristics of this ethical self from the writings of Judge William: harmoniousness, universality, and autonomy. Let us consider these characteristics in turn.

First of all, the ethical person believes that he can be a harmonious self. By "harmonious" I mean that there is no conflict between several aspects of his life; that is, the ethical self looks upon the aesthetic aspect of life, and the ethical aspect of life, and the religious aspect of life as allies.(E/O, II, p. 147=E/OL, II, p. 150) But it must be borne in mind that this is the view of Judge William, the ethicist, not that of Kierkegaard or the Christian.[36] There are some scholars who are rightly very careful to make this distinction. For example, Collins says: "Indeed, this ethical pseudonym [Judge William] supposes that there is a much greater degree of harmony between the three spheres of existence than Kierkegaard himself is willing to allow."[37]

Hence after the choice of oneself, which implies the choice of the ethical, all of the the aesthetic returns again. "If only the choice [of oneself] is posited," says Judge William, "all the esthetic returns, and you will see that only thereby does existence become beautiful, and that this is the only way a person can save his soul and win the whole world, can use the world without misusing it."[38] So now, as the ethical self one can have a right relation to the world around oneself. Now the world becomes beautiful to one and joyful; one has overcome the pessimistic view of the world, which is one of the characteristics of the aesthetic view of life. This does not mean that the world around oneself has changed, but one sees it with different eyes, the eyes of a harmonious ethical self. Judge William says:

> [Despair] and your spirit will never sigh in despondency, for the world will once again become beautiful and happy for you, even if you look at it with other eyes than before, and your liberated spirit will vault up into the world of freedom.(E/O, II, p. 219=E/OL, II, p. 223)

For "[in] despair nothing perishes."(E/O, II, p. 229=E/OL, II, p. 233) Now the aesthetic serves the ethical; what is present by way of hope and natural tendency in romantic love is transformed and realized more fully in the ethical love.(cf. E/O, II, p. 229=E/OL, II, p. 233) Thus, for the ethical person, there is a harmonious relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical.

Similarly, the ethical person does not know any break with religiousness. His religiousness (i.e., the ethical religiousness) is quite compatible with his ethical view of life. So Judge William, as an ethical person, quite comfortably speaks of himself as a Christian, and of his view of life as a Christian

view. Sometimes he sounds very religious. For example, he says:

> A religiously developed person makes a practice of referring everything to God, of permeating and saturating every finite relation with the thought of God and thereby consecrating and ennobling it.(E/O, II, p. 43=E/OL, II, p. 44)

But, as we shall see in the next section, his religiousness is not Christian in the proper sense. However, what is important here is the fact that for the ethical person even the religious is quite comfortably placed within the ethical view of life.[39] For, as Collins says, "[even] service to God must ultimately minister to ethical existence."[40] In the final analysis, we can see that the God of the ethical self is different from the God of Christianity. "Judge William's God, like the God of Immanuel Kant," says Mackey, "is a supersensible guarantor of the validity of his moral position and its invisible harmony with the seeming independent domain of natural desire."[41] Hence, for the ethical person there is no conflict between love for God and love for man.(cf. E/O, II, p. 245=E/OL, II, p. 249) In this sense, the ethical self is a quite harmonious self. This harmony comes from the ethical integration of one's self[42], and therefore, among the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious, the ethical is the supreme, for the ethical is the one which integrates the aesthetic and the religious. The following quotation clearly shows the profile of such a self:

> I love my wife, and am happy in my home...My work has meaning for me...I love my native country...I love my mother tongue.... So I love life because it is beautiful and hope for one even more beautiful.(E/O, II, p. 324=E/OL, II, p. 329)

As this passage intimates, as well as being harmonious, the ethical self has the characteristic of universality. That is, the ethical self tries to be the universal man.(E/O, II, p. 256=E/OL, II, p. 260) He sees the universal, and expresses the universal in his life, and he makes himself the universal man. In this sense, for the ethical person, to be the universal man is the task of his life. Judge William says: "The task the ethical individual sets for himself is to transform himself into the universal individual."(E/O, II, p. 261=E/OL, II, p. 265) What is required is to submit oneself to universal requirements that can be accepted by other individuals as well.(E/OL, II, p. 335=E/O, II, p. 330) For, as we have seen, the ethical principle is understood to be universal or universalizable. Hence one must appropriate the ethical "universal" in one's own existence. This is important, for the universal, to be actual, must be realized in and through the actuality of an existing individual. In this sense, Judge William says that "the universal can very well continue in and with the specific without consuming it."(E/O, II, p. 261=E/OL, II, p. 266) So, in a sense, to be the universal man is very difficult to achieve. But it is a task which is possible for everybody, for everybody has the possibility of being the universal man. "[To] transform himself into the universal human being," maintains Judge William, "is possible only if I already have it within myself kata dunamin [potentially]."(E/O, II, p. 261=E/OL, II, p. 265f.) And Judge William asserts that to be the universal man in one's particularity is to be ordinary, not to be extraordinary. But sometimes he uses a special expression which reveals the reversal of the concepts of ordinary and extraordinary

in the ethical view of life.(E/O, II, p. 328=E/OL, II, p. 333) As concrete exemplary ways in which one can be extraordinary in the sense of the ethical view (i.e., universal in one's particularity, or ordinary in the ordinary sense) Judge William suggests three relationships: marriage[43], friendship[44], and relationship to one's works.[45] Everybody has the possibility of being the universal man through these relationships.

This idea that everybody has already the possibility of being the universal man can be a bridge which connects the second characteristic of the ethical self (i.e., universality) and the third characteristic, that is, autonomy. For this possibility to be the universal man (i.e., the ethical self) is a possibility which one can actualize if one wills, whoever one may be. Judge William says this in several places. For example, he says: "[The] greatness is not to be this or that but to be oneself, and every human being can be this <u>if he so wills it</u>."(E/O, II, p. 177=E/OL, II, p. 181, emphasis given) And in another place he says again:

> In the act of despair, the universal human being came forth.... <u>Every person, if he so will, can become a paradigmatic human being</u>, not by brushing off his accidental qualities, but by remaining in them and ennobling them.(E/O, II, pp. 261f.=E/OL, II, p. 266, emphasis given)

Thus to become oneself in the ethical sense (i.e., to be the ethical self) is a situation which one must strive to achieve on one's own as an autonomous person; one can accomplish it by oneself, especially by one's will. In this spirit, Judge William asserts that "the crucial thing is not deliberation but the baptism of the will which lifts up the choice into the

ethical."(E/OL, II, p. 173=E/O, II, p. 169) For one can, as Collins says, "integrate" one's imagination and intellect "with [one's] will."[46] It is a task which one has to do in and by oneself. For, as Judge William says, "[only] within himself can the individual become enlightened about himself."(E/O, II, p. 259=E/OL, II, p. 263) As far as one's becoming of oneself is concerned, one has sovereignty over oneself.(cf. E/O, II, p. 251=E/OL, II, p. 256) In this sense, the ethical person "has his teleology within himself, has inner teleology, is himself his teleology". Therefore, "his self is...the goal toward which he strives."(E/O, II, p. 274=E/OL, II, p. 279)

Now we can describe the ethical self which comes out of true despair. He is the one who tries to accomplish the integration of his self; the aesthetic aspect and the ethical aspect and even the religious aspect of his life are viewed under his ethical view of life. At the same time, he thinks that he accomplishes the synthesis of necessity (facticity) and possibility (ideality). He <u>believes</u> that he becomes an actual ethical self.[47] He relies on himself and does not need God in the true sense, even though he may mention the name God. The ethical self is the self-sufficient self. This is the ethical understanding of the self and the problem of one's becoming oneself. This ethical self is very different from, and even antithetical to the Christian self. For as we shall see in the next section, the Christian is one who thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to the God-Man. This Christian self is understood by the ethical self as heteronomous, one-dimensional, and particularistic. Hence there

is a basic difference of opinion between the ethical person and the Christian. In order to see this difference more clearly, let us turn to a closer examination of the Christian understanding of the self. This is the task of the next section of the chapter.

NOTES

1. Cf. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 18.

2. Paul L. Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Religious Propositions," Journal of Religion 35 (1955), p. 138. See also Jean Wahl, A Short History of Existentialism, trans. Forrest Williams and Stanley Maron (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 31, 36.

3. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: SCM, 1962), p. 32.

4. Calvin O. Schrag, Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Human Finitude (Northwestern University Press, 1961; 2nd edition, 1972), p. 18. Cochrane uses the term "an implied ontology". (The Existentialists and God, p. 23).

5. John W. Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 70f., n. 133.

Laurence F. Bove criticizes Elrod's "regional ontology" and says: "It is...our major criticism of his position...that it is difficult to resolve the issues of human being without understanding the ontological parameters of being which is non-human."("Kierkegaard and the Eternal: An Ontological Basis for the Religious Individual's Ethical Action," unpublished Ph. D. diss., St. John's University, 1982), p. 31. However, as we have mentioned above, Kierkegaard refers to God in relation to the existing individual, and it is very difficult to say that Kierkegaard has an ontology which tries to understand God as a kind of being similar to human being, as far as both are "beings".

6. Elrod, Being and Existence, p. 3.

7. Ibid., p. 9.

8. See, e.g., Michael Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger (New York: Humanities Press, 1954), p. 24f. See also Calvin Schrag, Existence and Freedom.

9. Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 70. In this sense, he also says that Kierkegaard creates "an ontology which stands on a plane above the ontology basic to philosophy."(p. 100) This sentence must be understood with its double meaning. On the one hand, it stands on a plane above the traditional ontology; on the other hand, it stands above any immanental ontology, however existential it may be.

10. For a similar understanding of the ethical sphere as the sphere of choice, see Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 185: "[The] fundamental characteristic of the

ethical stage is the emergence of decision." See also his Journey to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, p. 241. See also Henry Sussman, The Hegelian Aftermath (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 142.

11. For a similar understanding of this subject, see Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 80: "Judge William's ethical wisdom can be compressed within a single precept: Choose thyself." See also Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, p. 99; Taylor, Journey to Selfhood, p. 243; F. Russell Sullivan, Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 78, 81; and Stendahl, p. 108.

12. The existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers is at one with Judge William at this point, as we can see in his following sentences: "Resolve and self-being are one...Insofar as I chose I am; by not choosing I lose my self."(Karl Jaspers, Philosophie, II, ss. 450, 451, cited in Schrag, p. 177). Schrag, after quoting these, says: "Selfhood is achieved, never simply given." Regarding Heidegger's emphasis on the "resolute decision", see Jean Wahl, A Short History of Existentialism, pp. 22, 26f. Jean-Paul Sartre also makes a similar point. However, the meaning which Sartre gives to choice is somewhat different from that which Kierkegaard's ethicist gives. For a similar view, see Jean T. Wilde and William Kimmel, eds. The Search for Being: Essays from Kierkegaard to Sartre on the Problem of Existence (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1962), pp. 217-220, esp. p. 220. See also Ussher, pp. 129ff., 145. Sartre's view of freedom and of becoming oneself is closer to that of Kierkegaard's aesthete than that of Kierkegaard's ethical person. For an excellent discussion of this, see Regin Prenter, "Sartre's Concept of Freedom Considered in the Light of Kierkegaard's Thought," in A Critique of Kierkegaard, pp. 130-40. For the view of a scholar who tries to see Kierkegaard from the perspective of Sartre, see J. Preston Cole, "The Existential Reality of God: A Kierkegaardian Study"(originally published in The Christian Scholar 48 (1965), 224-35), in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 93. However, Cole, in another article, criticizes Sartre from Kierkegaard's perspective. See his "The Function of Choice in Human Existence," Journal of Religion 45 (1965), pp. 196-210.

13. E/OL, II, p. 170=E/O, II, p. 166: "On the whole, to choose is an intrinsic and stringent term for the ethical."

14. See E/O, II, p. 166=E/OL, II, 170. See also E/O, II, pp. 11, 163, 202, 229f.=E/OL, II, pp. 11, 159f., 206, 234.

15. George J. Stack, Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics(Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1977), p. 91. See also E/O, II, p. 13.

16. Cf. E/O, II, p. 168, 184f., 231=E/OL, II, pp. 171f., 189, 235. See also Mackey, A Kind of Poet, p. 40.

17. Ronald J. Manheimer, Kierkegaard as Educator (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 68.

18. Mackey, A Kind of Poet, p. 56.

19. Elrod, Being and Existence, p. 133.

20. Magda King observes the same understanding of the relationship between choice and responsibility in the thought of Martin Heidegger, and says: "No man has freely chosen his being...[Nonetheless] he can freely take over his being as his own responsibility...."(Heidegger's Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964, p. 56).

21. I borrow this sentence from Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 192. Heidegger makes the same point when he says: "In one's coming back resolutely to one's thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as having thus come down."(Being and Time, p. 435, his emphasis) Heidegger interprets this taking over one's being as one's own responsibility as being authentically guilty.(Ibid., pp. 328-333)

22. Thomte, p. 50.

23. E/O, II, p. 251=E/OL, II, p. 256. Heidegger also makes the same point when he says: "Freedom...is only in the choice of one possibility - that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them."(Being and Time, p. 331) In another place, he also says: "[When] the call of conscience summons us to our potentiality-for-Being, it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but calls us forth into the Situation."(Ibid., p. 347. See also p. 355.) For a good discussion of the compatibility of Heidegger's notion of Dasein's potentiality-for-being-oneself and Kierkegaard's ethicist's self, see G. Stack, On Kierkegaard: Philosophical Fragments (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976), pp. 118f.

24. E/O, II, p. 273=E/OL, II, p. 279. In this sense, this ethical understanding of the possibility of becoming oneself may be compared to what Heidegger calls "Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole."(Cf. Being and Time, pp. 279, 349.) See also Guido de Ruggiero, Existentialism, tr. E.M. Cocks (London: Secker and Warburg, 1946), p. 33.

25. E/O, II, pp. 213f.=E/OL, II, pp. 217f. See also E/O, II, p. 177=E/OL, II, p. 181.

26. For a good discussion of this subject, based on a similar observation of the ethical self as the absolute, see Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, pp. 44-6; and Gardiner, p. 49.

27. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 81.

28. Stack, Existential Ethics, p. 145.

29. See also CUP, pp. 230f. See again Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, pp. 102, 107f.

30. McCarthy, "Psychological Fragments", in Kierkegaard's Truth, pp. 259f.

31. Mackey, A Kind of Poet, pp. 48, 50.

32. See also E/O, II, p. 193f.=E/OL, II, p. 198f.

33. For a similar understanding of ethical repentance, see Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, pp. 84f.

34. E/OL, II, p. 225=E/O, II, p. 221: "[A] will such as that is identical with absolute self-giving."

35. E/O, II, p. 241=E/OL, II, p. 245. See also E/O, II, p. 217=E/OL, II, p. 221. See again Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, p. 102; and Deyton, p. 86. Compare this with Heidegger's assertion: "The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty."(Being and Time, p. 314, his emphasis.) See also pp. 325-335. See again Guido de Ruggiero, p. 33.

36. For a view which tries to relate Judge William's opinion directly to that of Kierkegaard, see, e.g., Nordentoft, pp. 91-4.

37. Collins, p. 71. See also Utterback, p. 83, and Taylor, Journey to Selfhood, p. 243.

38. E/O, II, p. 178=E/OL, II, p. 182. See also E/O, II, pp. 177, 253=E/OL, II, pp. 182, 257f.

39. For a similar view, see Mackey, A Kind of Poet, p. 61; Crites, "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and as Act," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 203; Dupre, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p. 74; and Mullen, p. 134.

40. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 86. As we have seen in the first section of the first chapter of this study, this is exactly the Kantian and Hegelian view. See also J. Heywood Thomas's summary of Hegel's view in his Subjectivity and Paradox, pp. 22f., esp. p. 23: "[His] basic assumption is that the end and essence of all true religion is the morality of man."

41. Mackey, A Kind of Poet, p. 61. Taylor makes a similar point, even though he uses a slightly different expression. See his Journey to Selfhood, p. 249.

42. See also Mullen, p. 122.

43. See E/O, II, 302, 304f.=E/OL, pp. 306, 309. Hegel also understands marriage as a primary actualization of the ethical universality of the human race. See Hegel's Philosophy of Right, sections 161, 162, 164, 168. Crites, in his In the Twilight of Christendom, pp. 11f., has clearly shown how Hegelian Judge William's ethical view of marriage is.

44. See E/O, II, p. 322=E/OL, p. 327.

45. See E/O, II, pp. 282-83, 287-88, 291-93, 295-96=E/OL, II, pp. 286-87, 292, 296-98, 300.

46. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 75.

47. This is also the characteristic of modern existentialism represented by Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Cf. Cochrane, pp. 57, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70. Cochrane observes this characteristic even in the thought of Paul Tillich.(p. 90)

II

In this section I shall look at the Christian understanding of the self and compare it with the ethical understanding which I have examined in the last section. Through this examination I shall argue that the Christian's understanding of becoming oneself is fundamentally different from the ethical person's understanding. This assertion does not disregard the fact that at first glance, the Christian understanding and the ethical understanding look similar. However, as I shall show in this section, when we closely look at these two understandings of becoming oneself, we cannot help noticing obvious differences between them. In particular, there is a clear-cut distinction between the ways in which the Christian and the person in the ethical sphere think one becomes oneself. And therefore there is also a difference between the resulting selves, the ethical self and the Christian self. In short, the autonomous self of the ethical person is clearly contrasted with the Christian who becomes himself in his relation to the God-Man. This difference of the self-consciousness of the Christian and of the ethical person, as I shall also argue in this section, makes it impossible to assert that there is any positive continuity between the ethical person's understanding of the "self" and that of the Christian.

The main text, which we shall examine here to show this difference and discontinuity, is The Sickness unto Death published under the pseudonym "Anti-Climacus". When we discuss the content of the book, we have to bear in mind the fact that the book as a

whole is written from the perspective of Christianity. It would be difficult to think that the first part of the book is somewhat neutral and only in the second part the Christian view is explicitly expressed.[1] I think that the book as a whole must be interpreted from the Christian perspective.[2]

The first task of this section is to show that Anti-Climacus thinks that there are three situations in each of which the problem of becoming oneself is differently posited: the situation in which one has the possibility of becoming oneself, the situation in which one has lost the possibility of becoming oneself, and the situation in which one has once more been given the possibility of becoming oneself. In the first situation, each person is given the task of, and responsibility for, becoming himself, and it is in relation to God that he can be himself. In the second situation, man lost the relationship to God, so that he is in despair. In this situation one tries either not to be oneself, or tries wrongly to be oneself. In the third situation, one can be oneself as one who has experienced despair, and therefore here the problem of forgiveness of one's sin (one's despair) emerges as a decisive matter, so that Christ, who brings the forgiveness of sin, has to be involved as the vital factor for one's becoming oneself. In this situation, one can be oneself through one's relationship to Christ.

The second task of this section is to examine the question of whether there is any continuity between the ethical self and the Christian self. Through this examination I shall argue that it is difficult to assert the continuity between these two selves, even

though there are some similarities between these two persons' understanding of the problem of the self. In the course of this discussion, the Christian's evaluation of the ethical person's understanding of, and attempt at becoming, himself will be closely examined. Actually, this is a part of the above mentioned second situation. But the separate consideration of this problem is necessary for the purpose of this chapter, for through this consideration, it becomes clearer that there is a definite break between the Christian understanding of the problem of the self and the ethical understanding.

Let us then start with the discussion of the three situations through which Anti-Climacus, as a Christian, thinks of the problem of becoming oneself. Firstly, there is the situation in which one can be oneself through a direct relationship to God. This assertion comes from my reading of the first part (especially, I, II) of this book. According to Anti-Climacus, "[the] self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but the relation's relating itself to itself." (SUD, p. 13=SUDL, p. 146) But the self which the individual himself tries to think up is regarded as a false self. For Anti-Climacus, a self must have been constituted by another. This is also the point of view of Kierkegaard himself. In one of his journal entries he says: "Real self-reduplication without a third factor, which is outside and compels one, is an impossibility and makes any such existence into an illusion or an experiment."(Journals, No. 1041(Pap. X 2 A 396)) So the self is "a relation and relates

itself to that which established the entire relation."[3] Hence if one attempts to relate to oneself without the relationship to another, one cannot be oneself. If and only if one relates to another as one relates to oneself, can one become oneself in the real sense.

Here a question may be raised: what (or who) is the "another" of which Anti-Climacus speaks? It is true that in the first part, this term "another" is described very ambiguously. Sometimes Anti-Climacus uses the expression "the power that established the entire relation" or "the Power which posited it".(SUD, p. 14=SUDL, p. 147) Since Anti-Climacus uses a very ambiguous term "power", there is a possibility of different interpretations of this term. I shall consider two different interpretations in turn.

J.P. Cole interprets this as the power of being, or the power of selfhood. After quoting The Sickness unto Death, (Lowrie's translation) p. 147, Cole goes on to say:

> This Power, then, is the Power of selfhood, or the Power of being, for the self is contingent upon it. Insofar as the self is grounded in this Power, it exists; and insofar as it is not, it does not exist. Hence this Power is truly the Power of being for the self, and the relationship to this Power is a matter of being and not being for the self.
>
> Kierkegaard called this Power Spirit. It constitutes the third essential element of selfhood.... Now, Spirit, as the Power of human being, is given with human existence.[4]

By this bold statement Cole emphasizes the importance of the Power of being which is given with human existence. Hence, according to him, only Spirit as the Power of selfhood (or the Power of being) can integrate two different elements of one's self. This Power

"is present in man from the beginning as a possibility to be actualized."[5] That means: "Latent within this body-soul unity...is Spirit, the possibility of self-determination. Spirit continually projects itself as a possible mode of being, disturbing the passive unity of the psychosomatic entity, and tempting it to become responsible for itself."[6] Therefore, when Spirit actualizes its possibility, Cole asserts, one has become a self. Moreover, he even goes on to assert that "[it] would be more accurate to say that Spirit is Kierkegaard's God-concept."[7] By this he does not mean that our projected images of the self are identical to God. He agrees that such images are "in fact idols, graven images, counterfeit gods."[8] But he also maintains that there is a possibility of the imaged self functioning as a god. Furthermore, what he thinks of as the final assertion of The Sickness Unto Death is to exist in Christ's mode of being. "So, when one exists in Christ's mode of being," says Cole, "his reality is infinitely potentiated, for he has become a self."[9] The importance of Christ, for Cole, lies only in his being the exemplar of the one who has become a self. Cole says:

> In the religion of the Son, Christ is not a new image of God but an image of the Self. Christ is the paradigm of selfhood, the dialectical incarnation of God....In short, he is the paradigm of the relationship between man and God. As such, Kierkegaard calls him the God-Man.[10]

Hence the reason why Christ is called the God-Man is not because He is uniquely very man and at the same time very God. But it is merely because he is "the paradigm of the relationship between man and God". Cole calls this also "the paradigm of selfhood".

By interpreting Kierkegaard in this way, Cole, in the final chapter of his study, can make the following statements:

> Infinite, eternal possibility is what Kierkegaard means by Spirit. Hence Spirit is the fundamental category in an historical theology. Spirit is the power of human being, because without it the dialectic of selfhood would collapse. It exercises a god-function in the dialectic of the self; it is the absolute telos of human existence - the always transcendent, utterly inexhaustible horizon of the self. It is the creative source of human being, the Godhead.[11]

> We should also note that such an understanding of the historical process whereby the Absolute Spirit becomes a relative god, is the basis of the notion of a living God. While the Holy Spirit is absolute - i.e., infinite, eternal possibility - God the Father is relative. He is subject to the relativities of history and culture it produces. The God-concept, then, is itself historical. It is itself subject to the dialectic of Spirit and to the corrective of history.[12]

As we can clearly see in these passages, Cole by interpreting Kierkegaard in his own way, makes a kind of theology from which we may sense traces of Hegelian theology. By an idiosyncratic interpretation of Kierkegaard, Cole makes Kierkegaard a Hegel, the one whom Kierkegaard scathingly criticizes throughout his life.

John Douglas Mullen's interpretation of "a positive third term", though rather naive, is similar to that of Cole in that he also tries to think of it immanently. He thinks that by the "positive third term" Kierkegaard means human will. He says: "The self is constituted as a synthesis of opposing tendencies which remain always in opposition, but are 'held together' by spirit (will)."[13]

But most scholars do not think in the way in which Cole and Mullen think, for the context of Anti-Climacus' discussion of one's becoming oneself and the overall intention of writing this book make such an interpretation of "another" as the power of selfhood almost impossible. Most interpreters think that by "the power that established the self" Anti-Climacus means God[14], however not the God who is idiosyncratically interpreted as Power of selfhood (as we have seen in Cole's interpretation of Kierkegaard's "spirit"). I also think that this is the right interpretation, for, besides the above-mentioned two reasons for interpreting this in this way (viz., the context of Anti-Climacus's discussion of one's becoming oneself and the overall intention of writing this book), one can mention the fact that in the near context Anti-Climacus actually mentions God. For example, he says: "[He could not] despair if the synthesis in its original state from the hand of God were not in the proper relationship."(SUD, p. 16=SUDL, p. 149) Moreover, as Anti-Climacus' discussion of this subject progresses, there are more obvious assertions that one can be oneself only in relation to God.[15] Hence, even though Anti-Climacus uses ambiguous terms such as "another" or "power", what he wants to say from the outset is that one can be oneself in one's relation to God which inevitably involves one's relation to oneself. That is, one can relate to oneself as one relates to God who has constituted the relation.

What is important in the context of our study is the fact that one's becoming oneself is posited as a possibility at first. This possibility, however, is at the same time the possibility of despair, that is, the possibility of one's not being oneself. One faces the possibility either of becoming oneself, or of not becoming oneself. The possibility of becoming oneself becomes an actuality only when one is in the right relationship to oneself and to God in one's relationship to oneself. This possibility was a given condition for man. God made man as one who could be a self which relates itself to itself. That is, God gave man the possibility to be spirit, the self. And yet to be spirit (or the self) means that one integrates one's freedom and necessity, the eternal and the temporal, the infinite and the finite, that is, one's soul and body in one's relation to oneself, a relation which again relates to God. Thus man is given the possibility to be such a self, spirit. This is "the highest claim upon him."(SUD, p. 22=SUDL, p. 155) It gives man both advantage and responsibility.

But in reality, there is no one who has become oneself, spirit. Of course, every person, insofar as he is a human being, is a soul-body entity, a synthesis of the infinite and finite, of the eternal and the temporal, of freedom (or possibility) and necessity. But, as Anti-Climacus says, so regarded "a human being is still not a self."(SUD, p. 13=SUDL, p. 146) There is not yet the integration of the self. Even those who assert that they have the right relationship to themselves are found to be in despair. The phenomenon of despair is universal; there is nobody who is not

in despair.(SUD, p. 22=SUDL, p. 155) Anti-Climacus asserts that this is neither exaggeration nor overstatement, but "a consistently developed basic view."(SUD, p. 22=SUDL, p. 155)

This universality of despair does not mean that despair is "something that lies in human nature as such."(SUD, p. 16=SUDL, p. 148) If this were the case, God who made man in this way would be the author of man's despair. But according to Anti-Climacus, what God did was to give man the great advantage of the possibility of becoming spirit, not to make man be in despair. Only man himself makes the disrelationship. Despair is not something which happens to man or some deficiency in which he just happens passively to find himself, such as "weakness, sensuousness, finitude, ignorance, etc." These problems come from without, but despair originates in himself. In this sense, Anti-Climacus calls this disrelationship (i.e., despair) "a sickness of the spirit", or "a phenomenon of the spirit"(SUDL, p. 157), or "a qualification of spirit."(SUD, p. 24) Hence "to be unaware of being defined as spirit is [also] precisely what despair is."(SUD, p. 25=SUDL p. 158) So according to Anti-Climacus, everybody in despair suffers from the sickness unto death. This is the Christian understanding of the situation of human beings.(SUD, p. 8=SUDL, p. 145) In another place, Kierkegaard also says:

> If a man in relating himself to himself relates himself absolutely to God, there is no despair at all; but at every moment when this is not the case, there is also some despair. Consequently when a man in relating himself to himself absolutely relates himself to God, then all despair is annihilated.(JP, I, 749=Pap. VIII 2 B 168:6)

According to Anti-Climacus, such a disrelationship basically takes two forms: the despair of not willing to be oneself and the despair of willing despairingly to be oneself. Of course, there are some people who are even unconscious of their having selves. They are called "the despairing [individuals] who [are] ignorant of [their] despair."(SUD, p. 44=SUDL, p. 177) And the forms of despair can also be observed by reflecting upon the factors which compose the self as a synthesis (i.e., the factors of finitude and infinitude, of necessity and possibility, of the temporal and the eternal).

Here an interesting question can be raised: is there a kind of sequential order between Anti-Climacus' discussion of despair viewed under the aspects of Finitude/Infinitude (part 1, III, A, a), of despair viewed under the aspects of Possibility/Necessity (part 1, III, A, b), and of despair viewed under the aspect of consciousness (part 1, III, B)? There are some scholars who answer this question affirmatively. But I do not think that it is necessarily the case that one should read this part as having a sequential order. In the following few paragraphs, I shall discuss the view of the scholars who think that one should read this part as having a sequential order, and show that it is better to think that Anti-Climacus' discussion of "despair viewed under the aspects of the composing elements", and the discussion of "despair viewed under the aspect of consciousness" as discussions of different aspects of despair, rather than a series of developmental forms of despair.

Let us start with a discussion of the view that there is a sequential order. Dunning seems to think that there is a kind of dialectical relationship between these despairs. He suggests that there is an obvious development between (1) "despair without regard to consciousness" (part 1, III. A), (2) "conscious despair" (part 1, III, B), and (3) "the self-consciousness of the sinner before God" (part 2, I). And he designates each despair "despair in-itself", "despair for-itself", and "despair in-and-for-itself".[16] Let us quote his own summary of this argument:

> In the first movement, despair in-itself is posited without regard to consciousness; the second presents despair for-itself as externalized consciousness; and despair in-and-for-itself is the self-consciousness of the sinner before God. Perhaps owing to its level of abstraction, the development here is quite obvious. In despair without regard to consciousness there is as yet no awareness of a distinction between inner and outer or self and other. That awareness first emerges in despair as consciousness. Here the self as mere elements (namely, the binary oppositions of despair in-self) is negated by the concept of despair as a form of consciousness. However, in this movement consciousness is still of the autonomous human self over against the eternal. As consciousness develops through the phases - spiritlessness, weakness (not willing to be oneself), and defiance (willing to be oneself) - the self in despair for-itself remains alienated from its true nature, which is to rest transparently in the power that established it.... The fact that the birth of self-consciousness represents a new awareness of alienation from God determines self-consciousness as sin-consciousness. It is as this sin-consciousness that despair develops through the demonic and is transformed or transfigured by the redeeming practice of Christianity, that is, the acceptance of Christ's invitation to follow him as pattern, which completes the dialectic of despair and the development of consciousness.[17]

The structure of The Sickness Unto Death with that of Training in Christianity, we are told, shows the dialectical structure (and therefore, developmental structure) of consciousness, from (1) implicit consciousness (despair in-itself) through (2)

consciousness as alienation (despair for-itself) to (3) the self-consciousness before God (despair in-and-for-itself). Dunning's argument here clearly shows the "systematic nature of the structure" of the book.

John D. Glenn also suggests that there is a sequential order in various forms of despair. He says:

> [Kierkegaard] proceeds to dissect various forms of despair (a) insofar as they involve misrelation among the components of the self as synthesis, and (b) insofar as they are characterized by varying degrees of self-consciousness and self-assertion; finally, he analyzes (c) despair as sin. These three sections of The Sickness unto Death correspond to the three dimensions of selfhood, so that the definition of the self provides the structure of the rest of the work, while the latter's details make concrete the meaning of the definition.... [A] similar relation holds between these dimensions and the three 'stages' of existence...depicted in Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous works.[18]

In this spirit, he says that "[the] existence of the reflective aesthete...is lived in terms of the first dimension of the definition of the self [i.e., "synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, and of freedom and necessity"].[19] So he speaks of "the self as synthesis" as "the psychological-aesthetic dimension of selfhood[20]; of "the self as self-relating" as "the ethical dimension of selfhood"[21]; and of "the self as dependent on God" as "the religious dimension of selfhood."[22] What Glenn tries to show is that the three sections of The Sickness unto Death, in which Anti-Climacus discusses several forms of despair, has a kind of sequential order which is similar to that of three stages of existence.[23]

It is true that there are some parts of the book in which Anti-Climacus discusses the subject of despair in a developmental scheme. For example, when he discusses the unconsciousness of self, the despair of not willing to be oneself (the despair of weakness), and the despair of willing despairingly to be oneself (defiance), we can see a kind of developmental or progressive scheme. In relation to this part, Dunning himself rightly speaks of the progression from "self-ignorance", through "self-rejection" and to "self-assertion (as self-alienation)".[24]

But, in relation to Anti-Climacus' discussion of "the forms of despair" as a whole, I wonder whether it is better to view the discussion of "despair viewed under the aspects of the composing elements", and the discussion of "despair viewed under the aspect of consciousness" as discussions of two different aspects of despair, rather than as a discussion of a series of developmental or progressive forms of despair. For the discussion of the forms of despair from the reflection upon the factors of the synthesis is regarded by Anti-Climacus as "abstract" discussion.(Cf. SUD, p. 29=SUDL, p. 162) It is not clear why Anti-Climacus thinks this is "abstract"; perhaps, he thinks that what is discussed here is merely the logical possibilities which result from the fact that man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of possibility and necessity. And this discussion cannot be of prime importance, whereas the discussion of despair viewed under the category of consciousness is regarded as the "primary" or "principal" one. Hence the despair of a concrete individual can be observed "abstractly" by reflecting upon the factors which

compose the self; and at the same time, it must "principally" be viewed under the category of consciousness. Miller also intimates this view when he says that Kierkegaard offers "us at least two ways in which the forms of despair may be viewed."[25] The closer examination of Anti-Climacus' discussion of forms of despair clearly shows this point - that is, "the discussion of despair from the reflection upon the factors of the synthesis" and "the discussion of despair under the category of consciousness" are two different discussions from different perspectives. Let us consider Anti-Climacus' discussion of various forms of despair.

Anti-Climacus first discusses despair in the light of the factors involved in the relationship of body and soul, but he discusses this only under two categories, the category of finitude/infinitude and the category of possibility/necessity. (We do not know why he does not consider despair viewed under the aspects of temporality/eternity). So here what he calls "the despair of infinitude", "the despair of finitude", "the despair of possibility", and "the despair of necessity" are discussed. These despairs are characterized by an over-emphasis on one aspect of the synthesis, with a corresponding lack of its opposite aspect.

The "despair of infinitude", for example, where one becomes carried away into the fantastical and the limitless, is understood to come from the lack of finitude. In this despair one becomes "a fantasized existence in abstract infinitizing or in abstract isolation, continually lacking its self, from which it only moves further and further away."(SUD, p. 32=SUDL, p. 165) For "the fantastic is generally that which leads a person out into the

infinite in such a way that it only leads him away from himself and thereby prevents him from coming back to himself."(SUD, p. 31=SUDL, p. 164) So in some cases one's feeling becomes fantastic, and the final result of this is one becoming "a sort of abstract sentimentality". Such an abstract sentimentality is an inhuman one which "inhumanly combines sentimentally, as it were, with some abstract fate - for example, humanity in abstracto."(SUD, p. 31=SUDL, p. 164) In other cases, one may become fantastic with knowledge. For such people, "the more knowledge increases, the more it becomes a kind of inhuman knowledge, in the obtaining of which a person's self is squandered."(SUD, p. 31=SUDL, p. 164) Perhaps, Kierkegaard is thinking of Hegel's system building, but this can also be applied to any other inhuman systematization. For, as we can see from one of Kierkegaard's journal entries, not only Hegel's reasoning, but also "pure reason is something fantastical, and the limitless fantastical belongs at home where there are no negative concepts, and one understands everything like the sorcerer who ended by eating his own stomach."(JP, I, 7=Pap. X2 A 354) Or, in yet another case, the will becomes fantastic. Such a fantastic will, as is the case with fantastic feeling, is only concerned with the abstract or with infinite things, disregarding "the infinitely small part of the work that can be accomplished this very day, this very hour, this very moment."(SUD, p. 32=SUDL, 165) Arbaugh and Arbaugh take the following cases as examples of one who is fantastic with knowledge and of one who has fantastic will:

> Thus a scientist who is so intent on understanding microbes that he forgets to grow in self-awareness is sick. Similarly, a dreamy utopian may will infinite good for all mankind but be

> blind to the daily duties for which he ought to be responsible.[26]

There may also be "a fantasized religious person".(SUD, p. 32=SUDL, p. 165) Such a person infinitizes his God-relationship, so that he cannot become himself. As Dunning summarizes well: "In each case the self loses itself in uncontrolled imagination, so that eventually all senses of the finite factor in the synthesis is lost."[27] So everybody who "presumably has become or simply wants to be infinite" is in the despair of infinitude.(SUD, p. 30=SUDL, p. 163)

The despair of finitude, by contrast, is characterized by "the lack of infinitude". So worldliness, blind social conformism, complacency, ethical meanness and narrowness, and self-sufficiency can be listed as the characteristics of those who are in this despair. Anti-Climacus speaks of such a person in the following way:

> Surrounded by hordes of men, absorbed in all sorts of secular matters, more and more shrewd about the ways of the world - such a person forgets himself, forgets his name <u>divinely understood</u>, does not dare to believe in himself, finds it too hazardous to be himself and far easier and safer to be like the others, to become a copy, a number, a mass man.(SUD, pp. 33f.=SUDL, pp. 166f., emphasis given)

So those who are in the despair of finitude are also not themselves; "spiritually speaking, they have no self, no self for whose sake they could venture everything, no self before God...."(SUD, p. 35=SUDL, p. 168) Those who are in "the despair of infinitude", as we have seen, lost themselves in the process of infinitizing the self; whereas those who are in "the despair of finitude" lose their true selves through finitizing the self.

Let us turn to the second category, that of possibility and necessity. Anti-Climacus' point is simple: "A self that has no possibility is in despair, and likewise a self that has no necessity."(SUD, p. 35=SUDL, p. 168)

He who is in "the despair of possibility" is the one who is like a wave on the surface of a sea of possibilities, but does not actualize any of them. Such a person "becomes an abstract possibility", or "becomes for himself a mirage."(SUD, p. 36=SUDL, p. 169) For, "[instead] of taking the possibility back into necessity, [either] he chases after possibility - and at last cannot find his way back to himself", or "the individual pursues [with melancholy love] one of anxiety's possibilities, which finally leads him away from himself so that he is a victim of anxiety or a victim of that about which he was anxious lest he be overcome."(SUD, p. 37=SUDL, p. 170) Dunning speaks of them as "types that respectively adumbrate the manic and the depressive in contemporary psychiatric terminology."[28]

The despair of necessity, on the other hand, involves a lack of possibility, so that to the one who is in this despair, either "everything has become necessary" [fatalism], or "everything has become trivial [philistinism]."(SUD, p. 40=SUDL, p. 173) For the fatalist, according to Anti-Climacus, there is no God; he "has lost God"(SUD, p. 40=SUDL, p. 173), so he lost possibility and himself as well. For, according to Anti-Climacus' Christian point of view, possibility only belongs conclusively to God and only he who has God, has a self. While fatalism is "spiritual despair", philistinism is despair of spiritlessness.(SUD, p. 41=SUDL, p.

174) The philistine "has lost his self and God."(SUD, p. 41=SUDL, p. 174)

The above are forms of despair observed without taking consciousness into account. As Martin Heinecken says: "They represent merely the logical possibilities which result from the fact that man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of possibility and necessity."[29]

Anti-Climacus next discusses despair from the point of view of consciousness. This discussion is regarded by Anti-Climacus as the principal or primary one. Considered from this point of view, despair has basically two forms: the despair of weakness and the despair of defiance. Of course, there are some people who are not yet aware of their being called to be themselves. They may be said to be in despair unconsciously; they are in unconscious despair. But these three despairs (viz., unconscious despair, the despair of weakness, and the despair of defiance) are not different in the absolute sense; the contrast here is "only relative."(SUD, p. 49=SUDL, p. 182) It is because, for example, "[no] despair is entirely free of defiance"(SUD, p. 182) and at the same time, "even despair's most extreme defiance is never really free of some weakness."(SUD, p. 49=SUDL, pp. 182f.) Hence one may say with Nordentoft, that "defiance is a 'profound' weakness and weakness is a 'profound' defiance."[30] Moreover, even though the despair of weakness and of defiance are "the despair that is conscious of being despair"(SUD, p. 47=SUDL, p. 180), in the final analysis, it can be questioned whether those who are in despair of these sorts have "the true conception of

despair" which is understood by the Christian as the sickness unto death. It is true that those who are in the despair of weakness have more consciousness (and therefore more self-consciousness) than those who have the despairing unconsciousness of having an eternal self. Likewise, those who are in the despair of defiance in turn have more consciousness than those who are in the despair of weakness. It is also true that the despair of defiance is more intense than any of the other forms of despair. But it is not necessarily the case that those who are in the despair of defiance, who have a greater consciousness of being in despair than any other, have a more correct conception of despair. In this sense, we may say that, from the perspective of the Christian, even those who are in the despair of defiance are not aware that they are in despair as understood by the Christian. Especially, when we remind ourselves of Anti-Climacus' following assertion, this point that even the most conscious person does not have the exact observation of his situation as suffering from the sickness unto death: "[To] be [sharply] aware of this sickness is the Christian's superiority over the natural man."(SUD, p. 15=SUDL, p. 148) So when we look at the details of the difference between these despairs, we have to bear in mind the fact that these differences are only relative.

Those who are in unconscious despair "have no conception of being spirit".(SUD, p. 43=SUDL, p. 176) Hence "it makes no difference whether the person in despair is ignorant that his condition is [one of] despair - he is in despair just the same."(SUD, p. 44=SUDL, p. 177) Anti-Climacus compares this

man's case with the sufferer from consumption: "when the illness is most critical, he feels well, considers himself to be in excellent health, and perhaps seems to others to radiate health."(SUD, p. 45=SUDL, p. 178) Anti-Climacus regards this form of despair (i.e., unconsciousness of it) as being the most common in the world.(SUD, p. 45=SUDL, p. 178)

However, as we have just asserted (in the previous paragraph), this condition does not only apply to those who are in unconscious despair. All people, in so far as they are in despair, also have this characteristic of being unconscious of being in despair (in the true sense). As we shall see, those who are in the despair of weakness and that of defiance are aware of being in despair, but their awareness cannot be said to be true to the exact situation of their being in despair. In this sense, Anti-Climacus says that "to be unaware of being defined as spirit is precisely what despair is."(SUD, p. 25=SUDL, p. 158) Let us examine this by closely considering the despair of weakness and the despair of defiance.

Anti-Climacus divides the despair of weakness (the despair of womanliness) into two kinds: (1) "despair over the earthly" and (2) "despair over the eternal or over oneself". Despair over the earthly is also divided into the case of "pure immediacy"(SUD, pp. 50-54=SUDL, pp. 184-87) and the case "when immediacy is assumed to have self-reflection."(SUD, pp. 54-67=SUDL, pp. 187-194) In the first kind (i.e., the case of "pure immediacy"), one's inner self is also determined by some external things. When some disaster occurs, then despair occurs. So one's conception of

despair is wrong. "Here there is no infinite consciousness of the self, of what despair is, or of the condition as one of despair."(SUD, p. 50f.=SUDL, p. 184) The fact that he can become lively again through the change of his outward circumstances clearly shows that he is not aware of true despair. Such a man is satirised by Anti-Climacus as a man who "quite literally identifies himself only by the clothes he wears...."(SUD, p. 53=SUDL, p. 187)

When immediacy is assumed to have a certain degree of self-reflection, despair is somewhat modified; there is somewhat more "consciousness of the self" and there is some sense in it when such a man talks of being in despair.(SUD, p. 54=SUDL, p. 187) But he has only "a dim idea [or an obscure conception] that there <u>may even be</u> something eternal in the self."(SUD, p. 55=SUDL, p. 188) In the final analysis, he has no consciousness of the infinite self either. So in his case, "[as] long as the difficulty lasts, he does not dare...'to come to himself', he does not will to be himself."(SUD, p. 55=SUDL, p. 189) This despair is therefore "despair in weakness, a [passive] suffering of the self".(SUD, p. 54=SUDL, p. 188) Anti-Climacus says satirically that in the real sense this person does not have the true conception of despair:

> It is comical that he wants to talk about having been in despair; it is appalling that after the conquering of despair, according to his view, his condition is in fact despair.(SUD, p. 56=SUDL, p. 190)

Here two conceptions of despair appear: the despair of which this man speaks and the despair of which Anti-Climacus as a Christian

thinks. According to this man's conception of despair, he has overcome despair, so he is (according to his own view) no longer in despair. But according to the Christian conception, he is still in despair. So the despair of which this man speaks of having overcome is not the despair of which the Christian thinks.

Whereas "despair over the earthly" is called "the despair in weakness", "despair about the eternal or over oneself" is called the "despair over his weakness".(SUD, p. 61=SUDL, p. 195) But, as is always the case, "there is only a relative difference."(SUD, p. 61=SUDL, p. 195) Anti-Climacus describes the one who is in "the despair about the eternal or over oneself"(or "the despair over one's weakness") as follows:

> The person in despair understands that it is weakness to make the earthly so important, that it is weakness to despair. But now, instead of definitely turning away from despair to faith and humbling himself under his weakness, he entrenches himself in despair and despairs over his weakness."(SUD, p. 61=SUDL, p. 195)

So in the end, he either plunges into life, "perhaps into the distractions of great undertakings" (so that he becomes "a restless spirit who wants to forget"), or he seeks "oblivion in sensuality, perhaps in dissolute living; in despair he wants to go back to immediacy, but always with the consciousness of the self he does not want to be."(SUD, p. 66=SUDL, p. 199) So this man does not allow the possibility that with God, overcoming his weakness is possible. In this sense, he may be compared with the one who is in despair of necessity who does not accept the fact that for God everything is possible.

In contrast, the one who is in despair of defiance (the despair of manliness) asserts himself; he tries to be himself by himself. He defiantly and despairingly wills to be himself in defiance of the power which posited him. In his proud and conscious defiance he denies being grounded in God. So even though "there is a rise in the consciousness of the self", his consciousness of the infinite self is regarded by the Christian as "really only the most abstract form, the most abstract possibility of the self."(SUD, pp. 67f.=SUDL, p. 201) That is, the defiant man's consciousness of himself is not the consciousness of the true self, even though he has an increasing awareness of the self.[31] For, as Kierkegaard says in one of his journal entries, "no true self-knowledge without God-knowledge or [without standing] before God."(JP, IV, 3902(Pap. X 4 A 412)). Likewise, even though there is "a greater consciousness of what despair is", his conception of despair is not the right one, insofar as he thinks that he can overcome despair by his own power.

Until now we have discussed various forms of despair. Despair can be discussed from two different perspectives: (1) It can be discussed from the perspective of the components of the synthesis of human being. (2) And at the same time, despair can also be discussed from the perspective of consciousness. They (1 and 2 above) are two different discussions of despair from two different perspectives, one from the perspective of the components of the synthesis of human being and the other from the perspective of consciousness.

What is important in the context of this study, is the fact that everybody is in despair, of one form or another. And from the Christian viewpoint, despair is sin and those who are in despair are sinners. And "the state of [remaining in] sin" is regarded by the Christian as being "greater sin than the new sin."(SUD, p. 106=SUDL, p. 237) Insofar as man is in sin, he is not himself in the true sense. In this sense, Anti-Climacus says that "[to] despair over oneself, in despair to will to be rid of oneself - this is the formula for all despair."(SUD, p. 20=SUDL, p. 153) It is true that, as we have seen, there are some people who try to be themselves by themselves. Such people will not want to get rid of themselves. However, Anti-Climacus goes on to qualify this:

> Well, so it seems, but upon closer examination it is clear that [after all] the contradiction is the same. The self that he despairingly wants to be is a self that he is not..., that is, he wants to tear his self away from the power [i.e., God] that established it.(SUD, p. 20=SUDL, p. 153, emphasis given)

So everybody in despair tries not to be himself as defined by God. And, as Miller says, "losing the self-before-God is despair, ...more strictly...sin."[32]

When all men are in despair, however, a possibility of becoming oneself through being forgiven one's sin is provided. This constitutes the third situation of Christian understanding of one's becoming oneself. This third situation is closely related to Jesus Christ, for the existence of Jesus as the God-Man who came to this world in order to save human beings who are in sin, is that possibility which was given to men who are not able to be

themselves. The despairing individual is confronted with the God-Man.(SUD, p. 113=SUDL, pp. 244f.) What is required of him is an act of faith in which he submits to his own powerlessness on the one hand, and to the power of God, on the other. Here there is the possibility either of being forgiven, or of offence. If one relates in a proper way to the message of the forgiveness of sins, then one is forgiven one's sins, and one becomes oneself. Now such a person has faith. Yet faith is defined by Anti-Climacus as follows: "Faith is: that the self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests transparently in God."(SUD, p. 82=SUDL, p. 213) Here we should remember that for Kierkegaard, as Colette puts it, "to be before God is to be before Christ".[33] And here we may recall "the formula that describes the state of the self when despair is completely rooted out": "in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it."(SUD, p. 14=SUDL, p. 147) When we compare these two passages, we can see a striking similarity. In fact, we have to say that the contents are exactly the same; "[grounding] one's self transparently in God is an equivalent expression for faith."[34] This means that one can accomplish the task of becoming oneself in the real sense through one's faith in Christ. This is the last situation of Anti-Climacus' three situations in which the problem of becoming oneself is differently posited. Now what was at first only a possibility (i.e., to become oneself in one's relation to God) becomes an actuality. So according to the Christian, one is totally dependent upon God in Christ in one's becoming oneself.

Here would be the best place in which to consider the Christian's self-consciousness as a Christian. In fact, we have already mentioned all the salient factors in the Christian's self-consciousness. They are: sin-consciousness, the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin, and faith. Since these factors have already been touched on, here they will just be drawn together. Before going into a separate discussion, however, we have to bear in mind one important point in relation to these factors. That is, these three major factors of Christian consciousness cannot, for Kierkegaard, be separated from one another. They always exist together, side by side. They form, to use Robert C. Roberts' term, "a logically integrated package."[35] It is therefore purely an arbitrary division for the sake of a clear understanding of each factor or component in the Christian's consciousness that we shall discuss these factors one by one.

Let us start with the consciousness of sin. The consciousness of sin, writes Kierkegaard, is and continues to be the conditio sine qua non for all Christianity[36], and "Christianity...begins with the doctrine of sin."[37] Accordingly, the one and only entrance into Christianity is through the consciousness of sin. And it is this consciousness which binds a man to Christianity.[38] Hence if one could somehow be released from this, he could not be a Christian. It is this sin-consciousness which paganism (both ancient and modern) lacks.

What then is "sin"? According to the Christian conception, sin is not merely a matter of several misdeeds; one cannot think that one does some bad things as well as some good things. For in the presence of God one is measured by God's absolute standards. In this sense, sin is not the opposite of virtue but of faith. "Sin is not to believe"(JP, IV, 4020(Pap. X 12 A 348)), and faith is the way of being before God. Hence the natural man's subjectivity, which is the highest truth of the natural man, must be recognized as untruth "before God".[39] For, as Bruce H. Kirmmse says, sin is "an existential state, a willed condition, a position, as Kierkegaard calls it"; it is "a misuse of a capacity, an ongoing misrelationship or posture."[40] And as Verdenius quotes from Steinbuchel, "Christian sin is more than a transgression of the divine law, it is the hardening of the self's I against God's Thou".[41] Therefore, whatever he is doing is sin.[42] As Schrag expresses it, "[every] particular sin is simply an expression of...[the] state of being sinful."[43] The depth and power of sin are such that human goodness and human effort cannot prevail against them. The power of sin is far greater than can be overcome by human merits and moral efforts. The sinner is so thoroughly in the power of sin that he is blinded by its power. As Pojman makes it clear, "sin's corruption is total, affecting not only man's will and intuition but even his reason."[44]

Here we have to bear in mind one important thing in the interpretation of Kierkegaard's concept of "sin-consciousness". This is the fact that the "God" before whom one stands is not deity in general. For instance, Judge William (or Kant, Hegel)

has in mind a kind of deity. But the deity to whom the ethical person relates does not make him aware of his sinfulness, as we have seen in the last chapter. The person in religiousness A can have guilt-consciousness. But Kierkegaard carefully differentiates guilt-consciousness and sin-consciousness.[45] In guilt-consciousness the self asserts itself as strongly as it can in existence. But he who has the consciousness of sin, is outside of "immanentism". Immanentism means, for Kierkegaard, a point of view which does not know anything transcendent which can enter into time and space. So in relation to self-consciousness, immanentism is expressed in the very fact that self-reflection is constitutive of existence. Within immanentism one thinks of the process of inward self-reflection as the means of understanding and becoming oneself. However, the Christian thinks, as Kierkegaard says, "no human being [by himself] can come to know how great a sinner he is."[46] And yet in the consciousness of sin, one is conscious of oneself as not being in possession of the power of becoming oneself. That is to say, in the consciousness of sin, one recognizes that the existing individual is completely incapable of overcoming the division within oneself and the separation from God. Only when God forgives one's sin and makes one a new creature can one have the right relationship to God. In this sense, Kierkegaard, through the mouth of Climacus, says that "the relation to that historical fact (the Deity in time) is the condition for sin-consciousness...."(CUP, p. 517) Hence, as Elrod points out, for Kierkegaard, "sin-consciousness...depends upon the historical revelation of the deity in time," and "the consciousness of sin is mediated by a divine revelation."[47] That

is, only in relation to Christ can one have the consciousness of sin.[48] Thus one needs a radical change in self-consciousness, and therefore, there is "the breach with immanence". Sin is thus a transcendent category. As Kirmmse says: "Sin itself is a revealed, dogmatic, Christian category."[49]

Therefore, the Christian no longer thinks that through the process of inward self-reflection one can understand and become oneself[50]; the Christian asserts that one can be oneself only in relation to Christ. But this does not mean that one, who has not been a sinner, <u>becomes</u> a sinner only when one has the conception of God. On the contrary, now, in one's confrontation with the God-Man, one <u>realizes that one has been a sinner before God</u>.[51] For, in Kierkegaard's conception of sin-consciousness, sin is basically a misrelation to God, and sin is characterized as disobedience.[52] One cannot adjust this misrelationship by oneself. So long as one thinks that by one's own power one can have right relationship with God, one is in sin. For in fact this means that one does not know how serious one's sinfulness is and that one is not yet conscious of one's sin in all its seriousness.[53] Hence we may say with Shmueli that "[the] sinner is the person who shuts himself into his own immanence and defiantly considers it his actuality."[54] One who has the consciousness of sin in the real sense, is one who thinks that one cannot be removed from the state of sin but for God's forgiveness of sin. In this spirit, Anti-Climacus says that the requirement of Christianity is too high for man: the real reason why man is offended at Christianity is "because it is too high for him",

because its goal is not man's goal, because it would make of a man something so extraordinary that "his mind cannot grasp it."[55]

Hence sin-consciousness is always found together with one's belief in God's forgiveness of sins.[56] One's realization that one is so extremely sinful that one cannot solve by oneself the problem of sinfulness, makes one utterly dependent upon God. In this sense, Kierkegaard says: "The forgiveness of sin is a totality-qualification based on my being in relationship to God."(JP, II, 1218(Pap. IX A 482)) Hence when God in Christ offers the forgiveness of sin, such a person does not, and cannot say that this forgiveness is impossible.[57] Moreover, he should not suggest the way in which God should offer the forgiveness of sin, that, e.g., God should give us a perfect moral example, so that we can follow the example and in so following be forgiven our sins, or that it is proper for God to forgive everybody.[58] Those who believe in the forgiveness of sin just accept what God himself has offered, the way in which God forgives us, the extent of this forgiveness, and the character of this forgiveness. Therefore, he who has the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin is related to God through the mediation of the God-Man. In this spirit, in one of his journal entries, Kierkegaard says:

> [The] consciousness of the forgiveness of sins is linked to an external event, the appearance of Christ in his fullness, which is, indeed, not external in the sense of being foreign to us, of no concern to us, but external as being historical.(JP, II, 1100(Pap. III A 39))

And according to Kierkegaard, only one who believes in the forgiveness of one's sin is one who becomes spirit.(JP, I, 67(Pap. VIII 1 A 673)) Hence those who do not believe in the forgiveness

of sin are regarded as not being themselves in the proper sense. Only those who believe in Christ's forgiveness of sin are regarded as spirits and therefore themselves.(cf. JP, IV, 4333(Pap. X 2 A 445))

Thirdly, as we have suggested before, sin-consciousness and the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin are always found together with faith.(cf. JP, IV, 4036(Pap. X 2 A 477)) Those who have sin-consciousness and the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin, are those who must live by faith.[59] He who lives by faith asserts that if there is an integration of the self, this integration of the self is given only by God. For to become oneself in relation to God requires the negation of the thinking that one can be oneself through one's own power.(cf. JP, I, 53=Pap. V B 196) The life of faith is therefore that of total dependence upon God. But this dependence is a willing dependence.[60] Now one realizes that as long as one is trying to be independent of God, one cannot be oneself in the real sense. One no longer believes that one can existentially integrate oneself by one's own power. One relies upon God in one's becoming oneself. Now one can be called "spirit" in the sense Anti-Climacus uses this term. One is a self.[61] Accordingly, Anti-Climacus says: "[The Christian motto is]: according to your faith, be it unto you, or as you believe, so you are, to believe is to be."(SUD, p. 93=SUDL, p. 224) For faith is the belief that the self's lost integration is restored in existence through the atoning significance of the existence of "the God in time". In this sense, we can agree with Elrod, when he says: "To become

one's self in existence and to believe in the paradox [of the God-Man] are not two different and unrelated tasks. The two tasks, in fact, are inseparably linked. It is impossible for the individual to become himself apart from belief in the paradox...."[62] For, as we have discussed, one can be oneself in the real sense, only in relation to Christ, and yet Christ is the God-Man (the absolute paradox). Here again we can see the fact that we cannot separate the consciousness of sin, and of the forgiveness of sin and faith in the Christian's consciousness. These are the constituting factors of Christian consciousness. This discussion of the Christian's self-consciousness leads us to draw a comparison between the Christian's understanding of himself and the ethical person's understanding.

Let us then turn to this comparison. As we have seen in the last section, the ethical person thinks that the task of becoming oneself is a task which has a characteristic of total autonomy. Yet the Christian, as understood by Anti-Climacus, thinks that as long as one tries to be oneself by oneself, one is in despair. For, from the Christian understanding of the problem of becoming oneself, everyone is in despair, as long as one has no real relationship to Christ. Hence the ethical person, who tries to be himself by himself, is regarded by Anti-Climacus to be in the despair of willing despairingly to be oneself.(SUD, p. 67=SUDL, p. 200) So it is quite obvious that there are differences and discontinuity between the ethical understanding of the self and the Christian understanding. When we look at Kierkegaard's writings, these differences and discontinuity are too obvious to

be disregarded.

Some critics, however, while noticing the differences and discontinuity, try to find a kind of continuity between the ethical understanding of the self and the Christian understanding. For example, Elrod says as follows:

> Faith presupposes a definition of the self and the notion that the task of existence is an ethical one in which the individual actualizes and understands himself in existence....
>
> [Faith] is an act which is explicitly and understandably continuous with the preceding development of Spirit. Faith accepts the already established fact that the individual's self is a synthesis and that he has the ethical task of actualizing that synthesis as a relation (unity) in existence....
>
> Faith is explicitly continuous with the preceding levels of the ethico-religious stage of Spirit's development.[63]

Hence, according to Elrod, the definition of the self and the notion of the task of one's actualization and understanding of oneself in existence are basically those of the ethical person. Even the Christian self, we are told, accepts the ethical definition of the self and the task of ethical realization of oneself. The Christian accepts, says Elrod, "the already established fact that the individual's self is a synthesis and that he has the ethical task of actualizing that synthesis as a relation in existence." And in another place, Elrod says: "Grace for Kierkegaard is never received without a prior and corresponding human effort, namely, the ethical act of willing the others as end. Such an act, when honestly made, becomes the vessel that will be filled with grace."[64] Therefore, according to Elrod, the previous process of self-development makes a positive contribution to the Christian self's becoming itself; one's spiritual development is vital for one's becoming oneself.

It is true that there are some similarities between the ethical understanding of the self and the Christian understanding. At first glance, therefore, the Christian understanding and the ethical understanding look similar. Both the Christian and the ethical person see that man is in a sense already himself, but at the same time not yet himself; he has to become himself. In order to be himself, both the Christian and the ethical person assert, he has to integrate two different factors which compose the self as a synthesis, soul (the eternal, the infinitude, possibility) and body (the temporal, the finitude, necessity). Moreover, both maintain that the self is both the product of the integration of these two factors and the agent which integrates these factors.

However, when we look closely at Kierkegaard's texts, we cannot help questioning Elrod's assertion of the continuity (between the ethical understanding of the self and the Christian understanding). In particular, it seems to me very difficult to think that the definition of the self of the Christian is basically that of the ethical. In what follows, I shall argue against this assertion of continuity through a consideration of the following three questions: (1) Whether the infinitude (the eternal, possibility) of the self is understood in the same way in the ethical understanding of the self and in the Christian understanding? (2) Whether the way in which one becomes oneself is understood in the same way, or in a similar way, at the very least? And (3) whether the resulting selves (i.e., the ethical self and the Christian self) are similar, or whether there is any continuity between the two selves? Let us consider these in turn.

Firstly, the understanding of infinitude. Do the ethical person and the Christian have the same understanding of infinitude (the eternal, possibility) of the human being? When we look at Kierkegaard's texts, we cannot equate the infinitude of the Christian self with that of the ethical self, for the characteristics of the infinitude of each self are different from one another. So we have to say that their understandings of the infinitude are different. For the Christian, this possibility (or infinitude), though it is a given element, so that it is one factor which constitutes human self, is still a possibility only in relation to God.[65] For the Christian, "humanly speaking, there is no possibility."(SUD, p. 38=SUDL, p. 171) What does this mean? Does this mean that we human beings do not have soul, the infinitude, the eternal, within us? Anti-Climacus would answer this question negatively. What then does he mean when he says that "humanly speaking no possibility exists"? Perhaps he means that the infinitude (the eternal, possibility, soul) in man is possible only in relation to God.[66] Without the relation to God, man would be as if man did not have soul; his soul is a dead soul, even though he is living. His soul does not function as it should do. The eternal, the infinitude, possibility of the ethical person is "immanent", for, as we have seen in the last section, this possibility is latent in human beings; it is merely a human possibility. But what Christianity asserts is that the infinitude must be something transcendent.

The ethical infinitude is therefore regarded by the Christian as only abstract infinitude and, in the final analysis, as the immanent infinitude; the ethical infinitude is something which "is with [the ethical person] in time."(SLOWL, p. 116) Dupré also says that the ethical person's "relation to the infinite lies only within the finite."[67] Anti-Climacus' thinking develops in the following way. (1) An ethical self is one who is conscious of the infinite self.(SUD, pp. 67f.=SUDL, p. 201) (2) But since he cannot be himself in the real sense, Anti-Climacus thinks that this infinite self "is really only the most abstract form, the most abstract possibility of the self." He continues to say: "And this is the self that a person in despair wills to be, severing the self from any relation to a power that has established it, or severing it from the idea that there is such a power [God]."(SUD, p. 68=SUDL, p. 201)

The self which the ethical person thinks to be the actual real self is regarded by Anti-Climacus as "the abstract possibility of the self."[68] As the ethical person criticized the aesthetic person, the ethical person is judged by the Christian as thinking that he became himself abstractly, or only in possibility. It is true that the aesthete and the ethical person are different. What the aesthete lacks is his awareness of necessity and limitations; in this sense, the aesthete only lives in the world of possibility. The ethical person, on the other hand, is clearly aware of his concretion.(Cf. SUD, p. 68=SUDL, pp. 201-2) The trouble with the ethical self is that, by the aid of being the infinite, he wills to construct [himself] by

himself.(SUD, p. 68=SUDL, p. 202) In this sense, the ethical view of life is called by Anti-Climacus "stoicism".(SUD, p. 68=SUDL, p. 202) But he warns us not to think only of "this philosophical sect." By "stoicism" Anti-Climacus means that the ethical view of life is one of self-construction. Yet in the view of Anti-Climacus, as long as one thinks that one can construct oneself by oneself, one is thinking in an abstract way, for one is thinking what is impossible. The infinitude of the ethical person makes him think in this impossible way.

In contrast to the ethical person's understanding of infinitude, the Christian's understanding of infinitude is the basis of the acceptance of the concrete fact that he cannot be himself by himself. Hence we can say that the Christian's understanding of infinitude is very different from the ethical understanding.[69]

This discussion on infinitude has already touched the second point of our discussion. As this examination intimates, the difference between the ethical self and the Christian self not only lies in their understanding of infinitude, but also in their understanding of the way in which one becomes oneself. The ethical person is basically the one who tries to be himself by himself. He can either be "active" or "passive". (But in both situations, he is the one who controls himself.) So according to the Christian, the ethical person is in despair through trying to be himself by himself; he is defiant. Hence there is a difference between the ways in which the two persons think one becomes oneself. The Christian thinks that it is possible only in

relation to God; whereas the ethical person thinks that he can autonomously be himself. Therefore, it is difficult to agree without reservations with Mackey when he asserts: "The effect of Kierkegaard's position is to infinitize the freedom of the individual and thereby to absolutize human subjectivity."[70] As far as Kierkegaard's ethical person is concerned this statement is quite correct. But it is quite certain that for Kierkegaard's Christian this assertion cannot be valid, as our discussion in this context shows. Here, we may see a difference between the ethical person and the Christian.

Thirdly, as the result of these differences, there is also a difference in the resultant selves. The Christian self which integrates itself in relation to God is a willingly dependent self, or theonomous self. As Kierkegaard says, "what I am I am simply and solely by believing in and obeying God."(JP, V, 5125(Pap. VIII 1 A 602)) In contrast, the ethical self which attempts to integrate itself by itself is a totally independent self, or autonomous self. From the perspective of the Christian self, the autonomous self of the ethical person is defiant.

One of the most obvious examples of one's being defiant can be found, according to Anti-Climacus, in one's response to the existence of the God-Man. According to Anti-Climacus, the doctrine of the God-Man is not something which man imagined; "it is God who devised the teaching about the God-man."(SUD, p. 118=SUDL, p. 249) The importance of this doctrine of the God-Man lies in the fact that it makes the qualitative distinction between God and man clear on the one hand, and at the same time, it shows

what God did in order to save human beings who are in sin, on the other hand. But the ethical person does not accept this doctrine of the God-Man as it is; he can and may accept this doctrine when he interprets it in the way in which he can take away and abolish the possibility of offence. For example, he can accept this doctrine as it is interpreted by Kant, in which Jesus is only the perfect moral example[71], or the "ideal of humanity"[72], or the "archetype" of human being[73], or the "godly-minded teacher."[74] And he can accept this doctrine as it is interpreted by Hegel, in which the God-Man is only the symbol of human deification, or of the union of divinity and humanity in general. In his "Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion" in 1824, Hegel says: "What is posited [in the Incarnation] is that divine and human nature are not intrinsically different - God [is] in human shape. The truth is that there is only one reason, only one spirit."[75] Thus Hegel sees the unity of human spirit and the Absolute Spirit, the unity of human reason and the Absolute Reason. In the same spirit, in his lectures (on the same subject) in 1827, he says again: "The substantial unity [of God and humanity] is what humanity implicitly is."[76] Hence, for Hegel, there is the necessity of the Incarnation, as we can see in the following quotation:

> The necessity that God [has] appeared in the world in the flesh is an essential character - a necessary deduction from what has been said previously, demonstrated by it - for only in this way can it become a certainty for humanity; only in this way it is truth in the form of certainty.[77]

From this observation we can agree with Charles Taylor:

> [Although] Hegel probably continued to see in Jesus an exceptional individual who lived in harmony with God in a way quite without precedent or equal in his time, it could not be said of him that he was God in any sense other than in which

> we are identical with God. An sich, we are all the same in this regard.[78]

Here there is no need to list all kinds of attempts which understand the doctrine of the God-Man in a different way from what it was in classical theology. Anti-Climacus himself only mentions two heretical tendencies in the interpretation of the existence of the God-Man: to make the God-Man only a man, and to make the God-Man God who only appears to be a man. Perhaps these are enough for us as well. What is important here is the fact that the ethical person cannot accept the existence of Jesus as the God-Man as he is. He either rejects this idea all together, or tries to interpret it in his own way which abolishes the possibility of offence. Thus, according to Anti-Climacus, the ethical self is in despair of defiance. The ethical person himself thinks that he can become himself, whereas the Christian thinks that the ethicist is in despair of defiance.

To summarize the discussion which we have developed up to now: (1) There is a difference between the ethical person's understanding of the infinitude (the eternal, possibility) and the Christian's. (2) There is also a clear difference between the ethical way of becoming oneself and the Christian way; the ethical self tries to be himself by himself, whereas the Christian self becomes himself only in relation to God. And therefore (3) there is a difference between the resulting selves; the ethical self is the independent and autonomous self, whereas the Christian self is the willingly dependent self, or theonomous self. Accordingly, there is also a difference between their understanding of the

power of the self; the ethical self is the lord for itself, whereas the Christian self has God as the Lord.

Here one may raise an interesting question: does Kierkegaard suggest that the ethical person thinks that he had become a self, and only looking back from the Christian sphere realises that he was not a self at all? Or does he, while within the ethical sphere, begin to see his failure to be a self; until finally he falls down before his own eyes and realises he is getting nowhere? It is true that Kierkegaard speaks of the consciousness of limitation which the ethical person has to have, and that he, in relation to this, mentions repentance even within the ethical sphere. However, as we have seen, ethical repentance as the choice of the ethical self is the starting point of the ethical sphere; it is not at the end of the ethical sphere. Moreover, the absolute consciousness that he cannot be a self by himself can be attained only within the Christian sphere. This means that the person in the ethical sphere does not have the real sense of failure as understood by the Christian. Hence there is a difference between repentance within the ethical sphere and in the Christian sphere.

By this observation, we may also answer the following question: can we not say that the ethical person is at least on the way to becoming a self? At least, can we not say that he is closer to becoming a self than the person in the aesthetic sphere?[79] This is a very subtle question, and it is very difficult to find an adequate answer. In some places, Kierkegaard suggests the possibility of a positive answer to this question;

yes, he is nearer the telos (i.e., becoming a self) than the aesthetic person in that the ethical person at least tries to be a self. For the ethical person it may be said that he at least knows what he is aiming at: becoming a self. However, Kierkegaard immediately subjoins that this seeming nearness is the very reason why he is in a far more dangerous situation than is the aesthetic person.(cf. JP, IV, 4024(Pap. X 2 A 29)) Such seeming nearness is the basis of his arrogance, his defiance in asserting that he can be himself by himself. Both the aesthete and the ethicist are equally far from the Christian God and in need of becoming a self in relation to God. Hence Kierkegaard's answer to the aforementioned question is as follows: in one sense, the ethical person is near to becoming a self, but in another, and deeper, sense, he is further from becoming a self in the real sense of the word. I think we should emphasize the second point. For, as Kirmmse says, "it is the most dangerous sickness when one refuses to allow oneself to be healed from it."[80] Hence, in the final analysis, there is also a difference between the ethical self's understanding of its state and the Christian's understanding of the ethical self's state; the ethical self thinks that it becomes itself, whereas the Christian thinks that the ethical person is in despair and has not yet become the self.[81] Hence being in the ethical does not give any help for being a Christian.

Based on this discussion we can now conclude (1) that the Christian self cannot be understood as one handed-over from the ethical sphere; and (2) that the ethical person cannot realize his

failure in the genuine sense so long as he is in the ethical sphere. So if an ethical person becomes a Christian, there is a fundamental change in his self-consciousness; his self-consciousness can be no longer the ethical person's self-consciousness. Becoming the Christian self, therefore, cannot be understood as the development or enhancement of the ethical self. As we have seen in this chapter, to be the Christian self means that the characteristic traits of the ethical person have to be abandoned.

NOTES

1. I will discuss this view and its implication in the next section.

2. Cf. Journals, No. 755=Pap. VIII A 651. For a similar view, see Bruce H. Kirmmse, "Psychology and Society," in Kierkegaard's Truth, pp. 169f. Vincent A. McCarthy, "Psychological Fragments: Kierkegaard's Religious Psychology," in Kierkegaard's Truth, pp. 258f.

3. SUD, p. 13=SUDL, p. 146. See also SUD, pp. 13f.=SUDL, p. 146

4. J.P. Cole, The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 14, emphasis given. Cole, except in the direct quotation from The Sickness unto Death, capitalizes "Spirit" throughout his work, which is not the case for normal interpretation of The Sickness unto Death, nor for Lowrie's English translation of the book. And in the final chapter of his study, he uses the terms "the Holy Spirit" and "Spirit" interchangeably. I wonder why he can capitalize this term and how can he directly relate spirit as the self to the Holy Spirit. But in the next several paragraphs in which I discuss his interpretation of the book, I shall follow his convention.

5. Ibid., p. 14.

6. Ibid., p. 16.

7. Ibid., p. 20. See also his "The Existential Reality of God: A Kierkegaardian Study" (originally published in The Christian Scholar 48 (1965), pp. 224-235) in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 95.

8. Cole, The Problematic Self, p. 20.

9. Ibid., p. 31.

10. Ibid., p. 228, emphasis given.

11. Ibid., p. 223.

12. Ibid., p. 227.

13. Mullen, Kierkegaard's Philosophy, p. 47. See also pp. 45, 47, 53, 75.

14. See, e.g., Schrag, pp. 167f.; Stendahl, p. 187; Nordentoft, p. 87; Michael Theunissen, "Kierkegaard's Negativistic Method," in Kierkegaard's Truth, pp. 402, 403.

15. See SUD, pp. 29f., 30, 38-46, 50=SUDL, p. 162, 163, 171-180, 184.

16. Dunning, pp. 215-33, 239-241. See esp., p. 239.

17. Ibid., pp. 239f.

18. John D. Glenn, Jr., "The Definition of the Self and the Structure of Kierkegaard's Work," in Robert L. Perkins, ed., International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness unto Death (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1987), p. 6.

19. Ibid., p. 11.

20. Ibid., p. 6.

21. Ibid., p. 11.

22. Ibid., p. 15.

23. Stendahl, in her Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 189-191, also tries to see the phenomena of despair as a series of developmental stages.

24. Dunning, p. 225.

25. Miller, pp. 259f. See also Heinecken, pp. 192, 196. A similar view is put forward by Paul Ricoeur, "Two Encounters with Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard and Evil, Doing Philosophy after Kierkegaard," in Kierkegaard's Truth, p. 320.

26. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 324.

27. Dunning, p. 217.

28. Ibid., p. 217.

29. Heinecken, p. 196.

30. Nordentoft, p. 287.

31. For a similar view in this subject, see Miller, pp. 279, 280; Heinecken, pp. 209f.; and Gardiner, pp. 110f.

32. Miller, p. 305. See also Ronald E. Hustwit, "Two Views of the Soul," in Richard H. Bell and Ronald E. Hustwitt, eds., Essays on Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein (Wooster, Ohio: The College of Wooster, 1978), p. 66.

33. Colette, p. 71.

34. Perry D. LeFevre, The Prayer of Kierkegaard (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 171.

35. Robert C. Roberts, "Grammar of Sin and the Conceptual Unity of The Sickness Unto Death," in International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death, p. 145.

36. See SUD, pp. 120f.=SUDL, pp. 251f. and JP 1, 452(Pap. V A 10).

37. SUDL, p. 238. See also TC, p. 72; TOCS, pp. 9, 24, 25, 27; AUC, p. 213; LY, p. 188(Pap. XI 2 A 14); Journals, No. 926(Pap. X 1 A 467); and JP, IV, 4486(Pap. XI 1 A 564).

38. See Journals, No. 820=JP, VI, 6251(Pap. IX A 310). See also JP, IV, 4039(Pap. X 3 A 180).

39. Cf. Smit, p. 136.

40. Bruce H. Kirmmse, "Psychology and Society," in Kierkegaard's Truth, pp. 174, 171, his emphasis.

41. W.J. Verdenius, "Plato and Christianity," Ratio 5 (1963), p. 25.

42. See JP, IV, 4047(Pap. X 4 A 173).

43. Schrag, p. 170. See also Gates, Christendom Revisited, p. 144.

44. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, p. 21.

45. For a discussion of this point, see Schrag, p. 168. See also George Connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard's Thought (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1985), pp. 172f.; and Mullen, pp. 145ff.

46. JP, II, 1216(Pap. VIII 1 A 675). See also JP, I, 514(Pap. X 2 A 420). See again Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, p. 109.

47. Elrod, Being and Existence, pp. 215, 224. See also Soe, "The Last Period," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, p. 147; Heinecken, pp. 212f.; Weiland, p. 33; LeFevre, pp. 185, 187; Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, pp. 78f.; Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, p. 167; Shmueli, p. 173; Kirmmse, "Psychology and Society," p. 173; Nordentoft, pp. 172f., 365; and Utterback, p. 126.

48. Cf. JP, III, 2461(Pap. VII 1 A 192); JP. IV, 4021(Pap. X 1 A 433), 4026(Pap. X 2 A 400), 4035(Pap. X 2 A 473), 4472(Pap. X 4 A 251).

49. Kirmmse, "Psychology and Society," p. 173.

50. Cf. Michael Heymel, Das Humane lernen: Glaube und Erziehung bei Søren Kierkegaard (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1988), p. 10.

51. See also Miller, pp. 87, 104.

52. SUD, pp. 8, 20f., 22=SUDL, pp. 145, 153f., 155. See also LeFevre, p. 171.

53. Cf. JP, IV, 4027(Pap. X 2 A 403).

54. Shmueli, p. 162.

55. SUD, p. 85=SUDL, p. 216. See also JP, III, 3078(Pap. IV A 116).

56. Cf. JP, IV, 3991(Pap. I A 92). See also Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p. 92; Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, pp. 81f.; and Utterback, pp. 112-212, esp., pp. 142, 164.

57. Cf. JP, IV, 4029(Pap. X 2 A 429); SUD, pp. 109-112=SUDL, pp. 240-44.

58. Cf. JP, IV, 4524(Pap. X 4 A 639).

59. Cf. JP, II, 1215(Pap. VIII 1 A 663). See also Elrod, Being and Existence, p. 232; and Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 313.

60. For a similar view, see Elrod, Being and Existence, p. 234.

61. See also Shmueli, p. 43; and Gates, Christendom Revisited, p. 143.

62. Elrod, Being and Existence, p. 235.

63. Elrod, Being and Existence, pp. 233, 234, 242. Cf. Sponheim, p. 38. See also Smit, p. 152.

64. Elrod, "The Social Dimension of Despair," in International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness unto Death, p. 119.

65. Cf. JP, III, 3343(Pap. IX A 352). See also Shestov, p. 95.

66. Cf. JP, IV, 6135(Pap. VIII 1 A 650), 6514(Pap. X 2 A 112).

67. Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p. 47.

68. See also Journals, No. 1041(Pap. X 2 A 396).

69. For a similar discussion of the difference between the immanent understanding of eternity and the Christian understanding, see Smit, pp. 71f.

70. Mackey, "The Loss of the World in Kierkegaard's Ethics," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 282, his emphasis.

71. Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, pp. 54-60, 77, 79, 110, 119, 120, 146ff., 150, 187. For a general discussion on this theme, see Webb, Kant's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 117-126, 140f., 152f. See also Michael Despland, Kant on History and Religion (Montreal: MaGill University and Queen's University Press, 1973), pp. 193-202.

72. Kant, Religion Within..., p. 120.

73. Ibid., pp. 54ff., 69, 109ff, 119, 136, 150.

74. Ibid., pp. 55, 59.

75. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. III. The Consummate Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 214. See also his Early Theological Writings, p. 266: "Faith in the divine grows out of the divinity of the believer's own nature; only a modification of the Godhead can know the Godhead."

76. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, p. 313. As is well-known, the actual implication of such a claim is well expressed by one of the young Hegelians, D. F. Strauss in his Leben Jesu(1835) which Kierkegaard knew.

77. Ibid., p. 313.

78. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 495. See also Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, pp. 34ff.

79. For the view of a scholar who answers this question affirmatively, see Malantschuk, "Self", in JP, IV, pp. 634f.

80. Kirmmse, "Psychology and Society," p. 175, emphasis given.

81. For a similar view, see Deyton, p. 85.

In this section we shall consider the understanding of becoming oneself of the person in religiousness A. In the last two sections we have examined the ethical understanding of becoming a self and the Christian understanding. As a result of the examination we have seen that the Christian's understanding of becoming a self has certain characteristics which are different from the ethical person's understanding. The fundamental difference comes from their relation to God in regard to their becoming themselves. Whereas the ethical person does not need God in this matter, the Christian thinks that without God there is no self. In relation to this, one interesting question may be raised: how should we think about the understanding of becoming a self of the person who is in religiousness A? This is interesting because religiousness A is, on the one hand, quite compatible with the ethical sphere, but, on the other, in relation to the problem of becoming a self the person in religiousness A thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to God. Does this mean that in relation to the problem of becoming a self, the person in religiousness A has the same view as the Christian has? Or does the person in religiousness A have a different understanding of the expression "one can be oneself only in relation to God"? If the latter is the case, exactly what constitutes the difference between the Christian's understanding of the phrase "only in relation to God" and the way it is understood by the person in religiousness A?

I wish to show in this section that the basic difference between the Christian's understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in religiousness A lies in the characteristics of God to whom each relates in his relation to himself. In other words, the God of the Christian (or the Christian conception of God) is different from the God of religiousness A (or the conception of God in religiousness A), and this difference plays the major role in defining the difference between the Christian's understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in religiousness A. We shall also see the difference between their views of one's relationship to God, and the difference between guilt-consciousness which the person in religiousness A has and sin-consciousness which the Christian has. In the end, we shall see that as long as one keeps the characteristics of the ethical sphere, one's understanding of becoming a self is far from the Christian understanding. For, as we have seen, the Christian's relation to God, which is vital for his becoming himself, is regarded by the ethical person and the person in religiousness A as being particularistic, anti-rationalistic, and heteronomous. (But, as we have seen, this does not mean that the Christian himself also thinks that his relation to God has these characteristics. According to the Christian himself, one's relation to God is the most important thing which is demanded by God from everybody, and which allows one's real freedom.)

Before proceeding to the main argument of this section, it will be useful to make it clear here what I mean by religiousness A. This explanation is necessary, because there are some

ambiguities in Kierkegaard's use of this term.[1] I think that Kierkegaard applies this term to two somewhat different types of religiousness. (When I say "somewhat different types of religiousness" I do not disregard the fact that in the mind of Kierkegaard, in the final analysis, both of them have the same characteristic of immanentism, or of paganism.) He sometimes calls the religiousness of the subjective thinkers who are not Christians, religiousness A. For example, if there is a religiousness which is compatible with and suitable to Socrates, that religiousness is religiousness A. For, as Taylor says, "Kierkegaard most frequently uses Socrates as an example of a person who represents religion A...."[2] Thus, Dupré even calls religiousness A "Socratic religion"[3], and Roberts speaks of the Socratic position as a "paradigm of religious teaching" which is contrasted with Christianity.[4] Perhaps, as some people think, the religiousness of Schleiermacher is regarded by Kierkegaard as religiousness A.[5] On the other hand, Kierkegaard at times calls the religiousness of the person who lives in Christendom but does not have the Christian mode of existence, religiousness A. In other words, in some places Kierkegaard regards nominal Christians as people in religiousness A.[6]

When I refer to religiousness A in this section, I mainly mean the religiousness A in its former sense. Hence the main task of this section is to examine the understanding of becoming a self of the person in religiousness A in this sense. This examination naturally leads us to compare it to that of the merely ethical person and that of the Christian. Based upon this examination, we

shall conclude that the understanding of becoming a self of the person in religiousness A may be regarded as a continuation or enhancement of the understanding of becoming a self of the ethical person, and that in this respect, his understanding is also very different from the Christian's understanding.

I think we can reach this conclusion by showing that, for religiousness A, God is understood as an immanent God, who is only immanently in the natural world, whereas Christianity is dependent on revelation which is given by the transcendent God. To demonstrate the understanding of God of the person in religiousness A, (1) we shall consider the view that it is possible to think of the God of the first part of The Sickness Unto Death as God in general, not necessarily the God of Christianity. (2) Then we shall relate this kind of religiousness to the "Socratic" in the works of Climacus. (3) We may then look at Schleiermacher in order to understand better what religiousness A may be and why it is so different from what Kierkegaard understands by Christianity. That is, Schleiermacher may help us to understand better what a fully fledged religiousness A might look like.

Let us start with the discussion of The Sickness unto Death. Some interpreters of Kierkegaard think that as far as the first part of The Sickness unto Death is concerned, it can provide us with a good example of the thinking of the person in religiousness A in the matter of becoming a self. Although I wonder whether it is really possible to separate this part from the rest of the

book, and whether the God of this part is also the God of Christianity, I think it is interesting to reflect on this possibility. Let us suppose for a moment that this is possible, and try to draw out the understanding of becoming a self from this perspective.[7]

For those who think in the way which I have described in the above paragraph, the description of becoming a self and of despair does not include any Christological consideration; it has, if we may say so, only a unitarian (in the broad sense) picture of God. And in this part, God must always be understood as one who has nothing to do with the Incarnation in the traditional sense of the word.[8] Rather, one may say that the God of this picture does not need any incarnation, and actually cannot become incarnate. In this part, according to this view, one is understood to be oneself only in relation to this kind of God. Hampson says: "The self comes to itself essentially for the first time in relationship to God...Apart from God the self would not be itself. God 'constitutes' the self."[9] For, says she again: "[A] human was intended to become himself or herself in relationship to God."[10] In this respect, the person in religiousness A is different from the merely ethical person who thinks that one can be oneself by oneself without any relation to God. In contrast to the ethical person's independence, the person in religiousness A is dependent on some deity. But at the same time, in contrast to the Christian, the person in religiousness A cannot relate to the Christian God who has become incarnate himself as an individual human being without ceasing to be God.

Now let us turn to "the Socratic" in the writings of Climacus. Socrates' religiousness, if there is any religiousness in Socrates, has this very characteristic of religiousness A. That is, the type of religion which would be compatible with the Socratic thought, as explained in Philosophical Fragments, could only be religiousness A. Socrates is at the very least the subjective thinker (outside of Christianity) who emphasizes the task of existing as an individual.[11] He has his "God-relationship".[12] But, as Climacus say, "[in] religiousness A there is no historical starting-point. The individual merely discovers in time that he must assume he is eternal.... In time the individual recollects that he is eternal."(CUP, p. 508)

Here, in relation to this, one may make two major points: one is concerned with the character of God in religiousness A, and the other is concerned with the nature of one's relation to God in religiousness A. But these two points are closely related to one another. The first point concerned with the character of God is that in religiousness A, "God is neither a something..., nor is He outside the individual...."(CUP, p. 498) For in religiousness A God is "all and infinitely all" (so He is not something), and He is also in the individual. The God of religiousness A cannot be thought of outside one's relation to Him. And therefore, the second point is that in religiousness A, the individual finds the God-relationship within himself.[13] Thus, "every individual is in essence equally adapted for eternity and essentially related to the eternal."(CUP, p. 508)

Because of these characteristics of religiousness A, for the person in religiousness A, there is no need of the divine teacher, for the teacher is merely an occasion for discovering one's own eternity. Kierkegaard draws out this conclusion from the Socratic doctrine of recollection which is expressed in Meno, and says:

> [According to this doctrine of recollection] the Truth is not introduced into [the individual from without], but was within him. [This thought receives further development at the hands of Socrates...].(PF, p. 9=PFS, pp. 11f.)

In the thought of Socrates, the idea that one has the truth within oneself is based on the belief that one has an essential infinite within oneself. So according to the person in religiousness A, the self is made up of an infinite aspect and constantly changing temporal experiences.[14] This infinite within us is the agent which makes the relationship between God and man possible. As far as man has this infinity, he himself can establish the relationship to God. The connection with the Eternal is "part of the self's constitution."[15] So one may even say, with Manheimer, that "Socrates orients the individual to his own inward divinity."[16]

Hence there is a sort of continuity between God and the infinite within human being. The infinite within us, as Taylor says, is the "point of contact" between the self and...God."[17] As far as the infinite within us is concerned, there is no problem at all for the human being. But the trouble is that one is in the temporal realm. So there is a tension between one's essential eternity and one's staying in the temporal realm. Coming to be in the temporal world gives the human being this trouble and tension.

By coming to be temporal, one has forgotten one's eternal essential nature and the essential relationship between God and man. However, though hindered by the fact of temporal existence, one has, within oneself, the possibility of remembering one's eternal nature (to use the mythical word), or of establishing one's relationship to God. To put it otherwise, in spite of the obstacle of the temporal element, the bond between the human being and the Eternal, or God, is still there to be discovered.

Therefore, for those who continue in the Socratic religiousness, it is nonsensical that God, the Eternal, should become incarnate as an individual human being. First of all, there is no need at all for God to become incarnate. There is no need for a mediator; one can be related to God "without passing through a mediator."[18] For, as we have seen, one can, by oneself, make the relationship to God. Or, it would be better to say that one has already this God-relationship within oneself.[19] So there is no need of God becoming incarnate in order to be the Saviour and Teacher of man.(cf. PF, p. 47=PFS, p. 58) Secondly, therefore, the idea that God has become incarnate becomes the object of mockery for the person in religiousness A. According to him, this idea of the Incarnation is a distortion of the idea of eternal God. For, according to him, if God has become incarnate as an individual human being, then God is no longer eternal; from now on God must be temporal in <u>sensu strictu</u>. So the idea of the Incarnation, for the person in religiousness A, is the mockery of the Godhead and blasphemy. God cannot be a human being, and cannot be anthropomorphic.

Therefore, we can see that although they assert that one can be oneself only in relation to God, they themselves have already defined who God must be. Those who hold to the Socratic religiousness have a relation to God, but their God is the one who is defined by their conception of God. For the God of religiousness A, as Shestov says, "not everything is possible, and...the possible and the impossible are determined, not by God, but by eternal laws to which God and man are equally subject." "For this reason," continues Shestov, "[this kind of] God has no power over history, i.e., over reality."[20] Or, in a sense, one may say that in religiousness A what is important is the relationship itself, not the exact object to which one relates. "Religiousness A," says Climacus, "is not conditioned by anything but is the dialectic inward appropriation of the relationship...."(CUP, p. 494) This religiousness has led to greater inwardness and passionate subjectivity.

In order to see these points more clearly, I want to draw out several characteristics of religiousness A from Part Two, chapter IV ("The Problem of the Fragments"), section II, A ("Existential Pathos") of the Postscript, in the following few paragraphs. The examination of this part needs a very critical reading, for even though this part is mainly concerned with religiousness A, Climacus, in the course of his discussion of religiousness A, sometimes talks about the paradoxical religiousness (i.e., Christianity) as well.[21] Hence we need some means by which we can sever religiousness A from religiousness B and make the difference clear. In this part Climacus discusses the three

expressions for existential pathos: (1) absolute relation to the absolute telos as the initial expression, (2) suffering as the essential expression, and (3) guilt as the decisive expression. In the following discussion, I shall examine the aspects that are solely valid for religiousness A. From this perspective, I shall discuss these expressions in turn.

In regard to the first of these (i.e., one's absolute relation to the absolute telos), we can say that in religiousness A, one's relation to the absolute telos is expressed in one's resignation. So the first characteristic of religiousness A is resignation. Climacus emphasizes that one's resignation must be total; one should relinquish all rights to everything external and immediate. Here a "total renunciation" is the expression of the enthusiastic reconciliation to the infinite. As we have seen in our discussion of Fear and Trembling, this infinite resignation, as opposed to faith, is a movement that everybody is able to make in his own strength of will, i.e., an immanent movement.[22] The monastic movement of the Middle Ages is provided by Climacus as a classic example of this. But what he says of the monastic movement applies not only to that of the Middle Ages, but also to general religious monasticism.[23] Compared with Hegelian mediation, the monastic movement has passion, at the very least.[24] It tries to resign the relative and the immediate and in this resignation one expresses one's sincere devotion to the Absolute. But the trouble with the monastic movement lies in the fact that it makes one's relationship to the Absolute something outwardly and externally special and peculiar.(cf. CUP, pp. 366,

370)

So what is finally suggested as a true form of resignation is not even something like the monastic movement. What Climacus demands as the first characteristic of religiousness A is what may be called "religiousness as incognito", the hidden inwardness which does not express itself at all. Reacting against the suspicious inwardness of the monastic movement, Climacus is therefore taking the opposite extreme view of hidden inwardness. It is clear that this "religiousness...as incognito is...not yet Christian religiousness. ...it cautiously keeps itself within immanence...."(CUP, p. 473n) Anti-Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Training into Christianity regards such "hidden inwardness" as one of the symptoms of established Christendom and scathingly criticizes it.[25] Thus hidden inwardness is only the willingness to sacrifice any and every finite thing for the sake of the Absolute.(JP, IV, 3837(Pap. XI 3 B 45)) According to Kierkegaard, Mynster is the representative of those who emphasize this hidden inwardness.[26]

This hidden God-relationship is clearly contrasted to Kierkegaard's Christian understanding of God-relationship (which is summarized in his assertion that "an authentic God-relationship cannot avoid leaving its visible mark upon a man."[27]) From this perspective, Kierkegaard criticizes the hidden inwardness:

> The mistake of the religiousness of our time is that faith has been made into 'inwardness' in such a degree that in reality it has completely gone out. Directly or indirectly, life has been permitted to take on a purely worldly character....[28]

So he says: "Hidden inwardness. That is what must be

rejected...And nothing is more contrary to Christianity, Christianity which, above all, wishes everything to be made manifest."(Journals, No. 1226(Pap. X 4 A 327)) He says again:

> If I transform my Christianity into merely hidden inwardness and outwardly conform completely to the world, if I give absolutely no indication that in my inmost being I acknowledge a completely different criterion (the God-relationship), but am an upright man just like most people etc., then it is obviously a betrayal.(JP, II, 2119(Pap. VIII 1 A 511))

Hence we can agree with Fabro when, after examining Kierkegaard's various writings, he says: "It would be impossible to enumerate the sections and the pages of his works and the innumerable passages of the Journals in which Kierkegaard denounces the hypocrisy of 'secret inwardness'...."[29]

In contrast to this, from the perspective of religiousness A, what is expressed outwardly, whatever it may be, is despised as something inferior to a completely hidden inwardness. This hidden inwardness is the first characteristic of the pathos of religiousness A.[30] In religiousness A, what is religious must be only in the realm of inwardness; it must not be expressed in the outward way. Outwardly he must be just like a person in the ethical sphere. His religion does not affect his outward life, his ethics etc. Insofar as one has this inwardness which cannot be expressed in the outward way, one is in religiousness A.

Let us turn to the second characteristic of religiousness A. The essential expression for the existential pathos is suggested by Climacus to be "suffering".(CUP, p, 388) In religiousness A, suffering must be absolutely inward suffering. Religious suffering is not to be identified with the suffering that comes

about through misfortune. So from this perspective, it is wrong to think of external suffering as religious suffering. Climacus, from this perspective, criticizes the New Testament notion of suffering, for someone like Paul suffered externally and Peter speaks of external suffering which comes to the Christians because of their faith. As far as they think of external suffering, their suffering cannot be religious, even though they suffer because of their faith. "No," says Climacus, "when the individual is secure in his God-relationship and suffers only outwardly, then this is not religious suffering."(CUP, p. 405) What then is the religious suffering of which Climacus speaks? Only when one is not sure of his God-relationship, is there inner suffering, religious suffering. From this perspective, the Christian who is sure of his God-relationship and abandons everything and suffers from all kinds of persecution and even martyrdom is still not religious enough. The person in religiousness A would say that the Christian is too secure and he is too sure of his God-relationship. For, according to Kierkegaard, the Christian should have "an unshakable sureness, an unshakable certainty about one's relationship to God."[31]

Therefore, religiousness A's understanding of religious suffering as completely inner suffering is different from the Christian understanding of suffering which we have discussed in the first chapter. As we have seen, the characteristic Christian suffering is suffering for the sake of one's Christian faith and its expression as love and discipleship. Kierkegaard says:

> [Every] person is required to witness to the truth with his life, and please note, not in an illusory way, such as by

> becoming a pastor (office, paid occupation) but by supporting the truth. If one does this, then genuine Christian suffering will also come.(JP, II, 1385(Pap. X 1 A 64))

In short, Christian suffering is suffering "for the [Christian] doctrine."[32] And the Christian understanding of suffering is that not all religious suffering is inner suffering. In Christianity, some external suffering can also be regarded as religious suffering. What is important in the Christian understanding of suffering is whether that suffering comes from the conflict between faith and the world.[33] For, according to the Christian, as Marie Thulstrup rightly observes, "[the] real 'dying unto the world' [which is regarded by Climacus as the fundamental expression of religious suffering] occurs only by virtue of faith and grace."[34] Absolutely inner suffering is thus the second characteristic of the pathos of religiousness A.

The third characteristic of religiousness A is guilt, which is the decisive expression for existential pathos.(CUP, pp. 468ff.) "The eternal conservation of the recollection of guilt," says Climacus, "is the expression for existential pathos, the highest expression for it, higher than the most enthusiastic penance which would make up for the guilt."(CUP, p. 479) As this quotation shows, guilt-consciousness is "the eternal recollection of guilt."(CUP, p. 475) And in this eternal recollection of guilt, the person in religiousness A "comprehends guilt as a totality."(CUP, p. 491) That is, he does not think of guilt as something comparative and momentary. In this way, for the person in religiousness A, guilt is something which is inescapably related to his "being" itself. Guilt-consciousness is an

expression of his limitations, finiteness, or his consciousness of the discrepancy between the finite and the infinite within himself.(cf. CUP, p. 239) Provided that one has some sense of religiousness, one can discover one is guilty; one can have guilt-consciousness by oneself. In brief, guilt-consciousness is decidedly within immanence.(CUP, p. 474) In contrast, "the consciousness of sin [in Christianity] is the paradoxical, and in turn, quite consistently with this, the paradoxical thing is that the exister does not discover this by himself, but comes to know it from without. Thereby the identity is broken."(CUP, p. 475n.) Hence, from the perspective of religiousness A, it is a strange idea that one is totally sinful, as the Christian asserts. What the person in religiousness A can accept is that he is limited and finite, so he needs to be dependent. This is expressed as guilt-consciousness.

Up to now, we have examined the characteristics of the pathos of religiousness A. According to our examination, the person in religiousness A is the one who totally resigns every external and immediate thing, and shows religiousness as incognito. He suffers from the insecurity of his God-relationship. And he very definitely feels that he is limited and finite. As we anticipated when we started this discussion, we can now clearly see that what is important in religiousness A is only the religious <u>relation</u> itself, not the object of this relationship. Perhaps, this is because for those who are in religiousness A, God is no longer an object to which they should relate, but is immediately related to themselves.

In this sense, Schleiermacher's religious person may be indicated as the case in point. Let us, therefore, turn to Schleiermacher in order to understand better what religiousness A may be and why it is so different from what Kierkegaard understands by Christianity.

According to Schleiermacher, as is well-known, the religious person is the one who has the consciousness of being absolutely dependent. And this "feeling of absolute dependence becomes a clear self-consciousness."[35] To make this discussion of Schleiermacher comprehensible, I shall make some general comment on Schleiermacher's use of these expressions, before going deeply into the main discussion of Schleiermacher's conception of one's relation to God.

Firstly, when I use the term "the feeling of absolute dependence" as the translation of the German phrase "das schlechthinnige Abhaengigkeitsgefuehl" or "das Gefuehl der schlechthinnigen Abhaengigkeit", I am aware that there are other suggestions of the translation of this German phrase, e.g., "the feeling of unconditional dependence"[36], or "the feeling of utter (or simple) dependence"[37]. However, I think it is allowable to use the traditional translation of this German phrase, insofar as one clearly bears in mind the different nuances of these translations.

Secondly, in relation to this phrase, I am also aware that here "feeling" should not be understood in a merely subjective, psychological sense[38]; Schleiermacher's "feeling" may be

understood as "cognitive feeling".[39] Here it will be worthwhile to quote a sentence from Richard R. Niebuhr: "When, in The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher says that feeling is an abiding-in-self, in distinction from knowing and doing, he does not mean that feeling is an empty passivity of the self: rather it 'is the universal form of having the self'."[40] So Schleiermacher's term "feeling" must be understood positively and broadly, not negatively nor psychologically in the restricted sense of the word.

Thirdly, for Schleiermacher, the consciousness of absolute dependence has in itself the consciousness of freedom as well. For, in his thought, "without any feeling of freedom a feeling of absolute dependence would not be possible."[41] In our discussion of Schleiermacher's conception of one's relation to God (which we are going to deal with now), we should bear in mind these three points.

For Schleiermacher, this consciousness of being absolutely dependent is equated with the consciousness of being in relation to God.[42] For, according to Schleiermacher, "God is given to us in feeling in an original way"[43], and therefore, as Avis says, "the consciousness of God is given in and with the sense of absolute dependence."[44] Or, as Moltmann expresses: "God is indirectly experienced in the experience of the absolute dependency of our own existence."[45]

The self-consciousness of the religious person is the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, and this self-consciousness includes God-consciousness "in such a way that...the two cannot be separated from each other." So his God-consciousness is exactly this feeling of absolute dependence. As long as one has this feeling of absolute dependence, one has God-consciousness. "So that in the first instance," says Schleiermacher, "God signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant in this feeling and to which we trace our being in such a state...."[46] Shmueli makes a similar point when he explains religiousness A: "He [the God of religiousness A] is the expression of the religious feelings man acquires as soon as he comes to realize the finiteness of the human condition and opens himself toward what lies beyond it."[47]

The God-consciousness is sometimes called by Schleiermacher piety. According to Schleiermacher, "piety appears as a surrender, a submission to be moved by the Whole that stands over against man....So everybody who very definitely feels that he is finite and limited can have guilt-consciousness. Piety does, indeed, linger with satisfaction on every action that is from God, and every activity that reveals the Infinite in the finite, and yet it is not itself this activity."[48] Based upon this understanding of piety, Schleiermacher can describe the contemplation of the pious, and religion in the following way:

> The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal. Religion is to seek this and find it in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all doing and suffering. It is to have life and to know life in

> immediate feeling, only as such an existence in the Infinite and the Eternal.... Wherefore it is a life in the infinite nature of the Whole, in the One and in the All, in God, having and possessing all things in God, and God in all.[49]

Yet this piety, or God-consciousness is neither knowledge nor morality. "Piety," says Schleiermacher, "cannot be an instant craving for a mess of metaphysical and ethical crumbs."[50] But this does not mean that for Schleiermacher, piety (or religion) lacks cognitive and moral implications. However, referring to this state, one may say that God has not yet been definitely conceptualized in the God-consciousness at first. As Barth says: "Piety as a determination of the self-consciousness precedes pious ideas."[51] (But afterwards, this religious person draws out the concept of God from his God-consciousness. This analysing and interpreting the God-consciousness is suggested as the task of theology. So Christian doctrines are defined as "accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech"[52], and Dogmatics as "the knowledge of doctrine now current in the [evangelical] church."[53] In this sense, for Schleiermacher, theology is a descriptive, empirical, and even "phenomenological"[54] discipline; and one's statements about God are only statements about the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to God. Theological statements are only implications of the religious self-consciousness. In this sense, H. Richard Niebuhr says that for Schleiermacher, "God and faith belong together."[55] In short, for Schleiermacher, all the statements we make about God are expressions of our immediate consciousness of absolute dependence.[56])

Therefore, what is important in religion is God-consciousness itself which has not yet been conceptualized. To put this in the language of Climacus, as long as one is related to deity (whoever he may be), one has the God-relationship, and therefore, in this relation to deity, one becomes oneself. However, strangely enough, Schleiermacher's God appears as One who cannot allow us think of Him in the way in which the one who is in the traditional Christianity thinks about God. For, when we closely look at Schleiermacher's God, we have to say, with Robert C. Roberts, that "the God of the Bible and traditional Christianity...cannot be the [God] for this feeling of [absolute dependence]."[57]

In relation to this God, there is guilt-consciousness, the consciousness of the difference between God and man. But there is no need of sin-consciousness as understood in Kierkegaard's Christianity. Such sin-consciousness is regarded as a terrible distortion of man's image. It is true that Schleiermacher, unlike the person who is described by Kierkegaard as being in religiousness A, uses the term sin-consciousness. But the meaning which Schleiermacher gives to this term is similar to the guilt-consciousness in Kierkegaard's writings. For example, Schleiermacher says: "We are conscious of sin as the power and work of a time when the disposition to the God-consciousness had not yet actively emerged in us."[58] In this way, sin is discussed by Schleiermacher in terms of a weakness of the God-consciousness, or lower level of receptivity to divine influence.[59] And this weakening and defilement of the God-consciousness is understood to be due to our lower nature, the flesh. So, for Schleiermacher, as

for the person in religiousness A of Kierkegaard's writings, sin is a problem innate in the very self-structure of man. On the basis of this understanding, we can agree with Tillich when he says that in Schleiermacher's doctrine of sin, Schleiermacher follows the general trend of German idealism and certainly of the Enlightenment. He continues:

> According to this trend, sin is a shortcoming. It is not a "no" but a "not yet". Sin arises because of the discrepancy between the great speed of the evolutionary process in the biological development of mankind and the slower pace of moral and spiritual development of man....Sin is the "not yet" of man's spiritual development within an already fully developed bodily organism. The distance or the gap between these two processes is what we call sin. This condition is universal. It is the state of mankind universally....This makes sin in some way necessary and unavoidable.[60]

Hence Schleiermacher says that sin "does not invalidate the idea of the original perfection of man."[61] Schleiermacher says again that "sin is so little an essential part of being of man that we can never regard it as anything else than a disturbance of nature."[62] As Barth says, Schleiermacher's "dogmatics knows nothing of any sickness unto death."[63]

Consequently, Schleiermacher's conception of redemption and salvation is also different from that of Kierkegaard's Christianity. According to Schleiermacher, as Tillich quite clearly summarizes him, salvation is "the transformation of a limited, inhibited, or distorted religious consciousness into a fully developed religious consciousness", [or] "the liberation of our consciousness from inhibition, limitation and distortion"[64], or shortly "the presence of God in man, in man's consciousness...."[65] Hence he who has this fully developed

religious consciousness is one who has been saved. In this sense, we can agree with Barth when he says: "The antithesis of his second part [the antithesis of sin and grace] is a psychological one and therefore it falls short of the Christian antithesis at least in the New Testament and Reformation sense."[66] For, according to Schleiermacher, there is no need of vicarious sacrifice of Christ, no redemption in the classic and Reformation sense of these words.[67] In fact, in the thought-system of Schleiermacher, this traditional understanding of redemption is not necessary, or is even regarded as a misunderstanding or distortion of religious consciousness. Likewise, for Schleiermacher, there is no need of repentance and conversion in the traditional sense of these words.[68]

For, in the final analysis, for Schleiermacher, there is a kind of continuity between man and God[69], and therefore, it is natural for man to have God-consciousness. In this sense, Schleiermacher says that "as certainly as Christ was a man, there must reside in human nature the possibility of taking up the divine into itself, just as did happen in Christ."[70] In the same spirit, he says again:

> Inasmuch...as the reason is completely one with the divine Spirit, the divine Spirit can itself be conceived as the highest enhancement of the human reason, so that the difference between the two is made to disappear.[71]

But this does not mean that Schleiermacher equated God with every individual man. In the thought of Schleiermacher, God is regarded as the one who encompasses all human beings and all creatures. In this sense, Schleiermacher asserts that we cannot attribute a

nature to God. That is, there is no such thing as the nature of God; God is "the unconditioned and the absolutely simple."[72] God is the reality that corresponds to the religious person's feeling of absolute dependence. He is regarded as the universal Source {"the Whence"} of all creatures and as the absolute causality.[73] So, according to him, God is in them (i.e., human beings and all creatures), among them, with them, behind them, and above them. God is the depth of everything, and the power of the divine is present in everything so that God is the ground and unity of everything. But He is always in relation to them and He works only through them.

From this understanding, Schleiermacher can say that "[your] feeling is piety in so far as it is the result of the operation of God in you by means of the operation of the world upon you.[74] So, for the early Schleiermacher, God is equated with the Universe, the Whole.[75] A surrender to God is thus the surrender to the Universe. But this does not mean that the early Schleiermacher equates God and the world. In relation to this subject, we can agree with Richard B. Brandt, when he says:

> The situation is roughly as follows: Schleiermacher clearly did not believe that God is an individual self-conscious being, capable of distinguishing Himself from the world. On the other hand, he continually insists upon a distinction between God and the world.[76]

For Schleiermacher himself says: "The world does not allow of being completely conceived [as totality and unity] except in and with God, and there is no other revelation of God than the world."[77] There is a clear continuity between God and the world; but both particular things in the world and the totality of

particular things are not God. God is not the sum of all particulars, for, as Welch says, "the totality of finite things must also be viewed as utterly [absolutely] dependent."[78] God is opposite in kind and equal in scope to the world.[79] And yet, at the same time, for Schleiermacher, God is not an object beside other objects.[80] For Schleiermacher, to ascribe personality to God understood as the universal Source and the absolute Causality, "would be to reduce Him...to the level of finite," as Mackintosh says.[81] From this understanding of the relationship between God and the world, we may term Schleiermacher's thought "panentheism".[82] For Schleiermacher, the religious persons "refer everything to the Unchangeable and in all things alike perceive the Deity."[83] Yet, for the human being, "[humanity] itself is...the true universe, and the rest is only added in so far as it is related to it or forms its surroundings."[84] Thus, in the final analysis, God is equated with the Eternal Humanity which "is unweariedly active, seeking to step forth from its inward, mysterious existence into the light, and to present itself in the most varied way, in the fleeting manifestation of the endless life."[85] From this understanding Schleiermacher can assert: "All that is human is holy, for all is divine."[86] Moreover, there is a continuity between one's humanity and God as the eternal Humanity. Everybody lies "directly on the bosom of the infinite world. In that moment, [one is] its soul. Through one part of [one's] nature [one feels], as [one's] own, all its powers and its endless life."[87] Therefore,

> [the more] everyone approaches the Universe and the more they communicate to one another, the more perfectly they all become one.... They are no longer men, but mankind also. Going out

> of themselves and triumphing over themselves, they are on the way to true immortality and eternity.[88]

In short, there is no transcendent God, for Schleiermacher. To think of God, says Schleiermacher, "as if apart from His operation upon us through the world, the existence of God before the world, and outside the world, though for the world, were...vain mythology."[89] Schleiermacher's God is immanent (in the world).[90]

This conception of God as a completely immanent deity also influences Schleiermacher's understanding of Christ.[91] In the next few paragraphs I shall consider this. For Schleiermacher, Christ's role is quite compatible with the progressive improvement of human nature. For Christ is regarded merely as the supreme example of the one who is filled with God-consciousness. As is well-known, Christ is suggested only as the ideal of the "religious person" in his sense of the word.

According to Schleiermacher, in the life of Christ "the perfect form of God-consciousness lies in front of the human race" and this is the conclusive significance of Christ. Christ is suggested as having perfect ideality in relation to the God-consciousness; "we must conclude that ideality is the only appropriate expression for the exclusive personal dignity of Christ." In this sense, he can criticize the view which attributes only an exemplary (vorbildliche) dignity to Christ, but not "ideality (Urbildlichkeit) (which, properly, asserts the existence of the concept itself), that is, absolute perfection".[92] But when Schleiermacher says that Christ is ideal, he does not mean

that what Christ taught His disciples is the final ideality which does not have imperfection. Nor does he mean that Christ's actions are always perfect.[93] Especially at the earlier stage of Christ's life, sin was "certainly actually present" in Him, "even if only in the faintest degree".[94] Yet Schleiermacher thinks that in spite of sin in His life one can assert the sinlessness of Christ.[95] So here we can ask whether he shows that he uses this concept "sinlessness" in his own way, rather than in the traditional sense of the word; or whether he is inconsistent. In relation to this question, we should remember that Schleiermacher's conception of sin is different from the traditional sense of the word. Accordingly, his conception of "sinlessness" is also far removed from the traditional sense of the word. Barth notices this point and says that for Schleiermacher, "sinlessness is no more than human nature completely permeated by the divine."[96] Moreover, according to Schleiermacher, Christ must not be omniscient, for "this...would mean the loss of true humanity."[97] Only in Christ's inner being is there absolute ideality, and "inner being may always transcend its manifestation."[98] And this ideality in Christ's inner being can be explained "only by the universal source of spiritual life in virtue of a creative divine act in which, as an absolute maximum, the conception of man as the subject of the God-consciousness comes to completion."[99]

Therefore, the reason why Christ can have the absolute ideality lies in the fact that <u>human nature itself</u> has the possibility of arriving at the peak of God-consciousness. So

"what is peculiar in the Redeemer's kind of activity belongs to a general aspect of human nature".[100] In another place, he says:

> [If] personal immortality did not belong to human nature, no union of the Divine Essence with human nature to form such a personality as that of the Redeemer would have been possible; and conversely,...since God had determined to perfect and redeem human nature through such union, human individuals must all along have possessed the same immortality as the Redeemer was conscious of.[101]

Hence Christ's being the Redeemer partly owes to the peculiarity of human nature and its possibility of receiving the divine. Human nature is thus understood as having the capability of receiving divinity. So Schleiermacher says that "in so far as Christ none the less was also a perfectly human person, the formation of this person also must have been an act of the human nature"[102], even though there was also "the creative divine activity".[103]

In this sense, Schleiermacher can say that Christ "is like all men <u>in virtue of the identity of human nature</u>, but distinguished from them all by the constant potency of His God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in Him."[104] So, for Schleiermacher, to ascribe to Christ an absolutely powerful God-consciousness, and to attribute to Him "an existence of God in Him" are exactly the same thing. It is true that he admits that as far as we remain passive in our God-consciousness, there is no existence of God in any individual, but only an existence of God in the world.[105] Only when God-consciousness is in one's self-consciousness "as continually and exclusively determining every moment" and consequently also this perfect indwelling of the Supreme Being is one's peculiar

being and one's inmost self, is one's God-consciousness "an existence of God in one". And Schleiermacher thinks that this applies only to the case of Christ. So he says:

> [The] existence of God in the Redeemer is posited as the innermost fundamental power within Him, from which every activity proceeds and which holds every element together; everything human (in Him) forms only the organism for this fundamental power, and is related to it as the system which both receives and represents it, just as in us all other powers are related to the intelligence.[106]

But according to Schleiermacher, one should not think that the divine in Christ is "something special existing from eternity, its descent to earth takes on the appearance of a humiliation."[107] That is, as Avis suggests, the deity of Christ cannot be stated in ontological terms, for that would have no meaning for Christian consciousness of God.[108] For as we have seen, the existence of God in Christ is only another expression of his absolutely powerful God-consciousness. We may thus agree with Barth when he says:

> He [Schleiermacher] renounced the idea of a purely speculative christology, but precisely in so doing, according to the premises of his conception of religion, he was bound to renounce the idea of the Deity of Christ or, to put it differently, to understand the Deity of Christ as the incomparable climax and decisive stimulator within the composite life of humanity.[109]

So in relation to Christ, the being of God in his life "cannot be explained by its origin from a virgin without sexual intercourse."[110] "Therefore," says Schleiermacher again, "all ingenious explanations as to why this activity [virgin birth] is attributed specially to the Holy Spirit are out of place."[111] Schleiermacher understands Christmas, as Barth describes, in the following way:

> It is the true existence of man himself as this is most purely and beautifully depicted in the relation of mother and child; it is the feeling for life which is kindled by seeing this relation, which is elevated by the feast, and which lovingly seeks and finds fellowship.[112]

For him, not only the miracle of the incarnation, but also miracle in general "cannot but be altogether superfluous."[113] Therefore, according to him, the virgin birth, the resurrection and ascension, and the prediction of his return in Judgment cannot be proper parts of Christianity.[114] Hence Schleiermacher tried to "offer, or better, point out a few alternatives" through his dogmatics.[115]

Although he denies all "supernatural" elements (in the traditional sense of the word) in relation to "the existence of God in Christ", there is a very fundamental question as to why Schleiermacher thinks that only in Christ is there special existence of God. For, if one thinks with the perspective and presupposition of Schleiermacher's thought, then it seems that there would be no basis on which one could assert that only in the case of Christ is His God-consciousness the same as "an existence of God in Him". In spite of this, Schleiermacher asserts that only in Christ was there the existence of God and in this sense Christ is different from us all. In our case "Christ in us is the centre of our life"[116], and "we see God in Christ, and envisage Christ as the most immediate partaker in the eternal love which sent Him forth and fitted for His task."[117] So there are some people who see this aspect of Schleiermacher's thought (i.e., his Christological emphasis) as being inconsistent with other aspects of his thought. For example, Barth says that "it

[Schleiermacher's Christology] is the point where the system involuntarily breaks up."[118] Emil Brunner, in his book on Schleiermacher, also says that Schleiermacher's Christological thinking is an interlude in his dogmatics; it does not fit the whole system.[119] B.A. Gerrish summarizes Brunner's argument in the following way:

> In Truth, so it is claimed, his dogmatics really falls apart [into] <u>two</u> systems; and Brunner knows which belongs to the <u>real</u> Schleiermacher (the mystical) and which is only an intrusion (the Christian). The word about Christ, which certainly requires a conceptual awareness of him, is a mere disturbance.[120]

Even though there are some problems with their interpretations of Schleiermacher, I basically agree with them in their suspicion of Schleiermacher's <u>inconsistence</u> in relation to his Christological emphasis.

But even in Schleiermacher, the difference between us and Christ is only a difference of degree, not of kind.[121] Schleiermacher says that "the distinction between the Redeemer and us others is established in such a way that, instead of being obscured and powerless as in us, the God-consciousness in Him was absolutely clear and determined each moment, to the exclusion of all else...."[122] So although Schleiermacher uses the expression, "in the Redeemer God became man", and the Johannine phrase "the Word became flesh", he uses these expressions in his own way. For example, with regard to the Johannine phrase, he says that "'Word' is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness, and 'flesh' is a general expression for the organic."[123] In this sense, as Niels Thulstrup says, according to Schleiermacher, "[in]

Christ the God-consciousness conquered completely, but this indicates a change in quantity, not in quality."[124] To say that "in the Redeemer God became man", for Schleiermacher, is to say that we have in Christ a human nature saturated with the perfect consciousness of God. Therefore, for Schleiermacher, there is no essential difference between Christ and other human beings. In this sense, Schleiermacher, in the Christmas Eve, can make Ernst say: "[Every] mother is another Mary. Every mother has an eternal divine child and devoutly seeks the stirrings of the higher spirit within."[125] Similarly, according to Schleiermacher, not only Christ's suffering, but "all suffering, even on the part of one who is only relatively innocent, always has a vicarious character."[126]

Hence, in the thought of Schleiermacher, there is no Incarnation in the traditional sense of the word.[127] Barth makes a similar point when he says: "Schleiermacher's Christology has as its summit the indication of a quantitative superiority, dignity and significance in Christ as opposed to our own Christianity."[128] It is not only critical scholars like Barth who hold this view, but also sympathetic admirers (of Schleiermacher) like Heinrich Scholz. Scholz says: "The basis of his picture of Christ is...the evolutionary view of history given an idealistic sign, and therefore the best scholarship of his age."[129] For Schleiermacher, "[the] beginning of His [Christ's] life was...a new implanting of the God-consciousness which creates receptivity in human nature"[130], or more precisely, "the perfecting of human nature."[131] However, for Schleiermacher,

this receptivity and God-consciousness was already present in humanity itself. For, without this receptivity there cannot be any exertion even of Christ's influence and one cannot experience any change through Christ. "For there can be no change," says Schleiermacher, "in a living being without his own activity; hence, without such activity - that is, in a purely passive way - no influence exerted by another can really be received."[132] Thus there are two factors in relation to the work of Christ which may be termed a new implanting of the God-consciousness: the influence of Christ's consciousness of God and man's innate receptivity.[133] Only when there is the working of these two factors, is there any positive result.[134] Schleiermacher thus always presupposes that there is man's receptivity which plays its own role in the process of having relationship with God. So he says that "the indwelling being of God in Him [Christ] must be related to the whole human nature in the same way as that which previously was innermost was related to the whole human organism".[135] Only on the basis of this understanding can he speak of "the beginning of the life of Jesus as the completed creation of human nature", or "its second creation" or "the regeneration of the human race."[136] Hence, as Thulstrup says, according to Schleiermacher, "[Christ's] appearance in history signifies nothing supernatural, no break with the continuity of nature."[137] Indeed, Schleiermacher writes:

> The appearance of the first man constituted at the same time the physical life of the human race; the appearance of the Second Adam constituted for this nature a new spiritual life, which communicates and develops itself by spiritual fecundation. And as in the former its originality (which is the condition of the appearance of human nature) and its having emerged from creative divine activity are the same

> thing, so also in the Redeemer both are the same - His spiritual originality, set free from every prejudicial influence of natural descent, and that existence of God in Him which also proves itself creative.[138]

Hence, for Schleiermacher, it is not that there is an independent God who is outside of this process, and that this God constitutes firstly the physical nature of man, and secondly, the spiritual nature of man. God is understood by Schleiermacher to be in this process itself, and therefore the originality of these constitutions is understood as their having emerged from creative divine activity. So he says:

> [Christ] has part in our blessedness or salvation only through His influence upon this progressive improvement, which means that a specific difference between Him and other men is of little importance.[139]

Therefore, what happens in Christ conditioned humanity in general.[140] So we may agree with Barth when he says:

> They [Christ and other people] are mediated by means of their belonging together in the comprehensive composite phenomenon of the higher life. At some point or other they must coincide. And it is only with the prospect of this final coincidence and from this point of no distinction that they are distinguished at all.[141]

Therefore, it is natural for Barth to conclude: "To be sure, one cannot seriously speak of an absoluteness of Christ in Schleiermacher, but one can certainly speak of a supreme relativity which was most incisively maintained and which was tirelessly established [throughout his life] with both brilliance and warmth".[142]

Schleiermacher's understanding of the Church and the Holy Spirit is presented in a similar way. That is, the Church is the realm in which the power of Christ's God-consciousness is communicated immanently in history. The Holy Spirit is even said to mean "the [living] unity of the Christian [community] as a moral personality" or the "common spirit" of the Church, which is at the same time "the being of God in it."[143] And, according to Schleiermacher, there is no such thing as eternal damnation of some people, and "there will one day be a universal restoration of all souls."[144]

Based on the discussion developed so far, we may say that Schleiermacher has nothing to do with transcendence in the traditional sense of the word.[145] To conclude, Schleiermacher's God is immanent and his Christ's role is quite compatible with the progressive improvement of human nature.

So far we have seen the general characteristic of religiousness A. We started with the possibility of a non-Christian interpretation of The Sickness unto Death. We then related this non-Christian theistic religiousness to the "Socratic" of Climacus. Then, we have considered Schleiermacher's theology and Christology in order to see a clear example of this kind of religiousness. What we have seen is that for religiousness A God is immanent in the world. Of course, there are some people in religiousness A who speak of a kind of transcendence. However, that transcendence either has no real relation to this realm of time and space or that transcendence is only immanent transcendence. In the case of the absolutely

transcendent God being unable to enter into this realm of time and space, God has nothing to do with this realm of time and space. So in the realm of time and space, man himself is sovereign. Yet this sovereign man may have something of the feeling of total dependence, but this feeling does not affect the realm of reason in which he is still sovereign. He is dependent on God in the realm beyond that of reason. His God does not touch the realm of reason at all. In this sense, this man's transcendence becomes the immanent transcendence.

So there is, in religiousness A, no room for the God who is both transcendent and can enter into the realm of time and space. God becomes either the God of absolute transcendence, who cannot enter into the realm of time and space and the realm of reason, or the God of immanence, of panentheism. The God to whom the person in religiousness A relates is such a God. So for this person, the God-Man has nothing to do with his becoming himself. Without the God-Man, he can well relate himself to his God, and therefore become himself. This is very clear in the case of Schleiermacher. As Barth says: "Schleiermacher turns the Christian relationship of man with God into an apparent human possibility."[146] In contrast to religiousness A, Kierkegaard's Christian thinks as follows:

> [A] Mediator is necessary for [him], among other reasons, simply to make [him] aware that it is God with whom, as we say, [he has] the honor of speaking; otherwise a man can easily live on in the indolent conceit that he is talking with God, whereas he is only talking with himself.(JP, II, 1424(Pap. X 4 A 252))

Hence, says Kierkegaard again, "one's wanting to be related to God

without a mediator" shows one's untruth.(JP, IV, 4517(Pap. X 4 A 577))

From this (consideration) we can draw out the conclusion that the difference between the Christian's understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in religiousness A conclusively lies in the difference between their Gods, or their conception of God. If one is known by the Christian God, and believes by this God's revelation that the Christian God is transcendent but yet He can enter into the realm of time and space and the realm of reason, one inevitably thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to this God who reveals Himself through the God-Man. But, on the other hand, if one thinks that God is so absolutely transcendent that He cannot enter into the realm of time and space and of reason, one naturally thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to God, a relation which is neither in the realm of time and space. In a similar way, if one thinks that God is only immanent, one naturally thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to this immanent God, a relation which must be expressed in an immanent way, e.g., one's relation to another person and other creatures.[147] Hence, in the theology of Schleiermacher, the religious community is strongly emphasized. We can thus see a clear correlation between one's conception of God and one's understanding of becoming a self.

Let us here ask one more question: what makes the difference between the Christian's conception of God and the conception of God of the person in religiousness A? Fundamentally, the reason why the Christian thinks of God in the way described above lies in

the revelation of God through the God-Man. Face to face with the phenomenon of the God-Man, the Christian accepts this phenomenon as that of revelation, and in accepting this he abandons the presuppositions of the natural man, which he had in common with the ethical person and the person in religiousness A. However, the person in religiousness A does not want to abandon such presuppositions, so he develops his own conception of God which is compatible with his presuppositions as a natural man. So the fundamental difference between the Christian and the person in religiousness A lies in the question of whether or not one has abandoned the presuppositions of the natural man. (We shall consider the point more carefully in the next chapter of this study.) Here is the very reason why religiousness A is quite compatible with the ethical sphere, whereas Christianity is quite incompatible with the ethical sphere.

The discussion which we have developed in this section, therefore, can be a partial contribution to the thesis of this chapter, that of the difference and discontinuity between the ethical understanding of becoming a self and the Christian understanding. For, based on the discussion of this section, we may say that if there is any religious understanding of becoming a self, which is somewhat different from the ethical understanding of becoming a self but has a kind of continuity with it, then that is the understanding of religiousness A.[148]

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Hence we can conclude this chapter by stating that the Christian's

understanding of becoming a self has presuppositions and elements which are fundamentally different from those of the ethical person, and that it is very difficult to say that there is any continuity between the ethical understanding and the Christian understanding of becoming a self.

In the last chapter, we have seen that there is a great difference and discontinuity between the ethical view of ethics and the Christian view of ethics. And in this chapter we have seen the discontinuity between the ethical person's understanding of becoming oneself and the Christian's understanding. On the basis of these examinations we have said that to be a Christian means overcoming ethical ethics and the ethical understanding of becoming oneself and adopting new ethics and a new understanding of the problem of becoming oneself which are based on Christian faith. Becoming a Christian involves changes in one's ethics and one's understanding of oneself. In a sense, it is agreed generally among Kierkegaard scholars that there is a change in one's mode of existence when one becomes a Christian.[149] When people say this, they generally mean that one who becomes a Christian has a different way of life from that of the aesthete or that of the ethical person, or even that of the person in religiousness A. But does this also involve a change in one's epistemological standpoint? Does Kierkegaard indicate that what the Christian thinks to be true is different from what the natural man believes to be true? Or is there no change at all in one's epistemology when one becomes a Christian? Or is the change in one's epistemological standpoint confined to so-called "religious

matters"? These are the questions which we want to consider in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of these ambiguities, see Taylor, Pseudonymous Authorship, pp. 241f.

2. Cf. Taylor, Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 251.

3. Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p. 133. See also Charles J. Kelly, "Essential Thinking in Kierkegaard's Critique of Proofs for the Existence of God," Journal of Religion 59 (1979), p. 146.

4. Roberts, Faith, Reason and History, p. 23. See also Nordentoft, p. 100.

5. See, e.g., Kenneth Hamilton, "Schleiermacher and Relational Theology," Journal of Religion (1964), p. 32; Heinecken, p. 119, n. 3; James B. Torrance, "Interpretation and Understanding in Schleiermacher's Theology: Some Critical Questions," Scottish Journal of Theology 21(1968), pp. 277f. Daphne Hampson also has this view.

6. See CUP, pp. 493-498, 520-539; JP, VI, 6842(Pap. X 6 B 232). For a good discussion of religiousness A in this sense and its relation to Christianity, see F. Russell Sullivan, Jr., Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 1, 18, 19, 34, 43, 48,-53, 56, 58, 75, 87f., 103f., 106.

7. For a good analysis of the problem of becoming a self from this perspective, see Hampson, "The Self's Relation to God: A Study in Faith and Love", chapter 4, and "Kierkegaard on the Self", in Julia Watkin, ed., Kierkegaard at Sunderland (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, forthcoming), which is based on the fourth chapter of her doctoral thesis for Harvard University. But I have used her own type-written version of this paper, see esp. pp. 9-11.

8. For example, Daphne Hampson says that "I am theocentric and believe that we can immediately relate to God."("The Self's Relation to God," p. 3).

9. Hampson, "The Self's Relation to God," pp. 237, 182.

10. Ibid., p. 186.

11. See CUP, pp. 184, 274, 295, 315.

12. CUP, p. 83n. See also PFS, p. 54.

13. See also Weiland, pp. 30, 32.

14. Cf. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 253.

15. Ibid., p. 258.

16. Manheimer, p. 43.

17. Taylor, Pseudonymous Authorship, pp. 253f.

18. Cf. Taylor, Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 258.

19. See CUP, p. 498. See also Shmueli, p. 63.

20. Shestov, p. 14.

21. Evans also observes this point when he says that "[in] Climacus' discussion [of religiousness A]...his illustrations tend to be taken from the Christian tradition."(Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript", p. 138.

22. For a good comparative discussion of the infinite resignation of Fear and Trembling and resignation of the Postscript, see Smit, pp. 79f.; and Shmueli, pp. 44f.

23. See also Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript", p. 166.

24. Cf. CUP, pp. 360, 363, 375.

25. See TC, pp. 208f., 223; and WLH, p. 31.

26. Cf. JP, VI 6833(Pap. X 6 B 226). For a good discussion of this tendency in Mynster's thought, see Sponheim, pp. 73f.; Niels Thulstrup, "Kierkegaards Verhaeltnis zu Hegel," Theologische Zeitschrift 10 (1957), pp. 200-6.

27. Pap. X 2 A 644, cited in Marie Mikulova Thulstrup, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Imitation," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p. 269. See also Journals, No. 1120(Pap. X 3 A 237).

28. Pap. X 2 A 207, cited in Cornelio Fabro, "Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard's Dialectic," in ibid., p. 162. See also JP, II, 1135(Pap. X 2 A 207), 1897(Pap. X 4 A 274), 2125(Pap. X 3 A 334), 2127(Pap. X 3 A 357), 2136(Pap. XI 1 A 488; JP, III, 2359(Pap. XI 2 A 103), 3619(Pap. XI 1 A 106). See again B.R. Dewey, pp. 140f.

29. Fabro, "Faith and Reason In Kierkegaard's Dialectic," p. 169. See also Utterback, pp. 107, 243ff., 257.

30. See also Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard: An Introduction to His Life and His Philosophy, p. 159.

31. JP, I, 434(Pap. II A 252). See also JP, IV, 4376(Pap. X 2 A 182), 4862(Pap. X 1 A 410), 4951(Pap. X 3 A 617); JP, V, 5487(Pap. III C 8); JP, VI, 6794(Pap. X 4 A 488). See again D. Patrick, p. 297.

32. Journals, No. 1230(Pap. X 4 A 352). See also TC, p. 173. See again the third section of the chapter I of this study; and Utterback, pp. 308, 311, 312, 313, 318, 319.

33. Cf. JP, III, 2453(Pap. XI 2 A 390).

34. Marie Thulstrup, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Imitation," p. 271. For another discussion of the distinction between the suffering of religiousness A and that of Christianity, see Smit, pp. 80f. See also Utterback, pp. 282f., 308, 311, 314, 334.

35. Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (translated from the second German edition (1830) by H.R. Mackintosh et al., Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1928), p. 17.

36. Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology (London: SCM, 1967), p. 97.

37. Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. 1, 1799-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 65, note 16. See also Robert R. Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), p. 4.

38. For good discussions of this subject see the following: Tillich, pp. 96f., 104f.; Welch, pp. 66-68; and Robert R. Williams, "Schleiermacher and Feuerbach on the Intentionality of Religious Consciousness," Journal of Religion 53(1973), pp. 430-36 which is based on his doctoral dissertation entitled "Consciousness and Redemption in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher"(Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1971). See also W.B. Selbie, Schleiermacher: A Critical and Historical Study (London: Chapman and Hall, 1913), pp. 246f.; and "Translator's Introduction," to Schleiermacher's On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Luecke, trans. James Duke and Francis Fiorenza (Chico, C.A.: Scholars Press, 1981), pp. 10-21, esp., p. 12f.

39. P.D.L. Avis, "Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Science of Theology," Scottish Journal of Theology 32 (1979), p. 24.

40. Richard R. Niebuhr, "Schleiermacher on Language and Feeling," Theology Today 17(1960/61), p. 161. He is quoting from Schleiermacher, Dialektik, ed. R. Odebrecht (Leipzig, 1942), p. 288. See also Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, pp. 181f., 194, n. 29; and Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian, pp. 25f., 33f.

41. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 16. See also Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, pp. 43f. For a comment which emphasizes this point see "Translator's Introduction," to ibid., pp. 15ff.; and Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian, pp. 34ff.

42. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 12. See also p. 55.

43. Ibid., p. 17.

44. Avis, "Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Science of Theology," p. 23, his emphasis. See also Karl Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher. Lectures at Goettingen, Winter Semester of 1923/24, ed. Dietrich Ritschl (1978), tr. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), pp. 200, 216("The consciousness of God is included in this direct self-consciousness.").

45. Juergen Moltmann, Trinitaet und Reich Gottes (Muenich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1980), p. 18, tr. Margaret Kohl, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God (London: SCM, 1980), pp. 2f.

46. The quotations of this paragraph come from Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 17.

47. Shmueli, p. 63.

48. Schleiermacher, On Religion. Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, translated from the third edition (1821) by John Oman (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1893; New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 37.

One may question whether one can directly relate The Christian Faith to Speeches on Religion, for some critics see a development of Schleiermacher's thought. However, I am using the third edition of On religion (1821) in which Schleiermacher sometimes refers to The Christian Faith in order to substantiate his point. And there are some interpreters who see a direct relationship between Schleiermacher's early thought and later thought. See Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 256; Jack Forstman, A Romantic Triangle: Schleiermacher and Early German Romanticism (Missoula, Montana: The Scholars Press, 1977), p. ix; and Avis, The Methods of Modern Theology, pp. 21-3. Hence the following discussion is not far from truth. However, if there are some readers who think that such a procedure is to read too much into Schleiermacher's dogmatics, I would request them to read only my discussion of The Christian Faith omitting my reference to On Religion.

49. Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 36.

50. Ibid., p. 31. See also Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 5.

51. Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 188. See also Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher. Life and Thought (1968), tr. John Wallhausser (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), p. 113; Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian, pp. 4, 26, 48; James Duke and Francis Fiorenza, "Translator's Introduction," to On the Glaubenslehre, pp. 5f.; and David F. Ford, "Introduction to Modern Christian Theology," in The Modern Theologians, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 10.

52. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 76.

53. Schleiermacher, Brief Outline on the Study of Theology(1811, 1830), tr. Terrence. N. Tice (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 71.

54. Cf. Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian, p. 5.

55. H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 24.

56. Cf. Tillich, p. 111: "[Theological] propositions about God...are derived...from man's religious consciousness." See also Barth, Die Protestantische Theologie im 19 Jahrhundert (Zurich: Evangelisher Verlag, 1952), trans. Brian Cozens and John Bowden, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (London: SCM, 1972), p. 456: "From reflections upon pious self-awareness emerge statements about God."(Barth's emphasis).

57. Robert C. Roberts, "The Feeling of Absolute Dependence", Journal of Religion 57(1977), p. 264.

58. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 273. See also "Sermon on the Second Sunday after Trinity 1831", III, 8, cited in Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 44, and "The Christmas Sermon, 1810", VII, 573f., cited in Barth, ibid., p. 55. See again, Redeker, pp. 125-8, 165f.

59. See also Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, pp. 55, 196; and Selbie, pp. 143, 145, 161, 192.

60. Tillich, p. 113. See also Redeker, p. 166.

61. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 275.

62. Ibid., p. 385.

63. Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 221. See also p. 102; and Mackintosh, p. 97.

64. Tillich, p. 110. See also Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, p. 65; and Jack C. Verheyden, "Introduction," to Schleiermacher's The Life of Jesus, tr. S. Maclean Gilmour (Philadelphia: Fontana Press, 1975), pp. xli-xlii.

65. Tillich, p. 114.

66. Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 197. See also p. 242. Contrast this with Martin Redeker's assertion that in spite of a monistic tendency of The Christian Faith, his dogmatics is dualistic and arranged around the antithesis of sin and grace. (Schleiermacher, Life and Thought, p. 109).

67. For a similar view of this, see Selbie, p. 177; Redeker, pp. 141, 143; Forstman, A Romantic Triangle, p. 120.

68. See Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, pp. 43, 73, 102.

69. Tillich quite clearly makes this point by reminding us of the fact that Schleiermacher shares with Hegel the principle of identity, which they have learned from Friedrich Schelling. (pp. 95, 97) Emil Brunner also says: "The Speeches show the religion of Schleiermacher the philosopher of identity, the Dialectic shows the philosophy of Schleiermacher the mystic." (Das Mystik und das Wort, p. 60, cited in B.A. Gerrish, Tradition and the Modern World: Reformed Theology in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 23. See also Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, pp. 199, 241.

70. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 64.

71. Ibid., p. 65.

72. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 392. See also Schleiermacher, The Life of Jesus, p. 86.

73. See also Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 254.

74. Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 45.

75. Ibid., pp. 18, 24.

76. Richard B. Brandt, The Philosophy of Schleiermacher (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 233.

77. Schleiermacher, Die christliche Sitte nach den Grundsaetzen der evangelisher Kirche, ed. Ludwig Jonas (Berlin: G. Reiner, 1884), Beilage A, section 19, cited in Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian, p. 90.

78. Welch, p. 80

79. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, section 51.1. For a good discussion of this point, see Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian, p. 85.

80. See Schleiermacher, On Religion, pp. 50, 95. See also Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, p. 467.

81. Mackintosh, p. 76. Cf. Tillich, p. 109: "Schleiermacher is afraid that the term 'person' as applied to God would make him an object subject to our cognitive and active dealings. So he uses the term 'spirituality' instead of 'personality'." See also Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, p. 16.

82. For the same view, see Welch, p. 81, n. 40. See also Mackintosh, p. 83. Kierkegaard even speaks of Schleiermacher's position as "remaining in pantheism".(JP, IV, 3849(Pap. II A 91)

In the recent theologies "panentheism" is one of the most prevailing thoughts. See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, III (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 421f.; Moltmann, Trinitaet und Reiche Gottes, p. 35(=E.T., p. 19). See also Pannenberg's theology and process theology. Cf. Kenneth Surin, "Process Theology," in The Modern Theologians, edited by David F. Ford, Vol. II, p. 106.

83. Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 177.

84. Ibid., p. 72.

85. Ibid., p. 74.

86. Ibid., p. 180.

87. Ibid., p. 43.

88. Ibid., p. 180.

89. Ibid., p. 50.

90. For a similar view, see Heinecken, p. 119, n. 3; and Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, p. 191.

91. W.B. Selbie also makes the same point. See his Schleiermacher: A Critical and Historical Study, pp. 141f.

92. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, pp. 378f. For a good discussion of this point, see Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, pp. 218f., 225f.

93. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, pp. 378ff. See also his On the Glaubenslehre, p. 37.

94. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 382. See also p. 414.

95. Ibid., pp. 361ff, 371ff. 385f., 388f., 397("His utter sinlessness"), 413ff. See also his On the Glaubenslehre, pp. 46f.

96. Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 103. See also "Editor's Notes," to Schleiermacher, The Life of Jesus, p. 102, n. 18.

97. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 382.

98. Ibid., p. 379.

99. Ibid., p. 381.

100. Ibid., p. 386.

101. Ibid., p. 702.

102. Ibid., p. 400.

103. Ibid., p. 427.

104. Ibid., p. 385. See also p. 700.

105. Ibid., p. 387.

106. Ibid., p. 397.

107. Ibid., p. 473.

108. Avis, The Methods of Modern Theology, p. 17. See also pp. 18f.

109. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, p. 468.

110. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 405.

111. Ibid., p. 406. See also his The Life of Jesus, pp. 56-68, esp. pp. 56-62.

112. Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 62.

113. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, pp. 448ff.

114. Ibid., sections 97, 99. See also Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 102.

115. Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, p. 62.

116. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 433.

117. Ibid., p. 459.

118. Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 107.

119. Emil Brunner, Die Mystik und das Wort (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1924), cited in Tillich, p. 110.

120. Gerrish, Tradition and the Modern World, p. 28.

121. Barth also observes this point in relation to Schleiermacher's sermons (The Theology of Schleiermacher, pp. 18, 49) and to the Christmas Eve(ibid., pp. 67, 70).

122. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 397. See also Die Weihnachtsfeier(1806; Leipzig, 1908), p. 54, cited in Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 68.

123. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 397.

124. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," to PFS, p. liv.

125. Schleiermacher, Christmas Eve, pp. 24, 55, cited in Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, pp. 60, 68.

126. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 461.

127. There are some people who think that Schleiermacher takes up the Irenaean theme of redemption as the consummation of creation. See, e.g., Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, pp. 205f.; and Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian, pp. 58, 177f. However, whereas for Irenaeus in order to consummate creation the Redeemer must be God who became incarnate, for Schleiermacher, as we see here, there is no incarnation in the traditional sense of the word. For the view that Irenaeus has the belief that the Incarnate is the God the Son, see John Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus (London: The Epworth Press, 1948), pp. 145f., 150f., 156; Hans von Campenhausen, The Fathers of the Greek Church (London: Adams and Charles Black, 1963), pp. 20f.; R.A. Norris, God and the World in Early Christian Thought (1965), p. 71f., 78; Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, Vol. 1, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 81, 155, 192, 229; and Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Historical Theology. An Introduction (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1978), pp. 20ff., 25. Moreover, many scholars point out that when Irenaeus speaks of "recapitulation" in Christ, he does not think that every human being will be saved. See John Lawson, pp. 280-5, esp. p. 282; Pelikan, pp. 127f.; Bromiley, p. 24; George Park Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1896), p. 88; and Reinhold Seeberg, Text-Book of the History of Doctrines, tr. Charles E. May (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1952), pp. 134f.

128. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, p. 471. See also Mackintosh, p. 90: "The impression is all but unavoidable that eventually Schleiermacher puts 'archetypical humanity' rather than the personal Incarnation of God at the centre of his view of Christ."

129. Heinrich Scholz, Christentum und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre (Leipzig, 1911, 2nd edition), p. 118, cited in Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 103, n. 224.

130. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 389.

131. Ibid., p. 461.

132. Ibid., p. 371.

133. See also Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 86.

134. Cf. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 476.

135. Ibid., p. 411.

136. See also Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, pp. 56, 71.

137. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," to PFS, p. liv.

138. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 389. See also pp. 366, 411.

139. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, pp. 434f.

140. Cf. Ibid., p. 708.

141. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, p. 466. See also Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, pp. 54f.

142. Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 104.

143. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, section 116.3, pp. 535f.

144. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 722. See also Selbie, pp. 216, 218, 229, 199; and Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian, p. 134.

145. For a good discussion of Schleiermacher's immanentistic theology, see P.D.L. Avis, "Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Science of Theology," pp. 19-43. See also Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 445, 446. See again his The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 138.

146. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, p. 463.

147. See also Heinecken, pp. 118f., 125f.

148. For a similar view, see Manheimer, p. 46; Shmueli, p. 49; Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard: An Introduction, p. 159; and Walker, p. 7.

149. See Heinecken, pp. 112, 384; Thomas, pp. 76, 129, 167, 171, 172; Ralph McInerny, "Preface," to the English edition of Colette's Kierkegaard, pp. x, xiv; and Gardiner, pp. 112, 113, 115.

CHAPTER THREE

PERSPECTIVE ON TRUTH

In this chapter I shall consider the question whether the Christian has the same perspective on truth as the person in the ethical sphere and the person in religiousness A. This chapter concerns the cognitive aspect of one's Weltanschauung. What I want to show is that the basic presuppositions and the general orientation of one's epistemology change when one changes one's way of viewing the world (Weltanschauung) from that of the ethical sphere to that of the Christian sphere.

The basic task in this chapter is to compare the natural man's epistemological standpoint with that of the Christian. The fundamental question is whether what the Christian thinks to be true is different from what the natural man thinks to be true. I shall show that whereas the natural man thinks from his autonomous rationalistic standpoint, the Christian thinks from his Christian standpoint. What is most important for the natural man's standpoint is autonomous human reason: what is most important for the Christian standpoint is what the Christian God has done. That is, the Christian thinks with the presuppositions of Christian faith. Hence, as we shall see, the clearest difference between them appears when considering what Kierkegaard thinks Christianity to be characterized by: the Christ event (described as the absolute paradox), and Christian faith (the paradoxical relationship to this Christ event). But this does not mean that the Christian and the natural man think differently only

concerning Christ and faith. Their different views concerning Christ and faith can be seen either as determining their standpoints on the other subjects as well, or only as reflecting the basic difference between their epistemological standpoints in general. They fundamentally differ in their basic presuppositions, and in the general orientation of their epistemological standpoints.

Therefore, in this chapter, I shall firstly describe the natural man's epistemological standpoint, especially in relation to Christianity by examining some parts of Philosophical Fragments, of the Postscript and of other pseudonymous writings.

I shall then, in section 2, examine Kierkegaard's writings published under his own name and under the Christian pseudonym "Anti-Climacus", in order to show how the Christian depicted in these writings thinks of the Christ event and Christian faith. Through this examination, we can see how the Christian thinks differently from the natural man. That is, when we look at Kierkegaard's writings published under his own name and under the Christian pseudonym "Anti-Climacus", we can see very clear indications that what the Christian thinks to be true is different from what the natural man believes to be true. This change in one's epistemological standpoint is very obvious in relation to so-called "religious matters", but is not confined to these matters.

I shall then, in section 3, examine Kierkegaard's Journals with respect to this problem of epistemological standpoint. In this section, I shall show that even Kierkegaard himself did not always think in the way in which he said the Christian should think. However, at the very least, Kierkegaard admitted that anyone who does not always think as a Christian is not a Christian in the real sense of the word. By this admission he showed that the Christian is one who should always think from the Christian point of view.

I shall then, in section 4, come back to one of Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous writings (Philosophical Fragments) to show that it is possible to interpret these early pseudonymous writings consistently with his other writings, even though in his early pseudonymous writings the change in one's epistemological standpoint is expressed less clearly. That is to say, it is possible to look at these pseudonymous writings as having some indications that what the Christian thinks to be true is different from what the natural man believes to be true.

Based on this examination, I shall conclude this chapter by saying that there is also a great difference and clear-cut distinction between the natural man's epistemological standpoint and the Christian's.

I

The purpose of this section is to draw out the natural man's epistemological standpoint from Kierkegaard's various pseudonymous writings before 1846. The term "the natural man" is very broad.

What we are actually interested in here is the epistemological standpoint either of the person in the ethical sphere or of the person in religiousness A. Hence what I want to do in this section is to draw out the ethical person's and the non-Christian religious person's epistemological standpoint from Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous writings. We have already seen in the last two chapters that religiousness A is quite compatible with the ethical sphere. Therefore, it is not necessary to differentiate in detail between the epistemological standpoint of the ethical person and that of the person in religiousness A. What can be done here is to describe the general tendency of the way in which the natural man thinks. So what we are trying to do in this section is firstly to draw out the basic presuppositions and the general orientation of the natural man; and secondly, to describe his response to Christ and Christian faith.

Fortunately, we have a very clear model of the natural man's epistemological standpoint. In Philosophical Fragments, the Socratic standpoint is described, which is not only the standpoint of Socrates, but is the archetype of the natural man's epistemological standpoint. As Arbaugh and Arbaugh say, "Socrates...appears here [in Philosophical Fragments]...as a representative of the best of human insight and teaching."[1] In Socrates Climacus finds the supreme example of the natural man's epistemological standpoint. Niels Thulstrup also speaks of "Socrates as representative of the purely human at its highest."[2] Through Socrates, Climacus tries to show what would be the case if there were no God and revelation in the Christian

sense of these words.[3] This is the background for the term "the Socratic standpoint". Hence it is not necessary to give references to all thinkers we have in mind, because in this book Socrates is the prototype of the natural man's thinking.[4] In what follows I shall describe the general orientation and presuppositions of this Socratic standpoint as the archetype of the natural man's epistemological standpoint.

When I say this, I do not disregard the fact that there are some differences between the profile of Socrates in Philosophical Fragments and that of the Postscript. Climacus says in the Postscript that in Philosophical Fragments when he was speaking of Socrates he was actually presenting the outlook of Plato on the scope of the maieutic system.(CUP, p. 184) Hence one may say that what is presented in Philosophical Fragments as the Socratic theory is in reality the Platonic theory of recollection. But we may say that, as far as the basic idea is concerned, the Socratic standpoint even in Philosophical Fragments is the ideal form of the natural man's epistemological standpoint. Climacus says:

> In order if possible clearly to exhibit the difference between the Socratic position (which was supposed to be the philosophical, the pagan-philosophical position) and the experimentally evoked thought-determination..., I carried the Socratic back to the principle that all knowledge is recollection.(CUP, p. 184n., emphasis given)

That "all knowledge is recollection" is a Socratic proposition. Socrates and Plato share this principle; "This is, in a way, commonly assumed." But "[this] proposition is not for Socrates a cue to the speculative enterprise...Socrates concentrates essentially upon accentuating existence, while Plato forgets this

and loses himself in speculation."(CUP, p. 184) Here Plato is regarded as a precursor of Hegel, the speculative thinker. Climacus says again:

> The proposition [i.e., all knowledge is recollection] does indeed belong to both, only that Socrates is always departing from it, in order to exist...To accentuate existence, which also involves the qualification of inwardness, is the Socratic position; the Platonic tendency, on the other hand, is to pursue the lure of recollection and immanence.(CUP, pp. 184f., note)

Hence the figure of Socrates criticizes the less existential standpoint of the natural man (the clearest example of which is the Hegelian). In doing so, Socrates at the same time presents the ideal form of the natural man's epistemological standpoint. "I had recourse to paganism [in Philosophical Fragments]," says Climacus, "and to Greece as the representative of the intellectual, and to Socrates as its greatest hero."(CUP, p. 329) In this sense, the Socratic standpoint appears as the archetype of the natural man's.

What then are the general orientation and presuppositions of the Socratic standpoint? In the Socratic standpoint, there is basic continuity between the rational aspect of humanity and what may be called the ultimate truth. In mythical terms, this was described by the Greeks as the human soul existing in the realm of Eternity before coming into existence in the temporal realm. Thus the human soul can recollect every idea. This is the famous doctrine of recollection. That is, the eternal Forms are always immanent in man. However, when Socrates and Climacus use these Greek mythical terms, they do not mean that we have to believe that the human soul actually has existed in the realm of Eternity

before coming into existence in the temporal realm. They only mean that we should think that human beings have the possibility and capability of thinking about what is eternally true. They make explicit concepts implicit in the Greek mythical terms such as the pre-existence of the human soul and the doctrine of recollection. The meaning behind these mythical terms is that human beings can find the eternal truth by themselves. They can find the truth merely by using their innate ability, for the truth was already within them. As Crites says: "all intelligible truth is latent in [human] consciousness."[5] In this sense, Climacus says that "the truth is not introduced into him [from without] but was in him."(PF, p. 9=PFS, p. 11) And he says again: "[At] bottom every human being is in possession of the truth. This was Socrates' explanation"(PFS, p. 16=PF, p, 13); "[therefore], the learner himself is the truth"(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 64), for he had the truth from the beginning without knowing it.(cf. PF, pp. 12f.=PFS, p. 15) Therefore, as Thulstrup puts it, "the problem is at most one of making it actual."[6]

Hence, from this Socratic standpoint, even though one comes to know particular knowledge at a particular time, that knowledge has already been in one, and it has just been awakened. Therefore, "[viewed] Socratically, any point of departure in time is <u>eo ipso</u> something accidental, a vanishing point, an occasion."(PF, p. 11=PFS, p. 13) There is no such thing as the decisive moment in which everything is decided.(PF, pp. 51f.=PFS, p. 64) The moment of being taught or the moment of discovery is accidental, and opportunities are always available. So in this

standpoint, "the moment of occasion is merely a jest, like an end-sheet half-title that does not essentially belong to a book."(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 64) The moment of discovery is only an occasion for making explicit what was already implicit.

Likewise, if there is a teacher in this situation, he is also merely an occasion for others to awaken to this particular knowledge. He helps others become conscious of themselves and bring to birth what they already bore within themselves. The teacher cannot assert that he has taught or teaches something which has not been in his students' mind before. Hence "in death the teacher leaves [behind him] no claim upon the pupil's soul, no more than the pupil can claim that the teacher owes him something."(PF, p. 24=PFS, p. 29) In this way, the teacher and the disciple are on the same plain, and they stand in a reciprocal relationship to one another.(cf. PF, p. 14=PFS, p. 17) The teacher is only a midwife for begetting self-knowledge and therefore, conclusively, achieving noble humanity. As is obvious, the supreme example of this kind of teacher is Socrates who "was and continued to be a midwife,...because he perceived that this relation is the highest relation a human being can have to another."(PF, p. 10=PFS, p. 12) Climacus says again:

> [The] essence of the Socratic is that the learner, because he himself is the truth and has the condition, can thrust the teacher away. Indeed, assisting the people to be able to do this constituted the Socratic art and heroism.(PF, p. 62=PFS, p. 77)[7]

Indeed, this relation "is the highest relation a human being can have to another."(PF, p. 10=PFS, p. 12, cf. PF, p. 24=PFS, p. 29) Thus, in the Socratic standpoint, the persons involved in the

teaching-learning process help each other to discover themselves in order to find in themselves the truth. The teacher becomes unimportant, as a matter of principle, because all people can and must find the truth within themselves. It is not only the teacher who is the occasion for the learner, but "the pupil is [also] the occasion for the teacher to understand himself."(PF, p. 24=PFS, p. 29) As Croxall says, "[they work] both autopathetically, i.e., each affecting himself, and sympathetically, i.e., affecting each other."[8] Hence, Climacus says, "the truth in which I rest was in me and emerged from me. Not even Socrates would have been capable of giving it to me."(PF, p. 12=PFS, 15) And even though God becomes a teacher, He is also an occasion for one's self-knowledge.(PF, p. 14=PFS, p. 17) This is because human beings themselves have the possibility and capability of knowing the truth.[9] In other words, they have the truth within themselves.

Therefore, "[in] the Socratic view, every human being is himself the midpoint, and the whole world focuses only on him because his self-knowledge is God-knowledge."[10] But this does not mean that in this standpoint the teachings of the Sophists, which make everything relative, are regarded as the true expression of truth.[11] There can be a nobler understanding of human being than making man the measure of everything. Here is the greatness of Socrates, and the reason why Climacus uses Socrates as the archetype of the natural man. Unlike the Sophists, Socrates does not pretend to know everything (here there is an indirect criticism of Hegel's system-building).

Socrates avowedly asserts that he himself does not know, and always asks after the truth. In this continually asking after the truth, lies his greatness. This means that the Socratic position is not that from which one asserts that one knows everything, in the way God knows. From the Socratic standpoint an individual man cannot assert this omniscience. However, from this standpoint, insofar as man can ask after the truth, man has the truth in himself[12], "for the ultimate idea in all questioning is that the person asked must himself possess the truth and acquire it by himself."(PF, p. 13=PFS, p. 15) This is "the underlying principle of all questioning". And insofar as an individual man is aware of this, he is aware of the true situation in which he is, and therefore he has self-knowledge. He is not in a state of error. He is in a state of knowledge and truth. Hence the learner is himself the truth and in possession of the condition for understanding the truth.(cf. PF, pp. 62f.=PFS, p. 77)

The description which I have given in the last few paragraphs is a depiction of the general orientation and presuppositions of the natural man's standpoint in its ideal form. I emphasize the word ideal, for in reality, we usually see something like the standpoint of the Sophists and that of Hegel. In these cases, we hear the assertion that man knows virtually everything, like God. At the very least, Climacus understands Hegel in this way.(CUP, p. 108) According to the Hegelian standpoint, it is possible for a man who is in the temporal realm to think sub specie aeternitatis. This is the basis on which one can build a system of thought which includes everything in the world, including human existence

itself.[13] Hence even though Hegel mentions the subjective, this is only one element which must be subsumed under the objective and the absolute. Everything is absorbed in his great objective system. For this speculative philosopher, objectivity is truth; that is, only what can be thought of by one's reason is truth. Therefore, he is criticized to the extent that "he has absolutely nothing in common with Socrates."(CUP, p. 66n.)

In fact, this criticism on Hegel is not concerned with Hegel alone. The Socratic standpoint is contrasted with traditional abstract thinking and modern epistemological thought since Descartes.(Cf. JP, I, 774(Pap. IV A 72)) By "traditional abstract thinking" I mean the thought of the philosophers who give us analyses of human nature in general, the universal essence of man, abstracted from the act of existing. From the perspective of the existential Socratic standpoint, such a discussion of human essence, which divides it into its component characteristics and, in so doing, separates each faculty from the rest, is something like chopping a thing into its formal parts and examining them one by one. Such a procedure is not faithful to the existing human being who, as a living whole, cannot be divided into several compartments. The abstract thinking is not right, and therefore cannot represent the ideal epistemological standpoint of the natural man.

The Socratic standpoint is also contrasted with the modern epistemological isolation of the human mind from the concrete existential situation. For example, Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" is judged as wrong from the Socratic standpoint in that it tries

to divide the thinking subject and the existing subject, which properly cannot be divided. Descartes is wrong when he thinks that cogito does not involve sum already in itself.[14] Descartes' basic mistake is to presuppose thinking as something separate from the act of existing, even though he comes to that conclusion. So Descartes, as the initiator of modern epistemology, opens the door for the isolation of thinking from the act of concrete existing. Hegel just pushes this line of thinking to its logical conclusion.(cf. JP 1, 37(Pap. III A 3)) In the philosophy of Hegel, thinking itself is the whole and nothing is left; everything is absorbed into pure thought. Contrasted with these various somewhat distorted views, Climacus provides us with the ideal form of the natural man's epistemological standpoint, the Socratic standpoint.

Now let us present some religious corollaries of this Socratic standpoint. This will be a good preparation for seeing the natural man's view of Christ and Christian faith.

Firstly, God, if there is any God[15], does not intervene in the chain of causes. Accordingly, miracles lose their status as historical events. To take an anachronistic (to a study about Kierkegaard) example, we may quote from Adolf von Harnack:

> [We] are firmly convinced that what happens in space and time is subject to the general laws of motion, and that in this sense, as an interruption of the order of Nature, there can be no such things as "miracles"....Miracles, it is true, do not happen;...That the earth in its course stood still; that a she-ass spoke; that a storm was quieted by a word, we do not believe, and we shall never again believe....[16]

The world is a self-contained system of cause and effect, and

history is assumed to be a closed continuum[17], even though some natural men are more receptive to the idea of the possibility of something strange appearing in this process and of non-predictability.(Cf. JP, III, 3809(Pap. I A 217))

Therefore, secondly, there is no such thing as divine revelation (as understood in traditional Christianity) in time and space. There is no actual encounter with God in time and space.[18] The idea that God does particular things in history, in mighty works of redemption and judgment, is excluded. Moreover, there is no need of a Divine Teacher. If there were any revelation, it might take one of the following two forms.

The first form may be summarized in the following way: revelation would be the process of human understanding, and the advancement of human knowledge and possibility could be seen as the education of humanity. One of the good examples of this way of viewing the relationship between human history and revelation would be that of G. E. Lessing (1729-1782).[19] He regards history as a continuous revelation of God, and at the same time, as the record of man's moral and intellectual growth.[20] Lessing thus compares the divine education of the human race in the process of history to the growth of an individual man. The Old Testament time is the time of the child who has a direct relationship to God. The New Testament time is that of the youth who is still under the idea of future reward. But humanity should overcome this idea and become an adult who no longer needs any future reward, who can do his duty without hope of future reward. This is the highest stage of human development which began to

appear during the time of the Enlightenment. In this highest stage, humanity will dwell together, having come to see beyond their errors and oppositions. For Lessing, there is no absolute religion. As Randall says: "The only true and 'absolute' religion is the whole religious development of mankind, which has absorbed the lessons of the past and passed beyond them without rejecting them."[21] Lessing's thought on this is well expressed in the famous fable of the three rings in Nathan the Wise. In another place, he puts the same idea in the following way:

> All revealed religion is nothing but a reconfirmation of the religion of reason. Either it has no mysteries, or, if it does, it is indifferent whether the Christian combines them with one idea or another, or with none at all.[22]

Hence, for Lessing, every higher religion is an expression of the truth. The process of history in which religions reach the high stage is the process of the divine education of the human race. For him the idea of the gradual unfolding of the religious concept in a progressive order of development is very important. For Lessing, history as a whole is revelation. In this sense, Randall is quite right when he closely relates Lessing's thought to that of Hegel; "Lessing begins that long enterprise of reinterpreting the rational meaning of the Christian symbols that was to reach its culmination but not its end in Hegel."[23]

Indeed, Hegel's view of history is only one of the extremes of this way of thinking. As Thulstrup says, "[for] Hegel the relationship between revelation and history is contradiction-free and is not a problem, inasmuch as revelation occurs as a necessary historical event, and not only the particular event itself but the

entire sequence of historical events is determined, as well as the conception of it."[24] According to this view, there is only one universal history. Therefore, whatever claims are made for knowledge concerning the past must be confirmed by detailed historical observation. For historical process is a unity in the sense of a closed continuum which "cannot be rent by the interference of supernatural, transcendent powers...."[25]

The second form of natural man's understanding of revelation is somewhat different, even though those who adopt the second form (of understanding revelation) fully accept the presuppositions of the first. According to natural man's second form of understanding revelation, revelation must be in the realm beyond the arena of history. According to these people, what is in history cannot be directly identified with divine revelation. God is only to be found in the realm beyond time and space. What is in history must be subjected to historical research, but revelation, which is beyond history, is not influenced by historical research. In a sense, this second form is very similar to Kierkegaard's understanding of the relation between history and revelation. But for Kierkegaard, what is historical in Christianity must have existed in time and space. That is the reason why there is the absolute paradox. If Christ were the God-Man only in the realm which was beyond time and space, there would not be the "Absolute Paradox" of the God-Man. The God-Man is regarded as the "Absolute Paradox", because Jesus, who was an individual human being in time and space, was simultaneously God in time and space. Kierkegaard asserts that even though the

God-Man is in time and history, one should relate to the God-Man in faith. However, according to those who accept the view that there is revelation but it is outside the realm of time and space, if the object of faith were something historical, then this object would be grasped by reason and faith would no longer be faith. For these people (who think that what is in the realm of time and space is not revelation), the object of faith completely transcends the realm of nature and of history.

Hence, for the natural man, (1) either there is no revelation, or (2) human development itself is revelation, or (3) revelation is something which is completely transcendent, so that there is no revelation in time and space.

Thirdly, for the natural man, there is no need for redemption in the traditional sense of the word. There is no need for a fundamental and qualitative change in human nature; there is no need of new birth in the traditional sense of the phrase. What is needed is only man's clear awareness of himself, of his possibility and of the need to overcome the influence of the lower nature. Kierkegaard speaks of this as follows:

> Naturally, it does not occur to any man and to any society of men that they are deeply corrupted. It is quite simply, an impossibility; for men cannot be deeply corrupted if they simultaneously all by themselves, without outside help, can see that they are deeply corrupted. But a higher conception (Christianity) takes upon itself to proclaim to man that he is deeply corrupted and lays down the standard for him. But Christianity is not proclaimed in this manner these days. One assumes the natural man's natural conceptions about life; his hankering to enjoy life is regarded as the truth. Thus some of the promises are deleted from Christianity, and it is adulterated so that it fits in with this view of enjoying life.[26]

That is, in the natural man's consciousness, there is no sin consciousness as found in the Christian's consciousness. And in Christendom, there is adulteration of the true characteristics of Christianity, which comes from thinking from the perspective of the natural man. This is disaster to Christianity. Thus Kierkegaard says again:

> Yet what nonsense Christianity becomes when they take away the foreground or the background of Christianity. Christ says: "I am come to save the lost" - see this is the background; on this Christianity can be placed.(JP, I, 544(Pap. XI 1 A 39))

However, in the natural man's epistemological standpoint, there is no need to have this kind of consciousness that one is so totally lost that one needs the divine redeemer.

Fourthly, accordingly, there is in this standpoint no eternal punishment. Kierkegaard, in one of his journal entries, describes how this view was prevalent in his time:

> Once upon a time people tried to escape the thought of eternal punishment in thoughtlessness and defiance, - now even comedy lies in between; the whole educated world bears witness that it is nonsense, and one makes oneself ridiculous by entertaining such ideas.(Journals, No. 1076(Pap. X 2 A 552)=JP, III, 3640))

However, Kierkegaard - pace Charles Lewis[27] - thinks that even in this matter the Christian standpoint is opposed to this point of view. To take just one example, Kierkegaard says: "The New Testament clearly rests in the opinion that there is eternal perdition...."[28] In contrast to this, the Socratic religious thinking is universalistic; there is no such thing as eternal damnation. If there is a God, He must save all human beings. If He does not or cannot do so, then He cannot be God. God is thus

being thought of quite differently from the God of Christianity by the natural man. For some, God is thought of as present within us and part of our self-realization.

Lastly, for the existential subjective thinker outside of Christianity, everything is either eternal truth, or historical fact. They emphasize that there is nothing besides them. Thus there are two ways of knowing truth: in relation to eternal truth, one can know it by one's reasoning; and in relation to historical fact, one can know it by believing its "coming into existence". Apart from this, there is no way to the truth.

The representatives of those who make this idea clear are Leibniz and Lessing.[29] According to them, (1) one can know the eternal truth through one's reason[30] (the result of this is knowledge); and (2) one can approximate the truth of the historical fact by believing its "coming into existence". This is because whereas one can develop a system of necessary truths about the logical relations of concepts, one cannot have such a certainty in relation to historical facts. The result of this is sometimes called historical knowledge: knowledge of the present and knowledge of the past.(PF, pp. 80, 81=PFS, pp. 99, 100, CUP, p. 75, et passim) But the term "knowledge" here is used only in the sense of apprehension. In this sense, Climacus sometimes intimates that historical knowledge is "not a [form of] knowledge, but an act of freedom, an expression of will."(PF, p. 83=PFS, p. 103) In this sense, historical knowledge is sometimes called by Climacus approximation knowledge.(CUP, p. 75) For Climacus, as for classical empiricists, "[immediate] sensation and immediate

cognition cannot deceive."(PF, p. 81=PFS, p. 100) However, in order to have historical knowledge, one should believe that the object of this immediate sensation "has come into existence". Climacus takes the example of observing a star:

> For example, when the perceiver sees a star, the star becomes dubious for him the moment he seeks to become aware that it has come into existence. It is just as if reflection removed the star from the senses. It is clear, then, that the organ for the historical must be formed in likeness to this, must have within itself the corresponding something by which in its certitude it continually annuls the incertitude that corresponds to the uncertainty of coming into existence - a double uncertainty.(PF, p. 81=PFS, 100f.)

Hence, as far as the immediate sensation of something historical is concerned, one can be sure that it is immediate and certain. But in relation to the question of whether one can know for certain that this historical fact has come into existence, we have to say that when one believes that it does, only then can he have historical knowledge.

In relation to the historical, therefore, there are two faculties involved: sensation and giving assent (an act of will). One "does not believe that the star [is there], for that [one] sees, but [one should believe] that the star has come into existence."(PF, p. 81=PFS, p. 101) In this way, the "what" of a happening may be known immediately, but one should believe that it has happened, if one wants to have historical knowledge about this fact, "even though it is taking place, as they say, right in front of one's nose."(PF, p. 82=PFS, p. 101) Some people call this faculty relating to the historical, "historical reason". It is somewhat different from pure reason. So in relation to the historical, we may speak of Climacus' epistemology as volitional

epistemology. For Climacus, among the mental faculties related to the historical is the will. For example, according to him, the Greek sceptic did not "deny the [validity] of sensation and of immediate cognition...."(PF, p. 82=PFS, p. 102) But "the sceptic keeps himself continually in suspenso, and this state [frame of mind] was what he willed [to maintain]."(PF, p. 83=PFS, p. 102) According to Climacus, the sceptic is a sceptic because of his willing not to give assent. As far as the contents of the sensation are concerned, the sceptic also accepts them as they are, but the sceptic suspends his judgment to the end. The Greek sceptic "doubted not by virtue of knowledge but by virtue of will ([refusal to give] assent - metroipathein)."(PF, p. 82=PFS, p. 102)

Thus there are two ways of knowing truth: in relation to eternal truth, one can know it by one's reasoning; and in relation to historical fact, one can know it by believing its "coming into existence". However, to say that something historical (e.g., Jesus existed in time and history) is the eternal truth and to assert that this historical fact is the "absolute fact", are things which the natural man cannot accept. For the natural man, there is no such thing as the absolute fact which is a historical fact and which at the same time is applicable in every age.

In short, for the natural man, what may be believed is what is plausible to the human mind. One can believe in what is possible according to one's rational judgment, even though one cannot know for certain that it is absolutely true. In relation to the things which are fit for human reason, one can have

knowledge; in relation to the things which are not quite fit for human reason but can be judged as plausible, one can think that these are possible. However, in relation to the things which are judged by human reason as being implausible and impossible, one should not believe them, even though it is asserted that God has done them. The natural man "remains outside the paradox and retains probability."(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 65) Either rationality or high probability, according to the judgement of the natural man, is necessary to justify belief in a proposition. In short, in the mind of the natural man, there is, as Gardiner says, "an unquestioned belief in human reason as the sole source of ultimate or essential truth."[31] However, Kierkegaard as a Christian thinks that "[this] faith in probability...is...a prodigious superstition"(JP, VI, 4741(Pap. X 3 A 727)), and therefore "dangerous".(JP, VI, 4884(XI 1 A 146)) Hence we may say that the Christian standpoint is also against the natural man's belief in probability.[32]

So far we have drawn from the Socratic standpoint some religious corollaries. These corollaries are the basic religious standpoint of the natural man. In short, reason in the broad sense of the word (meaning the wisdom born of practical experience) is the criterion of religious truth.

I turn now to a consideration of the natural man's understanding of Christ and of Christian faith. His standpoint is the most in evidence when he is faced with Christian faith in the God-Man. (In this examination, I shall apply the Socratic standpoint mentioned above to the Christian assertion of the

God-Man and faith, so in some places the examination may seem to go too far, but I shall try to fully draw out the Socratic standpoint to its the logical conclusion.)

How does the natural man think of Jesus? For the natural man Jesus was merely a human being, a Jew of the first century. The Leben Jesu Forschung, which started sometime just before Kierkegaard[33], provides us with good examples which show us how the natural man thinks of Jesus. Miller summarizes well the naturalistic motive behind this quest for the so-called historical Jesus:

> Biographies of Jesus were attempted, in which Paul's writings were devalued in an effort to get at "the religion of Jesus" as against "the religion about Jesus". There were two motives behind such biographies and such historical and critical research. For the sceptical and the emancipated there was the intention of showing how scanty indeed were the verifiable historical evidences on which the entire Christian religion rested; ergo, the inference ran, one did not have to believe it. On the other hand, for those who wanted to believe the Christian religion but could not square the Gospel accounts with what their reason told them, the intention was to distil from these accounts a kind of minimal, de-theologized, believable picture of the real Jesus as he must have appeared to his contemporaries.[34]

Hence, for both kinds of biographers what is important is what reason tells us. According to the former, one should not believe in Christianity on account of human reason; and according to the latter, we should change Christianity into something which is plausible to human reason. That is, the Scriptures are acceptable only insofar as autonomous human reason admits that they are in agreement with those truths that it requires itself, or that draws from itself. Hence, as Shmueli says, "what the philosopher [as a natural man] knows is Jesus as a man."[35] In one of his journal

entries, Kierkegaard says: "It is clear that modern philosophy makes the historical Christ a kind of natural son, at most an adopted son."(JP, 1, 291(Pap. II A 765))

What is certain for the natural man is that Jesus cannot be thought of as the person who is described in the New Testament, even though there may be a thread linking the historical Jesus and the one who is described as Jesus Christ in the New Testament. What is described in the New Testament is nonsense.[36] The New Testament documents may reflect some historical facts which are related to this particular human being, Jesus. He may have lived as a rabbi (when this term is used in the broad sense of the word), and he may have appeared to the eyes of the first century to do some miraculous things, though their historical basis may be very slight. If there were "miracles", only those for which a reasonable explanation could be given should be granted historical status.[37]

Basically, Jesus seemed to attack the religious practice and religious leaders of his time, and was crucified. And the natural man thinks that some time later the conviction appeared in the mind of some of Jesus's disciples that Jesus was alive again. These disciples thought of the cross on which Jesus had died as the event of God's redemption, from the perspective of resurrection faith. Thus Jesus became Christ; the one who had proclaimed God's rule became the one who was proclaimed as the Messiah of God. But this was only a reflection of their mind. They thought that God acted through, or even in, this particular human being, Jesus. That is to say, in the concrete history,

there was no "God-Man". For the natural man, as Karl Jaspers says, "Jesus ist als Christus, als Gottmensch, ein Mythus."[38] Hence, according to the natural man, "Die Mythisierung des Gottmenschen...ist die Vernichtung der...Wahrheit."[39] If he actually lived in time and space, he may have been a good moral teacher. However, the assertion that Jesus is the God-Man is absurd. The God-Man in history is an absurdity. He cannot be the God-Man in this concrete time and space, as the Christian believes. From the natural man's point of view, the matter must be judged as absurd.

But for some natural persons, Jesus may be the God-Man above the realm of time and space. These people may believe that Jesus was the God-Man in the sense that he was such a person {"Christ"} in the realm beyond time and space. Nonetheless, for all natural men, Jesus cannot be the God-Man in the time and space in which we live. The reaction of the natural man is to assert that "the paradox [of the God-Man] is foolishness", and that "the paradox is the absurd."(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 65) Kierkegaard makes this point clear in one of his journal entries: "[If] faith is discarded and this whole sphere [of faith] ignored, reason will become presumptuous and will perhaps conclude: ergo, the paradox is nonsense."[40] Thus, from the natural man's view-point, it is not possible that God became an individual human being without ceasing to be God; the God-Man is a contradiction in terms. The natural man, as Alan P.F. Sell puts it, "[has] the presupposition that empirical humanity is normal humanity, and consequently, that there cannot really be a God-man." He continues to say: "This,

presumably, will be the conclusion of supposedly autonomous 'Enlightenment' men of every age."[41] Indeed, from the perspective of the natural man, the assertion that the Eternal [God] is the historical [Jesus] is an absurdity. This is the verdict of the natural man from his Socratic standpoint.

What then does the natural man think of the Christian act of faith which believes in Jesus as the God-Man in time and space? As naturally follows from his premises, the Christian act of faith is regarded by the natural man as madness in the genuine sense[42], and "foolishness."[43] Kierkegaard says that in this world the genuine Christians, "the witnesses to the truth, etc." are treated as "fanatics".(JP, VI, 6466(Pap. X 1 A 617)) For, according to the natural man, it is absurd to believe that a human being is at the same time God. He may be God, either if all human beings are God, or if "each man is potentially 'God incarnate'".[44] As Hastings Rashdall says:

> If 'divine' and 'human' are mutually exclusive terms, then belief in the God-Man is absurd. But all men are reproductions of the divine mind, and in all true human thinking there is a production of divine thought...In the conditions of the highest human life, we have access as nowhere else, to the inmost nature of the divine. Thus it is impossible to maintain that God is fully incarnate in Christ, and not incarnate at all in any one else.[45]

But if there is a clear difference, in any sense, between God and human beings, Jesus (insofar as he was a human being) is not the God-Man. Christians who believe that Jesus is the God-Man may behave morally and be good persons, but they are not honest to their reason. They are making an epistemological mistake, and are intellectually irresponsible, and somehow noetically deficient, if

they really think that it is true that Jesus is the God-Man in time and space. They are in error, not using their reason in the way they should.

If Jesus is presented in a way in which they can accept him with their reason, some natural men may accept him. But insofar as Jesus is presented as the God-Man in time and space, the Christian message about Christ is an absurdity, and Christian faith is madness. Jesus's immediate contemporaries asked: "Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not his mother called Mary, and his brethren...and his sisters, are they not all with us? Whence hath this man all these things?"(TC, p. 105) As anti-Climacus says, they were offended that he, "this lowly man, should be the extraordinary one, should be God... [They were] offended that God should be the son of a carpenter, and this [was] His family."(TC, p. 105) This is the human verdict on Christ and Christian faith.

Hence, according to the natural man's standpoint it would be wrong for a person to accept Christianity unless it was <u>rational</u> for him to do so. For the natural man, Christianity is unreasonable, so it cannot be accepted. On the basis of such an understanding of the natural man, Kierkegaard says:

> To dispute with men about what Christianity is is a misunderstanding, because with rare exceptions their tactic is specifically directed to defending themselves against understanding or getting to know what Christianity is....(JP, I, 523(Pap. X 3 A 285))

Here we can see a clear sense of what is dominant in the natural man's standpoint - autonomous human reason. There may be broadly two kinds of natural men. One kind is the person who asserts that

one can accept only things that which are fit for reason. Hegel is the most obvious example of this standpoint. The other kind is the person who asserts that there are some things which are not quite fit for reason, but which he nonetheless can accept. This second kind of natural man is more faithful to the Socratic standpoint. He at the very least admits the limitation of human reason. Therefore, he is different from the Sophists or the Hegelians. Yet even to the second kind of natural man, what he can accept must not be against autonomous reason. They may accept something which is beyond reason, but it must not be against self-sufficient reason.[46] The realm of autonomous reason must not be broken. They think that what is religious and the totality of everything rational cannot contradict each other even though the content of religious consciousness is in no way produced by reason. According to these people, to require anyone today to believe in the God-Man would sacrifice the intellect and change faith from its character of a free decision into an arbitrary commitment. For them, religious things are not things to which we can relate through reason, for they are things beyond reason. However, something like the God-Man cannot be accepted by even this kind of natural man. Thus, for the natural man, either self-sufficient reason is sovereign, or at the very least the realm in which reason is sovereign must be secured in any event.

Therefore, both kinds of natural man share the following common conviction: we have to be guided by autonomous reason. This autonomous reason is something that each of us has intrinsically. Thus following the guide of the autonomous reason

is to submit to that which is of the very essence of human being as understood by the natural man. Therefore, it guarantees that we can know the universal through the use of our reason. And in relation to the historical realm, we should follow what is most probable according to our autonomous reason. In short, according to the natural man, one must seek the truth only in one's own reason, and only that which reason recognizes as truth is truth. Hence the natural man puts the self-sufficient reason in a position to judge even God. This is the general orientation of the natural man's epistemological standpoint. Is this epistemological standpoint continued in the Christian sphere or not? In order to answer this question we have to look at the Christian standpoint. This is the task to which we now turn to consider in the next section.

NOTES

1. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 132. See also Perkins, Soren Kierkegaard (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1969), p. 9. See again Mackey, A Kind of Poet, p. 153; Stack, On Kierkegaard: Philosophical Fragments, p. 31; and Roberts, Faith, Reason and History, p. 92

2. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," to PFS, p. lxi. See also Utterback, pp. 25f.

3. See also Shestov, pp. 34, 121f., 152, 160, 258.

4. Perhaps Max Weber's term "the ideal type" may be used in this relation. For Weber's meaning of "the ideal type", see his Basic Concepts in Sociology, tr. H.P. Secher (London: Peter Owen, n.d.), pp. 14, 39-41, esp. pp. 51-55. For a good discussion of this theme, see Thomas Burger, Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation...History, Laws, and Ideal Types (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976), pp. 115-140, 154-167.

5. Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, p. 79, n.47.

6. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," to PFS, p. lxx.

7. In the educational field, John Dewey and his followers were faithful to this principle. More recently, the so-called humanitarian approach to education tries to be more faithful to this principle than Dewey's approach. See A.H. Maslow, "Self-Actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health," in C.E. Moustakes, ed. The Self: Explorations in Personal Growth (New York: Harper, 1956). And in the field of counselling, Carl Rogers and Rollo May try to apply this Socratic standpoint to the theory and practice of counselling. See Carl F. Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotheraphy (Boston: Houghton Miffhin, 1961); Rogers, ed. Existential Psychology(New York: Random House, 1961); Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New York: Ronald, 1950); and Rollo May, E. Angel, and H.F. Ellenberger, eds. Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York: Basic Books, 1958).

8. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 169.

9. Cf. CUP, p. 184. See also Plato, Theaetetus, 148e.

10. PF, p. 11=PFS, 14. For a good analysis of this Socratic view, see Heinecken, pp. 94-101.

11. See also David F. Swenson, "The Anti-Intellectualism of Kierkegaard," (originally published in Philosophical Review XXV (1916), pp. 567-87) reprinted in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 29.

12. See also Shestov, p. 122.

13. CUP, pp. 107, 197, 267, 275.

14. Cf. CUP, p. 281. See also JP, I, 1033(Pap. V A 30).

15. Perhaps the non-Christian subjective thinker will think as follows: "[Although] it could not be proved conclusively that there was a God, on balance the various arguments taken together showed that it was more probable than not there was a God."(Richard Swinburne Faith and Reason (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 1.) But Swinburne himself tries to defend and justify Christian theistic faith as a Christian.

16. Adolf von Harnack, What is Christianity?, tr. Thomas Bailey Saunders (Fifth edition, London: Ernest Benn, 1958), pp. 30f. See also Frances Young, "A Cloud of Witnesses," in John Hick, ed. The Myth of God Incarnate (London: SCM, 1977), p. 47, n. 45.

17. For a convenient explanation of this, see Frances Young, p. 31.

18. Cf. JP, II, 2266(Pap. II A 523). See also Weiland, p. 30.

19. On Kierkegaard's knowledge of Lessing's works, see Thulstrup, "Commentary," in PFS, pp. 149-52; and Malantschuk, "Lessing," in JP, III, pp. 797f. On Kierkegaard's criticism of Lessing, see JP, III, 2377(Pap. X 1 A 465), 2379(Pap. XI 2 A 39); JP, III, 3042(Pap. XI 1 A 482); JP, IV, 4326(Pap. X 1 A 417), 4375(Pap. X 1 A 478), 4474(Pap. X 4 A 335), 4862(Pap. X 1 A 410). See also Malantschuk, "Lessing," JP, III, p. 780.

20. See one of his final works, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts [The Education of the Human Race], 1780. According to this book, History as revelation is God's pedagogical program, the education of the human race. According to him, the education of the human race is a divine leading.

For a good discussion of Lessing's view of history, see Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, Vol. 1: The Rise of Modern Paganism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), pp. 330-35; John Herman Randall, Jr. The Career of Philosophy, Vol. II, From the German Enlightenment to the Age of Darwin (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965). See also John Grier Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (NY: Charles and Scribners Sons, 1910), pp. 199-206. See again Henry E. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment (Ann Arbor, 1966); and Gardiner, pp. 66f.

21. Randall, p. 101.

22. G. E. Lessing, "Gegensaetze des Herausgebers"(Comments on the first of the Wolfenbuettel Fragments), Schriften, XII, s. 431, cited in Gay, p. 330.

23. Randall, p. 102. Walter Kaufmann thinks that Hegel was partly influenced by Lessing in his conception of history as the unfolding development of the Absolute Spirit. See his From Shakespeare to Existentialists (NY, Doubleday, 1960). From this perspective we may question Climacus' understanding of Lessing's thought expressed in CUP, pp. 61-65. At the very least, we have to say that Climacus' comment comes from partial understanding of Lessing.

24. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," to PFS, p. lvi.

25. Rudolf Bultmann, "Is Exegesis without presuppositions possible?" in Schubert M. Ogden, ed. Existence and Faith (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), p. 292.

26. JP, II, 1176(Pap. XI 1 A 522). See also JP, IV, 4472(Pap. X 4 A 251).

27. Charles Lewis, "Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and the Faith of Our Fathers," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (1986), p. 15, n. 34.

28. Journals, No. 1294(Pap. X 5 A 146). See also JP, I, 540(Pap. X 4 A 658), 704(Pap. IV A 192), 830(Pap. XI 2 A 331), 844(Pap. X 2 A 617); JP, II, 1638(Pap. VI B 35:25), 1853(Pap. X 1 A 455), 2805(Pap. XI 1 A 217), 2915(Pap. XI 2 A 181), 3633(Pap. VI A 62); JP, IV, 4504(Pap. XI 2 A 410); JP, V, 5275(Pap. II A 629); JP, VI, 6834(Pap. X 5 A 46), 6851(Pap. XI 2 A 334); LY, p. 279(Pap. XI, 2 A 182). See also Malantschuk, "Punishment," in JP, III, pp. 897f. See again TC, pp. 224ff., CUP, pp. 86ff., AUC, p. 254, SUD, p. 80=SUDL, p. 211, Chr. D, pp. 368f.

29. For a good discussion of this theme, see Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," to PFS pp. xlvi-li.

30. For a good analysis of the characteristics of the so-called eternal truth in philosophical tradition, see Shestov, pp. 167, 210, 281f., 310.

31. Gardiner, p. 69.

32. For a similar view, see Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, pp. 93ff., 102, 144f.

33. As we shall see, during his student days he was fully exposed to critical studies of the Scriptures and at the very least three "lives of Jesus" were published during Kierkegaard's life time (by Schleiermacher in 1832, by David Strauss in 1835, and by Neander in 1837). Among them, Kierkegaard definitely read the work of Strauss. See JP, III, 3260(Pap. II C 54); JP, V, 5350(Pap. II C 60); and Lowrie, "Notes," in TC, p. 168, n.1.

34. Miller, p. 113.

35. Shmueli, p. 148.

36. Cf. Henry E. Allison, "Christianity and Nonsense," Review of Metaphysics XX (1967), pp. 439-59. For a good description of the natural man's response to the biblical image of Jesus as Christ, see Roberts, Faith, Reason and History, pp. 85f.

37. See, e.g., A.v. Harnack's view. He says: "[Although] the order of Nature be inviolable, we are not yet by any means acquainted with all the forces working in it and acting reciprocally with other forces. Our acquaintance even with the forces inherent in matter, and with the field of their action, is incomplete; while of psychic forces we know very much less. We see that a strong will and a firm faith exert an influence upon the life of the body and produce phenomena which strikes us as marvellous....[Hence,] that the lame walked, the blind saw and the deaf heard will not be so summarily dismissed as an illusion."(What is Christianity?, p. 31). See also Schleiermacher's view in Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, p. 19.

38. Karl Jaspers, Der Philosophische Glaube (Muechen, 1947, 2nd edition, 1948), 81, cited in Weiland, p. 78, n. 81.

39. Jaspers, Von der Wahrheit (Muenchen, 1947), 855, cited in Weiland, p. 70.

40. Pap. X 2 A 354, cited in Søe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox," p. 220.

41. Alan P.F. Sell, Defending and Declaring the Faith (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1987), p. 185.

42. See JP, III, 2940(Pap. IX A 146), 3356(Pap. X 2 A 154). See also JFY, p. 168. See again Shestov, p. 160.

43. JP, III, 3051(Pap. VIII 1 A 566).

44. Frances Young, p. 47, n. 47.

45. Hastings Rashdall, "Christ as Logos and as Son of God," cited in A.M. Ramsey, From Gore to Temple (London: Longmans, 1960), p. 71.

46. Cf. W.B. Selbie, Schleiermacher: A Critical and Historical Study, pp. 3-4.

II

The purpose of this section is to describe the Christian's epistemological standpoint and compare it with the natural man's standpoint which we have examined in the last section. From the present examination, we shall be able to answer the question of whether or not the epistemological standpoint of the natural man is in any way continued in the Christian sphere. In this section, I want to show that there are differences, indeed that there is a clear-cut distinction between the natural man's standpoint and the Christian's standpoint. The fundamental difference between them lies in the fact that the Christian is thinking from the stance of faith which is the core of his/her total stance toward God, for Christ "[turns the Christian's] mind to...God, so that [God] may rule there."(JP, III, 3383(Pap. III C 9)) (The meaning of "thinking from the stance of faith" will be clear in the main discussion of this section.) For the Christian, God is the ruler even in the realm of facts and of thinking. Therefore, the Christian should think "with the assumption of faith"(TC, p. 29), and "in the thoughts and conceptions of Christianity."(FSE, p. 36) Hence, as we shall show in this section, the Christian's conception of "what is reasonable" is different from the natural man's conception, and the general orientation and presuppositions of the Christian's epistemological standpoint are different from those of the natural man's.

This difference can be clearly expressed when we think of typically Christian themes, e.g., the God-Man and the Christian act of faith. So here we start with the Christian's understanding of Jesus Christ (the most important object of faith (fides quae creditur)) and of the Christian act of faith (fides qua creditur), and from this understanding, we shall try to draw out the general orientation of the Christian standpoint.

Let us then start with the Christian's understanding of Jesus Christ. For the Christian as described in the writings which Kierkegaard published under his own name and under the Christian pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, Jesus is the God-Man; and to accept this is the starting point of Christian thinking. The absolute historical fact that God has become an individual human being without ceasing to be God is decisive.[1] Everything else comes from this. In this sense, for Kierkegaard's Christian, the belief in the Incarnation is the basic belief: it is the fundamental presupposition of the Christian standpoint. Louis P. Pojman makes a similar point when he says: "Kierkegaard advocates putting the idea of the Incarnation in the foundation of one's noetic [i.e., cognitive] structure...."[2] Hence whether one is thinking as a Christian or as a natural man depends on whether or not one accepts Jesus as the God-Man.[3] As Kierkegaard says: "[Because] all Christianity is rooted in the paradox [of the God-Man], one must accept it (i.e., become a believer) or reject it."(JP, III, 3083(Pap. VI B 35:36))

Thus one who accepts Christ as the God-Man in time and space, is thinking as a Christian; this person's standpoint is Christian. However, here one must be aware of the paradoxical character of the fact of the God-Man. For Kierkegaard, if someone thinks of Jesus as a half-man and half-God, a "divine Uncle George" who is a good protector for the right-minded person and is something which is neither God nor man, then he is not yet aware of the full meaning of the God-Man.[4] That Jesus is the God-Man implies that he is fully man and at the same time fully God. Jesus is indeed a human being, "and yet he is not merely without sin, but is the Savior."(JP, III, 2472(Pap. IX A 377)) And as Saviour the historical Jesus is also "very God"(TC, p. 135), "the only begotten of the Father".[5] Hence God the Son who was incarnate is eternal (TC, p. 195, GS, p. 52), pre-existent with the Father (GS, p. 47), and omniscient (Chr. D, p. 78). Kierkegaard says again: "Here is Christianity. God decided to become man in order really to be able to have compassion for men."[6] This assertion is understood by the natural man as nonsense. But the Christian does not think that this is nonsense. For him, the God-Man is not a logical contradiction(JP, III, 2803(Pap. X 2 A 529)), nor absurd.[7] Rather, the fact of the God-Man is regarded as the truth.[8] "The paradox in Christian truth," says Kierkegaard, "is invariably due to the fact that it is truth as it exists for God. The standard of measure and the end is superhuman...."(Journals, No. 1061(Pap. X 2 A 481), emphasis given) Hence becoming the God-Man is regarded as what is needed.[9] If this is Kierkegaard's personal belief, then we may say, with Richard H. Popkin, that Kierkegaard is "[a] man who devoted his whole agonized life to a

crusade to awaken mankind to the cosmic importance of the truth that Jesus is God...."[10] In this sense, Kierkegaard asserts that "Christianity is God's invention"(Journals, No. 1200(Pap. X 4 A 212)=JP, I, 532), and that "Christianity is God's thought."(Journals, No. 1391) "For truth, from the Christian point of view, does not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it), but in a revelation which must be proclaimed."(Journals, No. 809(Pap. IX A 221))

Yet we have to bear in mind that the reason why the Christian believes in Jesus Christ in this way does not lie in his argument by which he proves that this historical fact of the God-Man is rational enough to believe. If there is someone who tries to believe in the God-Man in this way, he is regarded by Kierkegaard as one who tries to be above God himself, for in that case it is he who judges what must be true. Such a thought, even though it says "yes" to the content of faith, is regarded as disobedience[11], for it makes the human reason the final judge. For a true Christian, the fact that Jesus is the God-Man is simply accepted as true. As we have said, this is the starting point of Christian standpoint.(cf. Journals, No. 752=JP, V, 6134(Pap. VIII 1 A 648)) Hence, as N.H. Søe rightly observes:

> Christianity is...a message coming from outside which brings salvation. Since it comes from outside, this message does not originate in the heart of any man. It is, moreover, the opposite of what ratio [reason] would expect and therefore of what the pagan world imagined it to be.[12]

So the Christian starts from belief in the God-Man rather than from the premises of some argument whose conclusion is that God has become an individual human being. For, in the thought of the

Christian, one knows God only in that one is seized by God's reality in Jesus Christ.[13]

On the other hand, the one who does not accept Jesus as the God-Man in the real sense of the word, is still thinking as a natural man. Such a person either completely abandons the idea of the God-Man, thinking of it as nonsense, or tries to interpret the idea of the God-Man in some other terms which can be rationally understood by the natural man. Yet, according to the Christian as understood by Kierkegaard, the attempt to change the fact of the God-Man into the idea of the eternal unity of Godhead and manhood is a total denial of Christianity itself; it is an apostasy. For in this case, "Christianity becomes a phase of speculative thought, and the latter obtains a preponderance...."(CUP, p. 335) But "Christianity is no doctrine concerning the unity of the divine and the human...but the fact that God has existed [i.e., the fact that God has become an individual human being]."[14] In this spirit, Kierkegaard says:

> The danger in Hegel was that he altered Christianity - and thereby achieved agreement with his philosophy. In general, it is characteristic of an age of reason not to let the task remain intact and say: No - but to alter the task and then say: Yes, of course, we are agreed. The hypocrisy of reason is infinitely treacherous.(JP, II, 1618(Pap. X 4 A 429))

Anti-Climacus, the Christian pseudonym, even uses the term the "sin against the Holy Spirit" in order to describe the attempts which remove the actual historicity of the God-Man by interpreting it as myth or symbol of the eternal unity of Godhood and manhood.(SUD, p. 131=SUDL, p. 262) According to Kierkegaard's Christian, while in the fact that Jesus was God "there is no

contradiction", in the Hegelian idea that Jesus is the symbol of the union of humanity in general and divinity "there is a self-contradiction."(JP, III, 2803(Pap. X 2 A 529)) Kierkegaard describes this Hegelian interpretation as "a monstrous falsehood, a falsification of the doctrine of the God-Man."(Journals, No. 712(Pap. VIII A 414)) According to him, if somebody thinks that the assertion that Jesus is the God-Man is impossible and nonsense, he is at the very least faithful to the presuppositions of his standpoint as a natural man.[15] He is better than those who try to change the fact of the God-Man into the idea of the eternal unity of God and mankind[16], in that he honestly exposes his epistemological standpoint. At the very least, he does not change the meaning of the Christian terms into something else. (But this does not mean that the Christian thinks that the natural man's faithfulness to his standpoint is right. Rather this is regarded as wrong and error.[17]) Therefore, there is an absolute either/or: either the acceptance of Jesus as the God-Man or the offence against the assertion about the God-Man.(cf. JP, IV, 4463(Pap. X 3 A 396))

Kierkegaard knows well that to assert this demands much, but he also knows well that "in the relationship between the God-Man and a human being the situation cannot be other than this - blessed is he who is not offended!"(JFY, p. 213, Kierkegaard's emphasis). Thus there is a clear difference between the Christian standpoint and the natural man's standpoint. Kierkegaard says:

> For Christianity is not merely related to the human in such a way that it is that which does not issue from the heart of any man (I Cor. 2:9), in other words, that which is strange. But its terrible divine sharp-sightedness is as though intended to

> exasperate and embitter man in the most frightful manner - unless he can humble himself. For Christianity is the sovereignty of God.(LY, p. 114(Pap. XI 1 A 293))

In this sense, whether one accepts Jesus as the God-Man or not is the criterion of the Christian standpoint. Perhaps, as Søe puts it, "[Kierkegaard] would really maintain that from the Incarnation, correctly understood, the whole of Christian 'dogmatics' can be derived."[18]

The point - that the acceptance of the God-Man is the criterion of the Christian standpoint - makes it clear that the reason why some accept Jesus as the God-Man and some do not does not lie in their peculiarities, that is, their superiority or inferiority either in their cognitive power, or in their emotive power, or in their volitional power. In this matter, there is no distinction between man and man; there is no one for whom it is easier than others to become a Christian. Kierkegaard says:

> [God] has carefully organized Christianity in such a way that it revolts equally the man who from the human standpoint may be called the most good-natured man, and the most defiant man. For God does not desire any direct transition from something human to being a Christian.(LY, p. 123(Pap. XI, 1 A 324=JP, I, 554))

Thus everybody is in the same situation; everybody by himself unaided by God thinks as a natural man, whether he is in the aesthetic sphere, or in the ethical sphere, or in religiousness A. Until one accepts Jesus as the God-Man, one has been thinking as a natural man. There is nothing within man which contributes to the change in one's standpoint except God's grace itself.[19]. As Kierkegaard says, "this is Christianity's major premise."[20]

In one place, Kierkegaard relates this change in one's standpoint to the life-giving work of the Holy Spirit.(FSE, pp. 93-106) As we shall see in the next few paragraphs, the life-giving work of the Holy Spirit is the same as what Climacus calls the work of God of giving the condition for understanding the truth. According to Climacus in Philosophical Fragments, "[the] person who through the condition becomes a follower receives the condition from the god himself."[21] In Philosophical Fragments, the work of God of giving the condition for understanding the truth is also called new birth, becoming a new creature.[22] Only when God gives us the condition (i.e., only when we become a new creature), can we have a proper relationship to the truth.

Similarly, as we look at the For Self-Examination, we find that Kierkegaard asserts that only when the Holy Spirit gives us new life can we think as a Christian.[23] In relation to the work of the Holy Spirit, Kierkegaard uses the imagery of death and new life. The meaning which he gives to these words is not physical, nor psychical, but spiritual. That is, he is speaking here of spiritual death and spiritual life. If somebody does not consciously live in relation to God who conclusively reveals Himself in the Christ event, he is regarded as spiritually dead. In contrast, if somebody lives in relation to this God at every moment of his life, he is regarded as spiritually alive. These are the meanings of spiritual death and of spiritual life in the writings of Kierkegaard.[24] In relation to this, we may recollect Kierkegaard's concept of "the sickness unto death". The sickness

unto death is understood as a sickness worse than any physical ailment and involves a death worse than physical death.(cf. JP, IV 4329(Pap. X 2 A 103)) It is a sickness of the spirit, and it leads ultimately to the death of the spirit. And according to Kierkegaard, everybody, except for the genuine Christian, is in this state.

Then comes the Spirit which makes alive.(FSE, p. 97) Here is a new life, "literally a new life, a life on the other side of death."[25] This new life is not the culmination or direct continuation of one's natural existence.[26] So this process is sometimes called rebirth (New Birth) or regeneration.[27] The Christian is thus regarded as one who has once been spiritually dead, but now leads a new life. Kierkegaard says:

> The view of Christianity is that everything turns on a qualitative change, a change of the whole character in time (as qualitative as the change from not being to being which is birth). Everything that is only a development of what man is originally is not Christian existence.(LY, p. 223(Pap. XI, 2 A 81)=JP, III, 3101)

From now on, the Christian consciously thinks and lives in relation to God at every moment of his life. Kierkegaard speaks of this state: "The true Christian is always under the Spirit in a special sense, not in the general sense that everything is under the Spirit."(JP, III, 3065(Pap. XI 1 A 195)) In this sense, the Christian is called "'the spiritual man'(I Cor. 2:15)".[28] If one is still thinking as the natural man thinks, one cannot be regarded as being on the other side of spiritual death. But the Christian no longer thinks that the autonomous reason is the final judge.[29]

Does this mean that the Christian's faith has no cognitive element? Does this mean that Christian faith does not have a "propositional content"?[30] In order to answer these questions, one needs to carefully define the meaning of "cognitive element" and of "propositional content". For different people understand different things by "proposition". But suppose, as Wolterstorff suggests[31], we mean by a proposition simply whatever is demanded to be believed in order to be a Christian, what is supposed to be believed as truth if one is a Christian. In this case, we have to say, as we shall show, that Christian faith involves some propositional content.[32] For the Christian faith always has a "what of the faith", a quae creditur, a propositional content. Hence Kierkegaard says that "a knowledge about Christianity must certainly be communicated in advance."[33]

The most basic proposition in Christian faith is that Jesus is the God-Man. In order to be a Christian one should know that what is demanded is to believe in Jesus as the God-Man. Of course, belief in the God-Man is more than knowing the proposition that God once became an individual human being without ceasing to be God. In other words, Christian faith is not a mere intellectual assent to a set of propositions. But if Christian faith is more than that, it does at least involve the acceptance of these propositions. Kierkegaard says: "To believe is not an indifferent relation to something which is true, but an infinitely decisive relation to something [which is true]."(JP, IV, 4537(Pap. VI B 19:8), emphasis given)

What Kierkegaard wants to say is not there are no correct doctrines, but the Christian has to "interiorize the doctrine"(JP, IV, 4544(Pap. VIII 1 A 535)), or "live according to this doctrine personally"(JP, IV, 4568(Pap. X 5 A 84)). In short, "all the objectivity is to be realized existentially in the individual's life."(JP, IV, 4553(Pap. X 2 A 336)) Hence we have to say with Thomas, that "the subjective problem itself is the relation of the individual to the objectively given truth."[34] Therefore, with Valter Lindstroem, we can say that "he [Kierkegaard] tries to do justice to the objective element of Christianity whenever possible."[35] Especially, his book on Adler (parts of which are translated in English by W. Lowrie under the title On Authority and Revelation) is a very obvious case in point. For, in this book, as Utterback says, Kierkegaard "emphasizes that one must be in control of the conceptual definitions of Christianity in order to distinguish and express Christian inwardness. [He] also underscores the fact that Christian subjectivity is not a form of subjectivism, which lacks any transcendent reference, objective determinants, or concern for objective truth."[36] So one should say that the Christian has cognitive content of his faith.(cf. Journals, No. 1021(Pap. X 2 A 299))

And this content has the form of a historical fact that God has "come into existence" without ceasing to be God.[37] This content is a constitutive element in genuine faith. So, then, that historical fact remains.(PF, p. 87) Therefore, Levine is quite wrong when he says: "The absolute paradox, [according to Kierkegaard], is something of which we can be objectively certain

that it did not happen."[38] Kierkegaard says:

> Christianity is an historical truth; it appears at a certain time and a certain place and consequently it is relevant to a certain time and space...in Christianity it is precisely the historical which is the essential.(JP, II, 1635(Pap. IV C 35))

According to the Christian, even though this is against the natural man's standpoint, if God has become an individual human being, it must be right and true.[39] The Christian emphasizes that "the other must regard it as the absurd - and then still believes it." "At the same time," continues Kierkegaard, "it naturally follows that for the believer it is not the absurd."[40]

Hence it is not the case that for the Christian, everything which is against the natural man's standpoint is acceptable as true and right. For example, Don Quixote's thinking is regarded as nonsense by the Christian.(cf. CUP, p. 175) Kierkegaard even has Climacus warn us that believing in the God-Man is not the same as believing in nonsense.(CUP, p. 504) Not every absurdity is the paradox to which one should relate with faith. (cf. Journals, No. 1033=JP, I, 7(Pap. X 2 A 354)) In short, as Søe says, "the thought-content of Christianity is not nonsense but is clear and understandable within the sphere of faith."[41] So what is important for Kierkegaard's Christian is not, pace Ussher[42], absurdity itself in relation to which one can have the maximum of subjectivity, but the fact of the God-Man. Therefore, a criticism which we can see in the following passage of Pojman is out of the question:

> [It] would seem that there is no reason to choose Christianity rather than some other contradiction. Believing that God became a rat or a rotten apple or Adolf Hitler would seem

equally contradictory and be even more absurd.[43]

Only what God has done and what God demands are accepted by the Christian as true and right, even though they are against human understanding. In one place, Malantschuk makes a very significant comment which is suitable for quoting here:

> [Kierkegaard's] subjectivity is a blend of truth and what is individual (whereas...subjectivism is a blend of what is arbitrary and what is individual). For Kierkegaard it is truth which determines and transforms the individual; for [the subjectivist] it is the individual who determines what truth shall be.[44]

Therefore, we can conclude that for the Christian faith there are definite cognitive contents and Christians accept these contents as truth.

So far we have discussed what the starting point of the Christian thinking is: the belief in the God-Man; it is that in and through the Incarnate God that God conclusively reveals Himself and is believed and acknowledged in accordance with His nature; thus by letting our thinking obediently follow the way God Himself has taken in Jesus Christ, we can think as Christians. We also discussed the necessary condition in which it is possible to think as a Christian: only as the Holy Spirit makes us think in this way, only as God Himself gives the condition to understand the truth. It is the miraculous nature of the Spirit's work that He creates in us the ability to understand the Truth which God has taught in the God-Man beyond all human capacities. Through the Spirit, we are converted from ourselves to thinking from the perspective of Christian faith. In one place, Thomas F. Torrance makes a very interesting comment which can be closely related to

the idea which we have discussed so far:

> [Theological] thinking is essentially a spiritual activity in which we are engaged in a movement that corresponds to the movement of the Spirit and indeed participates in it. It is a form of kinetic thinking in which the reason does not apprehend the truth by sitting back and thinking ideas, but in an act or movement in which it participates in what it seeks to know. Thus in order to know Jesus Christ, the eternal Word became flesh, the Truth of God in historical happening, we must know Him in a way apposite to that divine becoming and happening in space and time, and therefore kata pneuma, as St. Paul said. This is what Kierkegaard used to call 'the leap of faith', but it would be a grave misunderstanding to think of this as a blind or irrational movement....[45]

Thus only in relation to the work of the Holy Spirit can one accept Jesus as the God-Man, and here is the fundamental meaning of "the leap of faith". Based upon this understanding, let us consider what else is involved in one's acceptance of Jesus as the God-Man.

If one has accepted Jesus as the God-Man, first of all, there is a change in one's conception of God (JP, III, 3102(Pap. XI 2 A 212)). Apart from God's revelation, according to Kierkegaard's Christian, man cannot have the right conception of God.(PFS, p. 79=PF, pp. 63f.) In this spirit, Kierkegaard says that "only the Christian has God's idea of how infinitely sublime God is; we men make God rather trivial."[46] In another place, he asserts that every conception of God which does not have the right relation to the Christ event "ends in superstition."(JP, III, 1332(Pap. IV A 157)) So in relation to the Christ event, the Christian has a conception of God who is the Creator and the Redeemer.(Chr. D, p. 297) The Christian believes that

> there is a God in heaven with whom there is no respect of persons...[and that] it is he who in order to live has need every instant, yea, every second, of this God, without whose

> will doubtless no sparrow falls to the ground, but without whom also no sparrow comes into existence and is.(Chr. D, pp. 53f.)[47]

And this God is "omnipresent, though never seen by any mortal."[48] "In each moment every actuality is a possibility in His almighty hand."(FSE and JFY, p. 231)

The Christian also believes that he is a sinner before God, whom God the Son came into the world to save.(Chr. D, p. 55) That is, now he has sin-consciousness and at the same time the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin by God. He now thinks of sin very seriously (Chr. D, p. 385), and following the Scriptures, he thinks that "there is nothing so deceitful and cunning as the human heart, so inventive in seeking evasions and in finding excuses; nothing is so difficult and so rare as true sincerity before God."[49] Moreover, the Christian also thinks that because of sin "the whole creation [groans] under the corruption to which it was subjected against its will".[50]

From this realization of the seriousness of sin, the Christian understands and affirms the redemption of Christ. He asserts that "[Jesus Christ came to bear] the burden of sin, that heavy burden which not mankind itself could bear, the sin of the race."[51] And he also thinks: "Originally the individual, the single person [the Christian] understood that his salvation had cost the life and death of Jesus."[52] So we can say, with Kierkegaard, that "[the] consciousness of sin silences [the sinner] so that in spite of the possibility of scandal [he chooses] faith."(Journals, No. 820(Pap. IX A 310)) Such a person

thinks that "He [Jesus Christ] died once for...[his] sins; His death is not repeated."[53] In short, Jesus's death is an "atoning death"[54], or "sacrificial death".[55] Accordingly, the Christian has the following conviction:

> So when retribute justice, either here on earth or hereafter at the Day of Judgement, seeks the place where I a sinner stand with all my guilt - it does not find me, I no longer stand in that place, I have left it, Another stands in my place, Another who entirely puts Himself in my place. For this I thank Thee, Lord Jesus Christ.[56]

So the Christian thinks that "the soul finds rest in God through the consciousness of the forgiveness of sins."(Chr. D, p. 273) Thus, for the Christian, "Christ's Atonement is infinitely everything."[57] This Atonement is the basis upon which the Christian stands in relation to the God-Man.[58]

Now if one has accepted Jesus as the God-Man, then one also thinks that for the God-Man it is possible to do some miraculous acts which are described in the New Testament, in order indirectly to reveal that this individual human being is at the same time God. The Christian no longer thinks that miracle is <u>a priori</u> impossible[59], rather he believes that for God everything is possible(Chr. D, p. 176), and that "Christ performs a miracle and can perform a miracle at any moment."[60] As a matter of fact, the existence of the God-Man is itself "<u>the wonder [Miracle]</u>."[61] As Miller says, "since it [the Incarnation] did happen..., it ceases to be mere poetry and becomes The Miracle."[62] Hence Kierkegaard thinks that the Christian has no problem with the virgin birth of Christ[63], and that the God-Man should give some sort of sign which shows that he is the God-Man.(PF, p. 56=PFS,

p. 69) But the miracles which the God-Man performed serve only as signs (semeia) which show who Jesus really is (i.e., the God-Man). Those, who follow Christ believing in Him as the God-Man, believe that He can do everything He wishes.(FSE, p. 90)

In this sense, Anti-Climacus even says that for the one who believes in the God-Man, the resurrection of Jesus and his ascension are also true. And in other writings Kierkegaard expresses his belief in the resurrection and the ascension of Jesus Christ.[64] In one place, he says that doubt about the ascension cannot arise in the mind of the real follower of Christ(FSE, p. 87); "Ascension was a sure thing to them"(FSE, p. 88); "it was a certainty to them."(FSE, p. 89) In a similar way, Kierkegaard speaks of those who do not believe in the literal second coming of Jesus Christ as non-Christians.[65]

Another example expressing the Christian standpoint is found in the Christian's attitude towards the Scriptures. He no longer tries to apply the natural man's standpoint (which he has had before he became a Christian) to the Scriptures. Before he became a Christian, he thought either that what is in the Scriptures is rubbish, or that they have some relative value just like those which are in any other books.(Chr. D., pp. 22f.) But for the Christian as understood by Kierkegaard, "every iota [in the Scriptures] will be of infinite value."[66] In Christian Discourses Kierkegaard says that "the Gospel itself is the real teacher"(Chr. D, p. 13). And in one of his journal entries, Kierkegaard says: "The New Testament contains the divine truth....It is always right, even if the opposite appears to be

the case."[67]

Likewise, according to Kierkegaard, the apostle, in contrast to the religious genius, has paradoxically something new to contribute; his message is not like that of the genius, an anticipation of what may eventually be developed in the race, but "the qualification an 'apostle'...belongs in the sphere of transcendence", the paradoxical religious sphere.[68] The apostle is "a man sent by God on a specific mission. Through the paradoxical fact the apostle is made paradoxically different from all other men for all eternity."(PA, p. 144) Hence what is written by the apostle has a special characteristic, for what is written by the apostle is "the revelation and the revealed teaching [which] cannot be assimilated to the qualifications of his personality."[69] So Pojman is right when he interprets Kierkegaard's Christian in the following way: "If a person has faith, he has the inner certainty about inspiration [of the Scriptures]."[70]

From this perspective, Kierkegaard asks us: "My hearer, how highly dost thou esteem God's Word?"[71] And he asserts that "he who is not alone with God's Word is not reading God's Word."[72] And, according to Kierkegaard, the Christian should think according to what the Scriptures say. But Kierkegaard also knows well how difficult it is to approach the Scriptures in this way for the natural man, and says that "flesh and blood are reluctant to understand and be obliged to do accordingly."(FSE, p. 59) Considering the confusion in Christendom {i.e., a continual reduction of the price, from generation and generation, of calling

oneself a Christian}, Kierkegaard says: "If the New Testament had been taken literally, this confusion would have been impossible."(LY, p. 252(Pap. XI, 1 A 128)=JP, III, 2334) In one place, Kierkegaard says again: "[The] New Testament...[is one] with which every generation has to begin."(JP, III, 2910(Pap. XI1 A 392)) Here, in relation to one's attitude towards the Scriptures, the difference between the natural man's standpoint and the Christian standpoint is expressed clearly. For example, Kierkegaard says:

> I do not listen to Paul because he is brilliant or incomparably brilliant, but I submit to him because he has divine authority.(JP, III, 3088(Pap. VII 2 B 256:10))

That is, the Christian believes in what is written in the Scriptures not because it is rational according to the judgement of the natural man, but because it has divine authority. Hence, as Søe says, "the highest authority for Kierkegaard is quite simply the teaching of the Bible...."[73]

The Christian thus thinks that Christianity is the truth, which is true independent of his accepting it as truth, and at the same time, Christianity is the truth which must be applied to his concrete existential life.[74] The Christian thus regards the content of Christianity as "eternal truth"[75], or "unconditional truth"[76], or "concerned truth".[77] That is, Christianity is understood by the Christian as something objective to which one must subjectively relate. In this sense, Kierkegaard says that the Christian must personally suffer for the truth(JP, IV, 4881(Pap. X 4 A 609)); and that "this is the only way in which one can relate oneself to the unconditioned."[78] Hence, in spite

of the demand of truth that one's subjectivity should correspond to the truth, the truth of Christianity is there, even though there were nobody who accepted Christianity.(JP, IV, 4964(Pap. X 1 A 209)) In this sense, Christianity is the "militant truth".(JP, IV, 4852(Pap. IX A 4)). And we can agree with Malantschuk when he says:

> According to [Kierkegaard's] conviction that Christianity was the only and the supreme truth, Christianity must be intolerant; it cannot watch with indifference when men go astray in unbelief or in false forms of religion.[79]

Therefore, for the Christian, there are two criteria for being in the truth: (1) whether one's conception of truth corresponds to what God thinks and revealed, and (2) whether one's mode of existence is at one with the Christian conception of truth. Here we can see a clear difference between the Christian perspective on truth and the natural man's perspective. As Deyton says, "what is irrational in the world's understanding is presented [by Kierkegaard as leading] to a fresh perception of the wisdom of God."[80] Hence, from the Christian perspective, the Christian truth is not regarded as irrational, but the expression of God's wisdom.

How then does the Christian think of the Christian act of faith (fides qua creditur) which believes in Jesus as the God-Man? Before he becomes a Christian, as we have seen, he thought that the Christian act of faith was madness and foolishness.[81] Does he still think that Christian faith is madness? Strangely, the Christian has a different view of this subject. Once he asserted that Christian faith is genuine madness. But he now as a

Christian asserts that it is not absurd[82], nor madness, but that "it is meet and proper that a man have faith."(GS, p. 33) And to be a Christian is "right and reasonable, [and] it is a plain duty to do so"(Chr. D, p. 184); "the fact of the matter is that Christianity must be accepted."(JP, I, 186(Pap. X 1 A 188)).

But here we have to bear in mind that his conception of "what is reasonable" is not the same as the natural man's. His conception of the reasonable has changed.(JP, I, 824(Pap. X 4 A 633)) Moreover, what he thinks as reasonable cannot be "rational" in the Hegelian sense and in the Enlightenment sense in general. The reason why he thinks that to believe in Jesus as the God-Man is proper and reasonable is not because he thinks that this fact is fit for his reason, as the natural man thinks of what is reasonable. Kierkegaard is very critical of all attempts to make Christianity plausible or reasonable to the natural man's thinking.[83] According to the natural man's standpoint, as we have seen, the God-Man is the most impossible, the most unreasonable thing in the world.(cf. PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 65) But for the Christian, as we have also seen, what is important is God and what God has done. So if God has become an individual human being and commanded that "you should believe", then for the Christian to believe this is proper and reasonable and not to believe is unreasonable. So for the Christian who has a different conception of "reasonable" from the natural man, as Pojman says, "Christianity is not irrational, nor merely a rational option, but the <u>only</u> way to knowledge of the highest truth and enjoyment of eternal happiness."[84] To repeat, the Christian's conception of

the "reasonable" has changed.

There are many places in which Kierkegaard indicates this fact. For example, in one place, Kierkegaard says that "the world and Christianity have the most opposite conceptions."(JFY, p. 113) Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, the natural man "regards Christianity as drunkenness", and Christianity regards the natural man's mind as drunkenness. So they say to each other "only be reasonable, come to thy senses, try to be sober".[85] Kierkegaard says:

> [The difference between the natural man's mind and the Christian's mind] is not that the first holds one opinion and the second another; no, the difference always is that they hold opinions which are diametrically opposite, that what the one calls good the other calls evil, what one calls love the other calls selfishness, what one calls godliness the other calls ungodliness, what the one calls drunkenness the other calls sobriety.[86]

And yet, according to Christianity, "[to] become sober is to come to oneself in self-knowledge, and before God, as nothing before Him, yet infinitely, absolutely, under obligation."(JFY, p. 120, Kierkegaard's emphasis). When we look at this sentence, we have to interpret it in the way in which Kierkegaard does. According to him, "to come to oneself in self-knowledge" does not mean to be oneself "according to the opinion of the merely human view."(JFY, p. 121) For Christianity calls drunkenness "what the merely human view calls sobriety."(JFY, p. 121) And according to Christianity, "[only] by being before God can a man entirely come to himself in the transparency of sobriety."[87] Moreover, while "[the] merely human view holds...that being sober is recognizable precisely in the fact that one is moderate in all things, that one observes the

sober maxim, 'to a certain degree'", "Christianity thinks that it is precisely the absolute, and this alone...is capable of making a man entirely sober, when he (for otherwise he has not received the impression of the absolute) absolutely surrenders himself to its sway."(JFY, p. 123) And according to Kierkegaard, "Christianity is the absolute."(JFY, p. 125) "Christianity says: 'The absolute reveals that thou art drunk, and there is only one thing that can make a man entirely sober: the absolute.'"(JFY, p. 130) So even though the Christian and the natural man use the same words the meanings which they give them are different.[88] One needs, then, to be "torn out of [the natural man's] conceptual setting and his world of ideas" in order to think as a Christian.(JP, II, 1409(Pap. X 3 A 359))

And from the Christian perspective, not to believe in God and His way of redemption is regarded as presumption.(cf. Chr. D, p. 66) "Presumption is essentially against God...Presumption therefore is either, in a forbidden, in a rebellious, in an ungodly way, to want to have God's help, or in a forbidden, in a rebellious, in an ungodly way, to want to dispense with God's help."(Chr. D, p. 66, Kierkegaard's emphasis). Hence, from the Christian perspective, those who do not have a right relationship with God through Christ are "without God in the world."[89] In a sense, this is a result of God's abandonment.(LY, p. 277(Pap. XI 2 A 175)) So "the god-forsaken world seems free in a quite different way from the Christian - for the god-forsaken world has been given up by God, it is free from God."(LY, p. 299=JP, IV, 5038(Pap. XI, 2 A 239))

So far we have discussed how the Christian thinks of the God-Man and the Christian act of faith. For the Christian the God-Man is not absurd, and the Christian act of faith is not madness. His standpoint concerning Christ and the Christian act of faith is different from that of the natural man. And the Christian thinks that one should not change Christianity into something which can be easily accepted by the natural man.[90] Those who try to change Christianity are regarded as "natural men disguised as Christians."(JP, III, 2921(Pap. XI 2 A 403)) Hence if there is something which cannot be understood by the natural man's epistemological standpoint, it must nevertheless be presented as it is. In this way, Christianity is absolute.[91]

But is the Christian epistemological standpoint confined to the realm of so-called religious matters? Is it only concerning Christ and Christian faith that there is a difference between what the Christian and the natural man believe to be true? This is an interesting question which we shall want to consider in what follows. I think and shall show that the Christian depicted by Kierkegaard is one who always and in relation to everything, thinks as a Christian, i.e., thinks from the Christian standpoint.[92] If we are totally committed to the truth of Christianity, then its truth is taken as basic assumption for every idea inferred and action taken.

Kierkegaard is very clear on this point. For Kierkegaard, Jesus, as an individual man in time and space, was the God-Man. So according to him, God can enter into the realm of time and space, since there really was the Incarnation and therefore there

was the God-Man in time and space. God became an individual human being in order to save human beings who are in their sin. There was no necessity for God to become incarnate; God did this out of love. So for Kierkegaard, the idea that God cannot enter into the realm of time and space, or that God cannot break the natural law, is destroyed in the face of the existence of the God-Man. So according to Kierkegaard's Christian, God is sovereign even in the realm of time and space. God can intervene in the world.[93] From this perspective, Kierkegaard interprets one Old Testament passage, "keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of the Lord"(Eccl. iv. 17) in the following way:

> Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of the Lord, for thou dost assume an immense responsibility. Remember that here is One who is in heaven - and thou art on earth. But do not imagine that in His exaltation He is far away: herein lies the seriousness and responsibility of the situation, that He, the infinitely exalted, is quite close to thee, closer than the men who are about thee daily, closer than thy most trusted friend before whom thou dost feel free to show thyself for what thou art.(Chr. D. p. 174)

As we can see in this quotation, for Kierkegaard, God is transcendent, but at the same time is close to everyone who is among His people.[94] Here God is not represented as the completely transcendent God of the early Barth who quotes this passage from Kierkegaard to suggest that God cannot enter into the realm of time and space.[95] According to Kierkegaard, God is transcendent, but He can enter into the realm of time and space of which He is the Creator. The most clear expression of this fact is the historical existence of the God-Man. Because of the God-Man, the Christian clearly thinks that God is sovereign even in the realm of time and space.[96] So the Christian must think of

everything in time and space in relation to God.

Moreover, according to Kierkegaard, only he who thinks and lives as a Christian at every moment of his life, is a Christian. The Christian is the one who "is occupied only with his own relation to God."(GS, p. 144) This does not mean that he only thinks of his God-relationship which is isolated from the rest of his concrete life. Rather, this means that he thinks and lives his life in relation to God; in this sense, everything in the world is related to God in the Christian's thinking and living.(cf. Journals, No. 487(Pap. V A 42)) Only in this sense is his relation to God everything to him. If someone thinks as a Christian (i.e., in relation to God) in some aspect of life, but, in relation to other aspects of life, does not think in relation to God, then his standpoint is not Christian at all.(cf. JP, IV, 4937(Pap. X 4 A 290)) Similarly, if someone at one time thinks as a Christian, but ceases to think as a Christian the next moment, then he is not a Christian either, and neither is his standpoint Christian. Likewise, those who think as Christians but do not live Christianly are not Christians either.(cf. Journals, No. 625(Pap. VII A 216)) According to Kierkegaard, the Christian is one who thinks and lives his life in its totality in relation to God. For, according to Kierkegaard, "[spiritually] speaking, a man's thought must be the building in which he lives - otherwise everything is topsy-turvy."(Journals, 583(Pap. VII 1 A 82)=JP, III, 3308) So the Christian "ought to live in the thoughts and conceptions of Christianity; this should be his daily life."(FSE, p. 36) In one of his journal entries, Kierkegaard describes the

same idea in this way: "To be a Christian is almost the same as saying: to talk and act like a Christian."[97] Here we should bear in mind the close connection between thought (which can be expressed in speech) and life. Based upon this understanding we can say that Collins is quite right when he says:

> Christian religious faith is distinguished precisely by the authority of Christ, who alone can rightfully place an unconditional demand upon the personal freedom of man. The special inwardness of the Christian man of faith consists in the practical commitment to the actuality of the Incarnation, with which he is constantly striving to conform his thoughts and deeds.[98]

Hence the Christian as understood by Kierkegaard is one who constantly strives to conform both in thought and deed with the actuality of the Incarnation.

From this perspective, Kierkegaard is always very critical of those who proclaim themselves to be Christians, but think as the natural man thinks. This is something abominable for Kierkegaard; this is blasphemy. One of Kierkegaard's main attacks upon Christendom is that, in Christendom, people who have the title "Christians" think and live as the natural man does. They do not think of everything in relation to God.[99] Only in relation to so-called religious matters, do they think as Christians. In one place, Kierkegaard satirizes this situation in the following way:

> In sermons we constantly hear that everyone must relate himself to God in everything; that everything must be referred back to God.... [And] nowadays nothing further is done; at the most it is the subject of a sermon.(Journals, No. 864, Kierkegaard's emphasis.)[100]

That is, only in so-called religious situation and in relation to something that they define as religious (the sermon, in this

case), they think Christianly (i.e., "one should relate to God in everything"). But that is all. They do not really relate everything in the world to God. For these people, God has become one who is sovereign only in religious matters, or in the religious situation; He has nothing to do with one's academic work and one's concrete life.[101] In short, their standpoint regarding what they define as religious and their standpoint regarding the other things in the world are different. They are double-minded; they have two different standards which they apply to two different things.

In doing so, they, as a matter of fact, distort the Christian standpoint. For they do not regard Christianity as the absolute. Hence they are Christians "in a way by which it is impossible to be a Christian."(JP, II, 2068(Pap. XI 1 A 421)) And they make Christianity, as Gates says, "a Sunday religion".[102] But this is not permissible for the genuine Christian; this is a distortion of the Christian epistemological standpoint. Thus the Christian asserts that nominal Christians (in Christendom) "[change] the whole point of view of Christianity."(JFY, p. 204) For they revise Christianity "according to the natural notions of the natural man."[103] In this sense, Kierkegaard says: "Christendom is apostasy from Christianity."[104] So Kierkegaard asserts that if you cannot think as a Christian, then honestly admit that you are not a Christian.[105] In this spirit, he also asserts that "[it] is <u>the thought of faith</u> we need, the honest, confident, frequent expressing of this thought to ourselves."(GS, p. 32) For "all the working of faith tends to do away with self-will and

selfishness, so that God may truly be admitted, and then allowed to rule in all things."(GS, p. 59, emphasis given) And according to Kierkegaard, here, in this complete submission to God in one's thinking, there is "true knowledge of the only true God."[106] In order to live as an existing Christian, to think as a Christian (i.e., to think of everything in relation to God) is a necessary condition, even though not a sufficient condition of being a Christian. So it is crucial for a Christian to think always and in everything in relation to God.

Here we have to consider one of Kierkegaard's special terms, reduplication. According to Lowrie, "reduplication is a matter of the transformation of one's life and way of living in accordance with truth one objectively knows."[107] So in order to reduplicate, first of all one should have something which one regards as truth, for "to reduplicate is to 'exist' in what one understands".[108] The idea of reduplication means that to the extent that I become what I know, to that extent do I come to know the truth. In this sense, the change in one's epistemological standpoint is either presupposed in the change of one's way of life, or happens at the same time as the change in one's way of life. At any rate, the change in one's way of life necessarily involves the change in one's perspective on truth. Kierkegaard even says: "If a man does not become what he understands, then he does not understand it either."(JP, IV, 4540(Pap. VII 1 A 72)) Hence the Christian consciously thinks and lives before God (coram deo) at every moment of his life. It would be strange for a man, who asserts that he lives before God, not to think of everything

in relation to God. It is a contradiction that a Christian thinks as a natural man in everything except for the things which are peculiarly religious.[109]

Kierkegaard is critical of non-Christian thinking as well as non-Christian living. Hence it is important to criticize both the non-Christian living of the so-called Christian, and the non-Christian thinking (which follows the natural man's standpoint) of the so-called Christian. (And non-Christian thinking has become more prevalent nowadays.[110] For nowadays it is rare to find even one who thinks of everything in a Christian way, not to mention, one who lives in a Christian way. At best, we find an admixture of Christian thinking and the natural man's thinking.) In several places, Kierkegaard himself clearly warns us of the danger of mixing Christian thinking and merely human thinking.[111] For Christianity is not something which "appeals to the taste of the natural man."(JP, III, 2330(Pap. XI 1 A 205)) Therefore, both he who thinks as a natural man but tries to do what he believes to be commanded in the Scriptures, and he who thinks as a Christian but acts as the natural man acts, are regarded as those who try to serve two masters. According to the logic of Kierkegaard's Christian, one should think as a Christian and live accordingly, i.e., as a Christian, who "seeks God's Kingdom first".[112]

The Christian thus sees everything with the eyes of faith. And in the eyes of faith "there is only one exaltation, that of being a Christian, everything else is lowly, both lowliness and exaltation."(Chr. D, p. 49) The Christians are sure that they do

"remain in the truth only by remaining in Him [Jesus Christ]" and that "only by remaining in Him" have they life.[113] For, in their thinking,

> there is in the end but one name in heaven and upon earth, one only name, and hence but one way to choose - if a man is to choose seriously and to choose aright!...There is but one name in heaven and earth, but one way and but one pattern...This name is the name of our Lord, Jesus Christ.(GS, pp. 21f.)

From this understanding, they also say that "Socrates did not possess the true ideal...."(Journals, No. 1122=JP, IV, 4279(Pap. X 3 A 253)) These assertions are regarded by the natural man as fanatical assertions. But Kierkegaard thinks that the reason why the natural man responds in this way lies in his rebellion against God: "it is because of a rebellious spirit, that will not believe."(GS, p. 44)

So we may conclude this section by stating that the Christian as understood by Kierkegaard is one who consciously thinks of everything in relation to God, and lives accordingly. For the Christian, even his thinking is related to his faith. Faith is not something which is isolated from the rest of life. It is the vital factor which is involved in every aspect of life. So even in relation to the realm of time and space the Christian thinks of everything in relation to God. What Kierkegaard demands is that if one is a Christian, then Christian thinking should dominate the entire breadth of one's life.

Here we may see discontinuity between the natural man's epistemological standpoint and the Christian's standpoint. For the Christian, reason is not sovereign. According to the

Christian, as Shestov says,

> the power and the sovereign rights of reason are maintained only by sin. If man could, for a moment, become an embodiment of the truth of Holy Scripture, reason would immediately be deprived of its sovereign rights: it would cease to be an independent giver of laws and would assume the modest role of dutiful executor.[114]

So if someone who has been in the ethical sphere or in religiousness A, becomes a Christian, then there must be a substantial change in his standpoint. For, as we have seen and as Cornelio Fabro summarizes well, faith differs "from the Socratic existence and its dialectic of inwardness which was not successful in overcoming either doubt or immanence (truth as '<u>anamnesis</u>')."[115] So, insofar as one thinks as a natural man, one is not a Christian.

Thus, according to Kierkegaard, there are basically two kinds of people: the natural man and the Christian. Accordingly, there are two perspectives on truth. This does not mean that everything that Christians and the natural man know is different. There is a very broad realm of investigation in which the difference between these two groups exerts no influence. For example, "plants, animals, and stars may be handled in that way [scientific method]."(<u>Journals</u>, No. 617(Pap. VII A 186)) But even in relation to this so-called common realm, the difference of approach is apparent. The Christian approaches even this realm in relation to God. For him, all truth must be God's truth. Hence if one does not relate everything to God, all one's achievement is only half-finished work and "all man's knowledge is but a chopped fragment."(JP, III, 3399(Pap. VI B 154)) But the natural man

tries to keep this realm as a realm in which autonomous reason is sovereign. The clearer difference between these two perspectives on truth, as we have seen in this section, appears in relation to so-called religious matters, e.g., the God-Man. Ultimately, the goal and direction of these two standpoints are at odds with each other, even though in some respects they are alike (e.g., both the Christian and the natural man thinks that 5+7=12, that A=A, and that A≠ -A.) Underneath there are warring principles at some fundamental level; they are struggling against each other.[116]

What is required by Kierkegaard is that Christians should be free frankly to state their presuppositions and starting points and introduce these into their concrete thinking in all areas of human inquiry, especially in their understanding of human existence, and live accordingly. In short, Christianity requires a total surrender of the person to God and His revelation. This revelation, accepted by faith, becomes, then, the arena within which and on the basis of which one thinks and lives. So there is one absolute either/or: <u>either</u> reason is autonomous and it establishes autonomously its own criteria for rationality in matters of both faith and life <u>or</u> revelation and faith are conclusive and one must obey God in all aspects of one's thought and life. As Kierkegaard says: "If God is the source of truth, then we have the essentially Christian position....If man is the source, well, then, the truth is where the majority is and is what the majority believes."(JP, IV, 4962(Pap. IX A 124)) Here we have a clear Either/Or. For, according to Kierkegaard, "[two] wills in the world cannot be tolerated. God is the one and only."(JP,

5038(Pap. XI 2 A 239)) In conclusion, I would like to quote a passage which makes this contrast between the Christian epistemological standpoint and the natural man's standpoint clear and scathingly criticizes the attempt to mix these two:

> Christianity came into the world on the basis of authority, its divine authority; therefore the authority is superior.
>
> But for a long time now the situation has been quite changed around: one seeks to prove and establish authority on grounds of reason....
>
> When Christianity came into the world mankind had long despaired of making sense of this existence, they had despaired of finding the truth - then Christianity came with divine authority...
>
> But now the matter has been turned around. A so-called philosophical Christianity has discovered authority is imperfect, at best something for the plebs, and that perfection consists in getting rid of it - in order to restore the situation to what it was before Christianity came into the world.
>
> And theology seeks to establish the authority of Christianity by reasons, which is worse than any attack, since it confesses indirectly that there is no authority...
>
> What is [nowadays] called Christianity is really nothing but making a fool of God.[117]

NOTES

1. See PF, p. 103=PFS, p. 130; AR, p. 60; PA, p. 99; CUP, p. 290.

2. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, p. 47.

3. For a similar view, see Roberts, Faith, Reason and History, p. 141.

4. Cf. TC, p. 38, 101-3, 135-7, 247f.; LY, p. 271(Pap. XI, 2 A 164=JP, I, 1370)

5. TC, p. 135 and JP, III, 2875(Pap. X 3 A 214); JP, III, 2875(Pap. X 3 A 214). See also JP, II, 1851(Pap. X 1 A 179), 1877(Pap. X 3 A 409); JP, VI, 6364(Pap. X 1 A 156).

6. JP, I, 533(Pap. X 4 A 452). See also JP, I, 1220(Pap. X 1 A 12); JP, IV, 3928(Pap. IX A 266). JP, V, 5376(Pap. II A 397); GS, pp. 49, 52. See also Geismar, p. 63; and Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, pp. 108f.

7. JP, I, 6(Pap. X 2 A 592), 7(Pap. X 2 A 354), 10(Pap. X 6 B 79); Journals, 1084(Pap. X 2 A 592); JP, VI, 6598(Pap. X 6 A 68); Pap. X 6 A 79, cited in Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, pp. 132f.; Pap. X 2 A 529, cited in Søe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox", in Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, eds., A Kierkegaard Critique (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 219; Chr. D, pp. 173, 184. See again Søe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox," p. 221; Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, pp. 132f.; and Wahl, p. 7.

8. See JP, IV, 4499(Pap. XI 1 A 348), 4633(Pap. X 1 A 405), 4858(Pap. X 1 A 159); JP, V, 6050(Pap. VIII 1 A 271); JP, VI, 6389(Pap. X 1 A 272), 6415(Pap. X 1 A 406).

9. See PF, pp. 32f., 46f.=PFS, pp. 41, 58f. See also Gates, Christendom Revisited, p. 140.

10. Popkin, "Kierkegaard and Scepticism," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 342.

11. JP, III, 3049(Pap. VIII 1 A 331). See also JP, IV, 4900(Pap. X 4 A 569), 4752(Pap. X 1 A 490).

12. N.H. Søe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox," in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 221f. See also Cornelio Fabro, "Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard's Dialectic," in ibid., p. 166; and Shestov, p. 88.

13. Cf. LY, p. 133=JP, IV, 4886(Pap. XI 1 A 355); Journals, No. 1237(Pap. X 4 A 437)=JP, I, 215.

14. CUP, pp. 290f. See also TC, p. 83.

15. Cf. JP, IV, 4905(Pap. X 5 A 118). For example, someone like Nietzsche would be a case in point. Cf. Gregor Malantschuk, "Kierkegaard and Nietzsche," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p. 127. See also Bonifazi, pp. 54, 104; and Charles Lewis, "Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and the faith of Our Fathers," p. 10. Perhaps Jean-Paul Sartre can be pointed out as one who is thinking along the lines of Nietzsche. For a good discussion of this point, see Regin Prenter, "Sartre's Concept of Freedom Considered in the Light of Kierkegaard's Thought," in ibid., pp. 130-40, esp. p. 135.

16. For example, see Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. John B. Baillie (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co.; New York: The Macmillan, 1910), pp. 759f.=Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 450f.

17. Evans makes this point clear. See his "Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed?," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 26(1989), p. 182. See also his Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript", pp. 212-244.

18. Søe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox", p. 223.

19. Chr. D, p. 67. See also Chr. D, p. 195; Journals, No. 1283(Pap. X 5 A 54); JP, III, 3409(Pap. VII 1 A 142); Journals, No. 749(Pap. VIII 1 A 645). See also Smit, p. 154; and Paul S. Minear, "Thanksgiving as a synthesis of the Temporal and the Eternal," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p. 300.

20. JP, II, 1383(Pap. X 1 A 59)) Cf. JP, II, 1490(Pap. X 5 A 54);LY, p. 279(Pap. XI, 2 A 182).

21. PF, p. 100=PFS, p. 126. See also PF, pp. 64f, 103, 105=PFS, pp. 80, 129, 132.

22. PF, pp. 18-20=FTL, pp. 22-5.

23. See also JP, I, 541(Pap. X 5 A 36); TC, pp. 128, 82, 102.

24. See, especially, JP, IV, 3915(Pap. III C 1), pp. 50f., 54.

25. FSE, p. 96. See also JP, III, 3752(Pap. X 3 A 351); JP, IV, 4326(Pap. X 1 A 417), 4410(Pap. II A 357), 4411(Pap. II A 358), 4412(Pap. II A 359).

26. Cf. Heinecken, pp. 113f.; Utterback, pp. 216ff.; and Heymel, p. 10.

27. Journals, No. 1265=JP, I, 273(Pap. I A 28); PF, p. 19=PFS, p. 23.

28. JP, IV, 4328(Pap. X 2 A 65). See also Gates, Christendom Revisited, p. 46.

29. For a similar view, see Roberts, pp. 128f.; Joe R. Jones, "Some Remarks on Authority and Revelation in Kierkegaard," Journal of Religion 57 (1977), p. 248; and Gardiner, pp. 96-102, esp., pp. 96, 101.

30. Among others, Klemke asserts that "faith is non-cognitive."("Logicality versus Alogicality in the Christian Faith," Journal of Religion 38 (1958), pp. 113f. See also Terence Penelhum, God and Skepticism (Dortrecht: Reidel, 1983), p. 82.

31. Cf. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (Nortre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 13.

32. For a similar view which is clearly aware of modern discussion of cognitive status of religious knowledge, see Paul Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Logic," in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 76; Heinecken, p. 222; Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, pp. 125, 126, 130f., 183; Charles R. Magel, "An Analysis of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Categories," unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1960, pp. 221 (n. 52), 225; Roberts, pp. 134, 144; and Gardiner, pp. 93-97. For a good discussion of the Christian conception of eternal life as "a coherent and cognitively significant truth claim", see John H. Whittaker, "The Content of 'Eternal Happiness'," in Richard H. Bell and Ronald E. Hustwit, eds. Essays on Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein (Wooster, Ohio: The College of Wooster, 1978), pp. 82-84.

33. JP, I, 653:29(Pap. VIII 2 B 85). See also JP, I, 650:13(Pap. VIII 2 B 82); LY, p. 33(Pap. XI, 1 A 22). See also Heinecken, p. 116.

34. Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, p. 72, emphasis given. See also p. 76. See again Wahl, p. 8; Colette, p. 50; and Michael P. Levine, "Kierkegaard: What does the Subjective Individual Risk?" International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1982), p. 19.

35. Valter Lindstroem, "The Problem of Objectivity and Subjectivity in Kierkegaard," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p. 230. See also Lowrie, "Translator's Introduction," to AR, p. viii; and James Collins, "Faith and Reflection in Kierkegaard," p. 152: "Because of his own intellectual situation, Kierkegaard deliberately stressed the act or

subjective how of faith over the content or objective what of faith, without excluding the latter." See again Langmend Casserly, The Christian in Philosophy (London: Faber and Faber, 1949), p. 155; and Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, p. 238.

36. Utterback, p. 61. See also pp. 57-82; Per Lonning, "Kierkegaard as a Christian Thinker," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, p. 171; and Malantschuk, "Truth," JP, IV, p. 749.

37. PF, p. 87=PFS, p.108f.; JP, I, 256(Pap. XI 2 A 330); Journals, No. 602(Pap. VII 1 A 130)=JP, III, 3628; Pap. V B 3, 2, cited in Niels Thulstrup, "Commentary," in PFS, p. 161. For a good argument that Kierkegaard emphasizes the historicity of the God-Man, see Utterback, pp. 194ff., 211; and Evans, "Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed?," p. 175.

38. Michael P. Levine, "Kierkegaard: What Does the Subjective Individual Risk?," p. 15. See also his "Kierkegaardian Dogma: Inwardness and Objective Uncertainty," International journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983), p. 183.

39. See JP, IV, 3916(Pap. IV C 1). See also Gates, Christendom Revisited, p. 117.

40. JP, I, 6(Pap. X 2 A 592). See also JP, VI, 6598(Pap. X 6 B 68). See also above pp. 304ff.

41. Søe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox", p. 221.

42. Ussher, p. 33. See also Penelhum, pp. 82, 92.

43. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, p. 123. (For a similar view, see Theodore Haecker, Kierkegaard, the Cripple (Harvill, 1948), p. 17; Magel, pp. 275ff.; and Malcolm L. Diamond, "Kierkegaard and Apologetics," Journal of Religion 44 (1964), p. 131.) Evans, in his recent article "Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed?", criticizes Pojman and clearly shows that "[the] belief is the result of the encounter with reality, not of some arbitrary act of will."(p. 183) See also Colette, p. 50; and Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, p. 133.

44. Malantschuk, "Kierkegaard and Nietzsche," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p. 124, emphasis given. See also Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, pp. 72f.

45. Thomas F. Torrance, God and Rationality (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 177. See also Mackintosh, p. 224.

46. JP, III, 3681(Pap. X 3 A 278). See also Evans, "Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed?," pp. 182f.

47. See also JP, III, 3391(Pap. IV B 149).

48. FSE and JFY, p. 231. See also Journals, No. 604(Pap. IV B 149)=JP, III, 3408; JP, III, 3410(Pap. VIII 1 A 55), 3433(Pap. X 1 A 210).

49. Chr. D, p. 193, citing Jer. 17:9). See also JP, IV, 3837(Pap. XI 3 B 45), 4006(Pap. IV A 189), 4041(Pap. X 3 A 199), 4042(Pap. X 3 A 341); JP, VI, 6648(Pap. X 3 A 194).

50. Chr. D, p. 351. See also Chr. D, p. 346.

51. GS, p. 28. See also TC, p. 270; Chr. D, p. 260; JP, II, 1329(Pap. IV A 104), 1654(Pap. X 2 A 451), 1834(Pap. III A 132), 1921(Pap. X 5 A 87), 1971(Pap. II A 187); JP, V, 6050(Pap. VIII 1 A 271); JP, VI, 6306(Pap. X 5 A 158).

52. LY, p. 76(Pap. XI, 1 A 168). See also Chr. D, pp. 278, 288, 368; FSE and JFY, p. 22; "Has a Man the Right...," in PAL, p. 81; JP, II, 1223(Pap. X 3 A 573), 1911(Pap. X 4 A 499), 2300(Pap. X 1 A 577); JP, III, 2442(Pap. X 5 A 50), 2651(Pap. X 1 A 119), 3409(Pap. VII 1 A 142), 3444(Pap. X 2 A 343); JP, IV, 4612(Pap. VIII 1 A 581). See again Heinecken, pp. 341f.

53. FSE and JFY, p. 23. See also JP, I, 693(Pap. X 1 A 132), 694(Pap. X 2 A 153); JP, II, 1925(Pap. XI 2 A 22); GS, p. 51; JFY, pp. 81, 189.

54. JP, V, 6050(Pap. VIII 1 A 271); JP, IV, 3928(Pap. IX A 266), 4651(Pap. X 3 A 118); JP, I, 278(Pap. II A 93); 693(Pap. X 1 A 132).

55. JP, IV, 3833(Pap. XI 1 A 159), AUC, p. 207. See also Malantschuk, "Sacrifice," JP, IV, p. 623.

56. Chr. D, p. 369. See also JP, IV, 3931(Pap. IX A 269).

57. JP, II, 2139(Pap. X 2 A 203). See also JP, II, 1886(Pap. X 3 A 667).

58. Therefore, it is impossible for Kierkegaard to accept the following words: "It is possible nowadays to find human answers to these problems [guilt, suffering, and death] too which leave God right out of the picture. It just isn't true to say that Christianity alone has the answers. In fact the Christian answers are no more conclusive or compelling than any of the others."(D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Eberhard Bethge, tr. Reginald Fuller

(London: SCM, 1953; NY: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 142f.=Fontana edition, p. 104=third edition (London:SCM, 1967), p. 175).

59. Cf. JP, III, 3344(Pap. IX A 412); JP, III, 2725(Pap. XI 1 A 187). See also Malantschuk, "Miracles," in JP, III, pp. 818f.

60. JP, III, 2718(Pap. VIII 1 A 340). See also JP, II, 1125(Pap. VIII 1 A 672); JP, III, 2713, 2715-2725.

61. PF, p. 36=PFS, p. 45, et passim.. See also Perkins, Kierkegaard, p. 19.

62. Miller, p. 97.

63. Cf. JP, I, 276(Pap. I A 232), 570(Pap. IX A 472): JP, II, 1190(Pap. II A 31).

64. Cf. FSE, pp. 85ff. For a good discussion of this subject, see Per Lønning, "Kierkegaard as a Christian Thinker," p. 167. See also Malantschuk, "Myth, Mythology," in JP, III, p. 828.

65. Journals, No. 923(Pap. X 1 A 447). See also TC, p. 198.

66. CUP, p. 32. See also JP, IV, 3924(Pap. VIII 1 A 386), 4738(Pap. X 4 A 86).

67. LY, p. 57(Pap. XI, 1 A 107)=JP, III, 2903, emphasis given. See also GS, pp. 106f.; JP, I, 207(Pap. VIII 1 A 20); PA, pp. 158f.

68. AR, p. 112. See also JP, II, 1293(Pap. VII 2 B 261:8); JP, III, 3088(Pap. VII 2 B 256:10). See again Jones, "Some Remarks on Authority and Revelation in Kierkegaard," pp. 240-3.

69. JP, II, 1293(Pap. VII 2 B 261:8). See also JP, I, 214(Pap. X 4 A 433).

70. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, p. 43. See also Shestov, pp. 149f. See again JP, III, 2328(Pap. X 4 A 313), 3192(Pap. VI A 163).

71. FSE, p. 51. See also JP, I, 574(Pap. X 3 A 755). See again Colette, p. 13; and Timothy Polk, "Kierkegaard on Reading James," in The Grammar of the Heart, p. 213.

72. FSE, p. 55. See also FSE, pp. 67f.; JP, IV, 4562(Pap. X 4 A 283), 3902(Pap. X 4 A 412).

73. Søe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox," p. 215.

74. cf. JP, IV, 4877(Pap. X 4 A 161).

75. JP, IV, 4852(Pap. IX A 4), 4499(Pap. XI 1 A 348).

76. JP, IV, 4900(Pap. X 4 A 569).

77. JP, IV, 4862(Pap. X 1 A 410).

78. JP, IV, 4900(Pap. X 4 A 569). See also JP, IV, 4873(Pap. X 3 A 652).

79. Malantschuk, "Toleration," JP, IV, p. 744.

80. Deyton, p. 111.

81. JP, III, 3051(Pap. VIII 1 A 566)).

82. See above 304f.

83. See, e.g., JP, I, 184(Pap. VIII 1 A 436); JP, III, 1223(Pap. XI 1 A 205), 3608(Pap. X 1 A 481), 3610(Pap, X 2 A 446), 3611(Pap. X 2 A 447), 3612(Pap. X 2 A 461); Journals, No. 1044(Pap. X 2 A 406).

84. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, p. 141.

85. JFY, p. 113. For a discussion of this point, see Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, pp. 175f.

86. JFY, p. 114. See also JP, II, 1613(Pap. VIII 1 A 283).

87. JFY, p. 122. See also JP, II, 2034(Pap. X 3 A 763).

88. See LY, p. 202(Pap. XI, 2 A 37. See also JP, I, 345(Pap. X 2 A 73); JP, III, 2333(Pap. XI 2 A 37), 2896(Pap. X 5 A 66).

89. Chr. D, p. 22. Kierkegaard borrows this phrase from Ephes. ii, 12. See also JP, III, 3399(Pap. VI B 154), 3400(Pap. VI B 160); SUD, p. 81=SUDL, p. 212; TOCS, p. 84.

90. Cf. JP, III, 2895(Pap. X 2 A 48), 2902 (XI 1 A 73).

91. Cf. JP, I, 493(Pap. IX A 414); JP, IV, 4905(Pap. X 5 A 118), 4914(Pap. XI 1 A 568), 4939(Pap. X 4 A 538); JFY, p. 167.

92. See JP, III, 3463(Pap. XI 1 A 11). See also Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, p. 44.

93. See Journals, No. 1161(Pap. X 3 A 659); and JP, VI, 6167(Pap. IX A 71).

94. Cf. JP, III, 2576(Pap. XI 2 A 166), 3398(Pap. VI B 150), 3408(Pap. VII 1 A 137); JP, IV, 3866(Pap. XI 1 A 465), 3899(Pap. X 1 A 65): JP, V, 5520(Pap. III A 165).

95. Cf. Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, translated from the sixth edition by Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 10.

96. Cf. Journals, No. 567(Pap. VII A 32); JP, I, 239(Pap. X 5 A 22), 553(Pap. XI 1 A 293); JP, III, 2976(Pap. XI A 372).

97. Pap. IX A 51, cited in Pierre Mesnard, "Is the Category of the 'Tragic' Absent from the Life and Thought of Kierkegaard?," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p. 112. cf. Journals, No. 988(Pap. X 2 A 141); JP, IV, 4433(Pap. VII 1 A 68).

98. Collins, "Faith and Reflection in Kierkegaard," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p. 152, emphasis given.

99. Cf. JP, II, 1509(Pap. VIII 1 A 253); JP, III, 2331(Pap. XI2 A 361); JP, VI, 6270(Pap. IX A 381), 6677(Pap. X 3 A 43).

100. Cf. Journals, No. 1120(Pap. X 3 A 237); LY, p. 53(Pap. XI, 1 A 86); JP, I, 662(Pap. IX A 233); JP, I, 675(Pap. X 2 A 19); JP, II, 1879(Pap. X 3 A 447), 1912(Pap. X 4 A 500); JP, IV, 4052(Pap. X 1 A 17), 4331(Pap. X 2 A 379), 4546(Pap. X 1 A 30), 4557(Pap. X 3 A 22); JP, VI, 6150(Pap. IX A 39), 6151(Pap. IX A 41), 6694(Pap. X 3 A 568), 6958(Pap. XI 2 A 399).

101. Cf. JP, I, 511(Pap. X 2 A 141); JP, II, 1354(Pap. VIII 1 A 77); JP, III, 2359(Pap. XI 2 A 103), 3148(Pap. X 3 A 176), 3530(Pap. X 5 A 62); 3631(Pap. X 4 A 602), 3826 (X 3 A 559); JP, VI, 6631(Pap. X 3 A 147).

102. Gates, Christendom Revisited, pp. 89, 171.

103. JP, IV, 5031(Pap. XI 1 A 519). See also LY, p. 10(Pap XI, 1 A 248); Journals, No. 1112(Pap. X 3 A 173); JP, VI, 6224(Pap. IX A 208); JFY, p. 209.

104. LY, p. 238(Pap. XI, 2 A 100). See also LY, p. 337(Pap, XI, 2 A 387)=JP, III, 2919; LY, p. 276(Pap. XI, 2 A 174)=JP, III, 2914; AUC, pp. 33f.

105. See Journals, No. 1112(Pap. X 3 A 173)=JP, I, 521). See also JFY, p. 219; JP, VI, 6503(Pap. X 2 A 75), 6774(Pap. X 4 A 358), 6776(Pap. X 4 A 367). See also Marie Thulstrup, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Imitation," in A

Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 278f.

106. Cf. "The obedience that would let God rule in all things is itself true knowledge of the only true God."(GS, p. 60)

107. Lowrie, "Notes of the translator", TC, pp. 133-4. See also Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard: An Introduction, p. 162; and Utterback, p. 21.

108. TC, p. 133, emphasis given. See also JP, I, 484(Pap. IX A 207).

109. See Journals, No. 764(Pap. IX A 39); FSE, p. 37; Chr. D, p. 89.

110. For a similar observation on this point, see James Collins, "Faith and Reflection in Kierkegaard," p. 153. See also Sponheim, p. 289; and Roberts, p. 133.

111. Cf. Journals, 1192(Pap. X 4 A 137), 1256(Pap. X 4 A 581), 1257(Pap. X 4 A 582).

112. Chr. D, p. 191. See also Chr. D, p. 331; JP, IV, 4910(Pap. XI 1 A 427), 4894(Pap. X 3 A 393), 4910(Pap. XI 1 A 427); JFY, pp. 126f.

113. FSE and JFY, p. 24. See also JP, III, 3368(Pap. II A 309); "Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays," in FSE and JFY, p. 9.

114. Shestov, p. 253.

115. Fabro, "Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard's Dialectic," in A Kierkegaard Critique, p, 163.

116. See Journals, No. 856(Pap. IX B 63), No. 1192(Pap. X 4 A 137).

117. LY, pp. 149f.(Pap. XI, 1 A 436)=JP, I, 191. See also JP, IV, 4494(Pap. XI 3 B 148), 4597(Pap. VIII 1 A 113).

III

In the last section we have seen that what the Christian thinks to be true is different from what the natural man believes to be true. When we look at the character of the Christian standpoint, which is almost antithetical to the natural man's standpoint, we cannot help asking, "who on earth can always think in this way?" Does Kierkegaard himself always think in this way? Or does Kierkegaard merely point out that the Christian should think in this way, yet he sometimes finds himself thinking differently? These are the questions which we want to consider in this section. Therefore, in a sense, this section may seem like a digression from the main argument of this chapter: that there is a clear-cut distinction between the Christian standpoint and the natural man's standpoint. Nonetheless, the discussion in this section will indirectly support the main argument of this chapter. For this section will make it clear that the Christian standpoint (which we have seen in the last section) is the ideal form of Christian thinking, so that Kierkegaard admits that even he himself does not always think in this way; he is aware of his tendency to mix this Christian standpoint (which he knows and believes is what the Christian should have) and the natural man's standpoint. This is one of the reasons why Kierkegaard never tires of saying that "I hardly dare call myself a Christian."[1] Sometimes, this statement is interpreted only as part of his indirect communication; that is, by showing that the so-called Christian is not a Christian in the true sense of the word, he tries to lead his readers towards Christianity.[2] There is some truth in the view that his

statement that he is not a Christian is part of his indirect communication, especially, when we consider the following passage: "Such is the distance of Christendom (of Protestantism, especially in Denmark) from New Testament Christianity that I must continually emphasize that I do not call myself a Christian."[3] But, as I want to show in this section, his statement is more than just part of his indirect communication.

What I want to show in this section is that one of the most important reasons why he asserts that he does not call himself a genuine Christian lies in the absolute character of Christianity. He is the one who knows what Christianity and the Christian standpoint should be. Thus within his mind there was a continuous conflict between the absolute, ideal Christian standpoint and the tendency to mix this Christian standpoint with the natural man's. Hence Kierkegaard's criticism of the so-called "Christian" in Christendom is also his criticism of himself. He himself finds that he is not absolutely faithful to the Christian standpoint which he regards as what every Christian should have.

In order to show this, I shall examine Kierkegaard's journal entries, supposing that these entries reflect relatively correctly what Kierkegaard himself thinks of his situation in relation to Christianity. Of course I am aware that there are some scholars who regard Kierkegaard's journal entries as another literary tactic, concealing his exact situation and his own thinking.[4] It is true that even in his journal entries it is not easy to find a clue which solves, with absolute certainty, the ambiguous problems innate in Kierkegaard's thought; his journal entries are also

cryptic. As is well-known, sometimes he crossed some passages out[5], tore some pages out[6], and he wanted the journals to be published after his death.[7] The public nature of his journals caused him to be intentionally ambiguous even in these entries. Hence it is difficult to know for certain how seriously to take, or how to interpret, his journal entries. However, we can at the very least get a kind of direct communication of his thought from them.[8]

I shall divide Kierkegaard's adult life into four periods: the period of wondering (-1838), the period of his first authorship (1838-1846), the period of the second authorship (1846-1852), and the last period (1853-1855). Let us consider these four periods in turn.

In the first period, Kierkegaard was officially a candidate for "theology", but tried to be a kind of free man of letters. Officially, he studied under C.E. Scharling (who preoccupied himself with A. Neander's Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel [History of the Foundation and Guidance of the Christian Church by the Apostles] (I, Hamburg, 1832)[9]), and H.N. Clausen (1793-1877, who thought that Christianity should presuppose that its substance and premises should be subject to human understanding.)[10] Kierkegaard also, during 1834, read Schleiermacher's The Christian Faith with his tutor H.L. Martensen (1808-84). He also read Clausen's and M. H. Hohlenberg's Journal of Foreign Theological Literature (2nd vol., 1834), through which he became acquainted with Johann Adam Moehler's and J.H. Fichte's thought.[11] So he

also read J.A. Moehler's Athanasius der grosse und die Kirche seiner Zeit, besonders in Kampfe mit Arianismus (Mainz, 1827)[12], and Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und spekulative Philosophie edited by J.H. Fichte,[13] and Zeitschrift fuer Spekulative Theologie (I-III, 1836-38) edited by Bruno Bauer.[14] And in 1837 Kierkegaard read Johann Eduard Erdman's Vorlesungen Ueber Glauben und Wissen (Berlin, 1837).[15] From his reading and from the courses which Kierkegaard attended[16], we can know that through these Kierkegaard was exposed to a rationalist (i.e., post-Enlightenment) approach to Biblical and theological studies.[17]

As a result, during this period, his attitude to Christianity is a kind of mixture of his early Christian faith and post-Enlightenment thoughts, so this is a period of wondering and of doubt. "With me", says Kierkegaard, "everything is 'wandering'...."(JP, V, 5306(Pap. II A 222)) His own attitude to Christianity is reflected well in the following passage (in his letter to his brother-in-law, Peter Wilhelm Lund): "As you know, I grew up, so to speak, in orthodoxy[18]; but as soon as I began to think for myself the tremendous colossus began to totter."(Journals, No. 16=JP, V, 5092(Pap. I A 72, June 1st, 1835)) He was in doubt about traditional orthodox Christianity. However, on the other hand, he found that the theology which was in fashion at that time, was only a form of rationalism. He said of theologians of his times that "when they find themselves in agreement with Holy Writ they base their argument upon it, but not otherwise, and as a result rest upon two different points of

view."(Journals. No. 16) Here we see what we have called, in the last section, the mixture of the Christian standpoint and the natural man's standpoint. Kierkegaard also thought that the theologies of his time were such mixtures. Such a theology, says Kierkegaard, "is without faith, without open confidence before God, without a good conscience in the presence of Holy Scripture."(JP, III, 2823(Pap. X 5 A 73), 1853) Sometimes he criticized his teachers from the perspective of traditional Christianity.[19] Thus he, who was looking for something for which to live and die, did not want to enter into the theological world of his time, but he could not find anything else for which he could live and die either.(Journals, No. 22=JP, V, 5100(Pap. I A 75))

In his wandering and searching, Kierkegaard found that Christianity was opposed to the merely human thinking which is exemplified in philosophy. "Christianity," said Kierkegaard, "posits man's cognition as defective on account of sin, which is rectified in Christianity; the philosopher qua man tries to expound the relationship of God and the world [without raising any question of sin]".(JP, III, 3245(Pap. I A 94), 1835) In this period, he based his views of the world and God on the natural man's standpoint. So he thought that if one thought as a rational being, one should conclude that Christianity was something which should be opposed.(Journals, No. 32=JP, III, 3247(Pap. I A 99), 1835) According to Kierkegaard at this stage, the merely human standpoint is better than the Christian standpoint. So it is generally agreed that during the years 1834-35 Kierkegaard was

strongly tempted to doubt Christianity.[20] Christianity appeared to him "the most inhuman cruelty"(PV, p. 76), and Christians seemed to him to be too dogmatic since they asserted that they had the truth. Moreover, sometimes he tried to interpret Christianity from the merely human perspective. He thus tries to interpret Christianity along the lines of Hegel and Schleiermacher.[21]

Yet at the very least he thought that this mixture of Christianity and the merely human standpoint should not be called Christianity. This mixture produced a change in the meaning of Christian concepts. Through the hands of these modern theologians, he wrote, "inspiration has become nothing more than God's breathing of the life-spirit into man, and incarnation no more than the presence of one or another in one or more individuals."[22] Thus he believed that even though he himself could not accept what Christianity taught, at the very least Christianity itself should be kept as it was.[23] From this standpoint, he made many statements which can be judged as Christian statements.[24] For example:

> The birth of Christ is not only an event but also in heaven; but our justification is also not merely an event on earth but also in heaven.(Journals, No. 104(Pap. II A 594), 1837)
>
> It is so impossible for the world to exist without God that if God could forget it it would instantly cease to be.(Journals, No. 129(Pap. II A 622), 1937)

However, at this stage, Kierkegaard knew the above statements only in an objective way. He had not yet definitely related them to his life. They have real meaning only in the kind of life Christ enjoins man to lead, yet this kind of life "cannot come to existence till after the rebirth...."[25] In this context,

Kierkegaard refuted the Kantian idea that Christ is only the good ethical teacher, and the Catholic idea that "one would be able to satisfy the requirements of the law".[26] But he himself did not yet feel that he had experienced rebirth. In this sense, he said, "I want to believe, but I cannot."[27] Kierkegaard himself was aware that he by himself could not accept Christ, so he said: "If Christ is to come and take up his abode in me, it must happen according to the title of to-day's Gospel [John 20:19] in the Almanac: Christ came in through locked doors."(Journals, No. 196=JP, V, 5313(Pap. II A 730), April 22, 1838)

Then in 1838 Kierkegaard underwent a conversion experience. Kierkegaard described this experience in the following way:

> May 19. Half-past ten in the morning. There is an indescribable joy which enkindles us as inexplicably as the apostle's outburst comes gratuitously: 'Rejoice I say unto you, and again I say unto you rejoice.' - Not a joy over this or that but the soul's mighty song 'with tongue and mouth, from the bottom of the heart': 'I rejoice through my joy, in, at, with, over, by, and with my joy' - a heavenly refrain, as it were, suddenly breaks off our other song; a joy which cools and refreshes us like a breath of wind, a wave of air, from the trade wind which blows from the plains of Mamre to the everlasting habitations.(Journals, No. 207=JP, V, 5324(Pap. II A 228), 1838)

This experience made Kierkegaard assert that "God creates out of nothing, wonderful, you say: yes, to be sure, but he does what is still more wonderful: he makes saints out of sinners."(Journals, No. 209(Pap. II A 758), July 7, 1838) From now on, his relation to Christianity is different from that which he had before this conversion experience.[28] He no longer stands on the side of merely human thinking, but on the side of Christianity. As before, he thinks that Christianity is the opposite of mere human

thinking, philosophy[29]; but now he thinks that Christianity is right and true. Now he thinks that "the mystery of God is revealed in Christ"(Journals, No. 218(Pap. II A 767), 1838), and that "Christ is both our Saviour and our Judge...the Saviour and the Judge are one."(Journals, No. 222(Pap. II A 261), Sep. 12, 1838). He has the consciousness of sin, and thinks of divine fatherly love as "the one single unshakable thing in life, the true Archimedean point."(JP, V, 5468(Pap. III A 78), 1840)

But he cannot continually think in this way. At times he remarks: "I feel so dull and so completely without joy, my soul is so empty and void, that I cannot even conceive what could satisfy it - oh, not even the blessedness of heaven."[30] Yet in the next entry he says: "To thee, O God, we turn for peace...but grant us too the blessed assurance that nothing shall deprive us of that peace, neither ourselves, nor our foolish, earthly desires, nor my wild longings, nor the anxious cravings of my heart."[31] So he has mixed feelings about Christianity, but in a different sense from what he had before 1838. Sometimes he has deep doubt, just like before: "My doubt is terrible."[32] Yet he knows that this is not the normal state of the Christian's consciousness. Even in this doubting situation, he does not want to mix his tendency to think as a natural man thinks with the way in which the Christian should think. In a sense, his criticism of any mixing of these two standpoints is a form of his criticism of his own doubt. Not only Hegel and Hegelian theologians, but Kierkegaard himself with his non-Christian thinking is the object of criticism.[33]

He found within himself all sorts of different trends which could not be compatible with Christianity, so he depicted every different views of life through various pseudonyms.[34] That is, Kierkegaard found within himself the tendency to be an aesthete, the tendency to be an ethical person, the tendency to be a person in religiousness A, and tendency to be a Christian in the genuine sense. As Josiah Thompson says,

> Kierkegaard was emptying out his thoughts and feelings through his pseudonyms...[He] felt he must write, must drain the watershed of ideas and fancies that had built upon over the years.[35]

Hence the spheres of life developed in his pseudonymous writings are a kind of idealization of the tendencies which he found within himself.[36] Yet the more Kierkegaard thought of these tendencies, the more he felt that to be a Christian should be different from being an aesthete, from being an ethical person, and from being a person in religiousness A.[37] His pseudonyms show what are the possible ways to live in the world. These ways of life are differentiated from one another. As Gardiner says, they are "designed to exhibit - from the inside - what it is like to envisage life within the perspectives identified."[38] In this sense, these pseudonyms are, as Martin Thust says, "Soren Kierkegaard's marionette theatre."[39] Kierkegaard thus maintains his distance from the pseudonyms. So according to Kierkegaard himself, each pseudonym must be treated as a pseudonym.[40] Kierkegaard says that "the voice of the one speaking comes from me but it is not my voice, the hand writing is mine, but it is not my handwriting."[41] The views of life of the pseudonymous authors must not be mixed with Kierkegaard's own conclusive view. For, as

Crites says, in Kierkegaard's "pseudonymous writings he preserved a sharp distinction between his own person and the point of view of each particular work."[42] As we have indicated, these pseudonymous works provide us with the description of different views of life which Kierkegaard himself found within himself as tendencies within him. This explains the fact that sometimes he used some material from his own journal in the writings of his pseudonymous works.[43]

Each pseudonymous work treats a different problem, so each work is written from a different point of view.[44] We may say with Crites that "each [work] is a distinct work of art."[45] But, as Crites admits, there is also a kind of superstructure which combines these works[46], even though that superstructure is one which can be revealed and perceived only at the end of his authorship, not at the beginning.[47]

What I have described in the last few paragraphs was about the content of his first authorship which is continued to 1846. He said of this authorship: "My merit in literature is that I have set forth the decisive qualifications of the whole of the compass of existence with such dialectical clarity and so originally as has not, as far as I know, been done in any other literature...."(Journals, No. 601=JP, V, 5914(Pap. VII A 127), 1846)

After finishing the first authorship, he felt that he had finished his literary activity.[48] He felt that his purpose had been achieved with his first authorship in which he did maieutic

work of introducing his reader into Christianity.[49] However, gradually he realized that what was needed was direct witnessing to Christian truth.[50] Hence from this time on, Kierkegaard wrote books in which he more directly asserted the Christian message.[51] In this sense, the Postscript is the turning point of his entire authorship. In this situation (i.e., 1846-1848), Edifying Discourses in Various Moods(1847), Works of Love(1847), Two Minor Ethico-Religious Essays(1847, but published in 1849), The Book on Adler(1847, part of which is published in English under the title, On Authority and Revelation) and parts of Christian Discourses (but published in 1848) and of Sickness unto Death[52] (but published in 1849) and of Training in Christianity[53] (but published in 1850) were written. In these works, as we have seen, he attempted to assert directly the demand of Christianity. He directly bore witness to what Christianity really is, and he thought from the Christian standpoint.

Then there was the Easter experience of 1848. He described this in the following way:

> NB NB Wednesday April 19, 1848.
> My whole being is changed. My reserve and self-isolation is broken - I must speak.
> Lord give thy grace.(Journals, No. 747=JP, V, 6131(Pap. VIII A 640), 1848)

On the basis of this experience, he said: "Now, with God's help, I shall be myself, I believe that Christ will help me to be victorious over my melancholy, and so I shall become a priest."(Journals, No. 748=JP, V, 6132(Pap. VIII A 641), 1848) He finally fully accepted the divine forgiveness of his sin.[54] This experience was a kind of confirmation of his desire to become

a country parson. Even though he could not accomplish this wish, he, at the very least, realized that Christianity is something that must be directly proclaimed. He no longer had to make use of indirect communication by means of pseudonyms. Instead, he took up the more direct communication of Christianity and used the Christian pseudonym "Anti-Climacus". Thus he said: "From now on I shall have to take over clearly and directly everything which up till now has been indirect, and come forward personally, definitely, and directly as one who wished to serve the cause of Christianity."(Journals, No. 808(Pap. IX A 218), 1848) For "[the] communication of Christianity must ultimately end in 'bearing witness', the maieutic form can never be final. For truth, from the Christian point of view, does not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it) but in a revelation which must be proclaimed."[55] During this time, he sometimes preached: on Sep. 1, 1848 in Vor Frue Church[56], and on May 1851 in Citadel Church.[57]

The experience of 1848 was thus not one which caused Kierkegaard to understand Christianity differently from how he had previously. Nor did he come to have a different attitude to Christianity in the way in which this was the case in relation to his 1838 experience. Rather, this experience was a culmination of his thinking since 1846, after finishing the Postscript.[58] For we can see a clear line of continuity in the way in which he thinks of Christianity.[59] Now, as one who had finished the maieutic education of Christendom, he went on to direct communication; "In Christendom the maieutic form can certainly be

used, simply because the majority in fact live under the impression that they are Christians. But since Christianity is Christianity the maieuticer must become the witness."[60] There is therefore a sense of continuity between his maieutic communication and the direct communication. As Crites says, during these years, Kierkegaard "kept interpreting the pseudonymous works, lest the reader miss the Christian point of the whole."[61] Indeed, Kierkegaard said that "Anti-Climacus repeats what is said in the pseudonymous writings."[62] In this way, the second period (1838-46) and the third period (1846-52) of Kierkegaard's life are closely related. There is an obvious connection and continuation of his understanding of Christianity.

Accordingly, even in this third period (1846-1852), he had exactly the same understanding of Christianity as he had had in the second period (1838-1846). He still thinks that the content of Christianity is something which is the opposite of what human beings as themselves can naturally think and accept.[63] Christianity is too much for human beings. Yet Kierkegaard, as he saw things from a Christian standpoint in the second period (1838-1846), thought as a Christian. From this standpoint, he seemed to think in the following way. Even though Christianity is something which goes against the natural man's standpoint, we should accept this as truth, since God himself has affirmed the content of Christianity.[64] He confirmed that Christianity is against self-sufficient reasoning: "It has constantly been maintained that reflection inevitably destroys Christianity and is its natural enemy."(Journals, No. 813(Pap. IX A 240), 1848)

However, this does not mean that the Christian does not think; as we have seen in the last section, there is definitely a "Christian epistemological standpoint".[65] Here Kierkegaard called Christian thinking a "godfearing reflection":

> I hope, now, that with God's help it will be shown that a godfearing reflection can once again tie the knot at which a superficial reflection has been tugging for so long. The divine Authority of the Bible and all that belongs to it has been done away with; it looks as though one had only to wait for the last stage of reflection in order to have done with the whole thing. But behold, reflection performs the opposite service by once more bringing the springs of Christianity into play, and in such a way that it can stand up - against reflection. Christianity naturally remains completely unaltered, not one iota is changed. But the struggle is a different one; up to the present it has been between reflection and simple, immediate Christianity; now it will be between reflection and simplicity armed with reflection. (Ibid.)

Thus, in this period (1846-1852), Kierkegaard was clearly aware of the difference between the Christian standpoint and the natural man's.

In relation to the theme of the difference between the Christian standpoint and the natural man's, we have to trace the trend of thought in Kierkegaard's time. Kierkegaard made it clear that in his time there was a strong tendency to emphasize the natural man's standpoint. In one place, he satirized the fact that this emphasis on the natural man's standpoint had even influenced Christianity:

> [Nowadays the] fact that Pascal was a famous mathematician is almost to the credit of Christianity; in consideration of the fact one can listen to, and consider what he has to say. (Journals, No. 1157=JP, III, 3118(Pap. X 3 A 641), 1850)

That is, in his time, people thought that Christianity was something which was worthy to accept, because a famous

mathematician like Pascal spoken well of Christianity. What Kierkegaard wanted to say was that these people tried to believe in Christianity not because it was what God had revealed, but because some rational man thought that Christianity was something which might be regarded as good. In another place he more directly said:

> I have often said that Christianity can be presented in two ways: either in the interest of man (an extenuating adjustment) or in the interest of God (true Christianity). I have also said that if I do not succeed or dare to present Christianity in the latter form I shall admit it and keep the place free.
>
> Hardly any of the early fathers present Christianity in God's interest with the same emphasis as Tertullian.
>
> Here Christianity is not a little moralising and a few articles of faith; Christianity is the reckoning between God and the world. That is why Tertullian fixed his gaze so determinedly upon its opposite: Idolatry.
>
> And now, long after Christianity has, as it is expressed, conquered and deposited a culture, Christianity and the world are so mixed up that the question must be expressed once again in a new potency: is Christianity of God or of man?
>
> That is what filled people with enthusiasm in the early days of the Church, they felt quite literally that it was God's matter which was being fought over, not just a few dogmas, but whether God was to be God.(Journals, No. 1192(Pap. X 4 A 137), 1851)

Hence, according to Kierkegaard, only a presentation of Christianity which allows God to be God (a presentation of Christianity in which God is sovereign in every realm) is a true presentation of true Christianity, and the standpoint involved in this presentation is the Christian standpoint. True Christianity and the Christian standpoint should not be mixed with the natural man's standpoint. Those who try to make Christianity acceptable to the natural man's standpoint (and this inevitably involves a change in the character of Christianity) do not realize "that Christianity is God's invention and, in a good sense, in God's

interest."(Journals, No. 1200(Pap. X 4 A 212), 1851) In this sense, we can see the clear emphasis on the difference between the pure Christian standpoint and one modified by the natural man's standpoint, in this third period (1846-1952).

The most characteristic emphasis of this period, however, is that one should live as a Christian, one who follows the example of Christ. "It is the 'imitation of Christ' that must now be introduced," said Kierkegaard.[66] In contrast to the second period when this aspect had been less emphasized, he began to strongly emphasize the importance of imitating Christ. Hence, after making it clear that the Christian standpoint was fundamentally different from the natural man's standpoint, Kierkegaard through his second authorship, tried to emphasize the importance of the peculiarity of the Christian way of living, concentrating upon martyrdom.

We have to bear in mind that this emphasis on discipleship is based on the belief in the God-Man as the Saviour. Even in this period, Kierkegaard did not forget to mention Christ as the God-Man and the Saviour.[67] He asserted that those who believe in Jesus as the God-Man should follow him, imitate him as they could. As we have seen several times, from the Christian point of view, it is a contradiction only to believe in the God-Man and not to imitate the way Jesus lived in the world. For the Christian belief in atonement does not allow a man to be indolent. Rather, it makes a man endeavour to do what God has commanded him to do from heartfelt thanks and in fear and trembling.[68] To repeat, according to Kierkegaard, the Christian should live as a

Christian; he should have a Christian mode of existence which is one with Christian thought. True "Christian knowledge" produces true "Christian life".(cf. JP, II, 2303 (Pap. XI 2 A 191), 1854))

Kierkegaard knew all this and even thought in this way. Yet, in a sense, he felt that this was not yet a description of his own life. His own life did not meet the demands of Christianity as he conceived that of a Christian should be. In this sense, he said that "I am only a poet."[69] He also added that he merely described Christianity.[70] Here "poet" is used in the sense of one who only describes the ideality, but he himself in his concrete existence does not fulfil the ideality itself.[71] He felt himself to have a "poet-existence".[72] This is, as we have seen, the characteristic mode of existence of the aesthetic sphere.[73] Thus Kierkegaard felt himself as an aesthete in relation to Christianity.[74] He found himself as being someone whom he satirized in the following passage:

> If it were not in one sense madness it would be a good example of humour if a man were to say to God: although I was strictly brought up as a Christian I was, as you know, born in the 19th century and so have my share of the universal superstitious belief in reason etc. The humour lies in the 'as you know'.(Journals, No. 1118=JP, II, 1764(Pap. X 3 A 228), 1850)

Kierkegaard had within himself a kind of tension between the purely Christian standpoint and the tendency to think and live as a natural man who removed himself from God as far as possible.(cf. JP, VI, 6426(X 1 A 494))

This gap between his Christian standpoint and his way of life was the reason why he published The Sickness unto Death and Training of Christianity under the pseudonym "Anti-Climacus" who is "a Christian in an extraordinary degree".[75] He had a kind of distance from what he described in these Christian books.[76] In this sense, he could not dare to call himself a Christian. He says: "Christianity is so infinitely elevated that I am no Christian."[77] Even though he "[presents] Christianity in the glory of its ideality"[78], "as a person [he does] not correspond to it."[79] From this position he says that if he were left by God as he was, then he would not be a Christian at all and would have forgotten Christianity entirely.(Journals, No. 970=JP, VI, 6500(Pap. X 2 A 61))

Kierkegaard knew that there should be continuity between what he thought of Christianity and his way of existence. The Christian way of living (which is bringing Christianity and the Christian standpoint into reality) is a scandal in this world, just as the Christian's epistemological standpoint is an offence to the natural man's standpoint. The genuine form of Christianity is regarded as something which is too much for human beings. Kierkegaard, who knew that this was the case, found that he did not reach his ideal.

What is interesting is that even though he himself had this tendency to be a natural man, he nevertheless did not try to justify this tendency. He always regarded this tendency as temptation, a kind of attempt to distort true Christianity.(JP, VI, 6834(Pap. X 5 A 46)) He tried to keep the ideal of

Christianity as it is, even at the risk of being forced to define himself as not being a Christian.[80]

The fourth and last period of his life (1853-1855) is characterized by the most direct attack upon Christendom, which he regarded as distorted Christianity.[81] In a sense, he wanted changes in the established Church. At the very least, he wanted an official admission that there was something wrong with the established Church.[82] Therefore, he said that "we should at least be so honest towards Christianity as to admit openly what the state of affairs is."(LY, p. 45(Pap. XI, 1 A 63))

His main idea was to apply New Testament Christianity to the 19th century Danish Church. According to his reading of the New Testament, the New Testament did not recognize "any kind of Christian other than the 'disciple'."(Journals, No. 1287=JP, VI, 6837(Pap. X 5 A 72), 1853) Even in his own days, all Christians had to be Christ's disciples who followed Jesus Christ in their concrete life. Becoming disciples of Christ is only an act of obedience to God. This obedience is something which must be here and now.(LY, p. 53(Pap. XI 1 A 91)) Yet in the problem of being disciples of Christ, "grace [is] in the first place".(Journals, No. 1289(Pap. X 5 A 101), 1853) Without grace, there is no disciple in the New Testament sense of the word, there is no possibility of obedience.

When we look at his later writings from the perspective which I have described in the last paragraph, there is hardly anything new in his demand to Christians and to the Christian Church to be

genuine. Almost everything had been already mentioned before, or was the logical conclusion of his previous assertions.[83] His sole demand was for genuine Christians and for a genuine Church.(LY, p. 67(Pap. XI 1 A 136)) If, as we have seen, to be a Christian is a very decisive demand, then the logical conclusion of this would be something like this:

> Every effort to bring about a Christian state and a Christian nation is eo ipso unchristian, anti-Christian; for every such effort is only possible in virtue of a reduction of the definition of a Christian, and is therefore against Christianity, and tending to establish the false claim that we are all Christians, and that it is therefore very easy to be Christian.(LY, p. 334(Pap. XI, 2 A 374))

Accordingly, Kierkegaard -- pace Pojman who asserts that "the logical conclusion of Kierkegaard's scheme of the divine comedy is universal salvation"[84] -- was very critical of the doctrine of universal salvation. "Christianity begins with one being saved," said Kierkegaard, "perhaps only one among millions, one in the whole world. And now we are all saved, all of us, perhaps including our cats and dogs - and this is...[Christendom's] Christianity."[85] In general, Kierkegaard's later thought was not substantially different from his previous thought.[86]

However, during his later years, there were some emphases which seemed to be too extreme. These were his emphases on asceticism, on being spiritual (which may even imply a kind of dualism between the spiritual and the physical), and on inwardness which resulted in a severe criticism of the system of infant baptism. We shall look at these points in turn.

Let us first consider his emphasis on asceticism. In relation to this theme, Luther and Lutheran Protestantism became one of the main objects of the later Kierkegaard's criticism. For example, he says:

> Luther really did incalculable harm by not becoming a martyr. Partly because it is a very awkward thing for a man who is marked out to be God's man, as Luther was, to end his days in ordinary comfortable converse with devoted admirers and followers...If it is true that for a few years of his life he was salt, the last part of his life is not free from insipidity, and the Table Talk is an example: a man of God sitting comfortably installed, surrounded by admiring devotees who believe that if he simply lets fly...it is a revelation or the result of an inspiration.... By the last part of his life Luther accredited mediocrity. One does not normally realise that it requires a hero to accredit mediocrity for the first time. This hero was Luther. But the instant it is accredited nothing more is required but mediocrity - and in that we are blest above measure in Protestantism.[87]

We do not know exactly what made Kierkegaard think that the later Luther did harm to Christianity. Probably, Luther became an object of criticism mainly because of the worldliness of Protestant Christianity. By worldliness Kierkegaard meant that the tendency to seek security and welfare in this world even using God and Christianity for this purpose. Kierkegaard thought that the dominance of worldliness came mainly from a distortion and forgetting what Luther meant and asserted.[88] Hence Kierkegaard says: "The place where we really have to begin again is with Luther. It went a little too fast with this lumping together of secularity and religiousness."(JP, III, 2518(Pap. X 3 A 153))

However, Kierkegaard in some places attributed partly to Luther the dominance of worldliness in Protestant Christendom. (Therefore, Kierkegaard's relationship to Luther is dialectical.[89]) So in the end, as we have seen in the quotation

above, the later life of Luther, who was no longer persecuted by the world and the worldly Church, was described as being wrong. But Kierkegaard agreed with Luther that in the situation in which Luther was (i.e., the later Middle Ages in which the Church was corrupt), it was necessary to emphasize the Gospel in order to make people free from various human-made religious laws.[90] Kierkegaard said that "surely Protestantism, Lutheranism is really a corrective."[91] But when people begin to hear the good news of the Gospel without understanding its full meaning, then there is a danger that the message of the Gospel becomes a version of cheap grace: you can be a Christian without altering your ways of thinking and living. In this situation, "people [have] forgotten the point in Christianity: self-denial, while worldly well-being and soft-hearted mediocrity are idolised."[92] In this sense, he said again: "[The] result of having made Protestantism into the regulative has been to produce great confusion."[93] This did not imply that after doing the work of correction we should go back to Roman Catholicism or other human-made laws.[94] He simply was emphasizing that we should not change Christianity into a cause of worldliness. In the Protestantism of Kierkegaard's time there was a danger that the Church had only the name "Christian Church", but in reality it was not the Church at all.(Cf. JP, II, 1762(Pap. X 2 A 32), 1849) In this situation, "one is a Christian in [such a way that] it is impossible to be a Christian"(JP, II, 2068(Pap. XI 1 A 421), 1855)), "which incidentally is just as strange as someone's being a violinist by virtue of not being able to play the violin."(JP, VI, 6850(Pap. XI 2 A 321))

Kierkegaard's criticism looks to be too extreme. Here is Kierkegaard's point. He knew that he demanded too much, but he also knew that this was what is demanded in the New Testament. What he was asserting is: let us admit that we are not Christians; we have used the name "the Christian Church" in vain; and let us start again from this point. Then, try to imitate Christ abandoning our worldly well-being and soft-hearted mediocrity.[95] For Kierkegaard, there must be only one standard by which the Christian can live and be measured - that of the New Testament. According to that standard, one should live as the Scripture demands; one should try to imitate Christ in his own concrete life as far as one can do as an existential human being, without having any consciousness of merits. In this standpoint, asceticism is understood as "existing in order to hold the flesh and the passions in check."(Journals, No. 1357(Pap. XI 1 A 551), 1854) Moreover, Kierkegaard's asceticism does not show any sign of being morbid. Referring to Schopenhauer's edition of Indian (or Buddhist) asceticism, Kierkegaard said:

> Christian asceticism rests in the thought that to exist is not identical with suffering - and then there is meaning in the asceticism. If to exist were to suffer, then asceticism would easily become , which is precisely what Schopenhauer urges against the Stoics.[96]

Therefore, Kierkegaard's emphasis upon asceticism appears something which is somewhat different from what is normally taught in Catholicism, especially in the Middle Ages, and any other forms of asceticism. Kierkegaard's asceticism does not attribute anything meritorious to sacrificial actions. In this respect, there is a continuity of his thinking between the third period

(1846-1852), in which Kierkegaard emphasizes Christian discipleship, and the final period (1853-1855), even though in the final period he emphasized the life of poverty more.

Let us turn to the second emphasis: the emphasis on the spiritual to the exclusion of the physical. In relation to this aspect, we can see some negative phenomena. Until the third period, he had a sense of balance between the spiritual and the physical.[97] He tended to think, according to the thought of the New Testament, that the spiritual should be regarded not as something which excluded the physical; a human being as a whole can be "spirit" in relation to God. However, in the final period (1853-1855), we see somewhat different element involved. For example, he writes:

> By nature man makes the propagation of the species the central thing in existence, therein lies his whole egoism qua animal-creation, or it culminates there. Christianity would like to decentralise that attitude - and what struggles it has cost...
>
> And then along comes Protestantism and introduces Christianity - in relation to marriage, marriage becomes what is pleasing to God. How disgusting, this lying Christianity which lies to mankind, partly because it is more comfortable to repeat the nonsense men talk, partly because the 'parson' in his capacity of master of the stud and breeder is egoistically interested in increasing the herd, in seeing that procreation continues on a grand scale.(Journals, No. 1385=E.P. IX, p. 305, 1854)

And in another place, he also said: "Creation is reserved to God; it is, if one may talk of such things, the highest autopathetic satisfaction. To give life is but a weak analogy thereto, and is granted to man - and is the culminating point in human egoism."[98] This perspective results in a very negative view of woman.[99] In one place He said: "Perhaps she does save a man

here and there from excesses, and make a decent man of him, but she corrupts all men who marry by reducing them to finitude and mediocrity."[100]

If we compare these passages with some passages in the Attack upon Christendom, we can get some idea that in this period Kierkegaard looked very negatively on the physical aspect of human life. When we only look at these passages, it is understandable that some scholars think that Kierkegaard has a kind of dualism between the spiritual and the physical which is similar to what the Manichaeans or the Platonists had.[101] Indeed, in one place Kierkegaard clearly expressed his negative view of the physical: "Man is a fallen spirit...[The] fallen spirit is punished by being put into a slave's dress, which is the body, and sent to this penitentiary, which is the world, because of his sin."[102] It is very clear that what is expressed in this passage cannot be regarded as what Christianity teaches. The content of this passage is closer to Platonism or Manichaeism than Christianity. Thus, during his final period, Kierkegaard seemed to depart from his previous view that creation cannot be identical with the fall.(cf. JP, II, 1309(Pap. II, A 237), July 26, 1838) Therefore, in relation to his emphasis on the spiritual at the expense of the physical, we see some discontinuity with his previous thinking.[103]

In relation to the Attack upon Christendom, we can point out another example which is not altogether in keeping with his Lutheran background: his attack upon infant baptism.[104] However, as some people saw[105], Kierkegaard did not have any

intention of abolishing the system of infant baptism. What he was attacking was the prevailing assumption that if a baby was baptized, then it was a Christian. Kierkegaard was emphasizing that if Christians wished to have infant baptism, they had to emphasize the doctrine of regeneration as well. According to Kierkegaard, without regeneration, there is no Christian; one is not a Christian in the proper sense of the word if one is not regenerated, even though one was baptized when one was a baby.[106] His attack upon infant baptism was not an attack upon the system itself, but upon the non-Christian standpoint involved in the misuse of this system.

It is generally true that Kierkegaard in these final years takes some extreme positions. He wants to suggest extreme cases in order to make people be aware of the seriousness of the problem of the worldliness of Christendom. As far as I can see, only in relation to his emphasis on the spiritual at the expense of the physical is there something which is outside the Christian standpoint.

In this section, we have examined Kierkegaard's journal entries dividing his adult life into four periods. What we have seen is that throughout these four stages, he always emphasizes the difference between Christianity and the merely human standpoint. In the first period, he emphasized this from the perspective of the human standpoint. Thus in this stage Christianity appeared as something which must be attacked from the purely human standpoint. In the rest of his life, he emphasized the difference between Christianity as God's thought (or God's

invention) and the human standpoint from the perspective of Christian faith. In the second period (1838-46), he tried to show this difference through providing several different views of life. That was the main purpose of his first authorship. In the third period (1846-52), he was more direct, and tried to be a direct witness of Christian truth. However, throughout the second and third periods, he occasionally still had doubts about Christianity. Even he himself was not always faithful to the Christian standpoint which he had described, not to mention the Christian way of living. However, in spite of this, he did not compromise his understanding of Christianity. In spite of his own existential weakness, he tried, as far as he could, to keep Christianity and the Christian standpoint as they are.[107] He thought that mixing the Christian perspective and the natural man's perspective in order to make many people enter into Christianity is "winning men over to Christianity by doing away with Christianity."(JP, VI, 6237(Pap. IX A 226)) In the final period there are many extreme assertions, but except for his emphasis upon the spiritual at the expense of the physical, we can say that even in this period he tried to keep the Christian standpoint pure. In conclusion, therefore, we may say that throughout Kierkegaard's life, he very clearly differentiated the Christian standpoint and the natural man's standpoint, even though he himself sometimes is not faithful to the Christian standpoint. His attack upon the mixture of these two standpoints can be understood as his criticism upon such a tendency - a tendency which is also found within himself. As Fenger puts it, "Kierkegaard is often his own worst enemy."[108]

NOTES

1. Journals, No. 1185(Pap. X 4 A 33). See also JP, II, 1961(Pap. X 4 A 91); JP, III, 2958(Pap. X 3 A 656), 2969(Pap. XI 1 A 64); JP, VI, 6431(Pap. X 1 A 510); JFY, pp. 126, 176; PV, p. 153; AUC, pp. 282ff.

2. See, e.g., Nordentoft, p. 346.

3. LY, p. 291=JP, VI, 6932(Pap. XI 2 A 206). See also JP, VI, 6780(Pap. X 4 A 383).

4. See, e.g., Weiland, pp. 13f.; Stendahl, pp. 46f; and Hennig Fenger, Kierkegaard, The Myths and Their Origins, trans. George C. Schoolfield (New haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. xiii, 1f., 134.

5. See JP, V, 5220(Pap. II A 69), 5642(Pap. IV A 79); JP, VI, 6423(Pap. X 1 A 476), 6629(Pap. X 3 A 144), 6749(Pap. X 6 B 173), 6842(Pap. X 6 B 232), 6965(PAP. XI 3 B 291:4).

6. See JP, IV, 4454(Pap. X 1 A 134); JP, V, 5653(Pap. IV A 97), 5664(Pap. IV A 107), 5680(Pap. IV A 133); JP, VI, 6303(Pap. X 1 A 23), 6488(Pap. X 2 A 3). Cf. Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard: An Introduction, pp. 32, 99,

7. Cf. JP, VI, 6380(Pap. X 1 A 239), 6818(Pap. X 4 A 629); Pap. X 2 A 277, cited in Malantschuk, "Søren Kierkegaard - Poet or Pastor," in AN and OL, p. 4. See also Crites, "Nulla dies sine linea," Journal of Religion 60 (1980), p. 83.

8. Cf. Howard A. Johnson, "Introduction," to JP, I, p. xxii.

9. In the discussion of this paragraph, I have strongly relied on W. von Kloeden, "Bible Study," in Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulova Thulstrup, eds., Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, pp. 16-31; and his "The Development of Kierkegaard's View of Christianity: The Early Period," in ibid., pp. 81-107; and Hong and Hong, "Notes," JP, V.

10. Cf. his "Dogmatiske Forelaesninger" [Lectures on Dogmatics]. For a summary of Clausen's theological position, see JP, V, p. 470, n. 75.

11. See JP, IV, 4243(Pap. II A 186); JP, V, 5282(Pap. II A 204), 5286(Pap. II C 50).

12. Cf. JP, V, 5357(Pap. II C 29, II C 31), 1838.

13. Cf. JP, IV, 4110(Pap. VII 1 A 20).

14. Cf. JP, V, 5355(Pap. II C 62), and p. 492, n. 459; JP, IV, 3998(Pap. II A 90).

15. Cf. JP, V. 5271, 5272, 5273, 5274, 5278, 5282(Pap. II C 38-40, 42-49, II A 193).

16. Kierkegaard heard the following lecture courses during this period: during the winter term of 1832/33 Kierkegaard heard the lectures of Clausen on the exposition of the synoptic gospels, in relation to this course Kierkegaard did some exegetic work on various passages from the synoptic Gospels(cf. JP, V, 5055(Pap. I C 7)); and during the winter term of the next year he attended Clausen's exposition of Acts (in relation to this course, Kierkegaard translated Acts 1-4 from Greek into Latin (cf. JP. V, 5057(Pap. I C 11-12)), and his lectures on Dogmatics (which continued to the summer of 1834).(cf. JP, V, 5058(Pap. I c 19)) During the spring term of 1834 he heard Scharling's lectures on the Epistles to the Corinthians, and during the winter of 1834/35, in relation to the course lead by Scharling, Kierkegaard translated Corinthians into Latin. At this stage Kierkegaard also read Phillip K. Marheineke(1780-1846)'s Die Grundlehien der Christlicher Dogmatik als Wissenschaft(2nd edition, Berlin, 1827) and Institutiones Symbolicae (3rd ed., Berlin, 1830)(cf. JP. V, 5065(Pap. I c 25-26)), and F. Baader's Vorlesungen ueber speculative Dogmatik, I (1822), II (1830).(cf. JP, IV, 3990(Pap. I C 31); JP, V, 5066(Pap. I C 27-33). During the summer term of 1835 he attended Engelstorft's lectures on the pastoral letters and during the autumn he made a Latin translation of 1 and 2 Epistles to Timothy, and Titus and Epistle to Philemon. During the winter term of 1835/36 he heard Kolthoff's lectures on Hebrews and Scharling's exposition of the Epistle of James. (In relation to these two courses, Kierkegaard translated Hebrews and James 4:1-15). During 1836/37, Kierkegaard read something about Hamann. During the winter term of 1837/38 and the first term of 1838/39, he attended H.L. Martensen's lecture, "Prolegomena to Speculative Dogmatics".(cf. JP, V, 5277(Pap. II C 12-24), 5299(Pap. II C 26-28)). During the winter term of 1838/39 he attended again Clausen's course on the synoptic Gospels, and in relation to this course he became acquainted with W. M. L. de Wette's Kurze Erklaerung des Evangeliums Matthaei (2nd edition, Leipzig, 1838); and Martensen's "The History of Philosophy from Kant and Hegel".(cf. JP, V, 5353(Pap. II C 25)) During 1839/40 he attended Scharling's lectures on Romans (in relation to this Kierkegaard did some exegetic work in Danish and Latin on Romans 9-16, cf. JP, V, 5435(Pap. II c 9). and p. 500, n. 576)), and M.H. Holenberg's lectures on Christology.(cf. JP, V, 5436(Pap. II C 10), and p. 500, n. 577).

17. See also Dupré, p. 145: "[The] theology of his [Kierkegaard's] time was imbued with rationalism." See also Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard: An Introduction, p. 32.

18. See also Pap. VIII 1 A 663, cited in Kloeden, "The Home and the School," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, p. 11.

19. See, e.g., Journals, No. 7(Pap. I A 30), 1834.

20. See, e.g., Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard: An Introduction, pp. 41f.; and Fenger, p. 89.

21. Cf. JP, I, 508(Pap. I A 108), Nov. 3, 1835; JP, IV, 3850(Pap. II A 199). But later Kierkegaard criticizes Schleiermacher, and says that "Schleiermacher may be said to have falsified Christianity."(JP, IV, 3853(Pap. X 2 A 417), 1850) See also JP, IV, 3852(Pap. X 2 A 416), 3848(Pap. I A 305), 3849(Pap. II A 91).

22. JP, V, 5181(Pap. I A 328)(1836/37). See also JP, IV, 3843(Pap. I C 20), 3844(Pap. I c 23). See again Jones, pp. 232f.

23. Cf. Journals, No. 105(Pap. II A 596), 1837.

24. See Journals, No. 14=JP, I, 274(Pap. I A 53), April.19, 1835; Journals, No. 126(Pap. II A 93), 1837; Journals, No. 166(Pap. II A 184), Oct. 29, 1837; Journals, No. 146(Pap. II A 676, Oct. 16, 1837=JP, III, 3058; Journals, No. 152(Pap. II A 133), July 15, 1837.

25. Pap. 1. A 28, 1834, cited in Kloeden, p. 85.

26. Ibid.

27. Pap. 1 A 44, Dec. 31, 1834, cited in Kloeden, p. 87. See also JP, V, 5280(Pap. II A 202), Dec. 8, 1837; Journals, No. 159(Pap. II A 165), Sep. 23, 1837.

28. For a similar view, see Holmer, "Kierkegaard and the Truth," p. 63; and Gates, Christendom Revisited, pp. 95, 104.

29. Cf. JP, III, 3259 (Pap. II A 239, Aug. 1, 1838), 3266 (Pap. II A 786, 1838), 3269 (Pap. II A 790, 1838); JP, IV 3858(Pap. II A 796).

30. Journals, No. 329(Pap. III A 54), 1840. See also JP, V, 5372(Pap. II A 382), 5380(Pap. II A 414), 5381(Pap. II A 415), 5384(Pap. II A 421), 5388(Pap. II A 435), 5404=Journals, No. 305(Pap. II A 521), 5433(Pap. II A 824), 6043(Pap. VIII 1 A 250).

31. Journals, No. 330=JP, V, 5455(Pap. III A 55), 1840. See also JP, V, 5449(Pap. III A 44), 5454(Pap. III A 54), 5456(Pap. III A 56).

32. Journals, No. 354=JP, V, 5494(Pap. III A 103), 1841. There are something of such doubt reflected in his pseudonymous writings. Cf. Shestov, pp. 104, 160f., 309.

33. See also Weiland, p. 11; Shestov, p. 311; Bonifazi, p. xi; and Fenger, p. 157.

34. See also David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief, p. 101, n. 3; Raymond E. Anderson, "Kierkegaard's Theory of Communication" (originally published in Speech Monographs 30 (1963): 1-14), in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 215; and Rohde, Soren Kierkegaard: An Introduction, p. 87.

35. Thompson, "The Master of Irony," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 108. See also his The Lonely Labyrinth, pp. 16, 58, 60, 65, 207. See the following entries of Kierkegaard's journals. JP, V, 5666(Pap. IV A 110), 5980(Pap. VIII 1 A 27); JP, VI, 6654(X 3 A 258).

36. See also Holmer, "Kierkegaard and the Truth," p. 34; E.D. Klemke, "Some Insights for Ethical Theory from Kierkegaard," in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 80; and Miller, p. 154.
By this assertion I differentiate my position from the view that the spheres of life is a series of development which Kierkegaard himself experienced through by his own life. (For this view, see Lowrie, Kierkegaard, pp. 289-290; Denzil Patrick, p. 252; and Mullen, p. 35).

37. See also Sullivan, pp. 17f.; and Ralph McInerny, "Preface to the English Edition," in Colette, Kierkegaard, pp. xii-xiii.

38. Gardiner, p. 40. See also Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, p. 61.

39. Martin Thust, "Das Marionettentheater Søren Kierkegaards," Zeitwend 1 (1025): 18-38, cited in Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, p. 73. See also Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, pp. 254f.

40. Journals, No. 1238=JP, VI, 6786(Pap. X 6 B 145), 1851. See also CUP, pp. 551f; JP, VI, 6393(Pap. X 1 A 300), 6567(Pap. X 6 B 245).

41. JP, V, 5864(Pap. VII 1 B 75). See also Pap. X 1 510, in AN and OL, p. 88

42. Crites, "Introduction," to Crisis, p. 42. See also Dupré, p. 15; Paul Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Logic," in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 71; idem, "Foreword," to Dewey's The New Obedience, pp. vii-ix; Paul Dietrichson, "Introduction to a Reappraisal of 'Fear and Trembling'," Inquiry 12 (1969), pp. 237f.; Sullivan, p. 22; Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms: A New Hierarchy," In American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969), pp. 116-26, esp., pp. 120f.; Rohde, SK: An Introduction, pp. 157f.; Colette, pp. 85f.

43. See JP, V, 5119(Pap. I A 123) -- E/OS, I, p. 19; JP, V, 5144(Pap. I A 169) -- E/OS, I, pp. 40f.; JP, V, 5251(Pap. II A 637) -- E/OS, I, pp. 19f.; JP, V, 5258(Pap. II A 649) -- E/OS, I, p. 39; JP, V, 5281(Pap. II A 203) -- E/OS, I, p. 24; JP, V, 5290(Pap. II A 683) -- E/OS, I, p. 222; JP, V, 5295(Pap. II A 690) -- E/OS, I, pp. 135ff., 163ff., 215ff.; JP, V, 5380(Pap. II A 414) -- E/OS, I, p. 21; JP, 5371(Pap. II A 373) -- E/OS, I, p. 21; JP, V, 5384(Pap. II A 421) -- E/OS, I, p. 21; JP, V, 5388(Pap. II A 435) -- E/OS, I, p. 21; JP, V, 5396(Pap. II A 495) -- FT, p. 40=FTL, p. 51; JP, V, 5407(Pap. II A 540) -- E/OS, I, p. 22; JP, V, 5433(Pap. II A 824) -- E/OS, I, p. 22; JP, V, 5447(Pap. III A 40) -- E/OS, I, pp. 215-28; JP, V, 5485(Pap. III C 4) -- FT, pp. 10-23=FTL, pp. 27-37; JP, V, 5496(Pap. III A 114) -- E/OS, I, p. 20; JP, V, 5497(Pap. III A 115) -- E/OS, I, p. 20; JP, V, 5539(Pap. III A 183)-- E/OS, I, p. 412. See also Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, p. 77 (Pap. III, 321-23). See again Thompson, "The Master of Irony,", p. 105.

44. See also Crites, "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and as Act," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 204.

45. Ibid., p. 205.

46. Ibid., p. 205. See also his "Introduction," to Crisis, pp. 42, 49; Holmer, "Kierkegaard and the Truth," pp. 65, 67; Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, pp. 4, 5, 12, 47; Price, p. 26; Friemond, pp. 27-31, 35f.; and Mullen, p. 6. See especially the following entries: JP, V, 5744(Pap. V A 109), 5905(Pap. VII 1 A 118), 6107(Pap. VIII 1 A A 548); JP, VI, 6204(Pap. IX A 169), 6346(Pap. X 1 A 116), 6356(Pap. X 1 A 138), 6361(Pap. X 1 A 147), 6388(Pap. X 1 A 266), 6393(Pap. X 1 A 300), 6505(Pap. X 2 A 89), 6511(Pap. X 2 A 106), 6595(Pap. X 2 A 596), 6770(Pap. X 6 B 4:3), 6777(Pap. X 4 A 373); Journals, No. 939=JP, VI, 6444(Pap. X 1 A 541), 1849).

47. Cf. PV, chapter III; JP, VI, 6654(Pap. X 3 A 258), 6780(X 4 A 383). See also Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, pp. 208, 237, n. 5; Ralph Henry Johnson, The Concept of Existence in the "Concluding Unscientific Postscript" (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 9.

48. Journals, No. 555=JP, V, 5873(Pap. VII A 4, Feb. 7, 1846), 588=JP, V, 5887 (Pap. VII A 98, March, 1846); JP, VI, 6157(Pap. IX A 54), 6843(X 5 A 146); Pap. X 5 B 217, cited in AN and OL, p. 10. See also Lowrie, Kierkegaard, pp. 366-69; Rohde, SK: An Introduction, p. 107; Malantschuk, "Søren Kierkegaard - Poet or Pastor?," In AN and OL, pp. 3-24; and Stendahl, pp. 62, 217, n 16.

49. There are two more elements which contribute to this thought of finishing his authorship. One of them is the financial condition in which Kierkegaard was. He felt that his financial condition no longer permitted him to be an author.(JP, V, 5881(Pap. VII 1 B 211)) The other is his thought that he would

die before his thirty-fourth birthday (i.e., May, 5, 1847).(cf. JP, V, 5999(Pap. VIII 1 A 100), 6003(Letter, No. 149).

50. Cf. JP, I, 670(Pap. XI A 235); JP, II, 1957=Journals, No. 809(Pap. IX A 221); JP, V, 6037(Pap. VIII 1 A 229). In relation to this direct communication, one may think of the Corsair affair and its effects on Kierkegaard's thought. However, I will not give much attention to this affair in this study, since (1) this affair is well-known among Kierkegaard scholarship, and (2) I think it is necessary to try to consider Kierkegaard's thought itself apart from this affair.

51. See also Hong and Hong, "An Introduction to Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter," in AN and OL, p. 25. See again Walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942), p. 211.

52. Cf. JP, V, 6110(Pap. VIII 1 A 558).

53. Cf. JP, V, 6130(Pap. VIII 1 A 637).

54. See JP, II, 1214=Journals, No. 751(Pap. VIII 1 A 647); JP, V, 6133=Journals, No. 749(Pap. VIII 1 A 645).

55. Journals, 809=JP, II, 1957(Pap. IX A 221, 1848). See also JP, 6769(Pap. X 4 A 323), 6770(Pap. X 6 B 4:3).

56. See JP, IV, 3928(IX A 266); JP, VI, 6249(Pap. IX A 271). The contents of the sermon is found in TC, pp. 151-6.

57. See JP, VI, 6767(X 4 A 318), 6769(X 4 A 323). See also Malantschuk, "Sermons," in JP, IV, pp. 639f.

58. For a similar view, see Bonifazi, p. 30.

59. Compare, e.g., JP, V, 6043(Pap. VIII 1 A 250), Aug. 16, 1847 with Journals, No. 748, 808(Pap. VIII A 641, IX A 218), 1848. See also Journals, No. 797(Pap. IX A 179), 1848; JP, VI, 6309(Pap. X 1 A 41).

60. Journals, 809=JP, II, 1957(Pap. IX A 221). See also JP, VI, 6786(Pap. X 6 B 145).

61. Crites, "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and Act," p. 228. See also Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, pp. 133, 161, 300ff.

62. JP, VI, 6601(Pap. X, 6, B 82). See also JP, VI, 6786(Pap. X 6 B 145). See again Per Lonning, "The Period up to the Ethical Religious Essays," pp. 144f.

63. See, e.g., Journals, No. 752(Pap. VIII A 648), 1848.

64. See, e.g., Journals, No. 753(Pap. VIII A 649), May 11, 1848.

65. See section two of this chapter. See also Crites, "Introduction," to Crisis, pp. 38ff., esp. note 26.

66. Journals, 1252(Pap. X 4 A 560), 1852. See also Journals, No. 843(Pap. IX A 414), 1848.

67. Journals, No. 884(Pap. X 1 A 127), No. 889(Pap. X 1 A 154), No. 902(Pap. X 1 A 245), No. 919(Pap. X 1 A 425), No. 935(Pap. X 1 A 507), No. 1030(Pap. X 2 A 343), 1850.

68. Cf. Journals, No. 953(Pap. X 1 A 643), 1849; Journals, No. 932(Pap. X 1 A 489), 1849.

69. See also Journals, No. 885(Pap. X 1 A 130, 1849); JP, II, 2301 (X 4 A 247, 1851); JP, IV, 4701(Pap. X 5 A 85); JP, V, 6061(Pap. VIII 1 A 347); JP, VI, 6317(Pap. X 1 A 56), 6353(X 1 A 130), 6367(X 1 A 162), 6383(X 1 A 250), 6390(X 1 A 273), 6391(X 1 A 281), 6431=Journals, No. 936(Pap. X 1 A 510); 6450(X 1 A 557), 6503(X 2 A 75), 6511(X 2 A 106), 6647(X 3 A 191), 6718(X 3 A 789), 6727(X 4 A 33), 6736(X 4 A 64), 6749(X 6 B 173), 6801(X 4 A 545), 6809(X 4 A 586), 6947(XI 3 B 57); Journals, No. 965(Pap. X 2 A 15), 1849); Journals, No. 1252(Pap. X 4 A 560), 1852); PV, pp. 18, 83, 86, 131f., 142-4, 155. See also Utterback, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic," p. 104; and Colette, p. 17.

70. Journals, No. 969=JP. VI, 6497(Pap. X 2 A 45), 1849. See also JP, VI, 6647(Pap. X 3 A 191), 6654(Pap. X 3 A 258).

71. Cf. Journals, No. 861(Pap. X 1 A 11), No. 936(Pap. X 1 A 510); TC, pp. 7, 211; AN, pp. 37, 44.

72. See also Malantschuk, "Søren Kierkegaard - Poet or Pastor?," in AN and OL, pp. 16f.

73. Thompson, in his The Lonely Labyrinth, pp. 18-49, shows how deeply Kierkegaard lived in the world of his own imagination. See esp., pp. 38-40.

74. See also Paul Ricoeur, "Two Encounters with Kierkegaard," in Kierkegaard's Truth, pp. 329f.

75. Journals, No. 936(Pap. X 1 A 510). See also JP, VI, 6656(Pap. X 3 A 265), 6762(Pap. X 4 A 299). See again Malantschuk, "Tertullian," in JP, IV, p. 736.

76. See JP, IV, 4312(Pap. X 4 A 484); JP, VI, 6431(X 1 A 510), 6446(X 1 A 548), 6450(X 1 A 557), 6461(X 1 A 593), 6487(X 1 A 678), 6496(X 2 A 44), 6500(X 2 A 61), 6501(X 2 A 66), 6503(X 2 A 75), 6505(X 2 A 89), 6511(X 2 A 106), 6525(X 2 A 174), 6526(X 2 177), 6528(X 2 A 184), 6533(X 2 A 196), 6616(X 3 A 77), 6645(X 3 A 189), 6650(X 3 A 210), 6700(X 3 A 628), 6727(X 4 A 33). See also Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, p. 226, n.42; Malantschuk, "Søren

Kierkegaard - Poet or Pastor?," pp. 20f.; Rohde, SK: An Introduction, p. 128: and Dupre, p. 204.

77. JP, II, 1961(Pap. X 4 A 91), 1951. See also Journals, No. 1185(Pap. X 4 A 33), 1851; Journals, No. 942=JP, VI, 6451(Pap. X 1 A 567), 1849.

78. JP, VI, 6727(Pap. X 4 A 33). See also JP, 6505(Pap. X 2 A 89), 6528(Pap. X 2 A 184).

79. JP, VI, 6431(X 1 A 510). See also JP, VI, 6650(X 3 A 210).

80. See JP, VI 6300(Pap. X 1 A 11), 6426(Pap. X 1 A 494). See also Shestov, pp. 225f.

81. For a good discussion of the situation of Kierkegaard's Danish Church, see Heinecken, pp. 3-10.

82. Cf. JP, III, 2971(Pap. XI 1 A 234, 1854), 3335(Pap. X 3 A 580, 1850), 3617(Pap. XI 2 A 305, 1853-54); JP, IV, 4363(Pap. XI 2 A 378); JP, VI, 6774(Pap. X 4 A 358), 6776(Pap. X 4 A 367), 6780(Pap. X 4 A 383), 6795(Pap. X 4 A 511), 6922(Pap. XI2 A 40). See also Dewey, p. 43; and Rohde, SK: An Introduction, p. 145.

83. For a similar view, see Holmer, "Kierkegaard and the Truth," p. 57; and his "Kierkegaard and Logic," in Kierkegaard's Presence, p. 70; and Lefevre, "On Interpreting Kierkegaard," Journal of Religion 61 (1981), p. 92. Contrast this with the view that the conception of faith which Kierkegaard develops in the pseudonymous writings is inconsistent with his attack upon Christendom represented by Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 346.

84. Pojman, "Kierkegaard on Freedom and the Scala Paradisi," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (1985), p. 147.

85. LY, p. 105(Pap. XI 1 A 260)=JP, II, 2058. See also LY, p. 76(Pap. XI 1 A 168); JP, I, 540(Pap. X 4 A 658), 481(Pap. IX A 51); JP, II, 1495(Pap. X 5 A 108), 1496(Pap. X 5 A 109), 1503(Pap. XI 2 A 342), 1853 (Pap. X 1 A 455), 2054 (Pap. XI 1 A 168); JP, IV, 4366(Pap. VIII 1 A 48), 4816(Pap. XI 2 A 382); JP, VI, 6852(XI 2 A 335).

86. For a similar view, see Soe, "The Last Period," in Kierkegaard's View of Christianity, p. 162; Geismar, p. 84.

87. Journals, 1304(Pap. XI 1 A 61, 1854)=JP, III, 2546. See also Journals, No. 1325(Pap. XI 1 A 193), 1854.

88. See JP, III, 2484(Pap. X 1 A 213), 2465(Pap. VIII 1 A 642, 1848), 2489 (Pap X 1 A 213, 1849), 2491(Pap. X 1 A 370, 1849), 2492(Pap. X 1 A 376, 1949), 2493(Pap. X 1 A 403, 1849),

2513(Pap. X 2 A 558, 1850), 2527 (Pap. X 3 A 510, 1850), 2540(Pap. X 4 A 372, 1851); JP, VI, 6651(Pap. X 3 A 219), 6653(Pap. X 3 A 249).

89. See JP, III, 2456-2556, pp. 62-104. For a good discussion on this subject, see Johannes Sløk, "Kierkegaard and Luther," in A Kierkegaard Critique. See also Ernest B. Koenker, "SK on Luther," in Pelikan ed. Interpreters of Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968); and Malantschuk, "Luther," in JP, III, p. 803.

90. Cf. JP, III, 2513(Pap. X 2 A 558, 1850), 2518(Pap. X 3 A 153, 1850).

91. Journals, No. 1327(Pap. XI 2 A 305), 1854. See also Journals, No. 1298(Pap. XI 1 A 28), 1854.

92. Journals, No. 1326(Pap. XI 1 A 198). See also JP, VI, 6863(Pap. XI 1 A 76).

93. Journals, No. 1327(Pap. XI 2 A 305), 1854. See also Journals, No. 1298(Pap. XI 1 A 28), 1854.

94. Cf. JP, IV, 4504(Pap. XI 2 A 410); JFY, p. 202.

95. Cf. JP, II, 2551(Pap. XI 1 A 297, 1854), 2958(Pap. X 3 A 656, 1850); JP, VI, 6774(Pap. X 4 A 358), 6776(Pap. X 4 A 367).

96. LY, p. 78=JP, IV, 3881(Pap. XI 1 A 181). See also JP, IV, 3882(Pap. XI 1 A 182); and Malantschuk, "Sopenhauer," in JP, IV, pp. 631f.

97. Cf. JP, IV, 4009(Pap. VI A 105), 1845; JP, V, 5334(Pap. II C 3), 1838; JP, VI, 6435(Pap. X 1 A 519), 1839.

98. Journals, No. 1386=JP, III, 2624(Pap. XI 1 A 154), 1854) See also LY, p. 113(Pap. XI 1 A 289)=JP, III, 3643; LY, p. 73(Pap. XI 1 A 157)=JP, III, 2908); LY, p. 88(Pap, XI 1 A 204)=JP, III, 3041; LY, pp. 114f.(Pap. XI 1 A 295)=JP, III, 2620; LY, pp. 92ff.(Pap. XI 1 A 226), pp. 119f.(Pap. XI 1 A 313)=JP, III, 2621, pp. 257f.(XI 2 A 150)=JP, III, 2622; LY, p. 264(Pap. XI 2 A 150)=JP, III, 2622; LY, pp. 266ff.(XI 2 A 154)=JP, III, 2624; LY, pp. 275(Pap. XI 2 A 172)=JP, III, 2626; LY, p. 288(XI 2 A 203); LY, p. 299f.(Pap. XI 2 A 246); LY, p. 309(Pap, XI 2 A 272); JP, II, 2225(Pap. XI 1 A 151); 2223(X 5 A 132), 2224(XI 1 A 139); JP, III, 2623 (Pap. XI 2 A 153), 2627(XI 2 A 176), 2995(XI 2 A 151), 3044(XI 2 A 163), 3098(XI 1 A 299), 3213(XI 3 B 175); JP, IV, 3966(XI 1 A 219), 3970(XI 2 A 202); JP, VI, 6969(Pap. XI 2 A 439); AUC, p. 213.

99. For a similar view, see Malantschuk, "Women/man", In JP, IV, pp. 773f.

100. LY, p. 109=JP, IV, 5003(Pap. XI 1 A 281). See also JP, IV, 3965(Pap. X 2 A 536), 3970(Pap. XI 2 A 202), 4999(Pap. XI 1 A 164), 5000(Pap. XI 1 A 226), 5004(Pap. XI 1 A 282), 5007(Pap. XI 2 A 192).

101. See, e.g., Mackintosh, p. 237.

102. LY, p. 89=JP, VI, 6881(Pap. XI 1 A 209). See also JP, IV, 4349(Pap. XI 1 A 363); JP. VI, 6898(Pap. XI 1 A 423).

103. For a similar view on this subject, see Nordentoft, pp. 64f. See also Heinecken, p. 183.

104. Cf. LY, pp. 173f.(Pap. XI, 1 A 546); LY, p. 194(Pap. XI, 2 A 25), JP, III, 2630(Pap. XI 2 A 241); JP, IV, 4344(Pap. X 4 A 617).

105. See, e.g., Gates, Christendom Revisited, p. 101; and David Law, "Kierkegaard on Baptism," Theology XCI (1988), pp. 114-22. This is a good study which corrects the usual interpretation of Kierkegaard's attitude to infant baptism. For a usual interpretation, see David E. Roberts, p. 91; and Bonifazi, pp. 62f.

106. Journals, No. 1265=JP, I, 537(Pap. X 4 A 616), 1852); LY, pp. 37f.(Pap. XI 1 A 39); JP, I, 494(Pap. IX A 461), 1848.

107. Cf. JP, VI, 6662(Pap. X 3 A 367).

108. Fenger, p. 157.

In the previous sections, we have seen that Kierkegaard asserts that what the Christian thinks to be true must be different from, and antithetical to what the natural man believes to be true, even though he himself sometimes has a strong tendency to mix these two different perspectives on truth. Especially, in his later works (which we examined closely in the second section) Kierkegaard clearly shows that the Christian standpoint must be very different from the natural man's standpoint. How about his early works? In his early works, does he also show that the Christian must have the Christian view of the world which is separated from the natural man's standpoint, or can the Christian standpoint stand side by side with the natural man's standpoint within the Christian's mind? This is a very interesting question which we wish to consider in this section.

In this section, I want to consider one of Kierkegaard's early works: Philosophical Fragments. I select this text because it is the text in which Kierkegaard most clearly considers the relationship between the natural man's standpoint (the Socratic standpoint) and the Christian standpoint (even though he does not clearly say that he is considering "the Christian standpoint", which appears only as a thought-experiment). This section explores the exact relationship between the Socratic standpoint and the Christian standpoint.

It is generally agreed by Kierkegaard scholars that the Socratic standpoint and the Christian standpoint are mutually exclusive. There are many commentators who emphasize this mutual exclusivity. Among them, we shall briefly discuss the interpretation of Per Lønning, Niels Thulstrup, Robert Perkins, and Gregor Malantschuk. To begin with, Per Lønning says as follows:

> The difference between a Christian and a Socratic (humanistic) conception of truth becomes nearly boundless. For Socrates - and all his successors - truth is, in principle, the secure possession of man; it is only a matter of "the teacher" helping "the disciple" to develop the knowledge which already lies latent in him. For Christ, on the other hand, it is a matter of communicating a truth from without to a person who is completely cut off from contact with the truth - something which can only happen when "the God', in disguise, enters into man's existence, and makes himself one with it, there it exists.[1]

Niels Thulstrup also makes a similar point in his "Introduction" to Philosophical Fragments. After making it clear that the main theme of this book is the relationship between the Socratic standpoint and Christianity[2], he asserts that what we can learn from this book ["what is new in this book"] is "the absolute difference" which Kierkegaard points out actually lies between the Socratic view and Christianity.[3] Let us hear his own words:

> [What] is the relationship between [the Socratic view] and Christianity - are they identical, partially different, or entirely different; Can they be joined or are they essentially irreconcilable? The answer is that they are entirely different and are not reconcilable.[4]

He says again:

> The originality [of this book] does not consist in the comparison of Platonism and Christianity, although this was and is exceptionally well done; it rather consists in pointing out the deep essential difference between Platonism and Christianity because of the fact of the Incarnation.[5]

Both Lønning and Thulstrup thus find the fundamental reason for the difference between the Socratic view and Christianity in the fact of the Incarnation. But they do not say that the Socratic view and Christianity differ only as regards to the fact of the Incarnation. Rather, what they say is that because of the Incarnation, there is a radical difference between the Socratic and the Christian standpoints.

Perkins also observes that the Socratic view as a humanistic view contrasts with the Christian view: "As opposed to the Socratic or humanistic view that man is in possession of sufficient powers, Kierkegaard suggests as an intellectual experiment that man is destitute of the truth, that he is in error."[6] From this understanding, he draws out Kierkegaard's motive for writing this book in this way: "Kierkegaard has proposed as a project of thought that one examine an alternative to humanism, and he differentiates the Christian from the Socratic.... The result is that Kierkegaard's reader is dialectically compelled to take one or the other alternative."[7]

Malantschuk also thinks that throughout his early pseudonymous writings Kierkegaard has laid the groundwork for an understanding of the difference between the human view of life and the life-view which points toward the transcendent, and "he completes the sharpest possible demarcation between the human and the Christian" in Philosophical Fragments.[8] So according to him, this book may be properly regarded as an elaboration and full explanation of the antithesis which Kierkegaard posed in the first of the theses in The Concept of Irony, namely, that "the

similarity between Christ and Socrates consists essentially in their dissimilarity."(CI, p. 349)[9] Hence, there is a general agreement among Kierkegaard scholars that the Socratic and the Christian are mutually exclusive standpoints.[10]

Indeed, in the text itself, there is very clear sense of the antithesis between the Socratic and Christian epistemological standpoints. The Christian standpoint is suggested as the case when the situation is different from the Socratic. So Christianity represented in the form of thought-experiment is valid only if things are to be different from what is supposed in the Socratic standpoint. Let us quote the paragraph by which the scheme B starts:

> If the situation is to be different, then the moment in time must have such decisive significance that for no moment will I be able to forget it, neither in time nor in eternity, because the eternal, previously nonexistent, came into existence in that moment. With this presupposition, let us now examine the relations involved in the question: Can the Truth be learned?(PF, p. 13=PFS, p. 16)

So from now on Climacus describes the situation which is different from that of the Socratic position. In this situation, the learner, in the antecedent state, is outside the truth(PF, p. 13), or in Sin.(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 19) Hence, "[now], if the learner is to obtain the truth, [then] the teacher must bring it to him, but not only that. Along with it, he must provide him with the condition for understanding it."(PF, p. 14=PFS, p. 17) So the teacher must be the saviour who "[restores the lost condition] and along with it the truth."(PF, p. 17=PFS, p. 21) This Teacher is the God-Man. And in this situation, "[the] truth, then, is that the learner owes him [the teacher] everything."(PF,

p. 30=PFS, 38) As we have briefly observed, everything in this thought-experiment is different from the Socratic standpoint. This description is that of the situation "if things are to be otherwise". Harry A. Nielsen is one of those who make this point clear. He says: "With the phrase 'if things are to be otherwise', Climacus breaks with the Socratic assumption and instead assumes that no man has the Truth."[11] Not only this phrase, but also the context makes it clear that it is almost impossible to think otherwise. Hence, it is certain that the Socratic and the Christian are mutually exclusive.

Some people, however, try to see this relationship from the Socratic standpoint. For them, the Socratic is the normal standpoint. So, in their view, everyone should adopt this standpoint, for in this world reason is sovereign. If there were something which intervenes into the process of the world (e.g., the God-Man who does not quite fit into the structure and process of the world), it must be regarded as something which does not fit at all. According to this view, the Socratic standpoint is what is unqualifiedly valid for the realm of facts. According to them, the Christian is one who normally takes the Socratic stance, but occasionally believes something which does not quite fit into it. To repeat, this world is the one in which one should live according to the Socratic standpoint. But if there is something which does not quite fit into this standpoint, one may relate to that object with faith. Except for that special relationship, he should think and live according to the Socratic standpoint. Hence, the Christian according to this view thinks that the

God-Man is essentially absurd.[12] In this view, one must relate to such a thing in a way which defies one's understanding. This view thus sees the relation of Christianity and the Socratic from the Socratic standpoint.

Here I want to ask an important question: how about approaching the relationship between the Socratic and Christianity from the perspective of the Christian? In this section I shall attempt to describe the relationship from the perspective of the Christian. I shall make two points. First of all, from the Christian standpoint, the Socratic view in religion is regarded as wrong. Secondly, if one becomes a Christian, then one sees the world anew, one's whole view of things changes. Here the main question is: how much does his Christian standpoint affect his view of the world? Let us consider these in turn.

Firstly, from the Christian standpoint, the Socratic view of religion is regarded as wrong. That is, there is a realm (i.e., religion) which one cannot approach with the Socratic presuppositions. Actually, many commentators think that in the context of Philosophical Fragments, the Christian standpoint appears as true when one supposes that the Socratic is wrong. Let us take some examples. Robert Bretall, in his introductory remarks on Philosophical Fragments, says:

> Now, says Kierkegaard, let us assume for a moment, merely as an 'experiment of thought', that this immanent point of view (i.e., the truth as within ourselves) is not correct. Truth would then have to be brought to us from the outside; for mankind (on this second assumption) is not in the truth or the truth in him. He is rather in error...actively in error.[13]

After describing the Socratic standpoint, Croxall also says: "But

suppose Socrates is wrong? asks Johannes Climacus... Then...he [the learner] is untruth. How, then, can the learner acquire truth? Only if the teacher brings it to him."[14] So he presents Christianity as "an alternative view" to the Socratic view.[15] Dunning also speaks of Christianity in this book as "an alternative possibility", and continues: "In contrast to the reasonableness of recollection, this notion [Christianity] involves a paradox... [The] Moment occurs when the eternal breaks in upon time."[16] These two standpoints (i.e., the Socratic and the Christian) are thus two contrasting attempts to see the realm of religion. There is no possibility of compromise. Nielsen again makes an insightful comment: "Repeatedly, Climacus warns us that even the mildest sounding compromise with his severe conclusion will tip us back into the Socratic position. 'If things are to be otherwise', and the Moment decisive, our break with Socrates must be clear and total."[17] So Nielsen also speaks of "two incompatible and fundamental positions".[18]

I agree with these commentators that in this book the Socratic standpoint is the opposite of the Christian standpoint. Especially, when we read closely the following passages, we cannot help noticing the clear difference between them:

> [If] the god did not come himself, then everything would remain Socratic, we would not have the moment, and we would fail to obtain the paradox [the God-Man].(PF, p. 55=PFS, p. 68)

> But if the whole structure is not Socratic - and this in what we are assuming - then the follower owes that teacher everything (which one cannot possibly owe to Socrates....)(PF, p. 61=PFS, p. 76)

These passages suggest that the relationship between the Socratic

view and Christianity must be that of either/or. If the Socratic principle is correct, then Christianity is wrong. Likewise, if Christianity is correct, then the Socratic is wrong. Malantschuk says that "if 'the God' is truth, then Socrates' search and all human searching for truth must be declared to be untruth. Here an either/or applies."[19] And this either/or is the absolute either/or. "If this [what Christianity is supposing] is not the structure, then we are left with Socratic recollection."(PF, p. 62=PFS, p. 77) On the other hand, "[if] the moment is to have decisive significance, ...then the break has occurred, and the person can no longer come back."(PF, p. 19=PFS, p. 24) Based on this passage, Croxall asserts: "If the Instant means anything, the new-born man cannot return to his previous stage [the Socratic], and unlike Socrates' pupil, he will take no pleasure in remembering the past."[20] There is thus no possibility of both-and. So we may say that in this book the Socratic standpoint and the Christian view in religion are mutually exclusive, and from the Christian standpoint the Socratic view of religion is wrong.

Moreover, there are some special terms which make this difference clear: 'sin', 'new birth', 'conversion', 'atonement', and 'saviour'. I take the meanings of these terms in their traditional senses. If one tries to change the meanings of these terms, as in some of modern theologians, then one may say that sin is only moral deficiency, that new birth and conversion are metaphors for a change in one's way of behaviour, and etc. In such a case, the Christian who has experienced the new birth is

just one who sincerely carries out the Kantian categorical imperative in relation to Christ. But if we take the meanings of these terms in their traditional senses, then I think that the Christian who is defined in reinterpreted terms (as in Kant etc.) cannot be regarded as a Christian by Kierkegaard. Let us briefly discuss how these terms are used in this book.

"Sin" is something which does not appear in the Socratic standpoint. So here "sin" is not an eternal recollection of guilt or ignorance as we can find in Socrates' religiousness. And it is not something which is innate in man who is created by God. If this were the case, it would mean that something is wrong with God's creation itself. In this case, sin is not sin, and man has no responsibility for sin. Rather, God is the one who is responsible for it. Moreover, in this case "he previously [before being born again] would have been merely animal, and that teacher who gave him the condition along with the truth would make him a human being for the first time."(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 18) But, as a matter of fact, man once had the condition for understanding the truth, yet has been deprived of it. "This [deprivation] cannot have been due to an act of the god...or to an accident...; it must therefore have been due to himself."(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 18) This is <u>sin</u>. So it is difficult to think that in this book the concept of 'sin' is treated as some metaphysical concept as some scholars think.[21] For here "sin", as in <u>The Sickness unto Death</u>, is treated as something which man has positively committed, not only something from which he has suffered. It is true that man suffers from the consequences of sin, but sin is regarded as something

which man has caused.

The concept of becoming a new creature is also represented as something decisive. Man was created as man. Even in the state of being a sinner, man is man; even though he has lost the condition for understanding the truth, he is still man. "But he becomes another man" in the moment in which God gives him the condition for understanding the truth which the God-Man has revealed. Climacus describes this process of becoming another man very carefully. He says: "[Not] in the jesting sense - as if he became someone else of the same quality as before - but he becomes a person of a different quality."(PF, p. 18=PFS, pp. 22f.) So this becoming a new creature is not becoming a man in the ethical sense or in the sense of religiousness A. For this process is not something which can be done immanently. That is, we cannot become a new creature by relying on our resources, however sincerely we may endeavour to do so. This is a process which only God can effect; it is possible to be a new creature only in the hand of God. In his discussion of Kierkegaard, Mackintosh describes this as follows: "When He [God] recreates a man in and by faith, the thing is done by breaking all ties with the past and calling into existence what, not only in figure but in fact, is a wholly new personality. Discontinuity is all, continuity has nothing to say."[22] We have already discussed the life-giving work of the Holy Spirit in relation to Kierkegaard's later writings. The process of becoming a new creature described in the Fragments may be compared to this life-giving work of the Holy Spirit. Even though Climacus does not mention the Holy Spirit, he nevertheless

says that it is the work of God.

As a result of being a new creature, one consciously changes one's course of life. This change is called conversion. Climacus says: "[As] a result of receiving the condition in the moment, his course [of life] took the opposite direction, or he was turned around."(PF, p. 18=PFS, p. 23) Here the change in one's direction in life is clearly expressed. If he went in the direction of Socrates before, he has now turned his direction from that of Socrates to that of Christ.

For both of these processes (i.e., becoming a new creature and conversion), a "saviour" is necessary. The saviour who "does indeed save the learner from unfreedom, saves him from himself."(PF, p. 17=PFS, p. 21) This expression intimates that before being saved, man was bound and enslaved. Perhaps, this is a good place to recall the fact that Kierkegaard is a faithful Lutheran. As understood by Luther, man is enslaved, in captivity. So man needs a redeemer (or deliverer) who "redeems the learner from the captivity into which he had plunged himself, and no captivity is so terrible and so impossible to break, as that in which the individual keeps himself."(PFS, p. 21=PF, p. 17)

So far we have discussed several terms in the scheme B (Christianity represented in the form of a thought-experiment), which cannot but give us the impression that Climacus uses them in a fairly traditional sense.[23] At the very least, it is obvious that Climacus does not use these terms as they are used by someone like Schleiermacher. So in relation to these terms, we also think

that the Christian standpoint opposes the Socratic. The fact that Climacus uses these terms in the traditional sense can thus be further reason to support the view that from the Christian standpoint the Socratic view in religion is wrong.

Here one may ask a very interesting question: in Philosophical Fragments does Kierkegaard think that the object of faith is absurd, only later to change his mind about it? Does he, in fact, think of the God-Man from the Socratic view, but assert that one may believe in the God-Man, which is absurd, if one wants to be a Christian? I think we can point out several points which weigh against this suspicion.

First of all, Kierkegaard himself asserts that what is expressed in Philosophical Fragments is only what is asserted by Climacus. Climacus, who is not a Christian, asserts that the God-Man is absurd. But Kierkegaard himself, even in this period, does not think that the God-Man is absurd.[24] As Sullivan says:

> Kierkegaard did not believe that the God-man in history was a logical impossibility. He did not think that something could be truly illogical, yet existentially possible.[25]

Hence, according to Sullivan's interpretation, Kierkegaard does not think that the God-Man is absurd. This means that even in this period, Kierkegaard believes that the Christian should not consider the God-Man absurd, even while the God-Man seems to be absurd from the Socratic standpoint. Therefore, as Thomas says, there is "the logic of the Christian's belief in God."[26] Roberts also says that "faith has a definite logic, which to violate is to lose the faith."[27] Thus, if the Christian does not think that

the God-Man is absurd, then this means that according to Kierkegaard, the Christian should think from the standpoint of faith, not from the Socratic standpoint.

Secondly, there is some discussion about the meaning of the term "Forstand" ("understanding" or "the Reason") in this book.[28] We cannot know God by our reason. This is an eternal truth. God is the Personal Spirit who can be known by us only when He reveals Himself. The trouble is that we tend to think that even God's revelation is something which should not be accepted. By doing so, we indirectly assert that our reason is self-sufficient reason. Swenson says that in this book 'the Reason'[Forstand] is "the self-assurance and self-assertiveness of man's nature in its totality."[29] Hence we have to question whether one should regard this state in which reason asserts its self-sufficiency is in fact normal or rather something abnormal. Thulstrup says:

> The basis for this [offence] is man's sin, which constitutes the absolute unlikeness and makes it impossible for the human being in his actual situation to grasp with his power the Miracle, the Absolute Paradox.[30]

So according to Thulstrup, it is because human beings are in sin, that they cannot immediately respond to God's revelation in a proper way. Stendahl also says:

> Christianity...knows why we are unable to understand the miracle [of the God-Man]. It is because of Sin. Sin beclouds the human mind and makes it incapable of understanding the paradox [of the God-Man]. Sin separates man from the truth by making the two unlike each other.[31]

Dupré is of the same opinion. He says that "revelation and redemption, by which God comes into contact with him [man], become

contradictions in the situation of sin."[32] If we take this interpretation, then "the Reason"[Forstand] in this book is only self-sufficient reason. The God-Man confounds self-sufficient reason which does not function in the way in which reason should do. As Miller says, "to the self-sufficient reason, [the God-Man] appears as the absurd, the enemy of reason, because self-sufficient reason is offended...."[33] In relation to God and what God has done, however, reason in its proper state should accept them as they are, for God is sovereign, not reason. But the man who is in sin would try to make reason to be sovereign even in relation to God. Thus, self-sufficient reason asserts that the God-Man is absurd. In a sense, this assertion is better than trying to relate to the God-Man through one's self-sufficient reason, and thereby changing the God-Man into something else, as Hegel does. If we interpret the relationship between reason and the God-Man in this way, we may say that even in Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard clearly shows that the natural man who is in sin reacts against the God-Man and the Christian standpoint. Therefore, we can say that from the Christian standpoint, the Socratic view in religion is wrong. This is very obvious from the text of Philosophical Fragments.

Let us then turn to the second question in this section: if one becomes a Christian, then does one see the world anew from the Christian point of view? Does one's Christian view in any way affect one's way of understanding the world? This is a very difficult question to ask, especially in the post-Enlightenment world. And Climacus does not give us a very clear answer to this

question. However, there is, I think, some evidence in this book which compels us to the conclusion that the Christian tries to see even the world from the Christian standpoint.

First of all, I think that we have to ask whether we can think of the Christian who has two different standpoints: the Socratic standpoint (which he takes when he thinks of the world) and the Christian standpoint (which he takes when he relates to the Christian God in faith). If this is the case, then the Christian is at the very least double-minded, and at the worst schizophrenic. Climacus describes the Christian as one who used to have the Socratic standpoint but now has the new perspective on life. So the Christian is one who has changed his life-view; there is a clear break in his view of life. The Christian even tries to see the world from this changed perspective. His Christian perspective is not the Socratic standpoint (which is sufficient within the natural realm) plus the Christian view of religion (which cannot have any relationship with the realm of phenomena).

In relation to this, we may consider the "Motto" of this book: "Better well hanged than ill wed," which in fact comes from Shakespeare's Twelfth Night, Act 1, Scene v. Some critics interpret this motto as meaning that it is better to hang two things in parallel (just like hanging two things on the wall) than to mix them together. If this is the interpretation of this motto, then the Socratic view and Christianity must be parallel, and each right in its own realm. Only the mixture of them (e.g., Hegelian philosophy) is the object of criticism in this book.

But I think it may be better to interpret this motto as in the original Shakespearean context. Croxall explains the meaning of this motto in the context in the following way: "Actually what Shakespeare wrote (they are the clown's words to Maria when she threatens that her mistress will hang him for absenteeism) is, 'Many a good hanging prevents a bad marriage.'"[34] So Croxall makes it clear that "hanging" in this context is not something like hanging something on the wall, but hanging as a means of execution. Niels Thulstrup also interprets this motto in this way and he relates this hanging to the crucifixion.[35] In the new English translation of the Fragments, Hong and Hong also adopt this way of interpreting this motto.[36] Mackey also intimates a similar way of interpreting it.[37] I also think that it is more natural to interpret "hanging" as "hanging as an execution" than to interpret it as "hanging on the wall." If we adopt this interpretation, then the overall motive for writing this book can be interpreted as showing that it is better to be put to death than to try to simultaneously have the Socratic and the Christian in any way. To be a Christian is the crucifixion of the natural understanding on the cross of the Paradox of the God-Man.(cf. CUP, pp. 531, 496, 501) In this case, the Socratic and the Christian appear as two things which are opposed to each other. So here, in relation to the "Motto" of the Fragments, we can have still further reason to support the view that from the Christian standpoint the Socratic view is wrong. Hence, it seems to me very difficult to say that the Christian has in his mind two different kinds of truth: the Socratic and the Christian. One cannot simultaneously have these two epistemological standpoints. What

is demanded is either the Socratic or the Christian epistemological standpoint. Insofar as the Christian is one who has an integrated view of life, we may say that he tries to see even the Socratic realm from his Christian standpoint.

Secondly, let us think of the Christian's conception of God. In Philosophical Fragments God is described as "the God in time". Within the Christian perspective, God is understood as one who can enter into the realm of time and space. We might even say that God has entered into the Socratic realm. From the Socratic view, this God who entered into the Socratic realm is understood as absurd, or a contradiction in terms; this particular individual who indicates that he is the God-Man cannot be God at all. But from the Christian perspective, he is the God-Man. Hence, from the Christian perspective, God can enter into the Socratic realm which tries to exclude this kind of God. From the Christian perspective, the God who cannot enter into the realm of time and space is not God at all. And if the God-Man in time and space is God at all, He should be regarded as the Lord of this realm as well. He cannot be understood as one who must be subjected to the rule of reason. Neither can he be understood merely as one who is the law-giver of the natural realm and cannot break the natural law, as understood by the deists from the seventeenth century onwards. Then, He must be understood as the Lord of even the Socratic realm. From this perspective, the Christian tries to relate the natural realm (Socratic realm) to God. For him, the natural realm is not one which is autonomous and out of the reach of God. Hence one can make a point that the Christian tries to

see the world from his Christian standpoint.

Thirdly, let us think of the state in which our reason is. We have already discussed that in this book Forstand (understanding, or the reason) is understood as self-sufficient reason. How does Kierkegaard think of this self-sufficient reason? There are some scholars who assert that according to Kierkegaard, our reason (which is regarded as of prime importance in the Socratic view) is also under the influence of our sin. Pojman makes this point when he says that "the faculties of reason, emotion, and volition [are] all affected radically by sin."[38] Nielsen also says: "In short, if sin is an "existence-determinant" that saturates the total life of an individual, then it holds in the domain of thoughts as well as of conduct and feeling."[39] Miller also says that "reason is itself a human faculty susceptible to sin."[40] According to this interpretation, "what God has done for man" appears to be absurd to human reason not because what God has done is essentially absurd, but because human reason functions wrongly. If there were no sin, man could immediately respond to God with his reason, feeling, and will, that is, with his whole person. That is, he would be subject to God even in his use of reason as well as in his emotion and volition. In describing this situation, Climacus says: "Inasmuch as the learner exists, he is indeed created, and, accordingly, God must have given him the condition for understanding the truth."(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 18) This may mean that in the original state, man had immediate faith in God, and that, in this faith relationship, when he thought he could accept

the truth.[41]

But as we have seen, man has now lost this condition. He is in sin. Since there is sin, man now does not respond to God in a proper way with his reason and feeling and will. Climacus says: "The untruth...is not merely outside the truth but is polemical against the truth."(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 19) This is the reason why man in the untruth asserts that the Christian assertion that the Christian should think of the world from the Christian standpoint is absurd. Against this Christianity asserts that "the understanding [reason] is absurd"(PF p. 52=PFS, p. 65); "the paradox [of the God-Man] has made the understanding [reason] the absurd, what the understanding regards as very important is no distinguishing mark."(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 65)

These passages admit of two kinds of interpretation. According to one interpretation, the only object to which reason cannot properly relate is the God-Man. According to this interpretation, there is a normal realm in which reason is sovereign and to which there is but one exception, the God-Man. In this view, the Christian standpoint must be something like the following: as far as the things in the natural realm are concerned, one should think as the natural man thinks, but only in relation to the things which are beyond the natural realm, may one believe something which does not fit the Socratic standpoint. Only in relation to religion is the Christian's somewhat different from the natural man's standpoint. So the Socratic standpoint must be sustained even if one adopts the Christian standpoint. In contrast to this, there is another interpretation which runs as

follows: reason becomes sinful when it asserts itself to be sovereign. For if the God-Man is the truth and therefore the revealer and teacher of the truth, he must be the Lord even of the things in the world. So everything in the world, including man with his reason, should be subject to Him. It is true that even for the Christian, there is a difference between "things over which man has control" and "the paradox of the God-Man over which man has no control". But the Christian, after relating to the God-Man in faith, thinks that even in relation to things over which man has control he should be subject to God. In this sense, his reason is no longer a self-sufficient reason.

Climacus uses the expression "the Reason is set aside"(PFS, p. 79), or "the understanding is discharged."(PF, p. 64) Let us briefly consider exactly what happens when "the understanding is discharged". Does this mean that one's thinking faculty ceases to work if one has faith? I think it is difficult to answer this question affirmatively. I do not believe that Kierkegaard thinks that the believer has no thinking at all in relation to the God-Man. His faculty of thinking is still working even after becoming a Christian. Yet, his faculty of thinking now works differently from when he was not a Christian. Now he thinks that he has to think and live in accord with what God thinks and has revealed. So as a Christian he does not cease to think, and in his thinking, his faculty of thinking is subject to God and to what God has done.[42] Indeed, Kierkegaard is strongly opposed to giving up thinking as a Christian, and he emphasizes that one's standpoint must be different from when he was not a Christian.[43]

Hence, as Shestov says, "it would be mistake to think that [the paradox of the God-Man] signifies in itself the end of thinking."[44] Therefore, the Christian thinks of the world as a man of faith. According to Christianity, this is the way in which one's faculty of thinking should function. That is, even one's reason should be subject to God. So the difference between "the reason against the paradox of the God-Man" (reason in offence, or the reason of the non-believer) and "the reason [which sets] itself aside"(the reason of the believer) is the difference between the self-sufficient reason and the reason which subjects itself to God. Hence, according to the Christian, the way in which the Christian's reason functions is in fact the proper way for one's reason to function.[45]

According to this state of mind, the Christian's assertion that he sees the world from the perspective of his Christian faith is not absurd, but is true. However, this statement, for the believer, is not the truth in the sense that the natural man conceives of truth. For example, it is not truth as Hegel conceives of truth, nor as Socrates does. But it is truth as the genuine Christian should conceive of truth (i.e., who God is, and what God has done) in relation to God. The Christian has changed his conception of truth. Now as a Christian he thinks that Hegelian conception of truth is wrong, and he is against the Enlightenment conception of truth in general. If we take this interpretation, then "the Reason"[Forstand] in this book is only self-sufficient reason. The Christian standpoint confounds self-sufficient reason which does not function in the way in which

reason should do. In relation to God and what God has done, however, reason in its proper state should accept them as they are, for God is sovereign, not reason. But the man who is in sin would try to make reason to be sovereign in the world.

For those who are not still convinced that even in this book Kierkegaard indicates that the Christian should see the world anew from his Christian standpoint, I would suggest comparing Kierkegaard's Christian with the believer as understood by Rudolf Bultmann. As is well known, Bultmann clearly separates the realm of facts and the realm of faith. If Kierkegaard's Christian is Bultmann's believer, then he has the Socratic standpoint in relation to the things in the world, and only in relation to faith he takes the Christian standpoint. In this case, both the Socratic and the Christian are true: the Socratic standpoint is true in the Socratic realm and the Christian standpoint is true in the realm of faith. However, can we say that this is the case in Kierkegaard's early thinking? I strongly doubt this. As I have discussed in this section, even in Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard gives some indications that the Christian tries to see even the world from the Christian standpoint. For the Christian the so-called Socratic realm is not an autonomous realm in which self-sufficient reason is sovereign.

Let us summarize our supportive arguments for the Christian view of the relationship between the Socratic standpoint and Christianity. According to this interpretation of the book, everyone in the world thinks and lives by the Socratic standpoint, some in accordance with its ideal form and the rest adopting

somewhat distorted forms of it. (For this, see the first section of this chapter). But according to Christianity (as stated in the thought project which is contrasted with the Socratic standpoint), the Christian should not think and live by the Socratic standpoint. If the so-called Christian thinks and lives according to the Socratic standpoint, he is not a Christian in the genuine sense of the word. In this view, the Christian is one who thinks and lives according to a standpoint which is in stark contrast to the Socratic standpoint. Thus, there must be a change in one's mode of existence, the new birth, in order to be a Christian. This new birth involves a change in one's standpoint as well. After that new birth, the Christian should think and live only according to the Christian standpoint which contrasts with the Socratic. Before becoming a Christian, one believes that human beings alone can discover the truth.(cf. JP, II, 2266=Pap. II A 523(1839)) But now, after becoming a Christian, one should think that insofar as one does not relate to God in the way in which God intends, one is in error. Formerly, he thought that sin concerns only one's moral deficiencies: but now he thinks that sin concerns every aspect of the human being - cognitive, emotive, and volitional. Formerly, he thought that the realm of reason should be autonomous and even God should be subject to the rule of reason: but now he thinks that even the realm of reason must be subject to God, that God must be sovereign even in the realm of reason. Formerly, he thought that the God-Man was a contradiction in terms: but now he passionately accepts the fact of the God-Man. Now, for the Christian, "just as truth is <u>index sui et falsi</u> [the criterion of itself and of the false], so also is the

paradox [of the God-Man]...."(PF, p. 50=PFS, p. 63) Now he thinks that the historical fact of the God-Man is the absolute fact which can be contemporary with every generation. By the "absolute fact" Kierkegaard does not mean that the fact of the God-Man is an eternal fact as in the sense in which Hegel does. For Kierkegaard, the absolute fact is "a historical fact."(PF, p. 100=PFS, p. 125) There is no other absolute fact except the historical Jesus who is the God-Man. However, as a historical fact, the fact of the God-Man differs from all other historical facts, for unlike them it can be contemporary with every generation. Climacus says:

> [Whatever] can be apportioned essentially by time is eo ipso not the absolute, because that would imply that the absolute itself is a casus[46] in life, a status in relation to something else, whereas the absolute, although declinable in all the casibus of life, is continually the same and in its continual relation to something else is continually status absolutus. But the absolute fact is indeed also historical.(PF, pp. 99f.=PFS, p. 125)

In this sense, the fact of the God-Man is called the absolute fact in Philosophical Fragments. To reiterate, before becoming a Christian one thinks that there is no such thing as the absolute fact, but now the Christian thinks that the God-Man is the absolute fact. Formerly he felt that essentially there was no need of a divine teacher, but now he thinks that without the God-Man as the divine teacher he cannot know the conclusive truth at all. It would be a very long list, if we were to continue in this manner, but I think this suffices to show that even in Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard indicates that the Christian standpoint differs radically from the Socratic. Hence, according to our view, in this book the Socratic standpoint as a whole is

contrasted with the Christian standpoint. What Climacus tries to do is to set us before the either/or: either the Socratic standpoint or the Christian standpoint. According to this view, there is no such thing as thinking on the basis of the Christian standpoint only in relation to the God-Man and faith, and in relation to everything else, thinking on the basis of the Socratic standpoint. Christian revelation does not concern only what is called spiritual in the restricted sense of the word; rather, it concerns reality as a whole. Reality as understood by God is the truth. If this is so, reality partly understood correctly (i.e., as it is understood by God) and partly understood incorrectly is not the truth. Even though one can correctly know several facts, unless these are related to God, one's knowledge is only partially true.[47] In this sense, according to our view, only in relation to God can one have the truth. Until one has the right relationship to God (i.e., insofar as one continues with the Socratic standpoint), one does not have the conclusive truth. This is the reason why the Christian tries consistently to contrast the Socratic and Christian standpoints. The Christian standpoint is opposed to the Socratic standpoint, and the Christian sees the world anew from his Christian standpoint.[48] That is, according to this view, the Christian should abandon the presuppositions and general orientation of the Socratic standpoint which he had in common with other persons before becoming a Christian.[49]

What I am arguing in this section is not that this way of interpreting Philosophical Fragments is the only way to interpret this book. But I think that this interpretation of Philosophical Fragments should be regarded as a viable one. For the person who accepts this interpretation, Kierkegaard's early writings seem to have a kind of continuity with his later writings after 1846[50], in which Kierkegaard clearly shows that the Christian standpoint as a whole is fundamentally different from the natural man's standpoint. But for the person who does not accept our interpretation, Kierkegaard's early writings are somewhat different from his later writings; then, he has to say that there is a change in Kierkegaard's thinking or in the way he expresses his thought. I do not judge this matter here, but leave it to the judgment of each reader. I merely want to suggest that it is possible to interpret Philosophical Fragments in the way I have described in this section.

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What then can we say in concluding on Kierkegaard's views on the question of epistemological standpoints? We have seen in the first section what the presuppositions and general orientation of the natural man's standpoint are. In that section, we have seen that for the natural man, reason as self-sufficient is either the absolute criterion of all things, or is that to which all things must be plausible according to its judgement, even when those things fall outside the realm of pure reason. In contrast to this natural man's standpoint, the Christian standpoint, which we have examined in the second section, is one which tries to subject

everything to God. We have seen that the Christian depicted in Kierkegaard's writings asserts that not only in relation to the God-Man, but also in relation to other things, should one subject oneself to God. Kierkegaard himself sometimes finds that this is too much for human beings, but nevertheless he says that we should try to keep the pure Christian standpoint as it is, and not to try to mix this with the natural man's standpoint (third section). In the last section, we have considered the question of whether or not Kierkegaard's early writings are consistent with his later writings in this matter. Through an examination of the relationship between the Socratic and Christian standpoints in Philosophical Fragments, we have argued that at the very least it is possible to interpret this book consistently with his later writings, even though there is room for different interpretations because of the ambiguities of the text.

Based on this examination, we could conclude this chapter by saying that it is clear that in his later writings, Kierkegaard thinks that the Christian epistemological standpoint is different from the natural man's standpoint (so that becoming a Christian involves a change in one's epistemological standpoint); and that it is possible to say that even in his early writings, Kierkegaard thinks that the Christian should think differently from the natural man.

NOTES

1. Per Lønning, "Kierkegaard as a Christian Thinker," p. 173.

2. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," to PFS, p. xlv.

3. Ibid., p. lx.

4. Ibid., p. lxix.

5. Ibid., p. lxxxvii.

6. Perkins, Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 9ff. Thompson also speaks of "the difference between the Socratic and the Christian standpoints."(see his "The Master of Irony," p. 111. See also Miller, p. 83; and Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, p. 106.

7. Ibid., p. 13. See also Evans, Kierkegaard's 'Fragments' and 'Postscript', p. 32, n. 12, and p. 208; Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, p. 138; Johnson, The Concept of Existence in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 22; and Stendahl, pp. 164f.

8. Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 245.

9. Ibid., p. 246.

10. See also Miller, pp. 87ff.; Heinecken, pp. 101f.; Magel, p. 38; Pojman, "Kierkegaard on Faith and History," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1982), p. 58; and Wisdo, "Kierkegaard on Belief, Faith and Explanation," p. 97.

11. Harry A. Nielsen, Where the Passion is. A Reading of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments (Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1983), p. 5.

12. See, e.g., Penelhum, pp. 82, 92.

13. Robert Bretall, in A Kierkegaard Anthology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946). Emphasis is given.

14. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, pp. 167f.

15. Ibid., p. 167. Evans also thinks that, in this book, Christianity is expressed as an alternative to the Socratic view. See his Kierkegaard's 'Fragments' and 'Postscript', p. 208.

16. Dunning, p. 167.

17. Nielsen, p. 8.

18. Ibid., p. 21. cf. p. 198.

19. Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 247. See also p. 248: "In Philosophical Fragments, then, Climacus demonstrates that viewed from the standpoint of Christianity, all Socratic and human interpretations of existence must be stamped as untrue." See again Stephen Crites, "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and Act," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 204.

20. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 169.

21. Niels Thulstrup mentions T. Bohlin, F. Petersen, N. Teisen, A.B. Drachmann in this connection. See his "Commentary," in PFS, pp. 191. See also Kenneth Hamilton, "Kierkegaard on Sin," Scottish Journal of Theology 17(1964), pp. 289-302.

22. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p. 249. See also Michael Heymel, Das Humane lernen: Glaube und Erziehung bei Søren Kierkegaard (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1988), p. 10.

23. See also JP, VI, 6686(Pap. X 3 A 526); Roberts, Faith, Reason, and History, pp. 19f.; Heinecken, pp. 102-6; Miller, p. 110; and Utterback, pp. 221ff. Mackey, in his "A Ram in the Afternoon," also makes a similar point. But in another place (p. 228) he makes a reservation of his assertion.

24. See JP, VI, 6597(Pap. X 2 A 601), 6598(Pap. X 6 B 68).

25. Sullivan, Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard, pp. 95f.

26. Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, p. 134.

27. Roberts, Faith, Reason and History, pp. 59f.

28. See, e.g., E.D. Klemke, "Logicality versus Alogicality in the Christian Faith," Journal of Religion 38 (1958), p. 110; Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," to PFS, pp. lxv, xci; Mackey, "A Ram in the Afternoon," p. 200; and Roberts, Faith, Reason and History, pp. 61-63.

29. Swenson, "Translator's Notes," in PFS, p. 222.

30. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," to PFS, p. lxxv. See also Roberts, Faith, Reason and History, p. 84.

31. Stendahl, p. 165. For another good argument that sin involves an intellectual dimension as well as volitional dimension, see Utterback, pp. 135-8.

32. Dupré, p. 134. See also Mackintosh, pp. 240, 242.

33. Miller, p. 125.

34. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 166.

35. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentary," in PFS, p. 152.

36. PF and JC, eds. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 274n.

37. Mackey, "The Poetry of Inwardness," p. 66.

38. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, p. 121. See also Penelhum, pp. 82f.

39. Nielsen, pp. 18f., emphasis given.

40. Miller, p. 118.

41. See also Nordentoft, p. 363.

42. Cf. JP, III, 3383(Pap. III C 9), 3402(Pap. VI B 164), 3410(Pap. VIII 1 A 55), 3464(Pap. XI 1 A 578).

43. See JP, III, 3646(Pap. X 3 A 23); JP, VI, 6234(Pap. IX A 222).

44. Shestov, p. 89. See also p. 187. See also Utterback, pp. 40ff., 82.

45. For a similar view, see Shestov, pp. 87f.

46. Cf. Niels Thulstrup's commentary on this passage in PFS, p. 256. See also PF, pp. 317f., note 23.

47. Cf. JP, II, 2289(Pap. VII 1 A 234, 1845-47)); JP, III, 3399(Pap. VI B 154).

48. See also Stendahl, p. 177.

49. Cf. JP, II, 2252=Pap. II C 48(1837), JP, II, 2277=Pap. III A 211(1840)).

50. See JP, VI, 6346(Pap. X 1 A 116).

Conclusion

We have now reached the end of our quest to understand the relationship between the ethical sphere and Christianity in Kierkegaard's thought. As suggested in the introduction to this study, we found that in Kierkegaard's writings there was a very strong emphasis on the difference and discontinuity between these two spheres. Let us (1) briefly summarize the discussion of this study, then (2) draw out some implications for Kierkegaard's theory of the existence-spheres as a whole and (3) suggest some implications for Christian theology today.

We started by asking whether there is a difference and discontinuity between "rationalistic ethics" (the ethics of the person who is in the ethical sphere) and Christian ethics. {See Chapter One.} In the examination of Fear and Trembling we found Johannes de Silentio, the pseudonymous author of the book, could not accept and understand Abraham's act of faith. In this examination, we saw that Johannes de Silentio had a religiousness which was compatible with the ethical sphere. In this book, we have also seen that there was some indication that the Christian who has faith regards as ethical only loving others in the Christian way. Here we saw a hint of a new ethics which follows from faith.

To answer the question as to whether there is any clear description of this new ethics, we turned to Works of Love. In this book, we identified the ethics of Christian love, according

to which only a ethic based on a stance of faith is regarded as "genuine morality"(WL, p. 42). Christian love was analyzed as (1) love as a response to the trinitarian God's love, (2) love which has God as its middle term, and (3) love which has social implications. In the course of our discussion, we found that Christian love was regarded as something wholly different from merely human love. Therefore, we concluded this section with the assertion that the ethics of Christian love was different and discontinuous from merely human love.

In the next section, we examined Christian ethics as the ethics of Christian discipleship. Through an examination of some parts of Philosophical Fragments and Training in Christianity we argued that Christian ethics, as understood by Kierkegaard, is different from merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagianism. It is not merely ethical discipleship, in that only in relation to God (to put it more clearly, under God's grace) can one follow Christ. It is not semi-Pelagian in that even though the Christian endeavours to follow Christ, this endeavour itself comes from gratitude for God's redemptive work. Moreover Kierkegaard's Christian does not attribute any merit to his own endeavour. We concluded in this section that Kierkegaard's Christian ethics was the ethics of Christian discipleship; only those who became Christ's disciples by believing that he is the God-Man could follow Christ.

Throughout this chapter's discussion we argued that Christian ethics was not only different from the ethics of the ethical person, but also antithetical to it. For ethics based on merely human love was criticized severely in Works of Love, and the merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagian discipleship were regarded as misunderstandings of Christian ethics.

We turned, in the second chapter, to the consideration of the problem of becoming oneself. In this chapter, we firstly examined the second volume of Either/Or, and found that for the ethical person, to be oneself was (1) to be ethical, (2) to choose oneself in one's eternal validity, and (3) to be the absolute self. So we argued that the ethical self was an autonomous self which tried to be itself by itself, and which almost made itself the absolute. Therefore, for the ethical person, in the final analysis, the self became almost divine.

In contrast, the Christian self is totally dependent on God in its becoming itself. We drew this conclusion from an examination of The Sickness unto Death. In our examination, we argued that even though there were some ambiguities in this book, despair as sin was clearly understood only by the Christian who believed in the forgiveness of sin by God and had faith. Only the existing individual who is in faith is regarded as overcoming the despair and having become a "self" (or "spirit"). Thus, we identified the difference and discontinuity between the ethical understanding of the self and the Christian understanding of the self. We pointed out that in their understandings of the eternal, of the power of self, these two viewpoints were different from one

another.

In the last section of this second chapter, we raised the question of the understanding of the self of the person in religiousness A. This question was raised because the person in religiousness A (which seemed to be quite compatible with the ethical sphere) asserted that one could be oneself only in relation to God. Therefore, we asked what he meant by "only in relation to God". By an examination of the Socratic understanding of this phrase, and an analysis of Socratic inwardness, we argued that those in religiousness A had a different God, or different conception of God, from the Christian God. We also argued that this difference between their respective conceptions of God was the fundamental reason for the difference between the Christian understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in religiousness A. Through the discussion of this section, we found that insofar as one held such Socratic presuppositions, one's religiousness could not be Christian religiousness.

In the third chapter, we examined the problem of epistemology. Firstly, we drew out, from Kierkegaard's various pseudonymous writings, the presuppositions and epistemological standpoint of the natural man. Then, we compared this with the Christian epistemological standpoint which was drawn from Kierkegaard's later writings. We argued that in his later writings there were very clear indications that the Christian has an epistemological standpoint which is substantially different from that of the natural man.

We turned then to an examination of Kierkegaard's journal entries in order to discern whether he himself always thought according to his descriptions of how Christians should think. In this examination, we found that he himself showed that he could not always think in the way which he asserted that the Christian should think. Nevertheless, we also found that in spite of this, he did not compromise and say that it was proper and inevitable for us to mix the Christian standpoint and the natural man's standpoint. Rather, he strongly resisted the idea that such a mixture was Christian. Here we found one of the main reasons why he always hesitated to call himself a Christian.

Next we returned to one of Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous writings, Philosophical Fragments, to show that Kierkegaard's ultimate intention in writing this book can be interpreted in a manner consistent with his later writings. We argued that even though, because of the ambiguity in this book, there are other ways of interpreting it, it is also possible that the Socratic standpoint and the Christian standpoint are two exclusive views of reality as a whole, and that even in this book Kierkegaard tried to show the difference and discontinuity of the Socratic (humanist) standpoint and the Christian standpoint. According to this interpretation of Kierkegaard's intention, he who has the Christian point of view should see and consider everything from the Christian standpoint; for him, there is no autonomous realm to be thought of from the Socratic (humanistic) standpoint.

Therefore, we can now conclude that for Kierkegaard Christian ethics follows from Christian theology (his Christian theistic faith), and the understanding of becoming oneself also follows from the Christian's stance of faith (so that the Christian self is regarded as the "theological self"), and his epistemological standpoint is also Christian. For Kierkegaard's Christian, as Kierkegaard interpreted Paul, whatever comes not from faith is sin.(cf. JP, III, 3194(Pap. X 1 A 392); SUD, p. 100) In this sense, there is a wide gap between the Christian sphere and the ethical sphere, or to put this another way, their direction is different: one is theistic and one humanistic. For Kierkegaard, to be a Christian thus involves a change in one's ethics, in one's understanding of becoming oneself, and in one's epistemological standpoint. This study is of value if it makes clear the difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. At the very least, if this study has aroused the reader's attention in such a way as to make indifference impossible, then it has performed its function.

Let us, then, turn to the consideration of the implications of this discussion.

Firstly, what are the implications of this study for Kierkegaard's theory of spheres of life as a whole? The answer to this question can be inferred from the relation between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere (which was the main theme of our discussion) and the relation between the ethical sphere and religiousness A, and between religiousness A and the Christian sphere (at which we have glanced briefly in the course of the

discussion). We have already seen that there is a clear-cut distinction between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. We have also seen that religiousness A is quite compatible with the ethical sphere. And we argued that religiousness A and the Christian sphere are far apart. They are different not simply in degree but in kind. Therefore, if we place these (i.e., the ethical, religiousness A, and religiousness B) side by side, we cannot help noticing that the gap between religiousness A and Christianity is wider and deeper than that between religiousness A and the ethical sphere. Since we have not discussed the aesthetic sphere extensively, it would be somewhat unfair to make any conclusive statements about the interrelationship between the aesthetic sphere, the ethical sphere, religiousness A, and religiousness B. However, insofar as the aesthetic sphere, with the ethical sphere and religiousness A, is regarded by Kierkegaard as being immanent in the sense that it does not know of real transcendence, it is not too far from the truth to say that there is the most serious either/or between these three immanent life-views on the one hand, and the Christian sphere, on the other.[1] For, as Stephen Crites says,

> [Once] the category of [the Christian] faith in the absolute paradox is rigorously enunciated, all the intervening stages lose their sharpness of definition in this new light. They are reduced to more or less complex modes of recollection, and we are left with the simple alternatives: Socrates or Christ - either/or.[2]

The leap of faith is only applicable in relation to Christian faith in the God-Man. It is true that there are also leaps between these three life-views (the aesthetic sphere, the ethical sphere and religiousness A). However, these are only within

immanence. As far as these leaps within immanence are concerned, there is no need of the God-Man's help; man can by himself make these leaps. Only the leap of the Christian faith is something which man cannot make by himself. It is something which can be done only in relation to, or by the aid of, the God-Man. Moreover, when we think that the Socratic is the highest within the immanent life-views, we can have a kind of hierarchical system between the three life-views of immanentism. However, all our human attempts become nothing in the face of the God-Man. As Climacus says:

> Because of the Moment the learner is in Error; and man, who had [been understood] before [being] possessed self-knowledge, now becomes bewildered with respect to himself; instead of self-knowledge he receives the consciousness of sin, and so forth; for as soon as we posit the Moment everything follows of itself.(PFS, p. 64)

If there were no such thing as the Christ event in this world, then each of us should try to be a Socrates. The Socratic standpoint is the highest ideal for humanity. However, in the face of the God-Man, the Socratic standpoint is declared to be wrong. In this sense, there is a substantial gap between the life-views of immanence and Christianity.

Hence we may say that the ethical life-view taken as a whole is totally different and discontinuous from the Christian life-view taken as a whole. Accordingly, we have to say that being a Christian and being an ethical person are alternatives. The relationship between the ethical sphere and religiousness A may be considered as that of progression. For, as we have seen, religiousness A is quite compatible with the ethical sphere. By

maximizing subjectivity without making any change in one's epistemological standpoint, the ethical person can become a religious person, and in this case, his religiousness is religiousness A. But it is very difficult to say that one goes from the ethical or religiousness A to the Christian sphere in a similar way. Here the word "leap" has to be used in its genuine sense. First of all, this leap is not possible by one's own power. Secondly, if one makes this leap of faith by receiving the condition from God, then one should change (1) one's ethics, (2) one's understanding of oneself, and (3) one's epistemological standpoint.

Now, let us turn to the next question: what implications for doing theology can we draw from this study? What I want to ask are complex questions about what we can learn from Kierkegaard today. What should we, who are doing theology at the end of the twentieth century, learn from Kierkegaard? In what follows, I will draw out from this study four implications for doing theology. The first one is concerned with the epistemological standpoint on which, and from which, the Christian should develop his theology; the second is concerned with Christology; the third with the relation between God and the world (especially, man); and the fourth with the existential character of Christian theology.

First of all, if what we have observed in this study is valid, then what we can learn from Kierkegaard is that Christian theology should be developed on the basis of the Christian epistemological standpoint, which we have examined in the second section of the third chapter. It is impossible for Kierkegaard to

develop a Christian theology either from the standpoint of the natural man, or by mixing together the natural man's standpoint and the Christian standpoint. Moreover one should not present Christian theology in the way in which the natural man can accept it without any problem. One should not try to remove the possibility of offence. In this sense, Christian theology should make clear the difference between the Christian's epistemological standpoint and the natural man's epistemological standpoint. Trying to mix the Christian standpoint and the natural man's standpoint in one's "Christian" theology would be severely criticized by Kierkegaard. In this sense, for Kierkegaard, Christian theology must be the theology which sheds light on the problem of being a Christian in every situation. A theology which has nothing to do with being a Christian in the Kierkegaardian sense of the word would be excluded by Kierkegaard from the domain of Christian theology. If one tries to develop a theology either from a non-Christian perspective or from the mixed perspective of the natural man and the Christian, Kierkegaard would say that it might just be called theology, but not "Christian" theology. He would say that one might develop one's own theology, but in so far as one's theology is not based on the Christian standpoint, it is not a "Christian" theology. In this sense, Kierkegaard is close to Tertullian who claimed that any discussion about God from a standpoint outside the Christian faith had nothing to do with Christianity and the Christian God.[3] In brief, the first lesson we can learn from Kierkegaard's view of the relation of Christianity to the ethical sphere is that Christian theological thinking is thinking which arises out of the stance of Christian

faith.

Secondly, in relation to a special point, Christology, one must bear in mind the fact that Kierkegaard makes it clear that Jesus whilst an individual human being is at the same time God. Surely, Kierkegaard himself thought that he was taking up Athanasian Nicene Christology. As Howard A. Johnson puts it: "Throughout his authorship Kierkegaard's point of reference was a full, orthodox Athanasian Nicene Christianity, although for strategic reasons he usually kept it concealed."[4] What is interesting is that Kierkegaard saw the incommensurability between the idea of the God-Man and the presuppositions of the natural man's thought which are clearly expressed in Enlightenment thought. In order to show clearly that the fact of the God-Man cannot be acceptable to the epistemological standpoint of the natural man, Kierkegaard lets Climacus use the terms "absurd", "contradiction" etc.[5] As a person who lives after the Enlightenment, Kierkegaard translates Chalcedonian Christology such a way as to bring it up to date for the modern age. A Christian theology which is faithful to Kierkegaard's challenge must be one which is faithful to the fact of the God-Man. Especially in modern times, this aspect is very important. For, if we are not careful, then it is easy to give the impression either that the God-Man is what Kierkegaard calls "the divine uncle George", or that the God-Man is only in the realm which is beyond time and space. According to Kierkegaard, as he interprets Chalcedonian Christology, it is crucial for being a Christian and for Christian theology to regard Jesus as an individual human

being and at the same time as God.[6] Moreover, according to Kierkegaard, Christian theology must come from this God-Man's activity of redemption.(JP, I, 412=Pap. I A 27)

Kierkegaard knew that the Christology which he asserted to be true would be regarded as crazy by his contemporaries; it was something to be laughed at. But Kierkegaard thought that if one wants to be a Christian, one should not be ashamed of being laughed at. Kierkegaard says:

> Formerly martyrdom always meant blood-martyrs; nowadays we perhaps can also think of the martyrdom of laughter. In a rational age the martyrdom of laughter is just what is expected for wanting to be [a Christian]."(JP, II, 2046=Pap. X 5 A 121, cf. JP, III, 2645=Pap. IX A 435)

Nowadays the situation is worse than in his day. People criticize Kierkegaard from the point of view of modernized Christianity. From that perspective, Kierkegaard is regarded as being not at all relevant today. However, here is Kierkegaard's point: should we accept God's becoming an individual human being without ceasing to be God, or should we try to modify this idea of incarnation in order to make it acceptable to the post-Enlightenment man? This is a very serious question, which Kierkegaard answered in his time with the assertion that one should not try to remove the possibility of offence. Kierkegaard's contribution is to show that Christianity does not "fit" easily into the post-Enlightenment world. He shows us the offence of Christianity. He sees the clash between Christianity and the modern world. He sees that to say an individual was God runs counter to post-Enlightenment thought. Accordingly, he reacted against the attempts of people from Kant onwards to make sense of

Christology; he thought that attempting to translate Christianity to make it more acceptable to the modern man, was mistaken. Perhaps Kierkegaard's description of Paul may be applied to Kierkegaard himself as well:

> Even if half the world had derided him and the other little half had taken offense, he would not have changed a thing, not a whit, even if he must then have taken the teaching with him to the grave without winning a single one.(JP, IV, 3916(Pap. IV C 1))

In the light of this, what should we, who live at the end of the twentieth century, do? This is one of the most crucial questions which confronts the twentieth century Christian. As a matter of fact, it is more difficult nowadays to accept that the historical Jesus is God, because all sorts of problems concerning historical criticism have come into prominence since Kierkegaard carried out his work. Many theologians today often try to make Christianity fit with modernity. By doing so they often fail to show us the offence of Christianity. They often fail to make it clear that Christianity just does not fit easily with modernity. Therefore, I believe that Kierkegaard has an essential message for us today, even though we are in a different situation from his. We are still, to an even greater degree, in the situation of either/or: either accepting the paradox of the God-Man, or trying to make the idea of the God-Man acceptable to the modern man.

Thirdly, concerning the relationship between God and the world (man, in particular) we may learn from Kierkegaard that Christian theology must keep away from both monism and absolute dualism. By monism, I mean the view that there is no fundamental discontinuity between God on the one hand and man and the world on

the other. By absolute dualism, I mean the view which completely separates the realm of God and realm of time and space so that, according to this dualism, even God cannot intervene in the process of history. Let us consider how Kierkegaard's position can be a challenge to each of these views.

The clearest form of monism in modern thought is Hegelian monism. As is well-known, in the thought of Hegel everything is integrated into the process of the self-development of the absolute Spirit. In this thought-system, in the final analysis, there is only One which integrates everything into Itself. Thus, even the finite self, by its use of reason, can participate in the infinite thought of the Absolute Sprit. It is clear that Kierkegaard is critical of this kind of monism. Accordingly, some theological treatises of modern times which try to adopt Hegelian thought as one vital element in their theology or which try to base their theology on Hegelian thought would be the objects of Kierkegaard's severe criticism. Especially, according to this absolute monism, there is only the totally immanent God; apart from nature and the process of history, there is no God.[7] God also must participate in and be modified by this concrete history. Therefore, in this absolute monism, there is a close relationship between God and man. Hegel says: "Human reason - the consciousness of one's being - is indeed reason; it is the divine in man."[8] Thus, as Jerry H. Gill says, "there is an essential unity between the knower and ultimate reality, which enables the mind of the former to reflect the latter - even though this unity is very often hidden behind the vicissitudes of sensory

experience".[9] Hence the Absolute, for Hegel, only means the infinitization and eternalization of some quality or essence that is supposed to be relatively present in human beings. For instance, if man is characterized as rational, then God becomes the absolutely rational being, the absolute reason. The difference between God and man is only in degree, not in kind. There cannot be any qualitative difference between them, only the relative difference between a finite being and an infinite being. This is the reason why Kierkegaard's Christian cannot accept this monistic thought.

At the same time, Christian thought cannot be absolutely dualistic either. Absolute dualism can take different forms. The classical form of absolute dualism can be found in the thought of Plato. The world of ideas is absolutely differentiated from the world of phenomena. What is needed is to escape from the world of phenomena to the world of Ideas. For the traditional Platonists, "salvation" means being lifted out of the temporal into the eternal. This is the reason why the body and the physical are consistently devalued in Plato's and his followers' thoughts. We have seen that in the last period of Kierkegaard's thought, there are some elements which follow this dualistic pattern of thought, but we have argued that this is not in accordance with the Christian standpoint.

In modern thought, absolute dualism exists <u>in different forms</u> in the works of various thinkers. The most typical form of absolute dualism can be seen in the work of the early Barth. The absolute differentiation between the realm of value and the realm

of fact observed in the theology of Rudolf Bultmann is also a form of absolute dualism. These modern forms of absolute dualism can be said to be based on Kantian dualism.

In a sense, Kierkegaard's position is closer to dualism than Hegelian monism.(cf. JP, I, 704=Pap. IV A 192) For instance, for Kierkegaard, there is a qualitative difference between God and man. As far as this difference between God and man is concerned, Kierkegaard is a dualist. However, in the God-Man, Kierkegaard finds that there is the clear intimation that there will be a time in which this dualistic structure will cease to be. This does not mean that there will be no difference between God and man. In so far as the difference between God and man is concerned, there will always be a clear difference and distinction between God and man, even in a situation in which sin is removed.[10] However, there will be direct fellowship [communio] between God and men. Even before that time, those who have faith in the God-Man must live in that fellowship and therefore must think in such a way that they overcome absolute monism and absolute dualism.(cf. JP, I, 705=Pap. V A 68)

Insofar as Kierkegaard asserts that the God-Man is in time and history, in the realm of phenomena as opposed to the realm of noumena, we have to say that Kierkegaardian dualism is not the absolute dualism that we can see in Plato, the early Barth, and Bultmann. According to this absolute dualism, God cannot be in time and space. What is in the realm of phenomena cannot be God or what God does. In this sense, in a system which is one of absolute dualism, God cannot directly intervene in the process of

time and history. But for Kierkegaard, since God comes into existence in time and history, there is the absolute paradox. God can intervene in the process of history. In this sense, Kierkegaard's dualism is not one of absolute dualism: God can break the dualistic structure. God is immanent without ceasing to be transcendent.

However, Kierkegaard's God who is both immanent and transcendent is also different from Schleiermacher's "immanently transcendent God." By "immanently transcendent" I mean that Schleiermacher's conception of God is neither absolutely immanent as Hegel's God is, nor absolutely transcendent as the early Barth's God is. Schleiermacher's God, however, is transcendent only in his immanence. As we have seen, Schleiermacher thinks that it is difficult to conceive of a personal God who was before the creation of the world. His God is God only in relation to this world. Thus, God's transcendence can only be defined immanently. Likewise, in his theology there is a naturalization of the supernatural. In this sense, Schleiermacher himself calls his position "natural supernaturalism".[11] Hence, even though he says that Christianity is both supernatural and natural, Christianity is presented in a way in which the supernatural element is naturalized; the supernatural element is explained away. This is the reason why the Incarnation, in the classical sense of the word, is impossible in his theology. So he is beginning to respond to the modern age - in a way that Kierkegaard is not. But for Kierkegaard, the God who came into the world in the Incarnation is the transcendent God, and He is the

transcendent, personal God even before the creation of the world. In this sense, Kierkegaard's way of overcoming absolute dualism is fundamentally different from that of Schleiermacher who looks to immanence for the answer.

One last thing we can learn from Kierkegaard is that Christian theology developed on the basis of the Christian standpoint must be lived out in practice. Christians should live commensurately with their Christian theology. In this sense, Christian theology cannot be carried out by one's thinking faculty alone. One's whole being must be mobilized in one's theology. Without passion and will one cannot do theology. The theology which has nothing to do with the concrete problem of being an existential Christian is regarded by Kierkegaard as not a Christian theology. In this sense, as we asserted in the first chapter, Christian ethics follows from Christian faith. According to Kierkegaard, Christian theology should not be something which is "invented in order to evade doing God's will."(JP, III, 3597(Pap. XI 2 A 376)) For "[after] all, the essentially Christian thing to do is not to write but to exist."(JP, VI, 6840(Pap. X 5 A 105)) In this sense, Christian theology must be existential Christian theology, though not in the sense of Bultmannian theology or Tillichian theology. To develop further this theme, interesting though it is, is outside the scope of this study.[12] I merely want to say that what we have discussed in the second chapter must be borne in mind when we develop this new kind of existential Christian theology.

These are the things which I think we can learn from Kierkegaard, even though we are in a different situation from his. Observing from our present situation how Kierkegaard in his age avoided many attempts to adapt Christianity to the modern age, we may learn from him how to avoid the same kind of pitfalls in our own age. Since, however, we are living in a different age, managing to avoid these pitfalls may be difficult, because more radical issues have arisen in biblical scholarship. It is true that even Kierkegaard himself was not constantly faithful to the Christian standpoint, as we have seen. Also it is doubtful whether there is anyone, especially in today's more complex situation, who is constantly faithful in his theology to the Christian standpoint as defined by Kierkegaard. However, Kierkegaard does not compromise by saying that one can regard such lapses as acceptable. At the very least, he makes it clear that if one cannot think and live as a Christian, one should not regard oneself as a Christian. Likewise, if one's so-called Christian theology is not constantly faithful to what he regards as Christian presuppositions and the Christian standpoint, it is not regarded by Kierkegaard as Christian theology. In this sense, Kierkegaard can present a real challenge to our various "Christian" theologies, even though we are in a different situation from his. This conclusion comes from our interpretation of the relation of Christianity to the ethical sphere in the thought of Kierkegaard.

What, then, is the relationship between the ethical sphere and Christianity in the thought of Søren Kierkegaard? This study's final answer to this question is that Christianity is different from and discontinuous from the ethical sphere. To be a Christian involves a change in one's ethics, in one's understanding of oneself, and in one's epistemological standpoint.

NOTES

1. For a similar view, see Weiland, Humanitas Christianitas, pp. 31-35.

2. Crites, "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and as Act," p. 204. See also Weiland, pp. 32f.

3. Cf. Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher, Life and Thought, p. 107.

4. Howard A. Johnson, "Introduction," to JP. I, pp. xxvii-xxviii. See also Soe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Paradox," p. 223; Geismar, p. 63; Bonifazi, pp. 92. 172; Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, p. 108; Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 206; Dewey, The New Obedience, pp. 78. 164; and Colette, p. 46.

Here three interesting questions can be raised, which I cannot try to answer in this study because of its limited scope. Firstly, what is the exact relationship between Kierkegaard's understanding of the God-Man and Nicene-Chalcedonian Christology? This is worthwhile thinking about especially in relation to the modern interpretation of patristic Christology, which emphasizes the fact that the Nicene and Chalcedonian Church Fathers thought in accordance with the Greek conception of the universal. Cf. Frances Young, "A Cloud of Witnesses," in John Hick, ed. The Myth of God Incarnate (London: SCM, 1977), pp. 24ff., 28f.; Richard A Norris, "Interpreting the Doctrine of the Incarnation," in D.R. McDonald, ed. The Myth/Truth of God Incarnate (Witon, Connecticut: Morehouse-Barlow, 1979), p. 71; and Dennis Nineham, "God Incarnate: Why 'Myth', in ibid., pp. 54, 58. Hence, according to the modern interpreters, even though "within their contemporary context [their theology was] a remarkable achievement"(Frances Young, p. 30), it is considered unintelligible in our different context. Modern interpreters assert that since we have lost the Neo-Platonic basis on which patristic Christology was founded, we cannot go back to patristic sense of the God-Man. They wonder whether saying the same thing the Fathers said in the 4th and 5th centuries has the same meaning in the modern age quoting the aphorism "to say the same thing in a different age is to say something different". Secondly, what is the exact relationship between Kierkegaard's understanding of the God-Man and the New Testament conception, or conceptions, of Jesus? This question can be raised because of the historical-critical reading of the New Testament. Cf. Maurice Wiles, "Christianity Without Incarnation?," in The Myth of God Incarnate, pp. 3f.; Michael Goulder, "The Two Roots of the Christian Myth," in ibid., p. 65; and Don Cupitt, "The Jesus of Faith and the Christ of History," in The Myth/Truth of God Incarnate, pp. 2ff., 6. Thirdly, what would this man, Kierkegaard, have said today in the period after major biblical criticism? Would he change his view of Jesus, or would he stick to the belief that this individual human being (Jesus) is God? These questions are interesting and important for the proper

understanding of Kierkegaardian Christology, and in order to put his Christology in historical perspective. However, in this study, I cannot enter into discussion of these problems, because they are too major to be discussed in one part of this study; they require separate studies.

5. See, e.g., CUP, pp. 188f.; PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 65. One of the most extreme expressions about this phenomenon comes from Malcolm L. Diamond, "Kierkegaard and Apologetics," Journal of Religion (1964), p. 132.

6. For a good discussion of modern Christology from Kierkegaardian perspective, see Roberts, Faith, Reason, and History, pp. 30-41.

7. Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, I, p. 200.

8. Ibid., p. 33.

9. Jerry H. Gill, "Kant, Kierkegaard, and Religious Knowledge," in Essays on Kierkegaard, p. 66. For a good discussion of Hegelian monism, see Ussher, pp. 43f., 48f., 52; and Bonifazi, pp. 74f.

10. Cf. PAL, p. 151.

11. Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, pp. 88f., 130, n. 73.

12. For a study about Tillich's theology from Kierkegaardian perspective, see Hamilton, The System and the Gospel (London: SCM, 1963). For a good study about Bultmann's Theology from a similar perspective, see Robert C. Roberts, Rudolf Bultmann's Theology: A Critical Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Eerdman, 1976; London: SCM, 1977).

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